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Masculinity as Ideology in Modern Political Thought
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D
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Directed by:
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Professor Jean Bethke Elshtain

In this feminist reinterpretat ion of modern political

theory,

the works of Thomas Hobbes, J. S. Mill, and Karl

Marx are analyzed with

a

view to uncovering the gendered

dimensions of their thought.

I

argue that Western

political theory, as a male-dominated discipline, is also

gendered phenomenon.

Psychoanalytic object-relations

theory is invoked and used to provide the model for

masculine gender identity, which

treated as a

is

historically and culturally specific form of human
identity.

Masculinity is found to have had

impact on modern Western political theory.

subjectivity is seen to operate as

a

a

significant

Masculine

privileged but

unacknowledged standpoint which effectively writes women
out of many of the substantial concerns of political

VI 1

a

theory.

It

is analyzed as an ideology operating at
a

latent level in the discourse of political
theory, which

embodies, expresses and reproduces particular
interests.

I

invoke the term "world view" to analyze
masculinity as an
ideology characterized by a set of systematically

interconnected beliefs and attitudes which have

a

wide-ranging influence on the concerns of political
theory.

Several key issues emerge as points of focus:

the

political theorist's treatment of nature, necessity
and
freedom, his intellectual style, his methodology, his

assumptions about human nature and social relations, and
his prescriptions for the "good society".

This work

concludes with the argument that masculine ideology poses

significant obstacles to feminist efforts to situate women

within political theory.

Such efforts,

if

they are to

succeed at all, will have to be cognizant of the "masculine
imagination" in the discourse.
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INTRODUCTION

The thesis of this dissertation began as a hunch that
first took shape during the final months of my preparation
for the comprehensive examination in Contemporary Social

and Political Thought in the spring of 1979.
"put it all together"

— to

As

I

began to

look for useful points of

contrast and comparison between the great social
theorists

—

I

began to wonder about this tradition as an

essentially male-dominated one.

Surely,

I

thought,

there

must be ramifications which extend rather deeply and

un-self consciously in such a tradition.
How might

I

go about finding them?

What were they?

To what extent was my

own work and identity as a political theorist already

implicated in them?
My hunch began inchoately.

Gradually,

it assumed a

more definite shape, thanks to the critical resources of
social and political theory itself, along with the virtual

explosion of published work in Women's Studies and feminist
theory.

As

I

read and re-read the texts of political

theory, my identity and commitment as a feminist took

firmer and more complex shape as well.

Much of this was

due to the developing and myriad attempts by women to

develop specifically feminist analyses of and responses to

1

various issues:

significantly, the international arms

buildup and the threat of global nuclear
devastation, U.S.
imperialism, and domestic social welfare
issues,

including

racism,

violence against women and children,
unemployment,
environmental degradation, and social service
cutbacks.
I
must also mention the Women's Pentagon
Action, a group to
which I have been tangentially and vicariously
connected,

as an important shadow presence in this
work.

With the benefit of hindsight,

1

can now say that

I

I

have been engaged in a feminist hermeneutic of
sorts.
is,

have approached the texts of modern political theory

I

with

That

a

view to interpreting them in

a

way that reflects

both my own historical and social identity as a "woman"
and
what the texts themselves have to "say".

I

have been

simultaneously active and passive in this process:
"listening" attentively,
back".

I

"interpreting", and "talking

would like to characterize what follows in this

dissertation as

a

"conversation"

teasing, often deadly serious

fathers of

a

— sometimes

— with

tradition to which

I

playful and

the brothers and

am deeply and

irreversibly attached, even if uncomfortably so.
The claim put forth here is a modest and circumscribed
one.

It does not address directly many of the urgent

questions confronting social and political theory.
Nevertheless, this claim does seek to promote

a

new

interpretation of political theory which has potential

3

longer range implications for our casting of issues,

problems, and their solutions.

Specifically, this work

aims to enhance the critical self-understanding of those

who engage in the discursive practice of political theory
by highlighting the issue of gender,

a

phenomenon in which

we are all deeply implicated.

This study looks to the intersection of gender and

modern Western political theory with a view to uncovering
and elaborating a distinctive standpoint in that

discourse.

2
I

call that standpoint "masculine" and also

refer to it as an "ideology".

The latter term is used to

highlight the partial and determinate nature of this
outlook,

in addition to its deleterious effects on women.

Its determinate nature,

I

argue,

is located in

gender-differentiated patterns of human development.
"Masculine" is used to underscore the gendered aspects of
this mind-set.

thinking.)
sorts.

It

(There is no such thing as "male"
is also intended as a historical

label of

This study of gender and political theory, which

begins with Hobbes,

is

deliberately confined to that

segment of political theory labelled as "modern", produced
and inhabited by a subject who is conceived as the agent of

his fate.
This work is, like any other, susceptible to a number
of criticisms.

Some of them must remain as outstanding and

unresolved problems, at least for the present, either

4

because of my own limitations, or because of the

necessarily circumscribed nature of this project.

Others

I

hope to be able to address, at least in part, if not to
the
full satisfaction of potential and actual critics.

Insofar as

I

can make out, criticisms of this work are

likely to cluster around the following two issues.
first is the charge of formalism.
of reductionism.

substantive.

I

The

The other is the charge

Each criticism is formidable and
do not take either lightly.

While

I

cannot

hope to meet all of the objections which issue out of a

concern with these perceived interpretive tendencies,

I

do

aim to meet them at least part way and to keep the door

open for future revisions of this work in the light of such
cr i ticism.

The charge of formalism is compelling and serious.

This work may well be too engaged with the "text", to the

exclusion and detriment of

a

historical appreciation of its

embeddedness in social, political and cultural phenomena.
The tendency to ignore history is one of the constitutional

hazards of the trade for those of us who do not do "the

history of political theory" per se.

That is,

those of us

who approach political theory as a "living tradition"

3

do

not read these texts for their historical interest only, or

even primarily.

We do not compare and contrast them simply

with respect to their historically-specific contents and
meanings.

Rather, we set up "conversations" between

5

theorists that never in fact existed, and we appropriate
and apply various problematics and insights from
these

works to the contemporary landscape as we see it.

Sometimes we try to imagine how a Machiavelli, or a
Rousseau, or a Hegel would respond to the issues and

dilemmas of our time.

absurd exercise.

"Historically" speaking, this is an

Why do we do it?

Because we have to.

Because we cannot help but establish generational links

with the thinkers of old.

Because we need to understand

who we are in relation to who we think they were. This kind
of activity in political theory also enables a sense of

perspective and multiple vision that would otherwise be
unavailable to us.

It continues a conversation that is,

strictly speaking, undoable, because the old boys are dead
and long gone.

But it contains the promise of newly

discovered perspectives on our own historically-specific
"ways of seeing".

It may also engender a more developed

historical appreciation for the roots of our political
thinking in the present, and for the peculiarities of our
vision.

Whether or not he intended to do so (and, of

course, he did not), Hobbes has something to say about the

socio-political aftermath of

a

nuclear war.

His state of

nature lurks in that scenario and enables us to ponder its

horror with additional clarity and fewer illusions than we
might otherwise have.

There is nothing "historical" about

this appropriation of Hobbes (unless we wish to work out

6

the parallels between the England of the Civil
Wars and

post-nuclear war world), but it

is,

I

a

would argue, a

legitimate and useful one.
What are we doing when we go back to the texts of

political theory?

This is a complicated question.

Certainly, we can read them as "historically specific"

primary source documents.

This is edifying and important

work; certainly we need to take account of it.

But this

approach does not exhaust the full range of possibilities.
We can,

indeed we must, give these texts contemporary

readings,

readings that could not possibly have been

available to the original theorists. 4

When we do this,

we are simultaneously attempting a reading of the text "on
its own terms",

effects,

even as we are judging the "quality of the

in us as readers".

5

Those of us who are

feminist readers are "stuck" with this approach.
no other.

We can do

The only alternative (and it is an alternative

that some feminists have chosen) is to ignore the

discursive male-dominated traditions of our culture.

This

alternative flies in the face of our structurat ion as
"women".

It is an idealist flight of fancy.

All of this is a roundabout way of getting to two

points that

I

wish to make in response to the charge that

this work is formalist.

The first is that

I

am not at all

sure what would be gained by invoking and reiterating the

historical background of the political theorists under

7

consideration in this study.

Of course this background is

important to understanding their work.

am aware of it

I

and often cite such material in my chapters.
hand,

I

On the other

have sought to highlight the gendered aspects of

each theorist's imagination and work.

There is nothing in

the explanatory claims of my approach which is exclusive.
As

I

argue,

this is one way, among others

these theorists.

,

of interpreting

The historical background which is most

appropriate to this line of analysis

is that of

family

history and relations between the sexes along with any
intellectual history that highlights the gendered aspects
of intellectual frameworks.

To date, the former offers

more tangible information than the latter. While family

history has certainly undergone changes in the period we
could roughly characterize as 1600-1900, this period is
also cohesive in many respects.

Significantly,

it

witnessed the emergence and solidification of the modern
nuclear family and scientific "rationality".

When we look at Western history as feminists, we are
faced with two wildly divergent possibilities for

analysis.

On the first view,

it

is tempting to view that

history as an unbroken sequence of sexism, misogyny and
patriarchy.

When we view the treatment of women in ancient

Greece (both actually and in the hands of the
philosophers),

for example,

it is difficult to resist the

temptation to situate such treatment on

a

line of continuum

8

that extends into the present.

On the second view,

our

sensibilities as women may incline us to look for
the
varieties and particularities of "different"
experiences on
the basis of cultural, ethnic, historical,
religious
and

other factors.

We know what it feels like to not be

understood on our own terms, and we hesitate to foist
grand
interpretive schemes onto others.
view are obvious:

The dangers of the first

it flattens out the significant

diversity and complexity of human experience.

The second

view, however,

the

issues in another problematic:

inability to theorize about meaningful patterns of human
interpretation, belief, behavior and action.
Based on my reading and interpretation of history to
date, gender between 1600 and 1900 in the West constitutes
a meaningful enough pattern to be used in fairly constant

ways.

While they share many significant differences,

Hobbes, J.S. Mill and Marx share

a

gendered imagination.

This is what my interpretation seeks to illuminate.

The

historical terrain upon which this interpretation

based

is,

I

admit, a contested one.

is

As such, and to date,

it

no less secure than the position of those who call for

periodization of gender that
from the one which

I

is

is
a

significantly different

employ.

My second point has to do with the interpretation of
texts.

Do texts exist independently of their readers?

there "a text"?

My definitive answer is:

yes and no.

Is

Certainly, the text can be said to exist
independently of
its readers.
On the other hand, we can only know
it

through the interpretations that we and others
bring to
and that it appears to elicit on its own.

I

it

would suggest

that while "the text" can admit of a multiplicity of

readings, this is not to say that all interpretations are

always equally valid.

We need to be able to judge the

adequacy and helpfulness of interpretations.

I

would agree

that it is fundamentally incorrect to view the text "like
an autonomous and functionally fully competent

organism."

6

On the other hand,

amorphous collection of words.
authorship.

I

it is not simply an

We need to respect

do not ally myself with those who think that

authors can be dispensed with as the inconsequential

conduits of the text.

Writing is simply too arduous, too

labor-intensive, to admit of this approach.

This does not,

however, mean that the activity of "reading into" or

"rereading" is illegitimate.

To understand something on

its own terms is often to condone it.

others,

For feminists, among

the injunction against "reading into" is both

deceptive and overly restrictive:

"But if we do not

reread, we shall go unread, bees who drone on while spiders

spin their webs."

7

What does all of this mean for the charge of
formalism?

I

do focus on the texts (and, to a lesser

extent, on the authors of those texts.)

In many ways,

.

10

these texts have taken on

life of their own in the

a

discursive activity of political theory.

As

I

texts have some interesting things to tell
us.

display what
not?

I

believe is

argue,

They

gendered imagination.

a

these

And why

All are situated in the context of modern
gendered

Western society.

All are written by "men".

formalism, so be it.

I

If this

is

am offering a textual

interpretation that certainly admits of
linking up with history.

a

more direct

But this dissertation is a finite

limited project, like any other.

If

history or biography

is less developed here than some would like,

its absence

does not pose a fundamental, devastating criticism of the

legitimacy of my interpretation.

Instead,

I

would assess

such criticism as an invitation to further development and

explorat ion
And now for the charge of reductionism.

This is, of

course, one of the hazards of applying psychoanalytic

theory to anything that is larger than the individual
patient.

I

am certainly not the only one to have found

this theory compelling and full of explanatory power,

particularly with respect to the entrenched power and
pervasiveness of gender.

However, there are many who do

not find this theory compelling, or even mildly

interesting.
at least,

This gap is one that,

is intractable.

I

for the time being

do not expect to convince

anyone of the appropriateness or usefulness of

11

psychoanalytic theory in this work.
theory in a heuristic fashion.

Instead,

I

use this

It provides the

taken-for-granted starting point of this analysis.

As

such, psychoanalysis is the "blind spot" of my

interpretation.

To engage systematically with all of the

criticisms of this method would make the analysis itself
impossible.

We must all start somewhere; and our starting

points do not admit of perfect, airtight certitude.

Something must be taken for granted somewhere, if we are
going to get started at all.
I

believe, and am prepared to argue, along with Sandra

Harding and a multitude of others that "of all social

characteristics, gender is the earliest to be solidified in
the individual,

the hardest to change, and the most

inextricably connected with how we conceptualize and relate
to ourselves, to others, and to nature."

9

When

I

invoke

gender as a necessary constituent of identity and thought
in the modern world,

I

do not mean that it produces

predictable and virtually similar outcomes in gendered
subjects.

For example,

I

can acknowledge the power of

gender in my own sense of identity, even as

I

do not fit

the standard mold of the "feminine personality".

What this

means is that all individuals interpret, mediate and even

transform the substance and constructs of identity in

particular and sometimes unique ways.

On the other hand,

we do not do this in wildly divergent ways.

To a

12

significant extent, we are embedded in "ways
of life" that
set practical and cognitive limits on our
abilities
to

'fight the system'.

The terms of opposition and collusion

are necessarily colored by the substance of our
revolt or

acquiescence.

Why is it reduct ioni st ic to suggest that

Marx's intellectual style contains traces of the self-other

oppositional stance between male child and mother?

Or that

his account of class relations, like that of Hegel's Master
and Slave, sounds an awful lot like a particular stage of

separation-indi viduation that inclines to a dualistic view
of radically opposed yet connected entities?

I

am

certainly not advancing this interpretation at the expense
of all others,

e.g., a historical study of the notion of

"dialectics".

I

do not claim any kind of exclusive or

primary explanatory power for my interpretation.

It

is,

I

would argue, one among a number of interpretive accounts
that we can and must utilize.

The terrain that

complex one.

If

I

I

have attempted to map out here is

a

have put blinders on, confining myself

to textual interpretation and a psychoanalytic

understanding of gender, it has been in the interests of
securing some foothold in the location of the intersection
of gender and modern Western political theory.

To suggest

that such an intersection must exist is not implausible.
To go looking for it is something more than a wild goose

chase.

What turns out to be almost incomprehensible and in

13

need of some explanation is that we have
failed, until
recently, to reflect on the possible modalities
and

implications of such an intersection.
Finally,

I

should like to point out that this work is

not intended to be a specific substantive contribution
to

feminist theory.

That is,

the aims of the work are

modestly confined to the intersection of gender and modern
political theory in the work of three political theorists.
As such, many issues are left unaddressed.

attempting to do here is

a

All

am

I

documentation and substantiation

of the claim that modern political theory is a gendered

phenomenon.

I

would hope and expect, of course, that this

analysis will help us to produce better feminist theory and
better political theory in the future.
The organization of the dissertation is as follows:

Chapter

I

I

In

explore the issue of sexual and gender

differences with several aims in mind.

I

want to establish

the plausibility and significance of gender-differentiated

experience and consciousness.

I

want to locate

my

position on the female-feminine side of that divide.

And

I

want to tentatively explore the hazards and promises of a
focus on "difference".

A feminist politics of difference,

confusing and problematic as it

is,

has been the impetus of

this work.

Chapter II is an elaboration of the notion of

masculinity as ideology.

It provides the theoretical and

methodological foundation, drawn in large
measure from
psychoanalytic theory, for the subsequent
examination and
interpretation of Hobbes, J.S. Mill, and
Marx.
Chapters
III, IV and V are devoted to each
theorist, respectively.
Finally, in Chapter VI I sum up the
main insights of the
previous three chapters and seek to apply
them to the topic
of gender and political theory.
Many of these
ideas are

necessarily speculative and open-ended.

They require

further practice and application.

Material which is relevant and suggestive for
the

analysis of masculinity as ideology in modern
political
theory, but not amenable to direct inclusion, has
been

organized into two Appendixes.

The first provides an

examination and anticipation of some of the theoretical
trouble-spots associated with the attempt to read gender
back into history.

It

provides a background defense of the

analysis of gender and political theory developed in the
main body of the dissertation.

Those who are immediately

sceptical of my enterprise for historical reasons, or

because of

a

distrust of psychoanalytic theory and

psycho-history, are urged to begin with this first
Appendix.

In the second,

I

explore several attempts on the

part of some French feminists to articulate

politics of difference.
unorthodox and eclectic.

a

theory and

This material is fascinating,
I

believe that it offers tangible

clues for a more creative use of language in political

15

theory.

While

I

am not yet ready to integrate the

stylistic and substantive aspects of this unique
discours e
into my work as a political theorist, I want
to acknowledg e
its powerful presence in the "subconscious"
of this study.

The evaluative criteria which may and ought to be

applied to this interpretive study are necessarily complex
or "mushy", depending upon one's epistemological

standpoint.

Clear-cut demonstrations of proof or empirical

invalidation will not work here.

There is no way in which

the analysis to follow is susceptible to evaluation in

terms of air-tight, exclusionary proofs.

In any case,

I

have no desire to proffer a singular explanation which
excludes or supercedes all others.

Instead,

I

would invoke

the criterion of "plausibility", defined by Richard Sennett
as "a matter of showing the logical connections among

phenomena which can be described concretely." 10
is to provide a reasonable analysis,

My aim

one capable of

highlighting a hitherto unexamined dimension of political
theory

— an

gender.

11

ideological standpoint constituted in terms of

Criticism of this work ought to be capable of

accounting for the interpretation offered here in terms of
an alternative logic (and even this type of criticism would

not necessarily undermine the validity of my

interpretation), or of indicating that the interpretation
does not merit attention because its implications are

inconsequential for the proper and contemporary concerns of

.

political and social theorists.

For reasons that ought to

become obvious in the course of this analysis,
if they have
not been made so in this introduction, I
believe that this
study touches on many of the most gripping
problems that we
f ace
As this work nears completion,

developments merit brief mention:

several political
the defeat of the Equal

Rights Ammendment for women; successful and growing

attempts to curtail reproductive freedom; the stubborn
intransigence,

if not escalation,

of racism,

sexism,

homophobia, and national chauvinism; an increasingly
aggressive, arrogant and destructive foreign policy in

Central America (otherwise known as "our back yard"); and
an impending Presidential election that threatens to turn

the democratic "choice" of the American voter into an

absolute farce.

Now more than ever,

it seems,

the

political pessimism of the Frankfurt School, especially
that of Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, has been

vindicated.

Few glimmers of hope exist.

them for all that they can yield.

one such glimmer.

I

We must nourish

Feminism,

I

believe, is

hope that this work will enable it to

shine a bit more brightly.

.

,

FOOTNOTES

See Rhoda Linton and Michele Whitham, "With
Mourning Rage, Empowerment and Defiance: The 1981
Women's
Pentagon Actions," in Socialist Review 12 (3-4),
pp. 11-26.
For all of the sophisticated theoretical work
that
has been done on "praxis", I have yet to reconcile
what
feels like a distinct contradiction between "theory"
and
"practice".
It always seems as if one must take place at
the expense of the other.
The absence of a forthright
discussion of this issue among political theorists who
consider themselves to be "radical" never ceases to amaze
me

.

2I

am most indebted to Nancy Hartsock's work on the
feminist standpoint for jogging and helping to solidify my
thinking during the early and difficult stages of this
work.
She was generous enough to share her paper with me
several years before its publication.
See "The Feminist
Standpoint:
Developing the Ground for a Specifically
Feminist Historical Materialism," in Discovering Reality:
Feminist Perspectives on Epistemology Metaphysics,
Methodology, and Philosophy of Science eds
Sandra
Harding and Merrill B. Hintikka (Dordrecht, Boston and
London:
D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1983), pp. 283-310.
,

,

.

3 I understand that
historians of political theory
such as John Gunnell might disagree with this way of
putting it, but this is how it looks and feels to me. Cf.
John Gunnell, Political Theory: Tradition and
Interpretation (Cambridge, Ma.
Winthrop Publishers
1979)
:

4 For an appreciation and exploration of this point
on the part of a feminist historian, see Susan Schibanoff,
"Comment on Kelly's 'Early Feminist Theory and the Querelle
des Femmes, 1400-1789'," in Signs: Journal of Women in
320-326.
Culture and Society 9 (2):

^Wayne C. Booth, "Freedom of Interpretation:
Bakhtin and the Challenge of Feminist Criticism," in The
(Chicago
W.J.T. Mitchel
Politics of Interpretation ed
The University of Chicago Press, 1982), p. 66.
and London:
,

.

6 John

The
Mepham, "From the Grundr isse to Capital
Making of Marx's Method," in Issues in Marxist Philosophy,
vol. 1 Dialectics and Method, eds. John Mepham and D-H.
:

17

)

18
6 (cont'd Ruben
(Atlantic Highlands, N.J.
Humanities Press, 1979), p. 146.
7 Schibanoff,

"Comment on Kelly," p,

:

322.

8<

9 Sandra

Harding, "Is Gender a
in
Conceptions of Rationality? A Survey Variable
of Issues " in Ro
1 98 3

)

Ynrt
York:

49

p.

,

(Totawa, N.J.:

,

m

Kowman and Allanheld,

10 Richard Sennett,
The Fall of Public Man
Random House, 1974), p. 43.

(New

1 As happ
s to most of us who think
^,
doing originalf^ work, someone invariably that we are
emerges on the
scene that we thought was singularly inhabited.
As I
discovered about three quarter's of the way
through
this
work, Jane Flax has been involved with many
of the issues
explored here. Her notion of "the patriarchal
unconsciousis similar to what I have described as a
"deep structure"
of masculine ideology.
We are both engaged with the texts
of political theory.
See her "Political Philosophy and the
Patriarchal Unconscious: A Psychoanalytic Perspective
on
S
m ° l0gY and Met aphysics," in Discovering Re ality,
pp.
??r
245—281
!,

^

.

.

.

CHAPTER

I

THE PROBLEM AND POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE:

TOWARD A RADICAL COMPARATISM

Throughout history people have knocked their heads
against the riddle of the nature of feminity ....
Nor will you have escaped worrying over this
problem those of you who are men; to those of you who
are women this will not apply—you are yourselves the
problem
Sigmund Freud, "Femininity"

—

To blunder over the fundamental problem of 'man and
woman', to deny here the most abysmal antagonism and
the necessity of an eternally hostile tension, perhaps
to dream here of equal rights, equal education, equal
claims and duties:
this is a typical sign of
shallow-mindedness and a thinker who has proved
himself to be shallow on this dangerous point shallow
of instinctl
may be regarded as suspect in general,
more, as betrayed, as found out:
he will probably be
too 'short' for all the fundamental questions of life,
those of life in the future too, incapable of any depth.
Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil
,

—

—

It would seem to follow as an indisputable fact that
"we"
meaning by "we" a whole made up of body, brain

—

and spirit, influenced by memory and tradit ion— must
still differ in some essential respects from "you",
whose body, brain and spirit have been so differently
trained and are so differently influenced by memory and
tradition.
Though we see the same world, we see it
through different eyes. Any help we can give you must
be different from that you can give yourselves, and
perhaps the value of that help may lie in the fact of
that difference.
Virginia Woolf, Three Guineas

The enigma of sex differences, baffling and haunting in
its persistence through the ages,

to the enigma of Woman.

is also centrally related

Both share a history of treatment

19

20

marked by powerfully ambivalent attitudes,
ranging from
contempt and fear to inspiration and desire.
Each

has also

been the product of a male imagination.

In most cases,

sexual difference is predicated on Woman's
distinctiveness

from the male norm.

Commenting on "the peculiar

epistemology of sex differences" in the contemporary
literature on sex role research, Sandra Wallman writes,
"it
is as though membership in the female sex class
constitutes
a

role, but membership in the male sex class does not." 1

Simone de Beauvoir made a similar observation in her

Introduction to The Second Sex

,

where she wrote:

of being a man is not a peculiarity";

saying that he is a man." 2

"the fact

"it goes without

Man as man has not qualified

for enigmatic status, persistent dilemmas of the human

condition notwithstanding.

Freud's reference to the

"riddle" of Woman is an apt and powerfully tangible

expression of this phenomenon. 3

Yet,

even as the riddle

persists, Freud has been proven wrong on at least one
count:

the riddle is now pondering herself.

The specific form that the formulation of the problem
of sexual difference has taken in the West indicates on the

one hand the currently acknowledged and criticized equation

between the generic and the masculine, and on the other,
women's generalized status as the Other.
de Beauvoir:

In the words of

"Woman thus seems to be the inessential who

never goes back to being the essential,
to be the absolute
Other, without reciprocity." 4
It is the specter of

Woman— unique, different

and mysterious,

in the eyes of

men—that prompts questions of differences and riddles
the first place.

in

Thus formulated, the question of

difference overtly protects, even as it covertly threatens,
the male subject as an "absolute human type."

The remarkable tenacity of the theme of sexual

difference

—a

persistent strain throughout various

historical chronicles of human culture— is worth noting,
along with its frequent thematic cohort, the Dangerous
Woman.

5

Anthropologists have recounted myths of

primordial single-sex tribes from which men and women

subsequently living together in an uneasy alliance are
regarded as the direct descendants.

We read of

elaborate rituals and taboos highlighting cross-sex

pollution dangers, along with accounts of social

organization which often segregate men from women and young
children.

7

The sexual division of labor, of course,

is a

persistent feature of nearly all forms of socio-economic
organization.

Several myths pose an authoritarian and

whimsical matriarchy as the original ruling structure,

subsequently overthrown by men who must preserve their
fragile rule through secrecy and careful dealings with
o

women.

Themes of difference and danger lurk behind

proposals for safe and harmonious social arrangements

22

between the sexes.

All of which suggests that concern
with

sexual difference is a basic and
powerful feature of the
human condition.

Jumping ahead to the contemporary fling
with androgyny,
we might invoke the adage "where there's
smoke, there's
fire," to note the persistence of concern
with
issues of

sexual difference in our own age.

In the realm of

contemporary literature, creative fiction accounts
of
all-female societies, androgynous worlds, and sex-change

experiments attest to this recurring preoccupation. 9
Informed by a related set of what if

.

.

.

?-type

questions, these literary forays play with imaginative

possibilities that strain the limits of credibility as they
provide unique critical pespectives on the
taken-f or-grantedness of sexual arrangements in modern

everyday life.

And the words of one feminist

— "Men and
professor," 10 — signal
protagonist

women live on different planets,
an important new trend within

feminist inquiry, as they hark back to those earlier myths
of primordial single-sex tribes.

Originally the bugaboo of the "Second Wave" of the
feminist movement in the United States, difference has been

reinserted into the vocabulary of feminist discourse; it is
no longer a dirty word.

While the manipulation and gross

exaggeration of sexual difference was correctly perceived
by many feminists of the 1960

problem,

's

and early 70

'

s

as a central

the corresponding political and theoretical

impulse to abolish difference altogether
was misconceived.
Many of the proposed feminist
solutions to the problem of
sexual inequality, construed as being
identical
to the

issue of difference, were crudely
simplistic and

dangerously instrumental.
Firestone,

for example,

In the hands of Shulamith

the problem of di

ff

erence-as-

inequality was reduced to the biology of
reproduction and
"resolved" through future projections of the
technological
appropriation of pregnancy and childbirth. 11
Liberation
became a vision of denatured people. Such is
the likely
outcome of a conception of equality posed in
opposition to

difference-as-inequality-on-the-basis-of biology.
In the attempt to give up difference,

feminists almost

lost a crucial critical tool for analysis and practice.
For a time,

emulate men.

the reigning assumption was that women should

Little thought was given to how the social

order might or ought better accomodate women.

Policy

prescriptions were oriented toward minimizing those
liabilities that women as women tended to shoulder.

And

feminist sex role research was designed to prove that

difference was nothing more than culturally contrived
attempts to keep women from competing with men.
"anything you can do

I

The

can do better" theme caricatures the

revolt from difference that inspired much research,

designed to reveal the ultimately arbitrary nature of sex
differences.

What was lost in the flurry of research and

3

rhetoric, however, was any sense of or
interest in the
uniquely critical role that women, in the
name of

difference, might be able to assume.
Still,

it

is worth reminding ourselves of
the still

powerful equation between difference and hostility
to
women, exemplified in the Nietzsche excerpt
above. 12

His

articulated fears of "betrayal" and "exposure" were
indeed
well-founded.
at his word.
us here,

The mistake, however, would be to take him
(Nietzsche,

I

believe,

is trying to

provoke

by rendering explicit a misogynist attitude in

Western philosophy of which he was acutely and brilliantly
aware.)

Ironically,

it has been precisely through the

investigation, rather than the denial of "that abysmal

antagonism" that masculine standards have been rendered
more open to criticism.

A significant shift has been

effected from the desire to emulate men to

a

calling into

question of the masculine paradigms of success, excellence,
identity, and "deep" thinking.

Some feminist critics have

gone so far as to analyze masculinity as an outmoded and

perhaps even dangerous construct. 1

It

is

this

possibility, embedded within Nietzsche's observation, that
signals in part the new critical import of

difference.

a

return to

He understood all too well the fragility of a

masculine identity premissed on the repression and fear of
women.

The critical question for feminists today is

whether such repression and its parade of symptoms are to

8

7

be undone through the denial or
articulation of difference.
While these issues are significant
within the context
of the development of contemporary
feminist theory in the

West it would be mistaken and arrogant to
presume that
today's feminists are the first to have
grappled with the
theme of difference.
Margaret Fuller's Woman
in the

Nineteenth Century, written in 1844,

is an

historical touchstone in this respect.

important

Her observation

that "the idea of Man, however imperfectly brought
out, has

been far more so than that of Woman,

1,14

could have, and

perhaps did, serve as the guiding inspiration for the

Women's Studies programs developed in the 1970
arguing for equality in non-negotiable terms

's.

— "We

While
would

have every path laid open to Woman as freely as to
Man,"

— she

15

also demonstrated a faith and pride in what

she termed "the feminine side".

Eschewing "the hard

intellectuality of the merely mannish mind," 16 Fuller

celebrated those uniquely feminine attributes which she
named variously as "poetical",
and "magnetic".

not,

1

."

1

"electrical",

"Let it not be said, wherever there is

energy or creative genius,
mind

"intuitive",

'She has a masculine

To have the same rights and opportunities did

for Fuller,

emulate men.

mean that women should or would want to

Invoking

nature that "seems to delight in

a

varying the arrangements, as if to show that she [sic] will
be fettered by no role,

1
"

Fuller was comfortable with

26

difference, between and among the sexes.

In spite of her

crudely formulated—as she herself admitted—
dualistic

classification of Energy/Harmony, Power/Beauty, and
Intellect/Love, signifying the twofold growth of the
human

being as a creature with masculine and feminine attributes,
she was insistent, as Freud subsequently was,

that these

characteristics were not symmetrically and strictly

distributed between the sexes.

"Male and female represent

the two sides of the great radical dualism.

But,

they are perpetually passing into one another.

hardens to solid, solid rushes to fluid.

in fact,

Fluid

There is no

wholly masculine man, no purely feminine woman." 19
Above all, her reflections on the unique contribution
that a feminine sensibility might offer the heretofore

male-identified intellect are subsequently echoed in the
works of various feminists pondering the unique

contributions of women to culture.

We are reminded of

Margaret Fuller in the works of Virginia Woolf, Adrienne
Rich,

and Julia Kristeva, to name a few. 20

passage,

.

.

The following

for example, describes a typically feminine way of

seeing and knowing which has more recently resurfaced as an

inquiry within social science research and psycho-

analytically-based theorizing.

Fuller here is describing

the "field dependent" woman of social science studies, the

psychoanalytic female subject (often characterized as

a

narcissist) with more loosely constructed ego boundaries,

V
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who is more closely attuned to the
intersub ject ive nuances
of her environment:

^

e
ri a1
ma
element in Woman has never
b^n fully £brought out 9 netic
been
in any period.
Everythinq miaht
This is commonly expressed by saying
that her
intuitions are more rapid and more
correct. You will
often see men of high intellect
absolutely stupid in
atmOS P heric changes, the fine invisible
wi?
links which
connect the forms of life around them,
while common women
will seize and delineate these
with unerring discrimination.21

^i

'

^

.

.

.

Her insistence on the mutual enrichment
of the

intellect and the emotions, in vital dialogue
with each
other, bridges those infamous Mind/Body,
rational/

irrational divisions that, in collusion with
assertions of
sexual difference, have been so instrumental in
legitimizing
the social and intellectual inferiority of women
with

respect to men. 22
rule

....

"Nature provides exceptions to every

She [sic] enables people to read with the top

of the head, and see with the pit of the stomach." 23

In

her acknowledgement of a rich multiplicity of ways of

seeing and knowing, including the cravings of the heart and
the vision of the stomach,

Fuller celebrates "unison in

variety, congeniality in difference."

Above all, her

work carries the hope that the claim to difference need not
exact the price of social and political equality.

Fuller's work, however,

is

the exception to a more

pervasive rule, one which appears incapable of invoking
difference without summoning the specter of inequality.

In

the contemporary vein of social
scientific inquiry, most
accounts of sex differences fall into
one of two

explanatory modes:

nature or culture is identified as the

singular cause/precipitating factor of such
differences.
This binary habit has served to distort the
issue at hand
in the search for overly simple and neat
answers.

It also

plays into and out of the very style of thinking which
has

rendered difference so troublesome for women.
The most glaring shortcoming of the nature/culture

dichotomized construct is that it fails to deal with the
nagging fact that what is called nature is itself a
construct of culture and that there is nothing inherently

unnatural about culture.

As the philosopher Mary Midgely

points out in her exploration of conceptions of human
nature, culture is eminently natural in the sense that all

human societies create culture.

25

Additionally, social

scientific attempts to distinguish between the methods and
subject matter of the social and natural sciences have

resulted in an inflated dependence on the concept of social
role,

to the near-exclusion and detriment of biology,

the

life of the body, and inherited psychosomatic dispositons.
If naturalistic explanations for women's "inferiority"

relative to men smack of a barely disguised transition from

magico-relig ious to pseudo-scientific explanation, overly
socialized explanations fail to do justice to an

understanding of the human creature as an embodied, carnal,

29

desiring and sometimes irrational being.

Clearly, such

accounts also fail to grant human agency
significance.
Furthermore, and in an ironically reversed twist,

oversocialized conceptions of human beings, their
histories
and cultures, yield a deeply pessimistic
account of human
events.

2G

This is particularly troublesome in the

attempt to understand the widespread devaluation and

oppression of women.

For the oversocialized account of the

history of relations between the sexes leaves us with two
unsatisfactory and ultimately unsocial socialization
accounts:

Either men function predominantly as brutes, or

women tend to be wimpy victims.

This brings us full

circle, back to a natural accounting.

Overly socialized accounts of sex differences,
motivated by an interest in breaking the stranglehold of

ostensibly naturalized and therefore powerfully entrenched
versions of sexual differences, may be assessed as

responses to the perceived and popular equation of

difference as inequality.

The feminist response to

difference construed in these terms takes one of two
forms:

Difference is denied; or it is reappropriated to

the tune of "different is better".

27

Both examples

indicate the ways in which difference acts as

a

powerful

/

entree to the discussion of equality and relations of
rights and obligations between men, women and the societies

which they inhabit.

This persistent association between
difference and

inequality-used by feminists and misogynists
alike to
justify women's superiority or inferiority
relative to
men— suggests that contemporary Western
culture has
terrific difficulty with the category
of difference.
it is
as if everything must be categorized
and then placed
on an

abstract continuum of rank with respect
to some central
2
anchoring point.
Difference as such cannot be
ft

accomodated, or even left alone, but must
instead be

transposed into some evaluative frame of
reference.
Several thinkers have probed this issue and
themes relating
to it with a marvelous blend of intuitive and
analytic
insight.

Their mistakes are as instructive as their

achievements.

We will explore the work of Simone de

Beauvoir, the grand theoretician of women's otherness in

a

male-dominated world, and then move on to consider an essay
by Robert Paul Wolff which raises more questions that it

answers about the inability of liberal political theory to

accomodate difference.

Mary Midgely's philosophical

inquiry into human nature conceptions will be used as

critical counterpoint to de Beauvoir and Wolff.

a

The

purpose of this examination is to flesh out some of the
issues at stake in the difference-inequality association,

along with several critical attempts to effect a divorce.

Mary Midgely's philosophical inquiry into human nature

conceptions in Western philosophy and the social sciences

.
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probes the rarely questioned positive
definition of human
beings in contrast to negatively conceived
animal life. We
are "after all,

a

primate species, not

a

brand of machine

or disembodied intellect," protests Midgely. 29
to Midgely,

According

the man-as-opposed-to-animals construct turns

on a major feat of denial—our own animal i ty— and
leads to
a

skewed version of human dignity and worth, established
in

contradistinction to the realm of Nature.

In contrast to

de Beauvoir's invocation of existent ially conceived human

action and dignity residing in the arena of Transcendence,

Midgely asserts that "Our dignity arises within nature, not
against it." 30

She has taken a clear stand against

philosophical and moral accounts which seek to sever the
"essential" man from the "inessential" contingencies of

everyday life, otherwise known as brutish existence or, in
Sartre's term, as the realm of Immanence.

For Midgely,

"we cannot dismiss our emotions and the rest of our

non-intellectual nature, along with the body and the earth
it is fitted for,

as alien,

contingent stuff.

We have

somehow to operate as a whole, to preserve the continuity
of our being

31

This continuity is evinced as much in language and

ethics as it is in parenthood or sexuality.

"Speech makes

sense only for a species that is already constantly

communicating by expressive movement."

32

The deep and

evident relationship between words and the way they are

spoken prompts Midgely to conceive
of language in terms of
a meaning system rather than
as the printed and abstract
word.
A too abstract notion of language
obscures
the

continuity of language with other ways
of communicating,
which, by the way, we can also observe
in other animals.
And she locates the basis for morality
in the

"weak, but

genuine" instinctual inhibitions, which
include self -and
species-preservation and empathy for fellow
creatures.
In
contrast to the man-as-opposed-to-animal and
-nature

foundation for morality, Midgely argues that
"the claims of
reason must be made good, if at all, within
the boundaries
of human life itself." 33
This terrain of human
life

necessarily embraces the life of the body, including
those
regenerative activities that keep bodies healthy and happy
and meet our needs for emotional care, security and
love.
"We are not,

and do not need to be, disembodied

intellects.

We are creatures of a definite species on this

planet, and this shapes our values." 34

identification of

a

The exclusive

"real" self with soul or intellect,

those faculties apparently absent in animals, has produced

limited and skewed versions not only of human life, but of

animal life as well.

Furthermore, such definitions come to

resemble a kind of unsteady holding pattern:
the irrational and the carnal

especially unpredictable

— dangerous,

— persistently

encroaches from the outside.

the realm of

evil and

threatens and

One cannot fail to note the

33

parallels between depictions of this
irrational realm and
cultural treatments of women and the
feminine in the West.
Not surprisingly,

they have often issued in portrayals
of

women as being intellectually and morally
deficient
relative to men.
It is precisely these parallels

that de

Beauvoir's genius identified and sought to
render explicit.
The Second Sex is an important, brilliant
work
that is

simultaneously shot through with unresolved problems.

A

measure of its continuing importance to feminist theory
is
the critical attention that it elicits from feminist

scholars thirty years after its publication. 35

heart of its problematic genius is

a

At the

bundle of dilemmas and

contradictions which can be located in two aspects of the
work:

the first is de Beauvoir's use of Sartre's

existentialism, a method and outlook that is ultimately
hostile, as we will see, to her feminist enterprise; the

second is the very ambivalence of the subject under

consideration.

The formulation of Woman as Other, while

capitivating and exceedingly useful, persistently begs the
question, Other than what?
"what"

— male

It turns out that the

subjectivity and existence

than its otherness.

— is

easier to grasp

As the Other, woman is negatively

implicated in "the transcended ground of the ontology of
the individual male existent."

Unfortunately, de

Beauvoir fails to scrutinize this ground sufficiently.
"[H]umanity is male and and defines woman not in

herself but relative to him," 37
wrote de Beauvoir. While
this is a potent and critical
observation, it fails-as
does the work as the whole-to
consider whether women might
not have unique modes of defining
themselves which elude
male observation and definition.
Woman as such does not
exist in her own right within de
Beauvoir 's frame
of

analysis.

We can only know her, grasp
her as the Other,

for

"She is defined and differentiated
with reference to
man and not he with reference to
her; she is the

incidental, the inessential as opposed
to the essential.
He is the Subject, he is the
Absolute— she
is the

Other." 38

De Beauvoir's critical acuity
was to plumb the

depths of this pervasive otherness, to
pursue it

relentlessly; her failure was to prematurely
resolve
feminine negativity into the existing masculine
terms of
positive identity and subjectivity.

Sartre's existentialism, especially as we find it
in
Being an d Nothingness

,

depicts an ethics that is

super-individualistic, transcendent, anti-slime, and
rationalist.

These key concepts play

a

powerful role in de

Beauvoir's work and ultimately undermine her feminist
project.

Here is Sartre attempting to define the symbolic

relationship between certain physical qualities and their
moral counterparts:
The slimy is docile.
Only at the very moment when I
believe that I possess it, behold by a curious
reversal, it possesses me.
Here appears its essential

character; its softness is leech-like
It is a soft, yielding action,
a moist and feminine
llve ?. obscurely under my fingers, and
I
TJ^lll
v
sense it like
a dizziness; it draws me to
it as the
bottom of a precipice might draw me ...
slime is
6 °f
In " itself
A sickly-sweet, feminine
revenge!??
.

.

'

^

^

.

'

This language and mind-set has clearly
had its impact on
The Second Sex, particularly in de
Beauvoir's use of the
concepts of Transcendence and Immanence.
We also find it
in her discussion of female biology,
where the revenge of

the In-itself takes its full toll on
women.

The problem, as de Beauvoir sees it,

is that women have

been unfairly consigned to the natural realm
of Immanence.
Woman are immured in natural processes, whereas
men

transcend brute existence through feats of projection.

Transcendence is the activity which purportedly creates
uniquely human values.

Notice that this existential frame

poses an essential dualism of the human condition, torn

between "mere" existence, which we share with animal life,
and a loftier Being-f or-Itself

.

De Beauvoir assumes this

dualistic and hierarchical frame and then goes on to point
out that men and women occupy opposing sides of the

polarity.

Her complaint is that women have been denied

their full share of transcendental humanity.

become stuck in

a

Women have

pattern of co-starring as Other to man's

Subject. De Beauvoir's critique is ultimately aimed at the

gendered differentiation of the dualistic frame;
however, the frame itself is retained as a constitutive and
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unproblematic feature of human consciousness
and
distinctively human life:
Every subject plays his part as
such specifically
through exploits or projects that
serve
transcendence; he achieves liberty only as a mode of
through a
119 ° Ut tOWard oth
liberies? There
° 3UStlflCatl ° n f ° r P"*ent existence other than
expansion into an indefinitely open future.
Every
Y
time transcendence falls back into
immanence,
stagnation, there is a degeneration of
existence into
the en-soi--the brutish life of
subjection to given
conditions-and of liberty into constraint
and
Th±S downfa11 represents a moral fault
if
tZ*
the Ivl*™?'
subject consents to it; if it is inflicted
upon
nim, it spells frustration and
oppression.
In both
cases it is an absolute evil. 40

«

^n-oTV?^
1

Because the Sartrian conception of

a

feminized arena of

Immanence has not been subjected to sufficient
critical
scrutiny, liberation for women becomes a
helter-skelter
flight from that realm, a one-way exodus towards

Transcendence.

In spite of herself,

de Beauvoir has

unwittingly depicted biology as the grand culprit.

Even

though she rejects a naturalized biological explanation
of
sexual inequality

— for

it would accord

poorly with the

existentialist maxim that "existence precedes

essence"— biology, under the guise

of a slimy,

feminized

Immanence, becomes the effective bogeyman of the account.
The accepted equation between Immanence and the feminine,

along with the unquestioned radical opposition between

Transcendence and Immanence prevents de Beauvoir from
exploring two critical possibilities: transcendent moments
within, or dimensions of,

those activities associated with

the realm of Immanence; and the
question of the

desirability of Transcendence as a mode
of being that
necessarily defies and denies the givens
of natural
existence, even as it requires that these
givens be

mediated by somebody.
An additional problem related to de Beauvoir's
use of

existentialism concerns the emphasis laid by
existentialist
ethics on individual respons ibli ty for fate, which
poses

serious problems for the conceptualization of the

oppression of women.
bind:

De Beauvoir is caught in a serious

how to account for the historical and cultural

breadth of women's oppression, within an ethical account of
ultimate and total individual responsibli ty?

Are women

totally responsible for the mess they are in?

No,

says de

Beauvoir, although she grants that women have complied to
some extent in the conspiracy to name them as Other.

Woman's complicity in her oppression is explained in
existential terms as the flight from freedom and
responsibli ty, which invariably tempts members of both
sexes.

Transcendence, after all, is hard work.

But an

additional mixture of our natural proximity to the realm of
Immanence and the insidious influence of cultural myths and

internalized oppression must also be brought into the
account, argues de Beauvoir, along with the more tangible

features of econimic and political organization designed to

maintain women's secondary status.
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It is on the terrain of culture
that de Beauvoir's

analysis works most successfully.

As the theorist of the

culturally fabricated and not simply
self-created woman, de
Beauvoir is at her best.
In breaking
out of the

existential ethical frame, she reveals and
depicts the
variegated and related ways in which the
idea of woman is
developed within Western thought. In her
exploration of
that "whole world of significance which
exists only through
41
woman,"
de Beauvoir initiated an inquiry that
continues
to enrich and expand the horizons of
feminist inquiry most

especially in the area of cultural criticism.
Before moving on to a consideration of this world
of

significance in all of its ambivalence,

it

is

worth noting

several apparently unintended but nonetheless critical
side
effects of her analysis.

For example, the play of

contradiction surrounding her initial use of the
existential categories of Immanence and Transcendence

backfires in some provocative ways that have not gone
unnoticed.

In the course of documenting the horrors of

Immanence and the lofty heights of Transcendence, de
Beauvoir unwittingly reveals the sham at the core of a

transcendence premissed on man's repudiation of his natural
contingency. 42

The ontological and moral pretentions of

men who must project unto women all that they fear or seek
to avoid is rendered strikingly transparent in her account,

despite the fact that she supports the transcendental

39

impulse.

She even suggests at one point
that women's

vantage point in the swamp of Immanence
may confer special
ways of knowing and observing, that
women are in a position
to see through the sham in ways
43
that men are
not.

Nonetheless, she never explicitly subjects
the transcendent
ideal to the criticism that it obviously
warrants.

Presuming that the sub ject /object

,

immanence/ transcendence

construct will continue to prevail in human
relations and
activities, her hope is that men and women can take
turns

playing the Other and tending the home fires of
Immanence
when necessary.
Finally, the Second Sex reader can hardly fail to

notice that while de Beauvoir argues for an existential

historical materialism as

a method,

denying universal and

cross-cultural truths that stand over everyday life

practices and beliefs, she seems at times to be revealing
misogynist moment in Western civilization itself.
over,

a

Over and

she documents how the civilizing impulse, rationalist

ideals,

the conquest of nature, and achievements in the

arts have been conceived and executed at the expense of

women

,

as both flesh and blood and symbolic creatures.

implicit suggestion here is that women have

a

The

far more

critical role to play in the Transcendent project, perhaps

going so far as to reconstruct the civilizing/transcendent impulse itself.

Indeed, what woman would not,

after reading The Second Sex

,

find something quite

40

distasteful about the project of
Transcendence?

The

contemporary feminist reappropr iation of
the previously
misogynist notion of woman's deep-seated
disloyalty
to

civilization bears witness to this side-effect
of de
Beauvoir's presentation. While she sought
to explain
women's antipathy or apathy towards
project-world
achievements as

a

problem requiring

a

solution, several

latter-day feminists embrace this relation as

starting

a

point for a critique of Western civilization
itself.
"Disloyal to civilization" is the new rallying cry
for a

feminist politics that embraces otherness. 44
If de Beauvoir's framework has operated overtly
as an

impediment to a more critical stance towards

a

transcendence that is deeply dismissive of women's
traditional activities, most especially those related to

motherhood and the work of nurture, it carries
critical covert message.

It

a

more

is this tension and spill-over

of meaning which helps to account for continuing interest
in The Second Sex as a work that challenges and stimulates

feminist thinking.

An added strength of the work is, as

already suggested, de Beauvoir's exploration of Woman as
cultural artifact and symbol, to which we now turn.
"It is always difficult to describe a myth;

it cannot

be grasped or encompassed; it haunts the human consciousness

without ever appearing before it in fixed form.
is so various,

so contradictory,

The myth

that at first its unity is

:

41

not discerned

.

critical acity.

.

.

^

Here is de Beauvoir at her most

The enigma of Woman, within the
dualistic

frame of male-as-subject/f emale-as-ob
ject

,

is tracked down

and explored in all of its vicissitudes,
ambigui t ies and
,

ambivalences
She is an idol, a servant, the source
of life, a power
of darkness; she is the elemental silence
of truth, she
is artifice, gossip and falsehood; she

is healing
presence and sorceress; she is man's prey, his
downfall, she is eve rything that he is not and t
hat he
longs for, hi s negation and his raison d'etr
e
hP r
ambiguity is just that of the concept of the Other:
it
is that of the human situation insofar as
it is defined
in its relation with the Other ... the Other
is Evil;
but being necessary to the Good, it turns into the
Good; through it I attain to the whole, but it also
separates me there from; it is the gateway to the
infinite and the measure of my finite nature. And here
lies the reason why Woman incarnates no stable concept;
through her is made unceasingly the passage from hope
to frustration, from hate to love, from good to evil,
from evil to good.
Under whatever aspect we may
consider her, it is this ambivalence that strikes us
~~
first
Italics mine.
"
,

.

.

.

(

If we understand that part of de Beauvoir 's project was to

give voice to the symbolic ambivalence of Woman, rather
than to resolve it in some neat formulation, we can

appreciate the work in

a

variety of appropriate ways.

If

we agree with this portrayal of the stubborn pervasiveness
of the conception of Woman as Other

— in

a

necessarily

dialectical relationship with Man as Subject

approach the notion of the feminine as

a

—

;

if we

projection and

construction rather than unmediated natural expression,
then it is in the spirit of necessary complexity and
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ambiguity, rather than of simple cures
aimed at resolving
easy discrete facts, that criticism
of the The Second Sex
ought to take place.
Even as a presentation of lived female
experience, The
Second Sex, while less successful on this
ground, often
strikes a dramatic and tension-filled pose
towards feminity
as both true and false experience.
For what woman has not,
at some point in her life,

experienced that alienated sense

of Otherness with respect to men and
male-dominated

culture?

experienced and perhaps internalized the cultural

distaste for the arena of immanence?

known too the

seemingly contradictory elevation and romant icizat ion of
that sphere?

experienced her body as a constraint?

helpless in the face of unwanted pregnancy?

felt

known that the

project-world does not accomodate life-world obligations
and rationales?

felt confused in the face of a shifting

and elusive ground of feminity that is perpetually beyond

tangible reach?
a new

De Beauvoir's accomplishment was to stake

exploratory claim on woman's "double and deceptive

visage."

As "all that man desires and all that he does not

attain," woman occupies a symbolic netherworld that is
neither here nor there, this nor that, in spite of its

seeming rootedness in the natural arena of Immanence.

Within de Beauvoir's account, woman's position is
remarkably similar to that of Hegel's slave.

Indeed,

the

symbolic dialectical interplay between man as subject and
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woman as object bears the unmistakable
imprint of Hegel's
dialectic of self-consciousness in
the master-slave
47
parable.
"The category of the Other," writes
de
Beauvoir,

"is as primordial as consciousness
itself

Otherness is a fundamental category of
human thought." 48
While otherness is not necessarily attached
to sexual

distinctions, the sexual casting of self/other,

subject/object has taken on
meaning in the West.
continues,

a

persistent and unchanging

Acknowledging her debt to Hegel, she

"we find in consciousness itself a fundamental

hostility to every other consciousness; the subject can
be
posed only in being opposed—he sets himself up as the
essential, as opposed to the other, the inessential, the

object."..49

And yet, as Hegel and de Beauvoir both

understood, there is an essention tension at the heart of
the dynamic whereby the other is depicted as the

inessential.

As Hegel wrote,

"self-consciousness exists in

and for itself when, and by the fact that,

another; that is,

acknowledged.
it

1,50

it so exists for

it exists only in being

The Other cannot be so inessential that

fails to acknowledge and confirm the Subject.

On the

other hand, it cannot be so essentially like the Subject
that it fails to provide a contrasting ground.

Hence,

women must simultaneously and alternatively embody

essentiality of the highest order, as well as
trivialized animal-like (non-human) existence:

a

brutish and

44

She is the good mediatrix
between propitious Nature *nri
8
te
tation of -conquered Nature!
counter tTlA
to all goodness.
She
values from good to evil, and incarnates all moral
their opposite^ she is
the substance of action and
all that ifan ob
11
it, she is man's grasp on
the world and his
frustration; as such she is the source
and origin of
all man s reflection on his
existence and of whatever
expression he is able to give to it;
and yet she worL
to divert him from himself, to
make him sink down in
silence and in death. She is servant
and companion?
P CtS
alS ° t0 bS MS audience and crTt
c
and tl
cn f
to confirm
him in his sense of being; but she
opposes him with her indifference, even
with her
mockery and laughter. He projects
upon her what he
desires and what he fears, what he
loves and what he
hates.
And if it is so difficult to say
specific about her, that is because man anything
seeks the whole
of himself in her and because she is
All.
She is all
the Plane of the ^essential; she is
all
01
the Other.°?i

^

u

'

De Beauvoir's success,

it may be argued,

was to give

voice to that host of cultural constructs
and mixed

messages concerning women, and to resituate these
as

uniquely male constructions rather than as strict

derivatives of womanhood.

While she had the courage and

wisdom to plumb the complicated depths of culturally
articulated difference between the sexes, she must be
criticized for coming up for air too quickly.

Above all,

she failed to pursue the dialectical logic and interplay of

the subject/object relationship to its more distant and

critical reaches.

Authentic existence for women becomes an

imitative act; rather than confronting and struggling with

masculine subjectivity as an otherness, feminine otherness
is to be shed so that women may assume their rightful and

.

human status as subjects for
themselves.

Unfortunately,

subjectivity and transcendence have
not, in this account,
been visibly transformed through
interchange with thei:r
.

repressed counterparts.

De Beauvoir's liberation boil
.s
£

down to the specter of universalized
masculinity.

And yet,

if the dialectical and relational
logic of the constructs

of masculinity,
to operate,

transcendence, and subjectivity continues

who or what shall serve as the Other?

Even if

de Beauvoir had succeeded in transposing
the subject/object

interplay into a new and presumably
non-sexual ized arena,
the question of what comes to stand for
the Other
is a

critical one.
racism,

In an age of nuclear weaponry,

endemic

national chauvinism, diminishing natural resources,

and crises of meaning and confidence among certain

populations of the industrialized West, the Other stands
ready to embody the problem or to legitimize the solution

aimed against it.
Pinko,

As Jew,

Nigger, Witch, Nature, Homo,

Lezzie, Enemy, the Other will continue to stand for

what we simultaneously fear and desire, for that which is
the ground of and threat to our particular construction of

identity

Difference entails

a radical

even as it posits the Other.

disregard of the Other,

De Beauvoir responded to this

feature of the problem and effectively proposed the

elimination of gender differences.

What she failed to

consider in the longer run is, as Josette

Fe'ral

argues,
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that the denial of difference
also entails a fundamental
disregard of the Other. This
failure, i n turn is
relat£d
to de Beauvoir's uncritical
adoption of the existing
logic
and terminology of difference.
Fe'ral describes this
iogio
thus
,

:

the slave's duplicity

L

fun

master confronts

I

th \™it, «d
presence confro
fferen
ce
has always
been construed and perceived
t
oppositions that
difference set outside of the
established system. 52
The possibility of such an
authentic difference never makes
its way into The Second Sex.
Women's otherness, correctly
perceived by De Beauvoir as
masculine-derived,

tL^T^

leS^^'SSfaS iS^l™*

is

nonetheless constrained by this
analysis:
Thus a woman does not become
the Other but his Other
nSC1 °^' hiS re P res ^d, and she
geti^faugh? in
th!
the endless and enduring cycle
of his representation
Enmeshed in man's ocxj.
\° n
self-representat-7^7
epresentat ion, woman exists
o^iw
only insofar as she endlessly
reflects back to him
nim tne
the
image of his manly reality. 53

^?

j.
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De Beauvoir's solution to the
problem conceived in these

terms was to argue forcefully for the
end of women's

enforced and acceded-to status of the Other.

What de

Beauvoir did not consider, however, was another
possiblity,
more recently articulated by a new generation
of French
feminists, of theorizing and acting in the name
of a more

critical and re-evalua tional heterogeneity,

"in the name of

47

its own inner diversity":

^

teXt iS n0t Sim
defin
by
??
the masculine norm-whose negative
j::
side
Bill it wou?A
would be while remaining inscribed
within the
ld6ntlty
Rath6r diff ^ence is to be
thought
n^
of t*
as other, not bounded by any
system or structured

referenceV^

C

n°r
"

^
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There is a final critical note
that requires
attention.
In attempting to answer the
deceptively simple
question "what is a woman?" de Beauvoir
sought to

articulate two very different aspects of
the modern Western
female condition.
Two womanhoods are
the subject of The

Second Sex

:

womanhood as cultural fabrication and

womanhood as concrete lived experience.

As we have seen,

the work often succeeds in providing a
host of critical

observations on the masculine construction of
femininity,
with the significant result of portraying
masculinity
itself in critical terms.

Beauvoir fails to develop

Unfortunately, however, de
a

competent or useful analysis of

feminity as lived experience.

This is especially true of

her depiction of sexuality and maternity.

Mary O'Brien's

important criticism of de Beauvoir centers especially on
these themes:
De Beauvoir shares the masculine evaluation of
sexuality and sexual freedom as having value superior
to reproduction, thus accepting the measuring of an
individual existent' s experience in the light of
another's values, even where it contradicts the
experience of the individual existent in question, the
experienced reality of procreating women. This is, by
definition, bad faith. This core of bad faith is the
negative component of de Beauvoir 's important legacy to

feminist thought. 55
De Beauvior has become so caught
up with feminity as a

second-level order of experience that
she cannot deal with
it in substantive, experiential
terms.
This failure is, I
would argue, integrally bound up
with her failure to
consider difference "in the name of
its own inner
diversity." Otherness, along with the
realm of Immanence,

devalued as the repressed terrain of
Transcendence must,
according to the logic of her account,
be repudiated by
feminists.
De Beauvoir never stops to consider
the wisdom,

pleasure and critical vantage-point that might
inhere in
uniquely female activities and biology, in
spite of, or

beyond the reach of, the hierarchical and
dichotomous
structuring of a male-dominated world.
In sum,

de Beauvoir 's failure was her inability to

transcend the terms of the problem as they were

initially

presented to her in the form of myths and intellectual
frameworks.

Mary Midgely's critique of the

identity-through-di f f erence-as-oppos ition construct

provides

a

plausible sense of an alternative approach.

Exchewing mono-meaning, she argues for a psychic and
intellectual pluralism that can do justice to the complex

structure of human feeling that is the rock-bottom basis
for ways of life.

In contrast,

female-identified sphere.

de Beauvoir flees this

Like de Beauvoir, Midgely takes

on explicitly the problems of equality and difference as

,
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they ramify on women in male-dominated
culture.

In

contrast to her, she opts for difference
and opposes the
conflation of equality with sameness, an
issue that de

Beauvoir did not address.

Arguing that the unique and

important issues in women's lives can't be
meaningfully

addressed via

a

notion of equal i ty-as-sameness

,

Midgely

suggests that the attempt would be "like trying to
dig

garden with a brush and comb.
unsuitable." 56

The tools are totally

For a variety of reasons, women are

significantly different from men, says Midgely.
Beauvoir,

in a fashion,

De

agreed, when she noted the absurdity

of insisting that "a woman is a human being,

man."

a

just like a

But de Beauvoir sought to articulate this difference

in the hopes of eliminating it, whereas for Midgely,

difference is not the problem.

The problem is what we make

of it.

For Midgely, the preemptive power of the category of

Equality, like that of man-as-the-measure-of-all-things

against which animals, the realm of nature, and women are

differentiated, evaluated, and then found lacking, is

centrally related to our culture's inability to see the
world of nature as an end-in-i tself

.

Women are indeed the

victims in a world that establishes and ranks male-de-fined

difference.

But their repudiation of difference in the

name of equal i ty-as-sameness plays into the hands of

a

destructive and limited mentality that is ultimately at

:
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odds with their interests as women
and as human beings.
For these interests can only be
ranked against those of
men,

if equal

i

ty-as-sameness is to reign.

Wolgast, writing in

a

Elizabeth

similar vein, notes: "Sex

egalitarianism leads to sexual uniformity and
this means
the suppression of whatever does not
conform to some
neutral or masculine norm." 57

Wolfgang Lederer, in his

historical survey of myths depicting the fear
of women,
goes so far as to suggest that sexual egalitarianism

is but

another attempt to tame the dangerous-because-di
f f erent
woman:

"Under the cloak of

'equal rights' we attempt to

deny the specifically feminine." 58
Chapter IV, Lederer

's

(As we will see in

analysis is strongly substantiated in

the political theory of J.S. Mill.)

Sarcastically invoking

that mode of Reason-in-contras t-to-Ins t inct that Midgely

has criticized, Lederer describes the current state of

knowledge concerning women and the limits of that

understanding
We are living in a very enlightened age. We live by
reason and therefore we know less about women than
almost any other age.
The proposition 'Woman'
has never been so securely in hand
yet it would
seem that we have 'forgotten' more than we permit
outselves to know. 59
.

.

.

.

.

.

What we have forgotten, for the sake of psychic

convenience and comfort

is,

according to Lederer, fear of

women inspired by their difference from men as perceived by
men.

As various psychoanalytic accounts have argued,

the

.

prototype for this fear-through-difference
construct can be
located in the mother-infant
relationship, which also
frames the early identity-through-difference
experience.
This topic will be given expanded
treatment in Chapter II.
For the time being, we should
simply take note of Lederer s
analysis of the evident cultural
denigration of women as a
mere 'surface' phenomenon, a symptom,
in the Freudian
sense, of this deeply entrenched and
repressed fear.
For
this suggests that the liberal claim
to and interest in
1

equality may have an other than transparent
impulse.
For
the contents of the repressed never go
away.
The apparent
suppression of sexual differences might be no
more than a

temporary measure.

Culture's revenge against nature, gone

haywire, becomes instead the revolt of nature.

And

Midgely's observation that "The trouble with asceticism

notoriously is that what you sling out at the door comes
in
through the window, in a worse form," 60 gives some pause
for sobering reflection on the longer range implications
of
a social movement or order hell bent on eradicating
all

traces of sexual or gender differences, most especially

when such

a task

requires the de-naturalization of human

bei ngs

Echoing Midgely's concern with "the contemptuous

dismissal of the biosphere," Robert Paul Wolff explores his
uneasiness with a "traditional political theory [that]

simply does not take seriously the dominant facts of human

life,

namely birth, childhood, aging
and death." 61
the specific case of liberal
political

m

theory, the

public-private division has effected

a

split and ranking

such that in its own higher ranked
realm, that of the
public political sphere, "no account
shall be taken of the
facts of the private world." 62 Shoving
"out of sight and
out of consideration, everything that
makes a human being
and not merely a rational agent," 63
liberal political

theory has progressively eliminated "from
the public realm
all pre-liberal traces of the differences
and inequalities
of those facts of human life which theory
relegates to the
64

private realm."

Wolff's dilemma is twofold.

On the one hand, he is

plagued by two contradictory versions of the human
subject:

man as rational agent, with its voluntarist

overtones; and man as embodied and biological creature,

with its naturalistic and determinist echoes.

He does not

think that it is possible to embrace one version without

giving up the other.
either.

But he is unwilling to give up

On the other hand, his sense of justice is

offended by the systematic ignoring of private world

differences in the public realm, even though the liberal
state's involvement in these differences makes him justly

nervous.

What is to be done?

If human dignity can only be

based on the presumption of sameness, and if the variegated
texture of private life threatens such sameness, then

differences threaten to upset the
liberal cart of rights.
In the face of differences,
precepts of fairness become
notoriously difficult to apply, except
when they
are

intended to undo such differences.
Is he as stuck as he supposes?

appealing and provocative as it
one.

Wolffs dilemma,

is,

appears to be a false

While he has rebelled against the particular

hierarchical form that the public-private dualistic
frame
assumes, feeling neglected, for example, as a
father,

husband and son, he has not subjected the dualistic
frame
itself to sufficient critical scrutiny.

has done a splendid job of articulating

Nonetheless, he
a

wide spectrum of

felt experience and analytic difficulties produced within

this frame of mind, specifying many of its problems even if

he does not or cannot correct them.
Wolff has smuggled into his account the unquestioned

everyday opposition between rationality and embodied
subjectivity, taking this opposition at face value as an

unproblematic or self-evident construct.

When he invokes

"two equally plausible and totally incompatible conceptions
of human nature

— on

the one hand, of man as essentially

rational, a-temporal, a-histor ical

;

on the other of man as

essentially time-bound, historically, culturally,

biologically conditioned," (italics mine 65 he gives
)

expression to a classical set of dichotomies that Midgely
would have us carefully re-appraise.

These include:
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Nature/Culture, determinism/voluntarism,
Immanence/
Transcendence, Ins tinct-emot ion/Reason,
and Body/Mind.
(Notice,

too,

that Female/Male is implicated
in each set.)

These dichotomies provide stereotypic
versions of competing
and mutually exclusive ways of
being in the world.
Soaring
above the petty constraints of
this-worldly existence,
rational man extends the transcendent
chain of being
established by the Greeks from Pythagoras
on.
Immanent man
would appear to be stuck in the finite
muck of his time-and
body-bound existence with few, if any,
cross-cultural and

trans-historical links to his fellow men, because
of an
over-identification with or investment in the banal

particularities of his own existence.
But these conceptions of man (and they are
of man) are

neither equally p lausible nor totally incompatible.
Neither version, considered separately, is particularly

plausible.

Each,

in fact,

borders on the absurd.

And such

absurdity is brought closer to home once women are

introduced to the scene.

For they embody and nurture the

life of the body, without which the mind would have no life
of its own to contemplate,

even as these nurturing

practices exhibit and require morality and
rationality. 66

From this perspecive, the portrayal of

man in either/or terms

essentially natural

— either

— is

essentially rational, or

quite implausible.

to view human beings as sexless

The inclination

(and consequently to

55

proceed as if they are male) is
related to the scheme which
Wolff invokes and protests against
in that both rely on a
disdain for and ignorance of what
counts as animal and
Physical about us; significantly, this
includes a sense of
clearly demarcated separation between
animal and human
existence. Wolff, it would seem, wants
to critically
question such disdain, but cannot envision
an alternative
a

to the separation between the two views.

provided one version of

a

Midgely has

safe exit in suggesting that

those activities commonly perceived as the
hallmark of

distinctively human, as opposed to merely animal,
functions

— language

and morality— do not reside in a neatly

differentiated arena, are not governed by abstract

promptings of disembodied intellects, but have their
origins in bodily and instinctual life, which we may, on
occasion, continue to share with fellow creatures of the

animal kingdom.

Viewing intelligence, along with forms of

social life, on a continuum model rather than in terms of

strictly differentiated arenas, attitudes and functions,

Midgely offers Wolff the means of extending his critique of
liberal political theory.

Notably, this approach would

call for a conception of humanity and politics capable of

accomodating difference.

Something else would have to take

the place of our cherished Everyman, that ideal and

universal being "possessed of a higher part,

a

rational or

spiritual part, which is unaffected by sexual identity."

"

The androgynous ideal, of course,
comes smack up
against the call for a recognition
of differences.
What
makes androgyny such a potent ideal?
According to Robert
May, the existence of two sexes
is an insult
to the

narcissistic image of ourselves as
self-contained and
complete beings.
(This image, of course, is part of
the
rationalist conception of man as well.) This
may help to
account for the remarkable persistence and
longevity of

androgyny as an ideal.

On this view, notions of androgyny

are rooted in ambivalent wishes and irreconcilable
hopes,
for they minimize the importance of our bodies,

overlook

the tenacity of individual histories, and externalize
evil

the oppression of women) onto 'society'. 68

(e.g.,

Androgyny heaven is the panacea for all of those earthly
ills associated with or projected onto sexual difference.
"The difficulty and sheer frustration of finding a way to

talk and think sensibly about men and women makes it

tempting to cut the knot with one sharp thought:

we will

no longer speak of men and women but rather of human beings

who can be either masculine or feminine, or both
I
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Like liberal egal i tar ianism, May observes,

.

.

.

"The New

Androgyny aims at enshrining free will and leaving bodies
behind.
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Rohrbaugh provides one of the many standard definitions
of androgyny which can be found in pyschology textbooks:

"Derived from the Greek andro for man and gyne for woman,

androgyny denotes an integration
of positive masculine
and
feminine behaviors or traits." 71
What is most peculiar
or noticeable about theories
of androgyny is that they
begin by repudiating a rather
frozen stereotypic sex-typed
account of sex differences, taking
roles as the sum total
of sexual or gender identity
and difference, and then

propose a solution in the form of
mixing these frozen and
separated masculine and feminine
attributes together.
Theories of androgyny often seem to
be reactions to
cultural images rather than real-life
experiences,
instances of a one-dimensional or false
negativity that
fails to transcend the terms and terrain
which it is

obstensibly criticizing.

In this case,

theories of

androgyny, mistakenly building their
opposition to rigidly
defined sex role prescriptions on a conception
of sex

differences that has been

s

implistically reduced to

behaviors or roles, end up preserving these crudely
fashioned distinctions.

Masculine and feminine traits,

served up in "positive" combination and subsequently

referred to as "androgynous", are still identifiably

masculine and feminine traits.

We are no closer to

understanding why they are associated with two different
sexes; androgyny simply proposes that we must now serve

them up gumbo style.

The solution to the perceived

arbitrariness and injustice of sex role "assignments" boils
down to one of redistribution and rearrangement.
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Along with a stress on absolute
personal freedom
understood as the absence of impediments
to the securing of
our desires, several other themes
are identifiable
in the

androgyny literature. 72

They include:

basic sense of
the arbitrariness of culture, a
plastic view of human
nature, the notion that gender and
sexual identity
a

(conceived in crude biological terms) are
totally

irrelevant to personal identity, and that
the body
functions as a constraint and must, therefore,

be minimized

as much as possible.

All Seasons,

Androgyny fabricates "the Person for

the individual who combines the best of
each

of us and has no apparent blemishes or even

limitations." 7 3

in short,

androgyny is

a

near-perfect

expression of Sartrian transcendence.
The identifiable and disturbing attempt to minimize,

if

not totally expunge the body from conceptions of human

identities, relations, and social organization reaches its

apex in modern-day transsexual technology, where bodies are

discarded and surgically re-made within

culture that

a

cannot tolerate confused or complex gender identities which

threaten the dualistic stereotypes.

Transsexualism,

appearing on the surface as the repudiation of androgyny in
its apparent overvaluation of the body,

flip side of androgyny'

s

carnal denial.

is

actually the

Transsexualism,

like androgyny, belies bodily integrity. 74

Each

formulation and its accompanying set of practices evinces

one of the two available
responses to a dualistic
Mind/Body, Culture/Nature formula.
Only in a culture
informed and structured by such
dualistic reasoning could
some unhappy man (and its is
predominantly men) conceive of
himself as occupying the "wrong"
body and needing a
75
different one.
Theories of androgyny, in their
denial
of the body, and theories and
techniques associated with
trans-sexualism, in their overvaluation
of the body, are

the two polar responses elicited
by a crude and

reductionistic account of the body.

Both flee the body as

over-valued source of impediments and
constraints within
starkly dichotomous formulation.
in both accounts,

a

the

existing body is the source of trouble,
denied within
androgyny and reified within trans-sexualism,
where a new
body will solve the problems posed by the
old.
Androgyny
flees the fetishized body of trans-sexualism;

trans-sexualism is heir to the crudely stereotypic
notions
of masculinity and femininity ostensibly
repudiated—
yet

preserved—by androgyny.

Transsexualism enacts the return

of the body repressed by androgyny.

Both schemes are

caught in the grip of a conceptual framework that is
deeply
flawed and especially injurious to women.

operations

— performed

wish to become females

For transsexual

predominantly by men on males who

— signify

the ultimate in male

technological appropriation of the female body, including
its procreative abilities, while androgynous formulations

of "personhood" nourish the
liberal Everyman of market
society, who stands to win out
over any identifiably
female

or feminine characteristics.

The totalitarian tendencies

of androgyny and trans-sexual
ism culminate in the

over-integrated view of society,

a

desideratum world with

no ripples to mar the surface
of smooth functioning:
a
world where the insipid and only
apparently genderless
smile button serves as mascot.
For those who find androgynous
and transsexual

treatments of the human body to be deeply
troubling-part
of the problem rather than a solution
to the unjust
treatment of women and the general
unhappiness of the

age— the

task at hand would seem to be simultaneously

linguistic and conceptual.

in re-thinking the body we also

require a language that does not surrept iously
reproduce

hierarchically related dichotomous constructs, but
rather
critically invokes them for careful reappraisal.

To begin

with "the recognition that in the beginning
body_,

"
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and to disallow

interpretation of such
"social man" vs.
vs.

Body,

a

i^s

the

biological determinist

a standpoint;

to repudiate the

"natural man", Culture vs. Nature, Mind

Reason vs. Instinct formulas is the challenge.

To invoke women's experiences and sexual difference in

critical opposition to these dichotomies

— which

constitute

the substructure of prevailing difference conceptions

an added,

related challenge.

— is

For the problem of difference

.

raises the specter of the body,

just as re-considerations

of the body resurrect the concern
with difference.

Theories of androgyny and transsexualism
bear witness to
the internal relation between
conceptions of the body and
conceptions of sexual difference, as well
as reminding us
of the dangers of an un-sel f -consc
ious acceptance
of such

dichotomies.

When we venture to ask:

What is the nature

of the boundary line between the
sexes?

In and of what do

sexual differences consist?— we are forced
to confront the
living body in its powerful presence, complex
psychological
and cultural articulation, and singular
immediacy as felt

experience.

We are compelled to come up with a language

that can do justice to this complexity.

In its repetitive

and rythmic biological processes and functions, and

sometimes erratic demands, the body invokes not only the
sense of individual identity and difference but also calls
up the image and sense of collective species-life,

historical, poltical and cultural boundaries.

spanning

As the root

source of our singular sense of selfhood and shared
humanity, the body invokes and produces a multiplicity of
truths and meanings.

Sexual difference,

invoking sameness

and difference simultaneously, partakes of this complex

phenomenology
When we invoke "difference", however, we must never
lose sight of the important fact that sexual difference is

created by and

embedded within gender, the cultural
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construction of sexual identity.

"Difference" is a kind of

short-hand expression for this
more complicated notion.
forget this is to play into
a misplaced sense of
77
origins.
That is, while sexual difference

To

is

experienced as a natural,
biologically-based
differentiation, the differentiation
itself has already
been produced within an
ideological universe that defines
the difference which is then
used as
the

'ground'

for

gender.

Androgyny and transsexualism each
fail, for shared
and different reasons, because
they have not grasped the
ground of their revolts.
"Difference",
then,

must

ultimately be related to gender.
The "call of difference" prompts
the renewed and
critical examination of culture in
terms of gender.
in
posing the sexually specific question
of "who is

speaking?", difference invites us to pay
attention to two
related issues. The first is that we must
insist on the

legitimacy and importance of asking what— of
a specifically
woman-derived or/-identif ied nature— might be missing
from

particular chronicles of social inquiry.
difference encourages

a

Secondly,

concerted focus on the question of

how those renditions of society, including methods of

description and explanation, which have predominantly been
the work of men, might bear the gendered imprint of their

creators.

It

is the second question which will be

substantively explored in this critical study of political

.

theory
This choice of focus,
designed to promote a practice
of
"radical comparatism" in order
to engage with the
masculinist assumptions of modern
political theory, 78
should not be construed as
implying a misleading sense
of
neat separation between the
masculine and feminine
dimensions of experience and their
cultural elaboration.
Masculinity and femininity, with all
of their accoutrements
and connections to other cultural
categories, are

dialectically related in mutually
constitutive ways.
throws the other into vivid and
definitional

Each

relief,

while
neither can be isolated in abstraction
from the other.
it
is literally impossible to think
one without reference to
the other.
As lived experience and complex
cultural
products, masculinity and femininity comprise
an intricate
£as de deux which, when reduced to its
constituent

elements, has lost essential qualitative, and
not merely

quantitative, aspects of itself.

Also worth noting is the fact that it would be
impossible to even formulate the notion of

a

particular and

specifiably masculine or feminine rendition of reality
without some tangible sense of existing alternatives.
a

Such

repertoire of alterntives exists within the framework of

everyday life, in men's uneasiness with the impossible
standards of masculinity, in those tangible features of
women's lives which elude, even if only partially,

ideological structuring even as they
are shaped within an
ideology of sexual difference and
female inferiority.
The
following focus on the masculine as
a partial rather than
inclusive expression of the modern
human condition in the
West is also made possible by the
burgeoning literature on
women's lives which has made available
for scrutiny
and

reflection detailed studies of women's
heretofore hidden
and often publicaly unexpressed
experiences. 79
In spite

of the overwhelming pressures and
contrary to de Beauvoir's

pessimistic rendering of the female condition
in the West,
women have been subjects for themselves
and each other.

They have not submitted blindly to the
sexism and misogyny
of Western culture but have instead
elaborated, with and

like those men and women of other specific
oppressed

groups, complex interpretive schemes and social

arrangements by which to live their lives. 80

That such

arrangements are often invisible to the (white male)
beholder who is situated in his dominant and ail-too
comfortable paradigm has, of course, obscured much of the

concrete substance and significance of women's lives. 81
The following attempt to tease out and reflect on the

dimensions of this paradigm, in the name of a difference
that has been simultaneously fabricated and avoided, should

be understood as an effort to rectify in all-too-skewed

balance of power and vision in Western political theory.
As such,

it offers the help of a different perspective,

as

envisioned by Virginia Woolf in her
essay on women,
education and pacificism, Three
Guineas
"Any help we
give you must be different from
that you can give
:

yourselves, and perhaps the value of
that help may lie
the fact of that difference." 82

.
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CHAPTER
THE MASCULINE EXPERIENCE:

II

MASCULINITY AS IDEOLOGY

... the existence of two sexes does not to beqin
with arouse any difficulties or doubts
in
children.
It is self-evident to a male
child that
a genital like his own is to be
attributed to
everyone he knows, and he cannot make
its absence
tally with his picture of these other
people
Sigmund Freud, Three Essays o n the Theorv
of
1
Sexuality
1

Representation of the world, like the world itself
is the work of men; they describe
it from their
point of view, which they confuse with absolute own
truth.

Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex
The real intellectual wealth of the individual
depends entirely on the wealth of his real
connect ions
Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The German Ideology
It is no secret that Western political thought
is

overwhelmingly male-dominated.

Less obvious and more

interesting, however, are the wide-ranging dimensions and

implications of this phenomenon which, over the last decade,

have received increasing critical attention from feminists.
What are we to make of this diverse collective expression of
male hegemony in Western culture's various attempts to

establish the possibilities, limits and contours of
political life?

How much of this tradition is potentially

useful to feminist critiques and visions of political

arrangements?

How much of it is deeply flawed and hence,

practically irretrievable for emancipatory feminist
73
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purposes?

To what extent does the
critical excavation and
perusal and the male monopoly in
Western political theory

illuminate deeply entrenched and
inherited

features of

contemporary political discourse?
These sorts of questions have both
motivated and been
generated by several recent feminist
reappraisals of Western
1
political theory.
In other fields as well, most

especially psychology, feminists have been
re-thinking the
significance of gender differences while
criticizing the
unequivocal valorization of male experiences at
the expense
of female.

2

Such work has contributed to our critical

understanding of the ways in which 'human' standards
of
identity, behavior and development have reproduced

(deliberately and unwittingly) Everyman standards that
deny
and denigrate female experiences. 3

De Beauvoir's earlier

claim concerning the confused and mistaken identity between
male points of view and absolute truth has received

extensive substantiation. 4
Her insight may also be extended to the terrain of the

sociology of knowledge.

For those feminists who argue that

knowledge is materially situated in particular ways of life,
the issue of the genderic dimensions of knowledge becomes

especially salient. 5

As Jane Flax has argued:

is the product of human beings,

form of activity.

"Knowledge

for whom knowing is only one

The history and life situation of the

knower cannot be completely different in kind from the form
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and content of the knowledge that
this subject produces."
Bruce Mazlish has made a similar
point in arguing

6

that

"there is really no sharp dichotomy
between universal theory
and practical politics, political
ideology and personal
"
identity
.

.

.

.

:

S S
SSSa S ° n P° litical science frequently
?
o offer universal
claim to
knowledge, transcending any
particular society, and are as frequently
their readers as primarily contributions perceived by
to pressing
political problems of the moment ....
It is less
usual, however, to view a treatise on
political
science
as also being based on the person
of the author, on the
way his pressing problems and needs shape
the way he
conceives and perceives the political world. 7

c1^\

2

Even less usual is an explicit appreciation for
and
accounting of the gendered person of the author.

For it is

this person, as will be argued, who experiences
particular

problems and needs as pressing even as he fails to see
and
feel others.
We have reached that point in the development of

feminist consciousness, practice and theory where it makes

sense and becomes possible to explore the notion that male

hegemony in political theory inhabits and structures that
body of knowledge in a multiplicity of complex and

significant ways.

The simultaneous appreciation of male

dominance, gender differences, and the material rootedness
of knowledge lends itself to the interpretive frame of

analysis which will be developed in this chapter and
implemented in the body of this work.

This analysis may be
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understood to enact the intervention
of gender differences
in the process of reading political
theory "through an optic
which reveals submerged structures
8
otherwise
invisible."

As such,

it aims at the

identification and exploration of

masculinity as an ideological structure with
specific
perceptual tendencies.
In short, this interpretation aims
to take gender seriously, as it seeks
to bring

males under a

type of scrutiny they have all too rarely
undergone.

As

David Morgan has argued in his exploration of
masculinity
and the process of sociological inquiry,
"taking gender into
account is 'taking men into account' and not treating

them— by ignoring

the question of gender— as the normal

subjects of research." 9
In treating masculinity as an ideological form,

this

study takes a cue from Marx's and Engels' analysis of

ideology which stressed the material and experiental

underpinnings of knowledge:
In direct contrast to German philosophy which descends
from heaven to earth, here we ascend from earth to
heaven
The phantoms formed in the human brain
are also, necessarily, sublimates of their material
life-process, which is empirically verifiable and bound
to material premises.
Morality, religion, metaphysics,
all the rest of ideology and their corresponding forms
of consciousness, thus no longer retain the semblance of
independence
Life is not determined by
consciousness, but consciousness by life. 10

....

....

One can,

I

believe,

utlize this notion of ideology without

resorting to the claim that ideology is necessarily "false"
or simply epiphenomenal

.

That is, one can retain an

2
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appreciation for Marx's and Engels'
insistence on the
material underpinnings of knowledge
without counterpos ing
ideology to non- ideologi cal knowledge.
On
this view, all

knowledge is to some extent ideological;
ideology does not
necessarily render knowledge problematic.
As it is being
used here, the feminist quarrel
with masculine

"ideology" is
that is seeks to totalize its
version of identity and

experience and that it is based on an
unacknowledged and
unconscious fear of women which issues in
the need to

dominate them.

This is very different from a simplistic

labelling of masculine ideology as "false."
used here,

As it is being

"masculine ideology" is understood to reflect,

produce and constitute social relations between
and among
men and women (including our interpretations of
those
relations.)

It is simultaneously "real" and "false".

In describing masculinity as an ideology

I

have in mind

three notions which, taken together, will comprise the

meaning of the term as it will be utilized here.

My biggest

debt is to the notion of ideology as "world view". 11

To

this will be added an aspect borrowed from the notion of

"standpoint".

1

Finally,

I

will invoke the image of "deep

structure" as a descriptive aid.

"standpoint"

I

From the notion of

wish to invoke the claim that material life

structures understanding.

Standpoints in this sense are

vantage points establisheed and secured on the basis of

material life conditions.

They have profound
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epistemological and ontological
consequences. 13
From the notion of ideology as
"world view", which I am
utilizing in full, two important
claims are implied:

Western males (from at least 1600 on)
qualify as
cohesive grouping of human subjects
characterized
1)

a

by 2 a
bundle of beliefs, attitudes and goals
which have some
coherence and a characteristic structure.
This bundle need
not include all beliefs ever held by
all males.
It

)

is

rather, an identifiable subset of all such
beliefs.

Ideology in the sense of world view has the
following
properties, which

I

am taking the liberty of borrowing from

Raymond Guess's very helpful schematic outline:
a)
b)
c)

elements in the subset are widely shared among
agents in the group
elements in the subset are systematically
interconnected
they are 'central to the agents' conceptual scheme'
(Quine)

d)

e)

elements in the subset have a wide and deep
influence on the agents' behavior or on some
particularly important or central sphere of action
the beliefs in the subset are 'central' in that
they deal with central issues of human life or
central metaphysical issues 1 ^

For the purposes of this study, engagement with the

political theory enterprise will be taken as
sphere of action'.

a

'central

The major texts of Hobbes, J.S. Mill and

Marx will provide the material of our focus.

For obvious

reasons, behavior will be much less salient as a focus of
inquiry.

Finally,

I

intend to explore and utilize the claim that
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masculinity as ideology operates at
the level of deep
structure.
By "deep structure" I mean
that masculinity
an ideology comprised of
systematically interrelated

is

elements which do not necessarily
manifest themselves at the
surface of theoretical discourse,
although they
do exert a

powerful influence on that discourse.

Identifying such an

ideological structure requires an interpretive
method akin
to that used in psychoanalytic explanations
of symptoms and
outward behavior which look for the hidden
systems of meaning
and logic embedded in their outer
manifestations. 15

Having set out, but not yet demonstrated the
validity of
my methodological framework of interpretation,
I am now
going to turn to gender identity as explored by
several neoand post-Freudians.

This material should provide support

for the rationale of this framework, as it fills in
the

substance of masculine ideology.

Psychoanalytically

understood masculine gender identity formation provides the
material underpinnings of masculine ideology, helping us to
ground this concept in developmental processes, human
relations, and corresponding modes of perception and

cognition.

It also introduces the unmistakable parallels

between masculine identity formation and prevailing
conceptions of sexual difference which take the male as the
unref lecti vely assumed norm.

This sustained focus on

masculine identity formation is also designed to render more
visible the particularity and partiality of a man-made and
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-intepreted world that de Beauvoir,
among other,, would have
us critically reassess.
Thanks to the work of many
post-Freudians,

identity

formation processes, especially those
occuring during the
pre-Oedipal stages of development, have
been creatively and
painstakingly explored. An overview of
this material, as it
applies to the analysis of masculinity
which follows in

forthcoming chapters, will be presented.

while the main

focus will be on masculine identity, aspects
of the feminine
identity-securing process will be introduced at
certain

points for purposes of comparison and highlighting.

We will

begin with the account of identity formation that
traces the
first months of mother-infant interaction, regardless
of
sex.

Where specific sexual differences in the process of

identity formation begin to emerge and to constitute gender
as such,

we will focus specifically on the masculine

rendition of that developmental process.
Several revisions and criticisms of Freud's original

formulation of gender acquisition have been made which merit
brief comment.

Where he believed that the formation of

gender identity coincided with the phallic phase, more
recent studies indicate that gender awareness exists before
the second year.

identity,

16

In fact,

it would seem that gender

the awareness of being male or female in a culture

that values, organizes and defines reproductive biological

characteristics as constitutive of personal identity,

81

coexists with the early awareness
of being
unique individual. 17

a

separate and

One,

especially if she is a feminist, cannot
utilize
Freud these days without being called
on to defend or attack
his theory of penis envy.
The notorious formulation
of

penis envy as the distinguishing feature
of the tortuous
attainment of feminity and point of origin
forthe many

psychological disturbances of women has been
extensively
criticized since Karen Horney first took up the
challenge. 18

This is not the place to review the various

disputes and engage deeply in this issue.

Since it is not

central to the focus on pre-Oedipal experiences and

masculine identity formation to be examined here,

I

only go so far as to suggest that penis envy is not

will
a

crucial concept within the frame of psychoanalytic
explanation. 19

That is, the integrity of the

psychoanalytic method can be retained without the penis envy
thesis.

Those who choose to do without it are not guilty of

deeply heretical behavior; nor can they be accused of trying
to have their cake and eat it too.

concept,

As an explanatory

"penis envy" does not share the crucial import of

other psychoanalytic notions such as "repression",
"instincts", and "unconscious" thought processes.

It may

also be a specifically culture-bound descriptive concept
whose time will eventually run out.

choose to build on and utilize

a

However, those who

psychoanalytic psychology
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without the penis envy formulation
must be wary of
underestimating the injuries to the
developing egos and body
images of little girls coming of
age in male-dominated
societies. We should all be able to
agree on one thing,
however:
that there is no automatic or
self-evident
preferability (aesthetic, functional or
otherwise) of the
penis in comparison with the clitoris.
Unfortunately,
Freud's language often conveys the
impression that there
is.
Freud may be at least partially vindicated
on this
score if we interpret his words as describing,
from the

boyJ_s point of view,

his experience of his body and emerging

identity.

Finally, the question of the Oedipus Complex and
its

dynamics as universal features of gender and identity

acquisition rather than as specific psychological
accompaniments to the more specific structure of the modern
nuclear family form still rages on.

Malinowski's attempts

to debunk this aspect of psychoanalytic theory by uncovering

anthropological counter-examples has given way more recently
to the anti-Oedipus and anti-psychiatry movements, which

identify psychoanalysis as one of the major guilty culprits
in a socio-cultural order that over-represses its people in

the name of a falsely singular and unified ego.

20

While

the universal istic claims of any social theory ought to be

justly suspect, the methodological question of the

applicability of psychoanalytic conceps to different
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cultures and historical periods
is an open and complex
one.
(For a more developed examination
of some of these issues,
see the first Appendix.)
Since this study will begin with
the political theory of Thomas
Hobbes (1588-1679),
our

burden of defense against charges of

a

historical

misapplication of modern concepts is not

a large one.

In

his important study of family history
and the emergence of
"affective individualism", the historian
Lawrence Stone
locates the emergent and detectable features
of modern
nuclear family life within the very time span
of Hobbes s
1

...
21
life.
In spite of the critiques and revisions,

some potent and

well-placed, while others are grossly ignorant of
the
tenets, methods and critical import of psychoanalysis,

the

psychoanalytic approach continues to be the most fruitful
method for the study of sex differences and gender identity
in modern Western culture.

What itmay lack by way of

speculative and creative ventures into alternative familial
and sexual forms,

it more than makes up for in its

descriptive acumen and explanatory power.

For those

interested in a sexuality and psychology of the here and
now,

as biological, psychological,

cultural and political

phenomena, no other theory can do the job as well as

pscyhoanalysis.

What Marx is to the onging analysis of a

capitalism that has understandably developed beyond the
vision of his limited life span, Freud is to the study of a
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modern Western psychology that
works in the service of
reality principle and pleasure
principle that are

a

dynamically related and perhaps evolving
in ways that
psychoanalysis in its formative stages
could not be expected
to have anticipated. 22
spite of the criticisms
levelled against pschoanalysi s some
valid and other grossly
misplaced, the theory continues to provide
powerful and

m

,

useful insights on the contemporary
construction of gender
identity in a sexually divided world where
we are all,

regardless of the outcome,

forced to deal with dichotomous

and hierarchical genderized categories of
identity. 23

According to contemporary psychoanalytic accounts,
the
formation of identity begins at birth and continues
throughout life.

Margaret Mahler, D.W. Winnicott, and

Melanie Klein have, among others, enriched our understanding
of the pre-Oedipal experiences of identity formation, an

arena left mostly untouched by Freud, although he

anticipated its importance towards the end of his life. 24
Erikson's work, focusing on the life-long process of
identity-formation, has broken the orthodox stranglehold of
a

conception of identity fullyformed with the resolution of

the Oedipus Complex.

25

The net effect of this work

simultaneously underlines Freud's insistence on the crucial
importance of childhood experiences while it opens up the
temporal parameters of investigation into the pre-Oedipal
and lifelong processes of human development.
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The most important aspect of
the process of identity
formation for both sexes, albeit
with different
implications, seems to be the
attainment of separation from
the original and highly charged
mother-child unity. This
primordial experience of unity is
simultaneously the ground
of and threat to viable identity
as we know it.
While the
mother-child dyadic unity provides a
sense of security and
unity that first enables the child
to think of itself as an
entity, failure to separate from this
unity spells disaster
for future abilities to develop
relationships with others
and to develop a specific individual and
sexual identity.
In the first month of life,

the infant inhabits a foggy

and delusional world with no awareness of
the mother as a

separate person.

Receiving care under the delusion of its

self-nourishing omnipotence, it does not yet perceive
that
the satisfaction of its needs depends on 'something

outside'.

This awareness begins in the second month; mother

(whoever is the primary care giver) is gradually added to
what the infant now perceives as a dualistic, but still

self-contained and omnipotent universe.

Margaret Mahler

described this state from the infant's point of view as

a

symbiotic union of mother and child.
As the sensory apparatus develops,

the infant becomes

more attuned to the stimuli of the world and begins to

realize a demarcation of its body from the rest of the
world.

This markes the beginning of the end of that
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nirvana-like "oceanic feeling" described
by Freud as the
repressed memory of and desire for
wholeness, sometimes
re-enacted in religious yearnings. 26
As the mother's face gradually
takes shape in the
infant's developing repertoire of perceived
objects, the

infant comes closer to recognizing that
something outside
itself is satisfying its needs. At this
stage, however, it
has still not differentiated "I" from
"not-I".
Self and

mother still constitute a dual symbiotic unity
in which the
infant is magically omnipotent. With the
emergence of a

specific (as opposed to undifferentiated) preferential

response to the mother— often seen in smiling

patterns— observers infer that the infant

is developing and

experiencing the rudiments of identity formation.

This is

initiated through that interactive process, taken for

granted by generations of mothers, and brought to
fascinating light by clinical observations on the part of
Mahler and her colleagues,
child to itself,

in which the mother "mirrors" the

imitating its facial gestures for the child

to see and respond to.

If this mirroring exchange is

impaired or absent, distinct and often tragic consequences

may ensue for the child's identity formation process.
The mirror process offers an early clue to the complex

identity that is formed out of relations of mutual

reciprocity rather than simple differentiation.

Identification of one's self as

a self

depends on the

.
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mother-caregiver's imitation of the infant
for it to
literally behold as well as on the
infant's growing ability
to identify with and eventually
introject the images of
itself that have been offered by the
mother.
These early,

complex dynamics of inter-subjective
relational trust and
reciprocity lay the foundations for future

social relations,

especially those that require empathy, the
ability to
identify with the position and feelings of
another
person 27

Through play with the mother-caretaker, the child
is
helped to move from primitive identification with
whatever
presents itself to selective identification, premissed on
the explicit desire to be like a particular object
among

available others.

These selective identifications with

various objects in the infant's immediate surrround help to

promote

a

compromise between the contradictory desires for

symbiotic fusion and independence.

Selective

identifications (from blankets and stuffed animals to
people) promote the secure sense of fusion even as they bear

witness to an expanding repertoire of object choices.

process helps to further create

a

This

particular sense of self

and identity as a subject-object in a world among others.
D.W. Winnicott's work on the role of aggression in the

differentiation process highlights the delicate structuring
of mother-child interaction as it aids in the psycho-analysis
of adult versions and cultural forms of violence.

28

The

s
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child's search for self-other
boundaries begins with
fantasies of destruction that begin
to confirm the
independent existence ot the
mother-caregi ver
This
original attempt at mastery, not to
be confused with our
adult sense of mastery as the attempt
to impose the will of
the self on another, is greeted with
clear-cut relief on the
part of the infant when it fails to
"destroy" the
.

mother-caregi ver.

Early aggressive fantasies result in

a

beneficial and welcome collision with the
resistance of the
maternal other. The establishing of the
independent

presence of the mother portends the independent
existence of
the self.

if

of resistance,

the mother fails to provide a tangible sense
if she fails to "survive"

the infants'

"attacks", a void is established that threatens

boundlessness because she has failed to provide the infant
self with the necessary touchstones for differentiation.

Frustration in the face of an overly yielding maternal other
promotes increasing rage and heightened violence on the part
of the infant in its quest for evidence and assurances of

its effect on the mother figure.

The child is desperately

searching for a mirror image of its physical efficacy in the
world.

One response to the failure of the mother to provide a

sense of boundary against which the differentiation drive
can be simultaneously checked and thereby acknowledged is
for the infant self to provide its own substitute
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boundaries.

This involves a process of false

differentiation whereby the idealized
and untested version
of the maternal other becomes
introjected.
This
now

objectified

(m) other,

against which the self must

differentiate, promotes

a

brittle and dualistic ego

organization that bears the tragic marks
accompanying the
absence of vital interchange with the
primary other. The
danger of merger becomes all the more
seductive and
terrifying (and it is terrifying enough under
more normal
circumstances) because it has not been successfully

tried

and resisted.

The only defense is an ob jectif icat ion
and

instrumental ization of the dangerous-because-unknown
other.
Such an experience exaggerates the already troubling
dynamic

between recognition and differentiation.

These two needs

press for satisfaction in tyrannical and rigid ways that

structurally undermine the possibilities for their
satisfaction.

The logical and practical outcome is a

relentless and repetitive search for recognition that

proceeds by way of domination.
The noted ambivalence surrounding the conflicting

desires for fusion and independence is situated at the core
of the miracle,

or near impossibility, of thoroughly

"successful" (in clinical terms) identity formation.
most of us,

For

this primal ambivalence experienced in relation

to a female mother who is part of and external to the

maturing neonate,

is never fully resolved or incorporated

.
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into consciousness.

Instead,

it simmers restlessly
in the

unconscious, an easy target of
re-evocation in adult
relationships of intimacy that invariably
recapitulate
emotions originally experienced with
the first love object.
This primal ambivalence is also
central to the vexing

tension that we experience in the
classically conceived
self-other, individual-community relationships
in which we
strive simultaneously for autonomy and
recognition from

others

29

The theme of conflicting desires for fusion
and radical

independence also converges explicitly in de Beauvoir's
assessment of the powerfully ambivalent functions of
the
feminized Other in relation to a masculine subject.

As

Jessica Benjamin points out, we also find this ambivalence
at play in the practice and imagery of sado-masochistic

eroticism which invokes the violation of the boundaries of
the Other as confirmation of the mastery of the Self in its

rituals and roles.

How and why this infantile experience

shared by children of both sexes becomes culturally

elaborated in gendered terms such that men tend to assume
the stance of mastery and boundary violation while women are

subjugated is an important question.
.

.

.

shortly.

It will be addressed

30

Even with the "best" of all possible mothering, the

anxiety of separation is unavoidable.

It seems to peak

during the second year of life, identified as the
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next-to-last stage of separation and
individuation. As the
child gradually realizes that s/he
pursues independence at
the cost of magical omnipotence
and fusion with the mother,
an alternating strategy is employed
whereby the child flits
from the impatient desire for independence
to the passionate

yearning for re-fusion.

Periodically, the mother is

rejected as a suffocating presence, only
to be clung to in
desperation at some later moment. The observed
activity of
clinging to/pushing away the mother is the
behavioral

evidence for this flux of contradictory emotions
and desires
that the child must struggle to accomodate and
resolve.

mother-caregiver at this point must walk

a fine line

The

between

solicitous behavior that the child may interpret as
instrusive and a letting go that puts traumatic and resented

distance between the child and its support world.

Understandably, the separat ion-indi viduat ion process is
easily subverted or subjected to temporary setbacks.

When

this happens, clinical observers have reported regressive

attempts on the part of children and sometimes mothers to

re-establish symbiotic union.
This is the point at which the father's role becomes

crucial as a new source of support against reengulfment into

maternal union.

Around the eighteenth month, the father

becomes significant as a facilitator of separation from the
mother.

Bearing none of the messy and primordial

attachments,

fears and desires experienced by the infant in

relation to the .other, he is a
stable

fi gure

who embodies

the seductive appeal of an
external reality that is not

maternally dominated or influenced.

This account differs in

some important ways from Freud's
portrayal of the father who
enters the scene only later on during
the Oedipal phase as a
threatening figure to the boy and seductive
object for the
girl.
Dorothy Dinnerstein s portrayal of
the father as
'

providing safe exit for children of both
sexes from conflict
experienced in relation to the mother and,
in so doing,

aiding and abetting a process in which the
ambivalent
feelings toward the mother may be psychically
preserved
rather than resolved, adds a complicated twist
to the story.
In the best of all possible mother-child
relations

within the modern nuclear family setting, the child
will

eventually learn to negotiate between the poles of

ambivalence surrounding separation from the mother figure.
S/he will be able (hypothetically or ideally) to maintain

a

mental image of the mother as a primary love object and as

increasingly distinct from the child's mental representation
of him or herself.

If the attachment to the mother as a

separate object can be developed and then preserved, a
coherent sense of identity and well-developed capacities for
social interaction are like to result.
to the mother takes,

instead,

If this attachment

the form of an identification

that blurs the boundaries between the child and her,

identity formation will be "disturbed" in some ways.

The

93

ego may be too fragile, overly
susceptible to environmental
disturbances, and become either too
fluid or overly rigid.
(Human development and identity
are never this neat, simple,
perfect, or pathological, of course.
It is better to think
of these characterizations as
qualitative tendencies rather
than as fixed pronouncements.) 31
Finally, the ability to
unify the good and bad aspects of the
maternal image into
one whole representation is important
if the child's
self-image, vitally related to what s/he
is introjecting

from the maternal object,

is to develop "wholistically"

.

m

other words, split maternal images contribute
to split self
images and to a host of complicated projective
and

introjective activities which may keep the self
divided and
unable to function in the world. 32
For the purposes of the analysis of masculinity
to be

offered here, the most important revision in orthodox

psychoanalytic theory involves

a shift

in focus from the

male child's relationship to his father during the Oedipal

phase to that prior relationship with the mother
relationship,

in the child's eyes,

.

This

is already marked by a

complicated series of ambivalent emotions, which begin with
powerful yearnings for the prior forms of satisfaction,
along with the first rage of aggression against
mo ther-world that inevitably frustrates desire.

wo rds of Melanie Klein:

and hate

— his

a

In the

"The baby's first object of love

[sic] mother

— is

both desired and hated with
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all the intensity and strength
that is characteristic of
the
early urges of the baby." 33 it
is against and within
this

primal emotional backdrop that the
struggles of separation
and individuation take place.
Overlaid on this complicated
ambivalent dimension is the more
specific struggle
over

gender identity.

That these struggles and ambivalent

desires are first experienced in relation
to a female mother
is now acknowledged by those
operating within psychoanalytic
(especially object relations) discourse and
theory to be the
source of the crucial differences between
the identity
formation processes of boys and girls in modern
Western
Societies.
This approach confirms Freud's insistence
on the

asymmetrical patterns of masculine and feminine
development,
whereby a primal poly-sexuality that is originally

undifferentiated with respect to object choice, must
subsequently conform to the heterosexual prescriptions of
sexual conduct, object-choice, and identity.

These

prescriptions make asymmetrical demands on males and females
who must become men and women.

Aspects of separation and

individuation take on special and different significance for
boys and girls in relation to a caregi ver-love object who
is,

in nearly all cases,

female. 34

Coppelia Kahn

summarizes the difference, explicated most extensively by
Nancy Chodorow and Dorothy Dinnestein, this way:
For though she follows the same sequence of
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symbiotic union, separation and
individuation,
identification, and object love as the
boy, her
riSSS ir relati ° n t0 a P^son of the
same
fe^whn^
sex,
£
\
while his
masculinity
arises in relation to a~~^
person of the opposite sex. Her femininity
is
reinforced by her original symbiotic
union with her
mother and by the identification with
her that must
precede identity, while masculinity is
same union and the same identification. threatened by the
While the boy's
Y
sense of self begins in union with the
feminine his
sense of masculinity arises against it. 35
On this view, the critical threat to
masculinity is not
that of castration, but rather the threat
of maternal

reengulfment.

36

Minimally, we can say that the latter

precedes the former and might, therefore, carry more
weight
in the overall struggle to achieve masculinity.

The boy is

faced with the awesome pre-oedipal task of breaking his

identification from the mother

(

di s- identi fying)

37

and

setting up a counter-identification with the father.

The

double lesson of this experience is that masculine identity
is bound up with the experience of dis- juncture and confluct

and that it contains an unmistakable ascetic dimension.

Masculine identity requires a massive repudiation of
identification with that all-satisfying/all-terrifying
maternal source.

A logical outcome of this difficult

process, particularly in cultures which promote a strict
sexual differentiation in gender identity and social
functions,

is the "mummification" of a split maternal

image,

one that simultaneously promises the blissful ecstasy of
total satisfaction as it threatens the primal nightmare of
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annihilation.

Against such a backdrop, the father's

implicit promise to the boy in the
later Oedipal drama of a
future mother/lover as recompense for
his willingness to
give his own mother up as a sexual love
object is like the

promise of store bought icing to top a
delectable but
temporarily poisonous cheesecake that mustn't
be eaten for
several years. On the one hand, it fails
to address the
boy's first wish, which was to be a mommy. 38
On the

other,

the Oedipal drama plays out and helps
to preserve the
association between women and danger. 39

The basic ambivalence of children towards the
mother is

heightened for boys because of the need to define
masculinity in contrast to maternal feminity.

This

requirement might also understandably be interpreted by the

boy child as a betrayal of the mother, likely to incur her
dangerous wrath.

This logical fear,

prior fear of maternal re-engul f ment

in turn,
.

intensifies the

And this fear of

annihilation, traumatic for children of both sexes who must

disengage to some degree from the mother, becomes attached
in the boy's psyche not simply to some general and neutered

version of selfhood, but to masculinized selfhood.
Hence,

issues of self and gender are more closely

intermingled in the separation-indi vidua tion period for the

boy than for the girl.

In contrast,

the girl's struggle for

selfhood is not so tied up with a traumatized version of
sexual and gender identity,

for it is much more easily
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secured in relation to a
mother-caretaker who is
anatomically "like" her daughter.
Chodorow argues that the
girl's struggle is .ore likely
to be over individualized
selfhood and independence and
that it takes place during
adolescence.
if this more protracted
period
of

identification with the mother spells
unique identity
problems for the girl seeking to
disengage from the mother
as an individual,

at least the struggle for
selfhood is

overlaid on an already secure sense
of gender identity.
Freud, it would seem, underestimated
the difficulties
encountered by boys in gender acquisition.
An important feature of masculine
development as
outlined in this psychoanalytic
literature, well worth
noting for the analysis to come in
following chapters, is
the negative articulation of masculine
self-hood visa vis
the pre-posited maternal-feminine
presence.

that which is not-mother.)

(As a boy,

I

am

The rudimentary building blocks

of the boy's struggle to understand
what it is that makes

him a "boy",

a

masculine subject and agent in

a

genderically

organized and differentiated world, consist of
negative

counter-factuals garnered through comparison with the
mother.

Minimally, we can imagine that there is some

comfort, some sense of tangible definition in the

assertation that

"

what

I

am is not mother/female/feminine."

Within family settings (certainly nuclear, but others as
well) where the father is not likely to be available
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consistently as

positive source o£ substantive
information
on masculinity, proceeding by way
of negative comparison
is
a sensible strategy.
An additional feature of
the absent
father phenomenon is that overdependence
on a maternal
a

figure may require an even more
vigorous and aggressive
response on the part of the boy who is
struggling to achieve
his sense of identity.
His society may help him by providing
elaborate and rigorous
rituals with which to mark his entrance
into manhood. 40
In cultures and families that put a
high value on sex

differences which are hierarchically favorable
to men, the
boy exhibiting effeminate behavior learns
quickly that
"sisiness" is a big no-no.

For all the studies that have

been done on the horrors on sex role socialization
directed
at girls,

there is still little comparison to the distaste

and moral opprobrium levelled against effeminate
boys in our

culture.

Tomboys are tolerated and sometimes even

encouraged, especially in families that are fearful of and
for heterosexually precocious girls.

The taboo against

effeminate boys, on the other hand, suggests

a

powerful

brand of horror at the mixing or confusion of cherished and
vulnerable categories. 41
This material suggests that there are significant,

internal links between masculinity as an achieved and

precarious identity and negatively conceived femininity as
represented by the mother.

The prototypical Self-Other
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relationship which so consumed de
Beauvoir's analysis, and
which she believed to be an immutable
feature of human
consciousness, may have its roots in the
self /not-self

definitional process which the boy is forced
to engage,
contra the maternal figure, in his quest
for

identity.

The horror of identification with the
feminine,

the

strictness with which masculinity is defined
and established
in opposition to femininity, suggest a
pairing of rigidity
and vulnerability in masculinity.
Because the defining

parameters of masculinity are so strictly set, they
are all
the more susceptible to identity-threatening

phenomena.

This adds a new critical perspective to

classically conceived masculine ego "strength", compared
favorably in the psychological literature on sex differences
(until recently) to women's notorious ego boundary

"problems".

42

Indeed the flip side of such strength may

be a brittle rigidity, the diminished ability to accomodate
a shifting and unpredictable environment inhabited by

independent fellow creatures and an enigmatic nature. 43
Nancy Chodorow sums up her reconstruction of the origins and

ramifications of masculinity in

a manner that

bears directly

on the themes being explored here:
the division of labor in childrearing results in
an object i fication of women a treating of women as
others, or objects, rather than subjects, or
selves that extends to our culture as a whole.
Infantile development of the self is explored in
opposition to the mother, as primary caretaker, who
becomes the other. Because boys are of opposite
.

.

.

—

—
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fr °m their

others, they especially feel
?I^J?«
to differentiate and yet find
differentiation

a need

problematic.
The boy comes to define his self
more in
opposition than through a sense of his
wholeness
or
continuity
He becomes the self and experiences
Sis
mother as the other. The process also
trying to dominate the other in order extends to his
to ensure his
elf
SUCh dorainat ion begins with mother
as
?
the object,
extends to women, and is then generalized
to
include the experience of all others as
objects rather
than subjects.
This stance in which people are treated
and experienced as things, becomes basic
to male Western
culture. Thus the "fetishism of commodities,"
excessive rationalism of technological thought, the
the
rigid self-other distinctions of capitalism
or of
bureaucratic mass societies all have genetic and
psychological roots in the structure of parenting and
of
male development, not just the requirements of
product ion. 44
*

Chodorow's analysis here, which has much in common with
the work of Dorothy Dinnerstein and Jean Baker Miller,

brings to mind the problem— art iculated with passion and
sensitivity, but no solution, by Adorno and Horkheimer— of
the domination of Nature. 45

It is not farfetched to pose

some of the apparent links between masculine psychology,

Baconian science and post-Enlightenment forms of
rationality, even if such links do not provide a causal or

ultimately satisfactory form of explanation. 46

Like

variations on a theme, all share a rigidly conceived

universe of strictly set meanings secured by the principle
of non-contradiction and the exclusion of ambiguity.

The

unmistakably sexualized tenor of a macho reason set in

opposition to a feminized world of natural mystery that can
be decoded if it is properly tamed is especially suggestive
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of important connections. 47

The seemingly bizarre

characterization of Western culture
as necrophilic by
American and French feminists,
notably Mary Daly and Helene
Cixous, might also be more firmly
grounded in this
material. 48

if the maternal presence
as our primal

natural surround and corporeal
awakener-caretaker-f rustrator
comes to be associated with women
and Nature in a social
world that operates within a
masculinized Culture/feminized
Nature symbolic framework, such links
begin to make exciting
and profoundly distrubing sense. 49
Nature, like Woman,
simultaneously feared and desired as the
dual ground of and
threat to masculinized identity and
"humanized" Culture,
must be dominated, de-clawed and tamed
for the safety and
pleasure of an ego that would be king.
And yet, an overly subdued Nature-Other,
as de Beauvoir
saw in her Hegelian fashion and as Benjamin
relates in her

discussion of infantile aggression, threatens identity
as
dangerously as an uncontrolled one. For if the tension
between the Self and Other is lost,

if the

Other becomes

totally absorbed by the Subject, that Subject has nothing
external to itself by which to gage its own identity.

The

thrill and necessary panic engendered by the antagonistic

self-other relation requires an ongoing process of attempted
but only partially successful appropriation of an object
that must elude total domestication.

The feminist charge of

necrophilia as characteristic of masculine culture

102

identifies this extreme logical and
behavioral tendency
embedded in a masculinized Self
/feminized other relationship
projected onto and perhaps also constituting
the

culture/nature relation, although it
underestimates the
interest in keeping such tension alive
and
well.

self-styled

f eminist-ecologists

As the

active in the contemporary

anti-nuclear weapons movement are well aware,
the
realization of a dead or tamed Nature/Other
would bring the
dynamic to an abrupt halt, with horrendous
implications
for

the very future of life on this plant. 50

When we juxtapose the early experiences of
masculinity-in-development to the sexual-social arrangements
of adult life which must ensure biological and
cultural

reproduction, the life-long tasks associated with

maintaining and protecting

a

overwhelmingly demanding.

The boy who had to disengage from

masculine self appear to be

the mother as his ground of identity and love object in

order to secure a masculine version of identity, who has
spent a good portion of his adolescence bonding with other
boys, must as an adult reunite with a woman.

While Freud

rightly pointed out how the girl's problematic shift from
mother to father spelt unique difficulties for her future

relationships with men, he was less perceptive of the

difficulties in the boy's case.

When we place adult

heterosexual relationships against the backdrop of
separat ion-indi viduat ion from the mother, a previously
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hidden aspect becomes strikingly
salient. As Dinnerstein
points out, the man-to-woman
relationship is more like to
re-kindle unconscious memories of
satisfaction and terror
than the woman-to-man relationship.
Not only does the man
enjoy direct access to the body
of a woman, thereby
rekindling earlier memories of his
relation to the maternal
body, but his previous relation
to that body become
the

negative ground of his struggle to
achieve masculinity.
other words, the man's emotional and
sexual experience of
woman in heterosexual relationships
is likely to reignite
fears and struggles associated with his
prior quest for
masculine identity.

Within

a

m
a

patriarchal society, which characterizes

preindustrial social and familial organization more
adequately than contemporary social structure,
marriage was
the means for men to fulfill their social roles
and gain
access to patr iarchally based political power. 51

Hence,

within a patriarchal environment that gives men power over
women and access to power as designated heads of households,
such power can only be assumed in the name of the father.
To become fathers,

men need women.

Such an arrangement

recapitulates the earlier relationship to the mother:

both

make men dependent on women for the validation of their

manhood and for the exercise of masculine prerogatives.

And

while this dependency is easily masked by the very tangible

political domination exercised within patriarchal settings

,
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that deny women citizenship,
socio-political participation
in the public arena or much
choice concerning their marital
fate, it is nonetheless at
the vital center of the

patriarchal works.
What highlights the dependence and
potential
vulnerability of men and masculinity
within a patriarchal
setting and to an admittedly lesser
extent within modern-day
society is the specially important but
also problematic cast
of paternity.
The definitive answer to questions
of
paternity ultimately lies in the hands of
women.
Natural
(i.e.,

biologically based) difficulties in ascertaining
paternity have led to some of the most oppressive
practices
levelled against women, practices designed to
keep them
within the strictly set boundaries of the household
and to
punish them severely for sexual infract ions real

—

possible, and imagined, of their making and not. 52

in a

system where lineage and inheritance of property are

established through the line of the father, whose only
biological role in reproduction in insemination, a female

sexuality that is not naturally bound by identifiably
restricted periods of fertility and sexual receptivity must
be rigidly supervised.

This supervision has, as we know,

been carried out on the bodies and psyches of women.

The

vestige of the sexual double standard, still in operation

today within a social order that no longer requires it in

strictly functional terms, bears witness to the powerful

tradition of male control of female
sexuality and
reproductive powers.
It also suggests

that the male desire

to control female sexuality and
reproductive powers link up
in direct ways with the
ambivalence associated with the

maternal object, the (m)other.
What is of special interest here is
the question of
whether the human relationship to and
experience of

reproduction is genderically differentiated.

Thanks to the

work of political theorist Mary O'Brien,
male reproductive

consciousness has been given sustained treatment
as an
important ground of distinctively masculine
experience.

53

Her analysis provides important insight on adult
masculinity

which will be used in conjuction with the psychological

discussion of early life presented above.
In her analysis of the Western political theory

tradition, The Politics of Reproduction

,

O'Brien pinpoints a

special concern with principles of continuity which, she
argues, reflect a uniquely male concern with and attempt to

mediate a problematic and uncertain relationship to

paternity.

The identifiably masculine search for principles

of continuity outside of natural continuity, which is

perceived as being untrustworthy, bespeaks attempts to deny
female maternal knowledge and power and to establish new

grounds for knowledge,

identity and control outside of the

maternally controlled parameters of reproduction.
Arguing that men experience

a

biologically-based alienation
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in relation to the experience
of the "lost seed" and
the

nine month gestation period of
the fetus, of which they
have
no direct bodily experience,
O'Brien believes that this
experience generates the need to create
alternative modes of

continuity-with offspring, fellow human
beings, past ages,
and a nature which has excluded
males from one of its most
vital functions:
The creation of a patriarchate is,
in every sense of the
Phrase a triumph over nature. The notion^?
man as
Nature s master is often regarded as a
product
of the
modern age and the development of science.
This
is too
limited a view. Men did not suddenly
discover in the
sixteenth century that they might make a
historical
project out of the mastery of nature. They
have
understood their separation from nature and
their need
to mediate this separation ever since
that moment in
dark prehistory when the idea of paternity
took hold in
the human mind.
Patriarchy is the power to transcend
natural realities with historical, man-made
realities.
... We cannot say categorically that paternity
was
the first historical development of the
concept of
right.
We cannot say categorically that man's discovery
of the problematic freedom embedded in his
reproductive
experience was his first notion of the concept of
freedom.
We cannot say categorically that the discovery
of the ability to rearrange Nature's more problematic
strictures was man's first taste of potency and power.
What we can say is that, if these things are true, then
the history of patriarchy makes a great deal more sense
that it otherwise can.
(pp. 54-55)

O'Brien's work is important for

a

number of reasons.

Heading the list is her valiant attempt to take on the

troublesome mind-body relation.

She takes biology and

corporeal experience seriously, although she is in no sense
a

biological determinist.

Rather, O'Brien takes the
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biological as an important ground of
experience and seeks to
trace out the ways in which human
beings respond to and
shape meaning out of this experience.
Of special note is
her unique rendition of the ways
in which certain biological
processes display a dialectical rationale.
Re-formulating
Marx's rendition of the Hegelian notion
that dialectical
thinking is essentially correct because
it reflects the
dialectical patterning of reality, O'Brien
looks to the

biological process of digestion as an illustration:
Let us think back from the need to produce
which produced the need, and consider the to the hunger
process of
digestion and how it is experienced. This particular
process is not usually used in an exemplary way,
for as
a
product', human excrement is not regarded as a
higher
stage of anything nor as a suitable object of
philosophy. The honourable exception is Freud
From our own digestive processes, we are conscious
basic structure of process, our own participation of'a
in the
opposition of externality and internality, and of the
unification and transformation of objects
All
that is argued here is that human consciousness
apprehends the living body primordially as a medium of
the opposition of internality and externality, of
mediation, of negation and of qualitative
transformation.
38-39)
(pp.
.

.

....

Her focus on "the dialectical structure of our biological

functions" prompts an examination of the reproduction of the
self and of the species as the two most basic of human

experiences, ontologically and exper ientially prior to

Marx's detailed focus on the activity of productive labor
and Freud's expanded treatment of sexuality.

She finds the

failure to take reproduction seriously in the history of

philosophy and social theory a notable flaw (Hegel is an
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important exception)
^

;
,

u

but
uut it i«»
is also a provocative

pattern of denial in need of
explanation.
O'Brien's argument is that the history
of social
theorizing ignores the reproductive
arena of human

experience and practice precisely because
that man-made
history reflects the male's unique attempts
to mediate those
experiences and to deny their originally felt
expression.
Because the male experiences a problematic
and questionable
sense of relation to the process and product
of reproduction
male theorizing often reflects men's attempts
to resolve
issues of reproductive biology onto second-level
and more

abstract arenas.

Hence the creation of patriarchy as the

theoretical and practical expression of the male's
socially
(as opposed to naturally) defined right to "his"
children.

Hence the creation of a variety of social forms (notably,
marriage) emerging from a complex series of mediations

created by man.

(This does not necessarily imply that women

have never developed or taken part in such mediations.
Clearly, there are circumstances in which women tend to

benefit from acknowledged paternity, particularly

subsistence resources are scarce.)

if

Hence the creation of

artificial modes of continuity in response to the mysterious

patterning of biological time during the gestation period.
O'Brien names the rationale which governs the creation of
the social forms and ideological expressions of male mastery
the "potency principle".

The potency principle
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incorporates, as it seeks to transcend,
the biological
paternal experiences of estrangement
and uncertainty,
alienation and exclusion. These
experiences make up "the
soft core of the potency principle."
As such, the principle
is inherently vulnerable and must
be carefully protected
with negative counter-assertions. 56

O'Brien's discussion of the potency principle
illuminates the often intuited relation of
masculinity to a
psychology of conquest and domination. And the
material of
its soft

core— an intransignet sense

of

alienation— might

also relate to "the persistent dualism of male
modes of

understanding," suggest O'Brien.

The parallels in the

patterning of masculine experience, first in relation to
one's (m)other, and next in relation to the wife-child dyad,
suggest a recapitulation and further strengthening of

patterns of experience established during the early months
of life.

Turning our attention to Western culture and its

philosophical legacy, we notice multiple examples of various
treatments of the problems of alienation, the separation of
man from nature, and the separation of man from continuous
time.

O'Brien locates these problematics in the male

consciousness of reproduction.

She argues that these

persistent philosophical problems are especially reflective
of the realities of male experience.

Her discussion of

genderically differentiated time consciousness is especially
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provocative.

Arguing that the maternal mode
o£ female ti,.me
is continuous, while paternal
male time is discontinuous,
she identifies a "familiar
ambivalence"

in the male sense of

discontinuous time:
it frees men to some extent
from the continopnr,,
9
of natural cyclical time, but
Y
deprives them of
•

.

.

.

experienced generational continuity.
have clearly felt compelled to create Historical! v m0 n
c j
J
continuity, principles which operate p
in the public realm
under male control and are limited only
by men's
creative imagination.
(p. 61)

While not seeking to disqualify 'time
separated from its
biological roots' as a worthy philosophical
problem, O'Brien
is concerned about philosophy's failure
to consider
this

problem as genderically specific to male experience.

This

is another expression of de Beauvoir's concern
with a

masculine rendition of the human condition that poses
as the
whole truth, which fails to think the experience that
woman

live,

and thereby presents a distorted view of things.

Such

distortion is amplified by the human tendency to redescribe
reality in such a way as to deny the original versions of
our fears and disappointments.

The philosophical problem of continuity over time,

transposed into the political problem of the state, reflects
in significant measure a male-derived problematic. 57

Hence,

the search for principles and means of transcending

individual life spans, which are capable of doing
so in self-regenerative ways, while a compelling and

Ill

familiar issue to men and women alike,

is also uniquely

reflective of the male's solitary
experience of self and
problematic sense of regenerative
contribution over
generations.

The time lapse between copulation
and

parturition, which exacerbates the uncertainty
of paternity,
suggests that it is this experience, along
with the more

generalized human trauma associated with
mortality, which
constitutes the foundation for the idea of
time as an

enemy:

"The shadow of lapsed time is the separation
of men

from the destiny of their seed.

Paternity is,

in a real

sense, an alienated experience in abstract
time:

physiology is fate."

58

for men,

Whether and how alternative means

of experiencing time and articulating continuity
might be

derived from the maternal standpoint is a question that
merits serious attention. 59
The fundamental alienation at the heart of male

reproductive experience is also manifest in those
formulations of human nature which

predominate in the Western philosophical tradition.
placed against the backdrop of

a

When

puzzling and elusive

paternal experience, the persistent amplification of

a

second nature which magically bypasses biological categories
and imperatives takes on a specifically masculine cast.

What has been initiated in relation to one's own mother is

recapitulated in relation to all potential mothers, i.e., all
women.

The denigration and repudiation of biological first

112

nature sets the tone for an
exaltation of

a

refined "human"

(male) nature bound by no natural
or sex-specific limits.
On the other hand, these conceptions
of "human" nature end
up penalizing women for their
sex-specific experiences. The
denigration of biological first nature
is the logical

outcome of ideologies which can only
justify and glorify a
masculine rendition of the human condition
at the expense of
the female.

Mary Midgely's perceptive critique of a
human nature
posed in opposition to an animal nature that
is viewed as
necessarily limiting and degrading takes on added

significance within the frame of O'Brien analysis.

We could

say that the posing of animal vs. human, first
vs. second

nature initially appealed to a creature motivated
to mediate
a

confusing and problematic biological experience and to

master a situation that eluded his control.

Those theories

in which "the individual is constituted abstractly without
ever getting born," 60 populated by what Clifford Geertz

has termed "bloodless universals", bear the fruit of the

wish to deny maternal origins and the female reproductive

contribution.

Re-evoking infantile omnipotence, that primal

sense of self-sufficiency which we have all tragically lost,

second nature conceptions go on to embody the adult

masculine desire for

a self- and

species-generation that can

be self-consciously willed, created and controlled.

The

failure to systematically think both the humanly biological
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and distinctively female
components of human experience
reflects, at least in part, the
male's attenuated and

problematic experience of reproduction. 61
If we consider O'Brien's
analysis of gender-differen-

tiated reproductive experience in
conjunction with
psychoanalytic accounts of pre-Oedipal identity
acquisition,
we become especially sensitive to
the suggestion that
mothers occupy privileged positions within
vital arenas of
human experience.
in both frameworks, maternity
threatens
males in identifiable ways. The denial of
and attempt to

appropriate such threats become, in turn, constitutive
features of distinctly patterned ways of interpreting
and

acting in the world which may be called "masculine". 62
Thus, patriarchy may be understood as a version
of men's

attempts to overthrow female control over reproduction,
while masculinity embodies a fundamental turn away from
the
mother.

In both scenarios,

maternal power is denied even as

it poses the ultimate threat.

Its denial,

in fact,

serves

to make it even more threatening.
It

is no secret that the classic bifurcations

in Western

— mind/body, culture/nature, freedom/determinism,
reason/emotion — make little sense on the terrain of female
rationalism

experience.

63

,

.

This is not simply because the denigrated

and feminized depiction of the latter halves of these

dichotomies violate women's sense of human dignity.

We must

also consider how female reproductive experiences and the
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host of activities entailed by
them constitute a different
ground for articulating the human
condition.
On this
ground, Nature is simultaneously
part of us and external to
us, articulating itself in the
rhythms and cycles of
reproductive biology.
Pregnancy and parturition partake of
the experience of a nature over which
we have little control
even as we "labor" as active partners
with it.
Encountering
nature in our unsocialized children, we must
simultaneously
accomodate it and mold it to the imperatives
of

civilization.

64

The female reproductive experience

provides a tangible sense of connection to biological
species-life and to the species through time, it facilitates
a sense of generational,

social and historical continuity.

The experience of self in relation to biological
offspring

who partake of parental flesh and blood even as they come
to
assume autonomous lives undercuts a radically dualistic
sense of self /not-self

.

Likewise, the daughter's quest for

identity and separation from the mother who is both like and
not like her mitigates against an overly strict sense of

differentiation.
thing"

— so

("A woman is her mother/That's the main

wrote the poet Anne Sexton.)

And an experience

of time with such biological roots calls into question the

hegemony of linearly structured time that proceeds as

if the

seasons, cycles and vicissitudes of nature and human needs

were irrelevant.

65

The material presented thus far constitutes an attempt

i

.
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to trace out some of the
distinguishing features of

masculinity as identity, life experience,
and ideological
standpoint. Two key features of human
development and
social life have been scrutinized
as important arenas for
the production and experience of a
masculinity with wide-

ranging ramifications-infancy and early
childhood, as well
as paternity.
Gender-specific adult experiences in relation
to biological reproduction seem to
recapitulate the earlier
relationship to the maternal (m)other. Such
recapitulation
would seem to be differentiated along the
lines of gender.
That is, adult male and female relations to
offspring tend
to reinforce or to reinvent the earlier
sex-specific

relation to the mother.

products of

a

These parallels are not simply the

psychic repetition of earlier experiences;

they are also induced by the biological and social

circumstances attending and constituting reproduction.
Hence, women, who as daughters experienced a more protracted

period of identification with the mother figure are also
more likely to identify closely with their babies, to

experience

curious confounding of bodily and ego

a

boundaries. 66

This is a result of the biology of

pregnancy, parturition and lactation as well as of their

cultuiral elaboration within a social framework that
specifies a sexual division of labor in chi ldrear ing

Within such

a context,

child as a fait accompl

men are presented with the infant
67
.

They have had no immediately
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tangible or firsthand experience
of the creature until
it is
born.
And the biologically dictated lack
of guaranteed
airtight claims to paternity can,
under particular
circumstances, increase the psychological
distance between
father and child.
To top things off, men have an
identity
that is more strictly differentiated
and are thereby

additionally less likely than biological mothers
and women
to experience a melting of ego boundaries
in relation to
infants and "significant others". 68 Finally,
the social

facts attending the sexual division of labor,
making women

more immediately responsible for the early care
of the
young,

reinforce the relative male distance from offspring

under these circumstance. 69
The central linchpin of contemporary psychoanalytic

arguments which seek to account for gender-based differences
in psychology and personality centers on the differences
by

which boys and girls separate from the mother.

The dynamics

of the separation process already presume a sexual division
of labor in parenting arrangements such that mothers occupy
a

privileged place on the site of separat ion-indi vidua t ion

dynamics.

This point merits strong emphasis.

Without it,

accounts of gender differences are vulnerable to charges of

biological reduct ionism.

At the risk of being redundant,

am going to summarize these differences,

since they will

occupy the backdrop of and be invoked to support the
analysis of the following chapters:

Where the dynamics of

I
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mother-daughter separation tend towards
a 'failure' to
differentiate completely, masculine identity
is secured by
means of an over-emphasis on ego boundaries.
Difference and
separation from a female (m)other characterize
the boy's
quest for self within a social setting
significantly

organized in asymmetrical and hierarchic gendered
terms.
concomitant aspect of this process is that the

A

(m)other

poses a significant threat to
rigid opposition to her.

a

masculinity acquired in

The masculine process of

individuation and identity formation, understood in these
"ideal-type" terms, is susceptible to a process of
"false

differentiation" whereby the maternal other is strictly and

unrealistically objectified in split versions rather than
vitally engaged with and at least partially accomodated in
more complex manner.

a

False differentiation is potentially

capable of becoming the ground of neurotic outlooks and
activities.

It can lead to a sense of unreality and lack of

connection to the surrounding object world which must be
held at safe, manageable, and non-instrusi ve arm's length.
For some,

it

qualifies as a "world view", which:

emphasizes difference over sameness, boundaries
over fluidity.
It conceives of polarity and opposition,
rather than mutuality and interdependence, as the
vehicles of growth.
That is, it does not tolerate the simultaneous
experience of contradictory impulse: ambivalence.
Finally, this world view does not grant the other person
the status of another subject, but only that of an
object.
By extension, this object status is granted to
the entire world, which, from early on, was infused with
the mother's presence.
In these psychic tendencies, the
.

.

.
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basic elements of Western rationality
take shapeff#r#Btutioni duaiity

-
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This "male stance of over-differentiation,
of splitting
off and denying the tendencies towards
sameness, merging and
reciprocal responsiveness," 71 characterized
by a

dualistically patterned posture (me/not-me)
in relation to
the world of nature, feminized others,
and "fellow" human
beings,

seems also to be organized and enacted
within

patriarchal politics and in relation to the
experience of
paternity.
Paternity and masculine differentiation
partake
of a fundamental alienation and dualism.
If "men have
always sought principles of continuity outside
of natural

continuity," 72 this may reflect the attempt to mediate
a

primal di s-connect ion from one's mother as well as from
the
process of procreation.

Estrangement and undertainty mark

the processes of masculine ego boundary acquisition
just as

surely as they typify the felt experience of paternity.

Masculine identity and paternity also share in a conspiracy
of silence and over-compensation in relation to this

power lessness

.

Hence the relation of masculinity to a

psychology of conquest. 73
The relationship between the problematic cast of

paternity and the institution of patriarchal politics also
raises the question of the relationship between Western

masculinity and aggression.

This is a difficult issue,
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easily susceptible to gross
reductionism (i.e., testosterone
level counts) or to shrill
denouncements of macho politics.
Why do masculine sexuality and
identity appear to
be so

bound up with an ethos of aggressive
domination? We have
already noted the ways in which infantile
violence functions
as an early attempt to address
and resolve issues of
autonomy and recognition. The fact that
our earliest
aggressive stirrings are invariably directed
against a
female is significant. The specifically
masculine rendition
of these experiences is tied in with that
aspect of

differentiation which ideally involves the discovery
of the
maternal person's self, but which tends to be
reduced
to a

process of establishing dissimilarity and difference
from
the (m)other.

The overemphasis on self boundaries in the

early securing of masculine identity and its adult
version
of an insistence that others

(including, and especially

women) relinquish their own, harks back to that earlier

process of separation.

In the historical elaboration of

paternity in the West, it would seem that father-right
proceeded at the expense of mother-right, although this is
by no means entailed as the singular logical outcome of

claims to the benefits and responsibilities of paternity.
The failure of Western men to devise a notion of paternity
that might also accomodate maternity is one of the singular

tragedies of Western history.

That a paternity conceived

along such lines could only be maintained by force

74

is a
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logical and strategic outcome of a
dichotomous either/or
approach to the originally problematic
experience which
seeks to reverse, as much as possible,
the terms provided by
the initial interpretation of biology.
This material on masculine identity formation
and

reproductive experience suggests that there are ways
in
which masculine experience and identity yield certain
cognitive proclivities, tendencies which structure

perception and proceed to interpret, create and reproduce
the social world along those perceptual lines. 75

perceptual tendencies,

I

Such

want to argue, may be thought of as

comprising an overall ontological and epi stemological
framework, or world view, organized around the primacy of
the masculine subject.

This primacy is reflected not only

in those substantive and easily identified arenas of

masculine privilege and power, including what is now
identified and explored as the sexism of Western political
and social theory 76

,

but also operates at the more obscure

level of overall perceptual and cognitive organization.

We

are entitled at this point to suggest with some confidence
that a masculine cognitive orientation may well inhabit the

terrrain of modern political theory and enjoy a wide-ranging,
if obscure

(i.e.,

implicit),

influence.

This is not to say

that all men or all male political theorists think alike, or

even that all such men think in identifiably masculine
ways.

To suggest that gender is necessarily constitutive of
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identity,

thought,

that it is an unavoidable ground
of experience and
is not to say that it determines
personality
or

intellectual creations in some simplistic
or linear
fashion.
On the other hand, those of us who
take gender
seriously as a constitutive feature of
our way of being in
the world, find it difficult to
proceed as
if we are

"people" thinking "human" thoughts.

just

Thinking and knowledge

issue out of a complex process of reflection
on and response
to experience.
While the mediation of experience can take
a

variety of forms, like the varieties of human
accomodation
to and revolt against the prescriptions of
gender,

such

mediation must already be colored by the substance
of its
departure or acquiescence.
Turning our attention in the following chapters to the

political theories of Hobbes, J.S. Mill, and Marx, we will
examine their work with a view to discovering whether a

gendered substratum can be found in their theories.
a cue

from Marx's and Engels

'

Taking

observation on the links

between "intellectual wealth" and the wealth of "real
connections", we will proceed with the notion of a gendered
self as a self that is constituted in particular relational
ways.

Gender differences, we have seen, turn on different

relational experiences; these experiences produce
"masculinity" and "femininity" as different experiences and

definitions of the self-in-relat ion-to the object world.
On a concluding note, the components of

a

specifiably
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masculine outlook will be briefly
summarized with a view to
filling in the outline of masculinity
as a world view that
was initially offered at the start
of this
chapter.

The

elements of a world view, we recall,
were said to be "widely
shared", "systematically interconnected",
"'central to the
agents' conceptual shceme'", to have a
"wide and deep
influence", and to be "'central' in that they
deal with
77
central issues of human life."
the forthcoming

m

analyses of Hobbes, Marx, and J.S. Mill,

I

intend to show

that masculine ideology can be located in their
work and
that it occupies a central position in their
theories.

We

will see that elements of masculine theory are
"widely

shared" among these three key political and social
theorists

who have been more notable for their differences than
for
their similarities.

This sharing of masculine elements

spans 250 years of social and political theory in the West.

We will also see that these elements of a masculine world

view have a "deep influence" on these political theories and
that they are "central" to the formulation of what these

theorists take to be "central issues of human life."

We are

already in a position to appreciate the ways in which the
elements of a masculine ideology are or might be

"systematically interconnected":

Heading the list is a

combative brand of dualistic thinking,

a

persistent and

systematic amplification of the primal Self-Other

oppositional dynamic and the creation of dichotomously
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structured polarities by which to
describe and evaluate the
events, objects, and processes of
the natural and social
worlds.
The need for singular identity and
certainty with
respect to one's own identity and that
of other

"objects" in

the environment, a concomitant of
which is panic in the face
of threats to such certainty, would
be another perceptual

tendency.

The explicit denial of relatedness,
to "fellow-

human beings and to nature, would be tied
in with an extreme
version of masculine identity. We can also
anticipate a

repudiation of natural contingency, including those
limits
imposed by the body and the natural surround.
in connection
with this, we can expect to find examples of an

identification of contingency with the feminine.

We can

also expect to find the (m)other lurking in the shadows of
this discourse,

as an invisible and unacknowledged,

significant presence.

but

Because of the tendencies towards a

radical individualism built into the masculine

differentiation process, we might also search for various
versions of a solitary subject immersed in a hostile and

dangerous world.

Autonomy is also likely to figure as a

significant theme and ideal.

Recapi tualat ing the earlier

experience of identity through opposition and negation, we
can expect to find versions of knowledge-through-opposition,

-tension and -conflict, an antagonistic and distanced
relation between the subject and object of knowledge.
Finally, we can expect attitudes of fear, denigration and
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hostility towards whatever is identified
as female or
feminine, along with its idealization
and

glorification.

Both sets of seemingly incompatible
attitudes would
recapitulate the effects of false differentiation

from the

maternal object.

Turning now to the political and social theory
of
Hobbe S/ J.S. Mill and Marx, we will see
if these claims and
intimations of discovery can be substantiated.
If they can,
political theory qualifies (at least tentatively)
as a

gendered phenomenon and, as such, ought to be additionally

amendable to feminist inquiry and criticism on new
grounds.
If the intersection of gender and political
theory can be

established here, we are a little closer to finding and
constructing an answer to Vivian Gornick's poignant question
What, then is the f emaleness of experience? Where are
the compositional elements of a female sensibility to be
found? Under what conditions does that experience and
that sensibility become a metaphor for human existence,
thereby adding, as the maleness of experience has added,
to the small sum of human self-awareness? 78
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can no longer rely on sex-typed standard
roles, at least in terms of the
participants.
Recent
lesbian contributions to the literature and
theory of
sado-masochism make it abundantly clear that
s/m is not
domai * or Phenomenon.
y »5
See
Heresies
#12
fllan
(1981),
Sex Issue"; SAMOIS ed
Coming to Power: w7T tinqs
ra
CS
n LeSb
S /M
Bost on: Alyson Publications?
!982?
H° Lisa Orlando,
,
1982), gev
rev. by
"Another Love That Dare Not
Speak Its Name, in Gay Community News 9
(33), 13 March 1982,
pp. 1-2 of the Book Review section.
There are many ways of
explaining this pehnomenon, not all of which
undermine
Benjamin s position. For example, Lisa Orlando
suggests
that s/m may involve a playful re-enactment of
women's
experiences of domination.
(This recalls Freud's
observation on our compulsion to repeat traumatic
experiences.) Also, we should take note of the gendered
language ("butch" and "femme") that is used to designate
perpetrators" and "victims".
In this case, lesbian s/m may
be understood to be playfully mimicking established
gender
roles.
In any case, the connection between eroticism and
violation of body boundaries would seem to lie at the
complicated heart of efforts to understand and evaluate this
phenomenon. One thing is certain:
strident accusations of
politically incorrect" and "anti-feminist" are not going to
get us very far.
The vigorously nasty responses that have
recently been hurled at lesbian defenders and articulators
of s/m are nearly as provocative as s/m itself.
See the
following, also by Lisa Orlando:
"Bad Girls and 'Good'
Politics," in the Village Voice Literary Supplement 13,
Dec. 1982; and "Coming to Terms with Lesbian S/M, " in the
Village Voice 26 July 1983. See also Wendy McKenna, "The
Construction of Desire," rev. of Powers of Desire: The
Politics of Sexuality eds. Ann Snitow, et al
(New York:
Monthly Review Press, 1983), in The Women's Rev iew of Books
1

r

,

^

. ,

,

,

,

1

(6),

pp.

.

3-5.

—

1 This

account of human development is meant to be
historically and culturally situated. I do not believe that
an all-purpose norm of human or moral development is either
possible or desirable.
•^

32 See Robert Stoller,

Mascul inity (New York:

Splitting: A Case of Female
Delta Publishing co., 1973) for a

.
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(cont 'd) powerful
and disturbi
cli
description of the effects on an
adult patlen? of an
internalized mother figure who is
split!
2

,

MeWe Ln',

;SV

SCr
f
SarlieSt SpUt Eternal
'?? and
ea s
breast/bad
breast)
of the ways in which thi<?

^^(gooa

ntrnn

3
«-

*

ner essay,
Love, Guilt and Reparation," esp.
pp. 333-43
Thanks to the work of Dorothy
Dinnerstein, the now-obvfo»«
connections between the split maternal
nd
e
Beauvoir's analysis of the contradictoryi, g
and ambivalent
depiction of Woman in the West have been
spelled out in rich
33 "Love,

Guilt and Reparation," p. 306.

34 None of this,

of course, is a simple one-way
process between child and parent(s). As Nancy
Chodorow
characte ^stic care in the first chapter
of
t^t
OC
6 Re roduct
of Mothering
we must also keep
?in mind? the ways P in which
parents' attitudes towards
already sexually-differentiated children contribute their
to the
dynamics of parent-child interaction. Empirical
evidence
for the differential treatment by parents of
their
beginning in infancy, and based on their beliefs andchildren,
interpretations of gender, exists. It also seems that
differential treatment often carries the unmistakable this
tenor
of seduction, usually heterosexual.

w

^

.'.

...

35 Coppelia Kahn,

Shakespeare (Berkeley:
1981), p.

10.

,

Man's Estate; Masculine Identi ty in
University of California Press

36 For empirical
confirmation of this argument see
Gilligan's discussion In a Different Voice) of
sex-differentiated responses to the Thematic Apperception
Test, where boys tend to be threatened by pictorial scenes
of social intimacy, while girls tend to exhibit the same
feeling in response to pictures of more distanced human
beings
(

37 See Ralph R. Greenson, "Dis-Ident
i fying From the
Mother:
Its Special Importance for the Boy," in the
International Journal of Psychoanalysis 49 (1968):
370-74.

38 Robert May makes this point in his important
critique of theories of androgyny in ch. 7 of Sex and
Fantasy:
Patterns of Male and Female Development (New
York:
W.W. Norton, 1980), p. 170:
"to settle for being
daddy seems thin stuff indeed when compared with the
concrete realities of gestation, birth and nursing."

a
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3 9H
R. Hayes
The Dangerous Sex; Th g Myth of
Feiuinxne Evil (New *ork:
G.P. Putnam's
Wolfgang Lederer, The Fear of Women (New Sons! 1964)YorkHarcouriBrace, Jovanovich, 1968).
For an a nalys is of the fear of
women in the Middle East, see Fatima
Mernissi, Beyond the
Veil: Male- Female Dynamics in a Modern
Muslim So^TeT^
(Cambridge, Ma.:
Wiley, Shenkman, 1975).
.

,

'

40 The missing
father syndrome is, of course,

not
simply a modern nuclear family phenomenon.
That it has been
statistically correlated with sexually inegal
itar
societies lends some support to the psychoanalytician
approach
offered here, although the correlation (which
includes
?he
element of female-dominated childrearing) does
not provide
any conclusive proof of causal links between
the two
phenomena.
See Peggy R. Sanday, Female Power and Male
Dominance, Appendix C, pp. 239-247:
See also Eli Sagan,
Cannibalism, Human Aggression and Cultural Form
(New YorkHarper and Row, 1974). For some vivid descriptive
accounts
of male initiation rites, see Mircea Eliade, Rites
and
Symbols of Initiati on: The Mysteries of Birth an d RPhirt-h
(New York!
Harper and Row, 1958)
.

41ln Man-Made Language (London: Routledge and Kegan
Paul, 1980), Dale Spender observes a relevant semantic
rule
in the English language:
masculine terms which have become
gradually feminized through time are never re-introduced as
terms of masculine denotation, except when used in a
derogatory fashion against males. Similarly, masculine
terms used to describe women are complimentary, whereas the
obverse is never true. The sad fate of the protagonist in
Herculine Barbin intro. Michael Foucault (New York:
Pantheon Books, 1980) also bears witness to the rule that
that which has been categorized as feminine cannot be
accepted into masculine ranks. Social critics such as
Spender interpret this semantic rule in strictly political
terms.
It seems to me that something else is also going on
in the non-trans ferabi lity of feminine to masculine.
Psychoanalytic theory suggests that the masculine category
itself is just too vulnerable to risk "pollution".
,

4^see Jean Baker Miller's provocative
re-interpretation of this material, which sheds a more
positive light on women's attunement to the nuances of their
environment (otherwise known as "field dependency") and on
their abilities to sustain multiple and complex social ties
in Toward A New Psychology of Women
Her suggestion that
the classically conceived Freudian ego may be more
appropriate as a standard for the masculine subject adds
further grist to the mill. For a comparable argument
.

.
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(c ° nt d)
relating to moral development
P
Gilligan, In a Different Voice

nnt

.

43_,

see
See
'

.

This attempt to draw out some of
the oroblPm^Mo

Y
unproblematic or necessarily superior to
masculine
eSe fe tUreS
* art
becomes
?.
SSSlSi. TrlTl'»T
m a
femnine
P° in t of view. See Gilliqan
°
?n - n
„
rent V ° 1Cfa f ° r an
r ^ch that explores
ways
in which
wh? h masculinity and femininty
may be brouaht to
°n
each other in mutually critical and
helpLl Says!
-

^

m

W

.

1

44 Nancy

Chodorow, "On The Reproduction of Mothe ring,
Debate," i n SignS: Journal of Wo melTT^
in
Culture and Society 6 3 )
5 02-503.

a Methodological
Mo( h
A
.

(

:

45 T.W.

Adorno and Max Horheimer, Dialectic of
Enlightenment (New York: The Seabury Press,
originally wrote this chapter, Isaac Balbus' 1972). sincP
book Marxism
and Domination: A Neo-Heae l ian. Feminist.
PsychoanaTvff^
Theory of Sexual, Politi cal, and Technological
LibeT.1
(Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1982), has come'
out.
He too finds significant parallels between
female-centered parenting and "modes of symbolizat
ion"
According to Balbus, the "instrumental mode of
symbolizat ion", which includes the ob ject i f icat ion
of
nature, prevails as a persistent modern problematic
that
social theory must engage and attempt to transcend.

I

^

46 Evelyn Keller,
"Gender and Science," in
Psychoanalysis and Contemporary Thought 1 (3):
409-53Benjamin, "The Bonds of Love".
For a critique of the
explantory abuses of gender theory, see Iris Marion Young,
"Is Male Gender Identity the Cause of Male Domination?"
in
Mothering: Essays in Feminist Theory ed. Joyce Trebilcott
(Totowa, N.J.:
Rowman and Allanheld, 1983), pp. 129-46.
,

47 See Genevieve
Lloyd, "Reason, Gender, and Morality
in the History of Philosophy," in Social Research 50 (3):

514-536.

See also Keller,

"Gender and Science".

See Mary Daly, Gyn/Ecology:
The Mataethics of
Radical Feminism
Boston: Beacon Press, 1978
(

)

49 See Sherry B.
Ortner, "Is Female to Male as Nature
is to Culture?" in Woman, Culture and Society eds. Michelle
Rosaldo and Louise Lamphere (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1974), pp. 67-87.
For important critiques of
Ortner' s mistaken universal ization of the
f emale-nature/ male-culture opposition, see the collection of
,
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49

cont
S Y
edlted by Caro1 MacCormack and
Marilyn Strathern,
Marilvn
si-r^v,
f
T f
Nature,
Culture and Gender
(Cambria
'

(

r\ \

essay,
Nature, Culture and Gender: A
Critique," dd
For a poetic rendition of the
woman-nature connection in
Western culture, see Susan Griffin,
Woman and S
? he
Roaring Inside Her
(New York:
Harp
P er and Row
1978)
See
*
er
A
ssion D -th and the Discontents of
:
2iv?ii"?
ln
Freud's Unfinished Journey pp.

^

'

107-128?

<

,

5

e * Ynestra Kin 9' "Feminism and
the Revolt of
°f,
m ,
Nature,"
in Heresies #13 4 (1), pp. i 2 -i 6
.

Slsee Peter Laslett, The World
We Have Lost:
England
Before the Industrial Age (New York:
Scnbner's,
1973):
No single man, we must remember, would
usually take charge
e
and
ny more than a single man would often be
found
°Z
£?
>
!
at the i
head of a workshop in the city. The master
of
a
ramily was expected to be a householder
Marriage, we must insist, and it is one of the
rules which
gave its character to the society of our ancestors,
was
entry to full membership, in the enfolding countryside,
as
well as in the scattered urban centres."
(p. 12)

....

52 See Susan Brownmiller,
Against Our Will: Me n.
Women and Rape (New York: Bantam Books, 1976; Simon 'and
Schuster, 1976), esp. ch. 2.
53 Mary O'Brien,

The Politics of Reproduction

.

54 See May, Sex and Fantasy
for the argument that
theories of androgyny reflect men's desires to repudiate and
appropriate for themselves maternal powers. See also Janice
Raymond , The Transsexual Empire: The Making of the
She-Male (Boston: Beacon Press, 1979) for a similar
analysis applied to the technology of sex-change operations.
,

55 See O'Brien's

provocative and critical analysis of
Hegel's masculine bias, in The Politics of Reproduction, pp.
24-25.

'

56 See

Sigmund Freud, "On Negation," in The Standard
Edition of the Complete Works of Sigmund Freud vol. XIX,
trans and ed James Strachey
London
The Hogarth Press,
1975), pp. 245-239, for his important exploration of this
psycho-intellectual dynamic.
,

.

.

57 See Breger,

(

:

Freud's Unfinished Journey pp. 22-24,
for a discussion of the world view of the modern state.
Breger argues that this view includes the joint extolling of

-
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m^J^ti^^

of

58 °' Brien

'

* lrtU

" -d

^

The Politics of Reproduction

notion

,

p.

62

..

59SS Sara Rudd i^'s important
essay, "Maternal
m
v
Thinking,"
in Femini st Studies 6 (2).
I
helpful hints. see also Smith s
discussion^ 'her'
experience of time and agency in "A
Sociology for Women"
and Julia Kristeva, "Women's time,"
in Signs* Journal of
Women in Culture and Society. 7 (l)
13 -35?
s

60 O'Brien,

The Politics of Reproduction

,

p.

184

.

6 F°r

a fascinati ng example of men's
creative,
r !
helpful
and, non-dominating efforts to take
part
biological process of reproduction, see Mead's in the
discussion of
Arapesh men in Sex and Temperament
According to her
account, Arapesh men believe that they have
an active and
r
t0 PlaY in the
rowth of the fetus:
°^\
9
they must
"ifeed
i..
it by having regular sexual intercourse
with their
wives for a designated period of time after
the women become
pregnant.
The most striking example of their involvement
reproduction is conveyed by Mead's anecdote of an Arapesh in
response to her comments on the handsome features
of a
certain man:
"Yeeeees? But you should have seen him before
he had so many children." Not surprisingly, Mead's
Arapesh
men were also involved in child-care.
1.

1

.

62 "Masculinity" is being
used here in the
historically and culturally specific sense (not necessarily
limited to industrial capitalism) of the outcome of a
process of gender identity formation and acquisition
undergone by males and secured within a social and symbolic
context that includes all or most of the following factors:
primary care of infants and children provided by a single
female mother and/or group of females; general lack of
intimate contact between fathers and young offspring; a
social structure organized in terms of a sexual division of
labor, male dominance in certain key sectors of the economy,
and highly articulated cultural expressions of gender
differences and male superiority. See the following
anthropological works for helpful discussions of the context
for masculinity:
Sagan, Cannibalism and John Whiting and
Irving Child, Child Training and Personality: A
Cross-Cultural Study (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1953
See also Balbus, Marxism and Domination for his
effort to historicize Dinnerstein s analysis of the effects
of female-dominated child care.
;

)

.

'

.
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6 3 It

has also, of course,

failed to make sense

to
certain men, as the Romantic revolt against
post-Enlightenment rationalism suggests. A full accounting
of Romanticism is beyond the scope of this work.
At
point, I am inclined to argue that much of Romantic this
thinking
failed to transcend the dichotomous framework it was
rebelling against. See M.H. Abrams, Natural
Supernat uralism; Tradition and Revolution in Romantic
Literature (New York and London- W.W. Norton, 1971); Perry
Miller, The American Transcendental i sts (New York:
Doubleday, 1957); and Charles Taylor, Hegel
(Cambridge:
University Press, 1974), esp. ch. 1.
64.

Much of this description is indebted to O'Brien,
The Politics of Reproduction and Ruddick, "Maternal
Thinking"
?

2

65 See Carlos
Fuentes, "Writing in Time," in Democracy
61-74, for a provocative treatment, from a Third
(1):

World perspective, of Western conceptions of time.
Kristeva, "Woman's Time".
66 See Adrienne Rich,

Experience and Institution

See also

Of Woman Born:
Motherhood as
(New York:
W.W. Norton, 1976).

67 Mead's

analysis of the Arapesh in Sex and
Temperament suggests that some men, at least, feel much more
connected, biologically speaking, to their offspring. See
n.

61 above.

uo We might also note that men often seem to harbor
distrust of and jealousy towards newborns as challengers to
their previously undisturbed access to wives as sexual
cohorts. See, for example, David Hunt's Parents and
Children in History: The Psychology of Family Life in Early
Modern France (New York: Harper and Row, 1972) which
documents Henri IV s deliberate distancing of his wife and
newborn son. Hunt's explanation of the elite practice of
sending newborns out to wet-nurses is also compelling in
women were not the prime movers in the
this respect:
In any case, the final authority in
hiring of nurses.

"...

....

important family matters did not rest with them
Almost all doctors who begged women to breastfeed their own
children recognized at some point in their argument that the
paterfamilias was perhaps the more important party to be
persuaded.
Putting a baby out to nurse had the effect of
If the
leaving the mother at the disposal of her mate.
child remained on his [sic] mother's breast, the husband
would then find himself in the position of competing for the
(p. 106)
attention and loyalty of his wife."

,
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69 as
a
a general characterization,

this argument
neither seeks nor requires an unsympathetic
Y
genuinely nurturant fathers. Despite their denial of many
increasing
numbers, they continue to be the exceptions
which prove,
rather than deny, the existing and prevalent
rule.
The
argument concerning relative male distance from
offsorinq
should not be construed as a denial of paternal
love',
either.
The important point concerns the qualitative
differences between the psychological orientations to
and
forms of parenting engaged by mothers and fathers.
See
Diane Ehrensaft, "When Men and Women Mother," in Socialist
Review 49 (Jan-Feb. 1980), pp. 37-73.
70

'^Benjamin,

"The Bonds of Love," pp.

71 Ibid.,

150.

p.

148-149.

72 0'Brien, The Politics
of Reproduction

,

p.

33.

73 For helpful
amplifications of this theme see the
following: Benjamin, "The Bonds of Love"; Chodorow, The
Reproduction of Mothering ; Dinnerstein, The Mermaid ancTthe
Mi notaur ; Nancy Hartsock, Money, Sex and Power;
Toward a

Feminist Historical Materialism (New York and London:
Longman, 1983) esp. ch. 7; May, Sex and Fantasy Sagan,
Cannibal ism
;

.

74 This is not to suggest that women
have been nothing
but unwitting and passive victims in the historical
elaboration of familial and sexual organization. Women have
often used the family and their sexuality as a source of
covert power. See the discussion in ch. 2 of Margaret
Stacey and Marion Price, Women, Power, and Politics (London
and New York: Tavistock, 1981). On the other hand, an
apparatus of intimidation and physical force has operated to
maintain the domination of men over women. See the
following: G.J. Barker-Benf ield The Horrors of the
Half-Known Life: Male Attitudes Toward Women and Sexuality
in Nineteenth-Century America
(New York:
Harper and Row,
1976); Kathleen Barry, Female Sexual Slavery
(New York:
,

Avon Books, 1979); Susan Brownmiller, Against Our Will:
Men, Women and Rape Cambridge Women's Studies Group, ed
Women in Society:
Interdisciplinary Essays (London:
Virago Press, 1981), esp. sec. 2 "Definition and Coercion"
;

.

and sec. 3 "Politics, Sexuality, Choice"; Mary Daly,
Gyn/ Ecology Andrea Dworkin, Woman Hating
(New York:
E.P.
Dutt on, 1974); Barbara Ehrenreich and Deirdre English, For
Her Own Good:
150 Years of the Experts' Advice to Women
Linda Gordon, Woman's Body,
Doubleday 1979
Garden Ci ty
Woman's Right: A Social History of Birth Control in
Ame r i ca
Penguin Books, 1977); Mary
(Middlesex:
;

(

:

,

)

;

.
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Woman,

(cont'd) Wollesntonecraft
Mari
intto. Moira Ferguson
(New *ork:

wronqs of
w.W? Norton, [ 9 75

)

75 My approach
here presumes two important

orientations towards the specified relationships
between
knowledge language, and reality. The
first is that
knowledge
(what can be known and how it can be
known) is
materially situated in particular ways of
life.
(This is
not to say that it is determined, in a
one-way linear
fashion, by ways of life.)
For an appreciation of this
in debted to a host of thinkers, including
Karl
£°;f
Marx, Karl Mannheim, Ludwig Wittgenstein,
and Peter Winch.
ar lculates th is position admirably in her
essay,
^
J
Mother-Daughter
Relationships". The second is that
categories of language do not passively reflect the
givens
of an established reality, but help to constitute
the
objects of perception and hence, help to constitute
"reality" itself.
See Benjamin Whorf, Language, Th ought and
Reallt Y
(Cambridge, Ma.:
The M.I.T. Press, 1956). On this
view, language does not simply describe, it also
engages in
the active interpretation and construction of reality.
For
a feminist utilization of this conception
of language, with
important implications for questions of feminist politics
and strategy, see Dale Spender, Man-Made Language
See also
Jean Bethke Elshtain, "Feminist Discourse and Its
Discontents: Language, Power and Meaning," in Signs
Journal of Women in Culture and Society 7 (3),:
603-621.
.

76 See the following:
Lorenne Clarke and Lynda Lange,
eds., The Sexism of Social and Political Theory:
Women and

Reproduction From Plato to Nietzsche (Toronto: University
1980); Mary Mahowald, Philosophy of
Woman:
Classical to Current Concepts
Indianapolis
Hacket Publishers, 1978); Martha Lee Osborne, ed
Woman in
Western Thought (New York: Random House, 1979).
of Toronto Press,

(

. ,

77 Guess,

The Idea of a Critical Theory

,

p.

10.

78 Vivian Gornick, "Toward a Definition of the Female
Sensibility," in her Essays in Feminism (New York: Harper
and Row, 1978), pp. 113-114.
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CHAPTER

III

HOBBESIAN (HU)MAN

He that is to govern a whole
nation,
himself, not this or that particular must read in
mankind; which though it be hard to man; but
do, harder than
7 l£mgua 9 e or science; yet when I shall
have set? J"
down my own reading orderly and
perspicuously, the pains left another,
will be only
Y
to consider, if he also find not
the same in
himself
Thomas Hobbes, Introduction to Leviathan

Introduction
Hobbes is most famous, of course,

for his Leviathan

grand masterwork in which he sought to provide

radically changing time.

the

a

comprehensive scientific theory of civil society for
1

,

a

He is perhaps best known for

his notorious yet compelling description of the
state of
nature,

in which life is grimly portrayed as a war of
all

against all, where insecurity and fear are the primary
constants.

His effort was to deduce a theory of legitimate,

uncontested and stable civil authority from what he saw as
set of fairly dismal facts of the human condition.
so,

In doing

he rejected both divine right and majority choice

theories of political authority, arguing instead for

a

secular civil authority that would be made capable of

withstanding the vagaries of competing and always private

139

a
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interests.

The legitimacy of this authority
was based by
Hobbes on the quasi -democratic
hypothetical consent of all
rational and right-thinking citizens who,
according to

Hobbes, would freely agree to such
authority on the basis of
their rational recognition of the
requirements for the

satisfaction of their desires for life and
security.

This

initially democratic basis of civil authority
(which
explains Hobbes'

s

status as a modern liberal political

theorist) could not, however, be renegotiated,
since men's
(and Hobbes did mean "men") unruly passions
were

untrustworthy.

Hence, Hobbes

's

civil authority is fully

sovereign and self-generating over time.

It must be,

since

it rules over an unsteadily harnessed state of
nature.

Why do we continue to read Hobbes today?

Aside from

historical interest, what makes him an important political
thinker for our time?

MacPhereson has argued that Hobbes

provides the first and freshest portrait of bourgeois,

propertarian man. 2

Others see his principles actively at

work in contemporary American politics, which preserve and

perpetuate Hobbesian notions of ruthless individualism,
transactional relations between individuals and among
interest groups, a civil authority whose sole function is
that of policeman, and a view of politics as nothing but

conflict management.

3

For some, Hobbes is the crucial

connecting link between the political thought of the
|t

Renaissance and that of modern liberal democracy. 4
i
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MacPherson has also suggested that
we are drawn to Hobbes
because his state of nature lurkes
in the horrifying
scenario of nuclear war and its
socio-political aftermath.
I

would add yet another:

perpetuates

Hobbes

's

5

thought reflects and

distinctively masculinist orientation
to the
realm of politics that continues to
be male-dominated
a

and

governed by masculinist presumptions in
our own time.
To
the extent that this masculinist
orientation dovetails with
other aspects of Hobbes s contemporary
relevance,
feminist

'

criticisms of his work promise to illuminate
Hobbesian
features of contemporary social life in
politically helpful
ways
.

A Male Standpoint
We can begin with a simple question.

about humankind or men?

Was Hobbes writing

While his theory seems to be

addressed to humanity in general, it is clear that Hobbes
was writing for a male audience and from a male point of
view.

Few English women of the 1650'

s

were literate 6 and

it seems that the occasional queens of the past were the

exceptions which proved the standard rule that women were
either unfit or less fit than men for civil affairs.

Hobbes

would have had little reason to imagine that the women of
his time would study and discuss his theory, much less be in
a

position to implement it.

And while his theory of
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sovereign rule did not exclude
female authority, this says
more about Hobbes s theory of
authority, succession and
obedience than indicating any particular
generosity towards
women as citizens and rulers.
Hobbes's deliberate
'

under-description of the sovereign ruler
leaves the question
of sexual identity quite open.
But this must be understood
as a side effect of his attempt
to sever the question of

legitimate authority and obedience due to
that authority
from the personal characteristicsof
the sovereign authority.
Hobbes's overly facile account of the
historical

emergence of paternal authority in De Cive
and Leviathan
suggests that he was neither perturbed by nor
curious about
women's civil inequality to men. What makes this

specifically noteworthy is his discussion of original
maternal authority and his description of the radical
equality between all persons in the state of nature,
where

personal differences in wit and strength are cancelled out
by the simpler and more devastating ability of anybody to

eliminate an opponent through murder.

Hence,

in his

discussion of the problem of succession of sovereign
authority, Hobbes writes, with no apparent discomfort:
"Among children the males carry the pre-eminence in the

beginning perhaps, because for the most part, they are
fitter for the administration of greater matters, but

specially of wars." 7

(How males got to be fitter is the

question Hobbes never asks.

Given his portrayal of radical

143

equality in the state of nature, it
is a question we are
entitled to ask him.)
A few scattered remarks in Hobbes's
work suggest more
definitively that he did assume a male
standpoint as, for
example,

in this curious,

if not depressing,

treatment of

same-sex (between men) and heterosexual (man
to woman) love:
Moreover, the love, whereby man loves man,
is understood
in two ways; and good will appertains to
both.
But it
is called one kind of love when we wish
ourselves well
and another when we wish well to others.
Therefore a
male neighbor is usually loved one way, a female
another; for in loving the former, we seek his
good, in
loving the latter, our own. 8
'

In The Citizen,

Hobbes uses subjects, sons and servants in

relation to their respective sovereigns,

fathers and masters

to discuss authority, obedience and liberty:

whether subject

son

,

,

".

.no

.

man,

or servant is so hindered by the

punishments appointed by the city

,

the father

,

or the lord

,

how cruel soever, but that he may do all things and make use
of all means necessary to the preservation of his life and

health." (p. 216)
wives, daughters,

— as
subjects — is

This implicit exclusion of women
mothers,

servants or civil

recapitulated, incredibly enough, in his discussion of the
family, where we would expect to find females,

else:

"A father

,

if

nowhere

with his sons and servants, grown into

civil person by virtue of his paternal jurisdiction,

called a family

.

"

(p.

217)

is

Female servants notwith-

standing (we will give Hobbes the benefit of the doubt

a

.
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here), where have the daughters
and wives gone? Women,
together with children, do get special
notice in On Man and
again in Leviathan for their unique
propensity for crying,

which Hobbes attributes to the fact tht
they "have the least
hope in themselves and the most in
9
friends."

(Presumably, women cry in order to elicit
sympathy and aid
for themselves.)
They are joined by cattle in Leviathan
as
those possessions which men in the state
of nature stand to
loose in those inevitable skirmishes with
other men:
So that in the nature of man, we find three
principal causes of quarrel. First, competition;
secondly, diffidence; thirdly, glory.

The first maketh men invade for gain; the second,
for safety; and the third, for reputation.
The first
use violence, to make themselves masters of other
men's
persons, wives, children, and cattle; the second, to

defend them

.

.

.

(p.

81)

This excerpt in particular betrays the actual meaning
embedded within a supposedly generic use of "mankind".
leaves little doubt that Hobbes'

s

It

"man" is not only

propertarian, but also male.

These last two examples are provocative for what they
suggest about Hobbes

's

implicit exemption of women from the

lifeways and standards of a civil order built on the

foundation of a state of nature.

However, he never develops

this insight nor does he explicitly consider some of the
ways in which women might force a reconsideration of his

depiction of human nature.

Rather,

females occupy a kind of

nether zone,

a

category of persons who can be
generally

located under the rubric of humanity
and human nature but
who are also excluded, by
implicit logic and meaning, as
well as explicitly, in his
writings.

Would Hobbes have women look into
themselves as a test
and confirmation of his theory
of human nature? 10
Probably not. Such a question, it
is obvious, would have
made little sense within the context
of Hobbes
1

Today, however,

s

time.

in keeping with the spirit of
Hobbes

'

s

maxim

that we "read mankind in ourselves,"
such a task is an
important part of the effort to come to
critical terms with
the Hobbesian vision of a civil order
built on the

foundation of "human" passions and requirements.
The important issue here, of course,

is not whether

Hobbes meant to include or exclude women in
his studies of
human nature and political life. conceivably,
a p_ro forma

inclusion of women would not automatically close
the search
for masculinist ideology in his work.

Conversely, the

exclusion of women does not automatically imply the
presence
of masculinist ideology in his work.

However,

the evidence

for an uncritically and unref lect i vely assumed male
subject
as the standard bearer for all citizens certainly invites

further exploration with a view towards looking for the man
in "man".

Such a search must begin with Hobbes

the passions.

'

s

account of
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The Passions

The temptation to portray
Hobbes as a Grand Inquisitor
intent on repressing the dangerous
and unruly passions of
men in the interests of a secure
civil peace is difficult to
resist.
Hobbes himself often contributes
to this view
as, for example, when he writes
in Leviathan that "the

passions unguided, are for the most
part mere madness." (p.
Yielding to such temptation, however,
48)
generates an
overly facile and misleading account of
Hobbes 's political
theory; it does little to advance the
quest for a genuine
engagement with the substance and spirit of
his work.
Hobbes is a dedicated student of the passions.

Not only

does he take them seriously, but he refuses to
pass moral

judgement upon them.

They are what they are:

neither good

nor evil in and of themselves or within the state
of

nature.

"The desires, and other passions of man, are in

themselves no sin.

No more are the actions,

from those passions, till they know
them."

(

Leviathan

,

p.

fact that within Hobbes

constitute

a

83)
'

s

a

that proceed

law that forbids

Of special significance is the

account some of the passions

tangible foundation for human reason and are

the point of origin for state of nature attempts to secure

peace.

The passion for life and a reason motivated in large

part by an instinctual and lusty curiosity about the world
of causes and effects converge in the state of nature to

"

,
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produce the enlightened
self-interest through which men
come
to appreciate the dictates
of right reason and to
understand
the requirements for a lasting
peace and felicitous life.
If nature has made man
unfit for society, it has
also
provided the means for man to create
an artificial
representation and enforcement of the
naturally situated
dictates of right reason which are
presumably available
to

all rational minds.

that is,

For though the "perturbations
of mind,

emotions such as fear, anger and
covetousness

impede the acquisition of knowledge,
not sometimes in a quiet mind."

"there is no man who is

(The Citizen

,

p.

148)

Hobbes's grand Leviathan is "artificial"
only in the sense
of being created by men.
It is no more "unnatural" than
a
work of art.

Curiosity, defined by Hobbes as "a lust of
the mind,"
which "exceedeth the short vehemence of any
carnal

pleasure,"

(

Leviathan

,

p.

35)

is,

distinguishes men from animals.
consider Hobbes

'

s

along with reason, what
We would also do well to

own self-attributed passion for lustily

conceived intellectual activity, which he described in vivid
and sensuous terms:

"...

how great a pleasure it is to

the mind of man to be ravished in the vigorous and perpetual

embraces of the most beautiful world." 12
If he calls for a harnessing of the passions in civil

society,

such an arrangement is designed to guarantee some

security for a portion of their satisfaction against the
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certitude of their non-satisfaction
in a state of nature
characterized by "an incessant war
of all against all."
He
has no blue-print for the
elimination or repression of the
passions in civil society although
he does argue for their
artificial control:
"... laws were not invented fcQ
away, but to direct men's
actions; even as nature ordained
the banks, not to stay, but to
guide the course of the
stream."
The Citizen p. 268)
It is precisely because he
takes the passions so seriously that
his prescriptions for
civil society seem so stringent.
Yet, his controls are
purely external; there is no hint in
his works of a desire
to tamper with the passions themselves.
Of

^

(

,

course, this

leads to a purely pragmatic politics
and to his vision of a
civil order denuded of ethical or personal
discourse. 13
But if Hobbes's ideal society leaves no
room for public

discourse on matters of conscience, at least
he has the good
grace to leave conscience and the realm of
desire alone. 14
Hobbes's work, then, presents an invitation to
consider
the passions in their full breadth.

It

is on this terrain

that we must initially search for hints of an
identifiably

masculine outlook.
this:

the question that we bring to Hobbes is

Is masculinity inscribed within his account of the

passions?

Because the passions are the building blocks of

his resolutive-compositive method, contributing to his

extensive treatments of human nature, the state of nature,
civil authority and obligation, they provide the logical

.
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starting point for any inquiry
into his conception of
politics
Man is portrayed by Hobbes as a
kind of desiring
machine.
The relevant point is not so
much whether Hobbes
believed that this portrayal was
literally true.
Rather, it
is that for Hobbes,

the language pertaining to the
movements

of a desiring machine was the
only way to scientifically

apprehend human nature. 15

Hobbes

's

attempt to develop a

scientific method of description and
explanation for what we
now call the social sciences is made
manifest in his
painstaking step-by-step reconstruction of
man, which beings
with the smallest bits of usable information
which are then
combined into ever more complex formulae.
These bits name
the elementary motions of a body towards
or away from

various objects.

(For Hobbes, what is called "sense" is

nothing but the sensible apprehension of motions
to which we
give various names, such as "sight", "sound", etc.
If we

want to make linguistic and logical sense out of

perceptions, Hobbes insisted, we must stop talking as if
the

qualities of perception actually inhered in the objects of
perception.

This was metaphysical gobbledy-gook which he

had no interest in sustaining.)

Hence,

Hobbes begins his

catalogue of the simple passions with appetite or desire,
and aversion, which designate movement towards or away from

other moving objects which are perceived to cause pleasure
or pain.

His subsequent cataloguing and definition of those
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passions which comprised the linguistic
fare of his time is
bult on the foundation of aversive
or appetitive motion.
Love is but another name for desire
when the desired object
is present, approachable, and
attainable.
Contempt
is

"nothing else but an immobility

...

of the heart,

resisting the action of certain things."
Finally,

(

Leviathan

in
,

p.

32)

the more complex passions such as courage,

ambition, the passion of love,

jealousy, and admiration

reflect such things as the perceived likelihood
of their
attainment, the objects which are loved or hated,
the

simplier passions in various combinations, and
their various
temporal and spatial relationships to each other
and to

their objects.

Laughter and weeping,

for example,

are both

"sudden motions" prompted by sudden "dejection" or "glory"
in the face of unexpected pleasure or pain.

Hobbes's approach to the passions is an analytic one in

which he seeks to give his nominalism full play:

he seeks

to provide a rigorous means of defining standard terms of

everyday language such that his subsequent discussion of

human nature and civil society, along with the anticipated
objections of critics, will not be muddled by imprecise
thinking.

For "the light of human minds is perspicuous

words, but by exact definition first snuffed and purged from

ambiguity

..."

(

Leviathan

,

pp.

29-30).

what is especially

striking about his catalogue of the passions is the attempt
to radically simplify the various emotional yearnings and

.

torments of the heart and mind.

While Hobbes's subsequent account
of human nature is
undoubtedly pessimistic, it is important
to bear in mind
that his catalogue of the passions
contains a balanced
itemization of passions which we would

label as "good" in

the sense of being conducive to
sociability.

Courage,

benevolence, magnanimity, good nature (good
will) and even
kindness find their way into the account of
the human
passions which Hobbes lays out in Leviathan. 16
While life
in the state of nature may be "nasty,
mean, brutish and

short," human beings are by no means all nasty.

Unfortunately, the nasties, however few, set the pace
for

everyone else in a zero sum game where every winner
implies
a

loser.

Those who would refute Hobbes by pointing out various
features of human behavior or emotion which are conducive to

peace are taking the wrong tack.

Hobbes's point is not that

human beings are especially evil or deliberately
anti-social.

It is rather that we inevitably get into each

other's way.

For appetitive machines that engage

incessantly in the pursuit and maximization of pleasure
cannot help bumping into and impeding the motion of each

other
The noteworthy aspect of Hobbes's chronicle of the

passions,

for our purposes,

portrait of human nature.

is not that it paints an ugly

Rather,

it

is that

it presents
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and requires a view of desire
and motivation which is
strictly self-originating and
self-controlled within the
bounds of a clearly delineated
ego.
Objects of desire
derive only from individual will.
Commonality
of

desire-for example, the universal
fear and avoidance
death-figures only as a sum total of

of

individual desires

bound in external allegiance to

a

shared object.

What is

markedly absent here is the notion
of types of desire
constituted socially or intersub ject i

vely-f or example,

the

desire for community which is kindled
and explored within a
social context.
Objects of desire for Hobbes can only
pertain to individual yearnings for satisfaction.
And those
of us who might invoke persuasion, as
a counter-example
to

Hobbes'

ultra-individualized conception of desire, which
might open the way towards a recognition of
s

intersubjectively secured values and desires, will have
to
contend with the Hobbesian retort that persuasion is
nothing
but the displacement of one will by another.
In the Hobbesian world,

desire is a private and

individual affair, some of whose outward effects must be

checked by civil authority.

But desire itself has no place

of substance in the political arena of discourse and

law-making.

Hobbes

'

s

egoism "is only the individuality of

creature shut up, without hope of immediate release, within
the world of his own imagination.

Man is, by nature, the

victim of solipsism; he is an indi viduae substant iae

a
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distinguished by

i

ncommunicabi li ty

"
.

i7

what communication

there is takes place as a result of
agreement on the
definition of terms. Like the "discourse"
of a contract,
Hobbes's nominalist notion of communication
is remarkably
antiseptic. Hence, Hobbes's nominalist
epistemology and his

egoism are fundamentally connected.
Hobbes's approach to the passions generates
his
treatment of the human subject in relation
to rather than
with others. His rendition of the primary
play of

ego-centered desire is recapitulated in his account
of
social intercourse, described vividly by Michael

Oakeshott:

Between birth and death, the self as imagination
and
will is an indestructible unity, whose relations
with
other individuals are purely external.
Individuals may
be collected together, may be added, may be
substituted
for one another or made to represent one another,
but
can never modify one another or compose a whole in
which
their individuality is lost.
Every reason is
individualized, and becomes merely the reasoning of an
individual without power or authority to oblige
acceptance by others: to convince a man is not to enjoy
a common understanding with him, but to displace his
reason by yours. 18
At the same time, Hobbes's thoroughly inviolable ego is

threatened by the fear and distinct possibility of ultimate

dissolution

— namely,

opponent.

This stark picture provides the components for

Hobbes's depiction of

death at the hands of a social

a

civil order which is either governed

by the strong hand of authority (an inviolable ego in the

ultimate sense) or reduced to a state of internal dissension
(signifying death for civil authority as well as for
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Particular citizens.)

Clearly evident here is a
thorough
going preoccupation with the
integrity of a self
that is

strictly delineated and
self-contained, a potential victim
of similarly constructed
egos.
Hobbes's own presentation of
his Leviathan as "an artificial
man" makes the connection
between a civil order as
organism-mechanism and
the

individual as organism-mechanism
quite evident.
Norman Jacobson has suggested

that "We still read

L6Viathan after three centuries

.

.

.

because we have all

experienced the threat to the self
implicit in the dread of
personal annihilation." 19 Jacobson's
observation could be
further refined by asking whether
this threat of personal
annihilation is not also significantly
tinged with
a

specifically masculine sense of selfhood.

I

would suggest

that what we find in Hobbes's account
is a vital concern
with the survival of a self conceived in
masculine terms.
The strict differentiation of self from
others, identity

conceived in exclusionary terms, and perceived
threats to an
ego thus conceived which will be minimally
displaced and

maximally dissolved by an invader all recapitulate
issues
encountered and constructed in the securing of masculine
identity vis a vis a female maternal presence.

These themes

receive their fullest treatment in Hobbes's state of
nature

— that

imaginary zone which represents an intermediary

state of reconstruction from the rudimentary building blocks
of human nature to the completed architecture of civil
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society.
the day.

In the state of nature,

Furthermore,

underscored by

a

Hobbes'

egoism carries

s

its masculine dimension is

radical atomism built in part on the
buried

foundation of denied maternity.

The State of Nature
In The Citizen,

where Hobbes first elaborated in a

systematic fashion those aspects of the state of nature

which would make his prescriptions for civil society
in
Leviathan so welcome and reasonable, he asks us to "consider
men as if but even now sprung out of the earth, and

suddenly, like mushrooms, come to full maturity

kinds of engagement to each other."
205.)

,

without all

(Italics mine, p.

Although Hobbes does not specifically repeat this

imaginative directive in Leviathan

,

it is

obviously at work

in the shadows of his description of the state of nature

there.

20

_
The

mushroom is

a

charming and ingenious

mataphorical choice; 21 it works in ways that "cabbages" or
"maple trees" would not, conveying a host of images and

associations that are worth extracting for brief perusal.

Mushrooms do seem to spring up overnight; they grow rapidly
in the wild and require no special tending.

(Rapid growth

eliminates "maple trees"; no tending eliminates
"cabbages".)

In his state of nature conception,

Hobbes

wants to eliminate factors such as socialization, education

and other cultural means of "cultivating" human beings,
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removing those "secondary" features
of human behavior and
motivation which might be mistakenly
attributed to first
nature.
His insistence that "nature has
made man unfit for
society" requires a careful distinguishing
of learned
behaviors appropriate to peaceful social
life from man's
22
innate disposition.
Another feature of mushrooms is
that they grow in clusters (not so
with maple trees); hence,

Hobbes is able to slip in

proximity to each other.

a

picture of human beings in close

The image of mushrooms, as opposed

to that of solitary and stately trees,

reminds us that human

beings will inevitably confront each other in
disputes over
desired goods that are always inevitably limited,
since gain
and glory require a relative surplus of accumulated
goods.

Man in the state of nature may be

a

radical individual but,

like the mushroom, he is not solitary.

Finally, mushrooms

reproduce quietly, invisibly, and asexually:

spores are

scattered by the wind and land haphazardly, sprouting up
when temperature and moisture conditions are right.

This

feature of the metaphorical image allows us to accept that
much more quietly one of the most incredible features of
Hobbes'

s

hypothetical state of nature.

And it is this:

that men are not born of, much less nurtured by, women, or

anyone else for that matter.

In the process of extracting

an abstract man for rational perusal, Hobbes has also

expunged human reproduction and early nurturance

— two

most basic and typically female-identified features of

of the
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distinctively human life-from his
account of basic human
nature.
Such a strategy ensures that
Hobbes can present a
thoroughly atomistic subject,
one whose individual

rights-sparsely concei ved-clear
ly precede any obligation
to belong to civil society.

metaphor, Hobbes

With the help of the mushroom

atomism affirms the self-sufficiency
of
man alone in the crowded midst
of other men.
'

s

The point here is not whether
Hobbes

's

state of nature

is realistic.

No state of nature construct
is going to be
realistic if, by "realistic", we mean
conforming to the
contours of life as we know and cherish
it.
for state of

nature constucts are intended to make
us more self-conscious
about the unreflectively accepted
particularities of our
life-forms.

They could not do this if they simply

reproduced social organization as it existed.

But we do

need to ask, what is the point of including
and excluding

particular features of contemporary life?

Is our

understanding of the human condition enhanced or
handicapped
by the simplifications provided by the theorist?
We are

entitled to query Hobbes on his fully formed and
un-mothered
men precisely because his individualism rests securely
on
it.

And also, because it violates some pretty essential

features of the human condition.

Just as a state of nature

populated by immortal creatures would be too off the mark to
be useful in helping us come to grips with our predicaments
in this life,

so too does a state of nature populated by
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mushroom-like men throw out too much
of distinctively human
requirements and possibilities.
Eliminating mothers also
makes it that much easier to read
"males" into "men", a

train of thinking that Hobbes has
already facilitated by
including wives as part of the property
which state of
nature man must struggle to preserve
against encroachment
and theft. 23
The mushroom imagery— in its unmistakable
denial of

human sexuality, reproduction and
nurturance-makes that
much more plausible a central tenet of
Hobbes s theory of
civil authority, obligation to that authority,
and
'

rights.

As Charles Taylor argues,

the doctrine of the primacy of

rights relies on an atomistic conception of the
individual
in the sense of affirming "the self-sufficiency
of man

alone."

Self-sufficiency here refers, not to the

ability to survive alone in the wilderness, but rather, to
the denial of the notion that characteristically human

capacities need particular social or life forms in which to
develop.

In the state of nature scene being considered

here, which we might subtitle the Case of the Missing

Mother, the issue is not whether infants would survive

untended in the world; 25 it concerns instead the ways in

which early maternal and parental care provide

a social,

intersubject ive context for the development of particular

human capacities in children
capacities

— which

— emotive,

social and cognitive

are presupposed in Hobbes

's

state of
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nature man who is capable of
implementing compacts and
contracts as well as of deducing
the dictates of right
reason from his natural
circumstances. Hobbes's metaphor,
of course, aims at avoiding
any such discussion of the
etiology of such capacities. in
providing us with fully
sprung men and tracing out their
hypothetical social
exchanges, Hobbes keeps his schedule
of rights to a bare
minimum:
the right to life, maximum
pleasure so long as it
does not interfere with the pleasure
or rights of others,
and maximum freedom from pain.
He makes social obligation a
purely pragmatic affair, external to the
identity
of the

subject, one that is derived from
natural right and hence,
is secondary to it.

Hobbes's bare bones schedule of rights

contributes to his analysis of the right to
revolt only in
the case of threats to life and to his
curious discussion of
liberty as minimum interference with our movements. 26
The Hobbesian state of nature is a device aimed
at

stripping bare the requirements and materials of civil
society so that the political theorist can, by rational
means premissed on the resolut i ve-composi t i ve method
of political sciency geometry),

(a

kind

establish the full force of

the pragmatic need for a civil order governed by irrefutable

authority.

Such a civil order, argues Hobbes,

is mandated

by Nature, and its role is purely a restraining one.

In

civil society, the atomistic individuals of the state of

nature remain unchanged (still mushroom-like) except for
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their contracted allegiance to a
singular civil authority
brought about by the sum of their
individual fears of
injury, loss of property, and untimely
death.
Death, that
radical equalizer in the state of nature,
is transposed into
the singular power to punish by the
sovereign authority.
And fear, which in the state of nature
kept men at odds with
each other, becomes the social gluten of
the civil order.
In sum,

Hobbes's civil society has no transformative

effect on its body politic.
a

His grand artifice consists of

recombination— clever, but not especially creative— of the

given elements of the state of nature.

These essential

elements are natural human beings atomi st ically conceived
along masculine lines.
first,

This masculine tenor may be found,

in Hobbes's conception of a clearly unified and

discrete ego, one that is unassailable except in combative
terms, and approachable only on the terms of contracted and

nominalist exchanges.

It is an ego constituted in strict

either/or terms of total integrity unto itself or total

disintegration at the hands of
opposing ego.

a

similarly constructed

We can also discern masculinity at work in

the fantasy pattern which underlies his state of nature:

men magically sprung like mushrooms, unmothered and

unfathered.

27

While such a fantasy deals a blow to

parenthood and the organic notion of generational
continuity, it strikes especially hard at the maternal

contribution, whose denial is uniquely remarkable and
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difficult to implement since it is
so biologically and
socially apparent. Hobbes s omniscient
and self-sprung ego
has no dues owed to others except
those which
'

we "freely"

and individually contract. 28
Hobbes'

civil order, where social relations are

s

formalized and particular roles are assumable
by

interchangeable because ultimately similar human
beings,
assumes distinctly masculine characteristics. At
the heart
of Hobbes' s conception of the civil order
is a particular
notion of identity, a particular notion of the human
subject.

An identity that is spontaneously conceived and

solipsistically self-constituted requires an all-out
repudiation of organic and interpersonal factors.
denial of the maternal contribution.

Hence the

Within the

psychoanalytic frame of reference, masculinity is achieved
at the cost of a denial of femininity in oneself.

To the

extent that an internalized sense of femininity derives, in

significant measure, from an introjected version of the
mother,

the achievement of masculinity may require the

denial of maternal contribution to one's life and identity.
If this is achieved at the individual level of personal

identity, extending it to a generalized view of humanity is
a

small step.

We cannot be sure that this characterization

correctly or adequately captures the development and origins
of Hobbes

'

s

thought.

On firmer ground, however, we can more

comfortably suggest that Hobbes

'

s

work may have resonated

s
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with just such a set of meanings
in the minds o£ subsequent
readers; that part of the appeal
and sheer power of Hobbes
analysis oan be traoed to this
psychological dimension of
his theory.

Civil Authority

Hobbes

's

denial of the mother, with its
unmistakable

ramifications on his portrayal of atomistic
identity and
contractual social intercourse, is also
refracted in his
theory of legitimate authority and
obedience.
As the
inaugurator of a liberal tradition which
deauthorizes
individuals in the name of an abstract
individual, breaking
the more traditional associations between
authority, persons
and their unique (divinely ordained)
attributes, Hobbes
presented a radically new, and to some, disturbing

interpretation of authority as
absolute. 29

s

imultanaeously arbitrary and

It was arbitrary in the sense that the

question of who might be invested with civil authority
was

effectively inconsequential for Hobbes.

Legitimate

authority and its proper exercise had little to do with
personal attributes, expertise, or status.

what mattered

for Hobbes was only that a strong, central and uncontested

form of authority be identifiably located in some one person
or executive body and that the problem of succession be

abstractly settled ahead of its required implementation.

In

throwing out divine right and
democratic majority choice
together, Hobbes made enemies
out of two opposing

camps-traditionalists and libertarians.
he portrayed himself as a
solitary

Small wonder that

and heroic fighter in

the

midst of hostile opponents.
This deauthorization of
individuals, pursued by Hobbes
at the expense of divinely
and democratically sanctioned
authority, rests squarely on a
prior deauthorization of the
mother.
The connecting link is the
depersonalization of
authority. Maternal authority
embodies a view of authority
and obligation to which Hobbes
's scheme is throughly
opposed. Not only is maternal authority
indelibly personal,
it also stands in a complex
relation to its subjects, one
that cannot be characterized in the
simple linear terms of
commandments and prescriptions with merely
behavioral

consequences (i.e., consequences that are
external to the
identity of the behaving agent). Parental
authority is at
least partially introjected.

(The strength of such

introjection, of course, is significantly dependent
on the

qualitative strength and intimacy of parent-child
relations.)

For this reason, our relation to it cannot be

cast in simple contractar ian terms.

That Hobbes attempted

to portray parental authority in precisely this
fashion

suggests that he understood the significant difficulties
that parental authority posed for his theory of civil

authority and civic obligation. 30

Hobbes treats the

.
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relation between parent and child
and sovereign and subject
in the same essential way:
"the preserved oweth
all to the

preserver."

The terms of allegiance and
obedience are
strictly external to the preconst ituted
identities of the

participants
The Leviathan is effectively composed
of a body politic
of social orphans who have reared
and acculturated

themselves, whose desires are situated
within and reflect
nothing else but independently generated
movement.

Disagreements are likely to erupt and-because
there are no
conceivable means for adjudicating between
competing

desires— there must be

a locus of

pronounce on such disputes.

authority which can

Such pronouncements must be

obeyed, not because they are correct or in our
best

interests, but simply because they reflect the voice
of

civil authority.

The prime directive, after all,

is peace;

and justice refers simply to a correspondence to
the written
law.

Norman Jacobson's clever and vivid image of the voice

of Hobbes's sovereign authority coming through to us via
a

telephone receiver clamped to our ears conveys this

characteristic feature of Hobbesian authority.

We are

forced to listen but "free" to obey or disobey (although we
ought to be willing to accept the price of disobedience).

Whatever the response, however, we are essentially unchanged
by the process.

Our relation to sovereign authority, like

our relations to fellow human beings, takes place within a

.
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behavioral panorama peopled by
strictly differentiated
individuals whose highest civic
achievement is mutual
accomodation.
Having explored the substance
of Hobbes's political
theory with a view to uncovering
a masculne substructure,
we
now turn to Hobbes's style and
what Sheldon Wolin has termed
the "informing intention" of Hobbes's
work. 31 Not only do
intention and style affect the substance
of thought
generally, but in Hobbes's case especially
they bear
directly on our exploration of the
masculinist stamp of his
work

The Heroic Intellectual
In stylistic terms and in terms of the
often strained

relation between his "talk" and his

"

walk " —between his

avowed philosophy of "right method" and his actual

implementation of that method— Hobbes is a fascinating

patchwork of contrasts.

To begin with, we should note that

his sceptical and nominalist epistemology coexists with a

genuine respect for the lessions of experience.

When Hobbes

argues that he would learn more about anatomy and physiology
by accompanying a midwife on her rounds than from reading
the texts of physicians, or, as in the opening pages of

Leviathan

,

when he entreats his readers to reflect on their

experience as

a test of his arguments,

he is pursuing a very
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different tack than the one contained
in his nominaiist
version of knowledge:
No discourse, whatsover, can end
in absolute
knowledge of fact, past or to come.
For, as for the
knowledge of fact, it is originally,
sensefand ever
m
ry And f ° r the ^owledge of consequence,
which I r°
have said before is called science,
it is not
absolute, but conditional.
No man can know by
discourse, that this or that, is, has
been, or will be-

^

^

0 " * bS ° lute1
only, that if thL be,
which is to know conditionally; and
that
co
of one thing to another; but of
one
nZL of; a thing, to another name of the
name
same thing.
y

that shal^bf
Sat
shall be:

^^e

(

Leviathan

,

p.

40)

An easy, and grossly mistaken interpretation
of this

epistemological stance would be to depict Hobbes
as
or humble thinker.

32

Forty pages on in Leviathan

,

a timid

Hobbes

invokes experience as a measure of the soundness
of his
argument concerning the distrust that humans harbor
against

each other. 33

It is a devastating rejoinder to those who

would question his account.:
It may seem strange to some man, that has not well
weighed these things; that nature should thus
dissociate, and render men apt to invade, and destroy one
another:
and he may therefore, not trusting to this
inference, made from the passions, desire perhaps to
have the same confirmed by experience. Let him
therefore consider with himself, when taking a journey,
he arms himself, and seeks to go well accompanied; when
going to sleep, he locks his doors; when even in his
house, he locks his chests; and this when he knows that
there be laws, and public officers, armed, to revenge
all injuries shall be done him; what opinion he has of
his fellow-subjects, when he rides armed; of his fellowcitizen, when he locks his doors; and of his children,
and servants, when he locks his chests.
Does he not
there as much accuse mankind by his actions, as I do by
my words?
(pp. 82-83)
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Another significant contrast may
be located between
Hobbes's own prescription for right
method-a plodding,
methodical and rational arrangement
of basic definitions and
propositions a la Euclidian geometry-and
the sheer power of
his prose, which is characterized
by an imaginative and
flamboyant style.
Notwithstanding his protests against the
improper use of poetic and rhetorical
flourishes in a

philosophical and scientific enterprise that
ought to be
soberly dedicated to the careful study
of causes and their
consequences, Hobbes himself was often a dazzling

rhetorician and highly adept at flourishing
potent

metaphores to convince readers of his right thinking.
(Remember the mushrooms.)

Hobbes's avowed scepticism, which is rescued from
a
radical solipsistic stance only by his faith in shared

common sense experience, contrasts sharply with his
argumentative mode, which seeks to demonstrate the air-tight
logic and common-sense truth of his arguments.

One of his

intellectual biographers, Miriam Reik, has this telling

observation to offer on the tone of Hobbes's work:
one of the most prominent chracteri sties of
Hobbes's philosophic impulse [is] the drive toward
discovering and building on the simplest, most basic
elements of reality, and reasoning about them with such
force and directness that his explanations seem to be
come almost intellectually
coercive 34
.

.

.

.

A fruitful means of exploring and accounting for this series
of interesting incongruities in Hobbes's thought is provided
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by Sheldon Wolin'

thesis that Hobbes cast himself
in the
role of epic-theorist. As we will see,
many of the features
of this epic heroism are also related
to masculinity.
s

Wolin argues that Hobbes had epical intentions
in
writing Leviathan, intentions that he shares
with Plato,
Machiavelli, Hegel and Marx, whose collective

great works

comprise an epic tradition in political theory:
The phrase "epic tradition" refers to a
type of
political theory which is inspired mainly by the
hope of
achieving a great and memorable deed through the
medium
of thought.
Other aims that it may have, such as
contributing to the existing state of knowledge,
formulating a system of logically consistent
propositions, or establishing a set of hypotheses for
scientific investigation, are distinctly secondary. 3 ^

Political theories of the epic mold are intended by their
authors as forms of action, where the work itself is the
deed, a thought-deed that will hopefully be translated into

reality.

But if it is not actualized,

that the thought,

the residual hope is

like the written and spoken chronicles of

long dead heroes, will endure through time.

Theories cast

in the epic mold reveal "an attempt to compel admiration and

awe for the magnitude of the achievement."

As such,

argues wolin, the epic theoriest casts himself in the role
of epic hero rather than that of bard or poet.

His aim

extends beyond the relatively humble one of logical

persuasion to that of astonishing his audience by a
remarkable thought-deed.

Like the hero of epic poetry, the

heroic theorist is a single individual whose exploits

169

surpass those of other men and whose
talents and strengths
are strictly human (essentially
self-made). 37 j ust as

divine intervention on behalf of the hero
has little
substantive room in the tales of epic
heroism,

so too the

eipc theorist performs his intellectual
feats through the
use of his unique and natural human brain
power and

imagination.

Finally, the hero of epic poetry and the

heroic theorist share another significant trait:

their

achievements are bound up with the stuff of manhood.

CM.

As

Bowra has written:

Heroes are the champions of man's ambition to pass
beyond the oppressive limits of human frailty to a
fuller and more vivid life, to win as far as possible a
self-sufficient manhood, which refuses to admit that
anything is too difficult for it, and is content even in
failing provided that it has made every effort of which
it is capable. 38
The theme of self-sufficiency recapitulates one of the

most distinctive psychological features of masculinity.

To

the extent that masculine identity is bound up with a

repudiation of the mother, vigorous self-sufficiency emerges
as a kind of defensive react ion- formation against memories

of dependence and the early symbiotic relation.

Hobbes's

atomistic individualism also invokes this image of
self-sufficiency,

as we have seen,

which is strengthened by

the effective displacement of mothers from the state of

nature.

We encounter it in yet another form in the figure

of the heroic subject.

The epic hero achieves immortality by surpassing the

.
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standards of achievement set by others.
is an essential

Thus,

feature of epic heroism.

competition

It is this

competitive and individualistic quality
of

action-competition directed at the select few
who have set
the highest intellectual standards—
which marks the style of
Hobbes's approach. We find it in his Autobiography
as well
as in Leviathan.
Hobbes never argued with any but the most

prominent and formidable recognized intellects:

among them

Aristotle and the best mathematicians of his
time.
Furthermore, these disputes were cast by Hobbes into
some of
the most vivid combative terminology ever
written,
as this

excerpt from his Autobiography reveals plainly:
I brought out another little book
on
Principles
Here my victory was acknowledged by
all.
In other fields my opponents were doing their best
to hide their grievous wounds.
Their spirits were
flagging and I pressed home the assault on my flagging
foes, and scaled to topmost pinnacles of geometry
Wallis enters the fray against me, and in the eyes of
the algebraists and theologians I am worsted.
And now
the whole host of Wallisians, confident of victory, was
led out of their camp.
But when I saw them deploying on
treacherous ground, encumbered with roots thick-set,
troublesome and tenacious, I resolved on fight, and in
one moment scattered, slaughtered, routed countless
•

•

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

foes 39

We also find an interesting and relevant complaint

inscribed in Hobbes's criticism of too much attention and
respect directed towards the thinkers of antiquity:

"competition of praise, inclineth to a reverence of
antiquity.

For men contend with the living; not with the

dead; to these ascribing more than due,

that they may

.

obscure the glory of the other."

(Leviathan, p. 64)

Hobbes

wanted to shine forth in his day.
unimpeded by the ghosts of
the past who attracted attention
to themselves and therefore
detracted from the attention and glory
that Hobbes sought.
As would-be epic theorist, Hobbes
himself
is in the midst of

the competitions for power, gain and
glory which he depicted
so vividly.

Leviathan opens with the image of Hobbes as
a Ulysses
figure carefully maneuvering between the
Scylla and
Charybdis of liberty and authority:
"For in a way beset
with those that contend, on the one side for
too great
liberty, and on the other side for too much
authority,

'tis

hard to pass between the points of both unwounded."
("Dedication to Francis Godolphin", p.
mind that Hobbes

'

s

2)

We should bear in

characterization of his enterprise here

is not entirely fanciful.

Many were the unlucky victims of

the political disputes of his time.

And Hobbes himself was

lucky to have survived the political upheavals of

seventeenth century England. 40

However, Hobbes

'

s

sense of

risk here goes beyond the arena of immediate political

intrigue to that of intellectual risk as well, as he reveals
so engagingly in his Autobiography

course,

.

Heroic honor, of

is predicated on the pursuit of risk. 41

And the

ultimate risk is loss of life, to which most heroes

inevitably succumb, often prematurely, always bravely and
gloriously, if sometimes from the view of hindsight,
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foolishly.

The casting of heroic honor
in these terms,
labelled by Marina Warner as
"our necrophiliac culture's
ideology of heroism," 42 has
tended to exclude females who,
as the anthropological record
suggests, have been less
willing than men to risk their
lives in ultimate

confrontations. 43

This is not to say that women
have been
historically unwilling to risk their
lives.
Individual
women have died hereoically, often
in political resistance
struggles against oppression. And
we also know that mothers
have risked death on behalf of their
children.
But these
are better understood as last-ditch
efforts.
The

willingness to risk life would seem to be
less a
constitutive feature of femininity and more
an instrumental
means of protecting and preserving life.
The strong connections between heroism,
masculinity and
the willingness to risk life are unmistakable. 44

These

connections are further strengthened if we stop to
ponder
the gender-specific dimensions of the heroic
quest for

immortality.

As Mary o"Brien has argued, men's alienated

relationship to reproduction, manifested most clearly in the
uncertainties of paternity, is carried over into their

conceptions of time:

"Men have always sought principles of

continuity outside of natural continuity." 45

Among the

many cultural forms of temporal continuity instituted by
men,

within which we may include patrilineal descent and the

regenerative succession of political authority embodied in

:

the state, heroic immortality is
especially noteworthy.
It
defies the biological pronouncements of
death, decay, and
ultimate defeat; provides a tangible
sense of generational

continuity over time for the male "family"
of heroes and
their admirers; and, above all, assures
men of an

uncontested role in their "reproduction" through
time.
Like
Hobbes's state of nature man, the immortal
hero is self-made
and lives in a motherless world.
Hobbes's heroism is housed, appropriately
enough, within
dangerous territory—the state of nature. This
territory
serves to dramatically enhance the heroic dimensions
of his
work
Epic heores move in a world of dark and occult forcesthey encounter great perils and horrors, sometimes
at'
the hands of nature, sometimes by the machinations of
malevolent powers; they are constantly in the midst of
violent death and widespread destruction; and yet by a
superhuman effort, which stretches the human will to its
limits, they succeed nonetheless. 46

"Violent death" and "widespread destruction" appropriately

describe the England of the Civil Wars as well as Hobbes's
state of nature.

His theoretical "feat" was to rescue us

from an existence that would otherwise be "nasty, mean,

brutish and short."

This "salvation" is made possible by

the theorist's courage in exploring the dark and dangerous

terrain of the state of nature, which he makes available for
all to see in its full horror.

Against this backdrop of

miserable existence, Hobbes's creation of an "artificial"
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Leviathan out of the very components of
state of nature life
is rendered into a remarkable
achievement.
Along with his courage, Hobbes wields
the hero's
requisite weapon which is both the emblem and
instrument of
his power.
Hobbes' s special power is knowledge; and
his
weapon, as Wolin tells us, is "right method":

Rational method is not a weapon easily fashioned
easily mastered, especially in political matters. or
The
prolonged preparation, constant practice, and
dedication
which it demands are analogous to the long
apprenticeship and severe trials which a knight had to
undergo before he was declared fit for chivalric
47
tests.

It is Hobbes' s heroic use of a deductive method
cast in a

sober, plodding, and ultra-rational terminology which
helps
to account for the inconcruity between his avowed philosophy
of method and his implementation of that method.

Under such

circumstances, Hobbes-as-heroi c-theor ist and Hobbes-assc ientif ic-phi losopher are bound to be caught in a

paradoxical relationship to each other.

political geometry is employed in

a

When Hobbes 's

battleground

environment, incongruous, as well as exciting, things are
like to result.

This is the stuff of Hobbes'

If he had been more consistent,

s

achievement.

enacting his method to the

letter of the law, we would not continue to read him and to

be provoked by his analysis of the requirements of and

possibilities for civil society.
Like the curiously strained yet compelling notion of
'the war to end all wars',

Hobbes

's

heroic enterprise is
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paradoxically aimed at eliminating future
heores by creating
a civil order in which heroism would
have no legitimate
space.

Strictly bound in allegiance to a central
ruler,

citizens of his Leviathan would be effectively
stripped of
all heroic motivation, transformed into
wimps.
Hobbes's aim
is to create the risk-free society.

sacrificed to peace and stability.

Heroism is necessarily
And the choice as Hobbes

presents it is overwhelmingly tempting:
Out of this state (of civil society), every man
hath
such a right to all, as yet he can enjoy nothing; in
it,
each one securely enjoys his limited right.
Out of it,
any man may rightly spoil or kill another; in it, none
but one. Out of it, we are protected by our own forces;
in it, by the power of all.
Out of it, no man is sure
of the fruit of his labours; in it, all men are.
Lastly, out of it, there is a domain of passions, war,
fear, poverty, slovenliness, solitude, barbarism,
ignorance, cruelty; in it the dominion of reason, peace,
security, riches, decency, society, elegancy, science
and benevolence.
The Citizen p. 222)
(

,

For obvious reasons, Hobbes believes he has made us an offer
we can't refuse.

Hobbes's all-or-nothing choice, between a chaotic and
violent state of nature or a predictable and peaceful civil
order which is made so by the unconditional obedience of

citizens to the political sovereign, points to a solution
which conveniently leaves Hobbes as the last hero.

The

heroic dismantling of the requisite conditions of heroism is
an altogether remarkable feat, one from which Hobbes could

expect to derive uncontested future praise and admiration.
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Conclus ion

Hobbes

political theory has been subjected
to a number
of criticisms, many of which
center directly on his
treatment of human nature and argue
that he failed to
provide a convincing account of generalized
humanity. 48
This failure becomes all the more
evident when Hobbes is
read as a masculine thinker. Masculinity
inhabits his work
throughout a remarkably broad range of
levels, from his
unselfconscious adoption of a male standpoint
in his prose,
to his depiction of a motherless state
of nature, to his
atomistic portrayal of the human subject in that
state and
's

in civil society,

to his heroic conception of his own work.

The substance and style of Hobbes'

s

work, which

significantly includes a specific notion of the human
subject in various capacities

— state

of nature man, civil

subject, and heroic intellectual—betrays a specifically

masculine cast, one that ignores and debases the female

presence in and contribution to social life.
Hobbes'

s

As such,

political theory is distinctively flawed in newly

apparent ways which are both disturbing and instructive.
The most significant finding involves the denial of the

maternal contribution.
show,

This denial, as

I

have tried to

is logically central to and required by Hobbes 's

atomistic account of human nature, social interaction, and
civic life.

In other words,

the denial of the mother here
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is not an incidental
feature of Hobbes's theory;

saturates his analysis
throughout.
the maternal contribution,

it

Al0 ng with the denial
of

the heroic dimensions
of Hobbes's

style also point convincingly
in the direction of
masculinity. Hobbes's sense
of himself as a heroic
intellectual actor and his
depiction of the state of nature
have quite a bit in common.
Significantly, the threat of
Personal annihilation in the
state of nature and the
promise
of its elimination in civil
society share with the heroic
conception of risk a highly
individualized and masculinized
sense of selfhood. A self
conceived along such lines is
simultaneously vulnerable to attack
and capable of heroic
feats in a dangerous world.
Hobbes's feat was to cast
himself as the last hero by
proposing a solution
to a

predicament that was more masculine
than human in tenor.
The external and inviolable
authority of the sovereign would
replace the social anarchy of a world
populated by
motherless self-sprung men.
A portion of Hobbes's genius thus might
be said to
include the unwitting exploration of a
masculine politics,
one that is premised on a distinctly
gendered and distorted
sense of identity.
It is a negative politics that is
grim
and instrumentally limited in its abilities
to transform the

human condition.

Hobbes's abstract man is a creature who is

self-possessed and radically solitary in

a

crowded and

inhospitable world, whose relations with others are
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unavoidably contractual, and whose freedom consists
in the
absence of impediments to the attainment of
privately
generated and understood desires. Abstract man
thus bears

the tell-tale signs of a masculinity in
extremis

;

identity

through opposition, denial of reciprocity,
repudiation of
the mother in oneself and in relation to oneself,
a

constitutional inability/refusal to recognize what might
be
termed dialectical connectedness. Hobbes's genius and
courage was to face the momentous and uncomfortable truth
of
this masculine revelation.

His failure was the inability to

recognize it as a half-truth.

s

.
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state of nature account presupposes socially constituted and
secured capacities, while it ignores their genesis.
In
effect, Hobbes gets to have his cake and eat it too.
24 Charles Taylor, "Atomism," in Power, Possessions
and Freedom:
Essays in Honor of C.B. MacPherson ed. Alkis
Kontos
(Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1979), p. 41.
,

2 ^Hobbes

either.

never intends self-sufficiency in this sense
See fn. 23 above.

.
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master and

servant, similarly "free".

27 While no
attempt is being made here to
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29p
For this discussion of authority
in liberalism and
the specific notion of "deauthor
ization"
I am indebted to
Zelda Bronstem, "Psychoanalysis
Without the Fa^er?" in
Humanities in Society 3 (2):
199-212.
,

30 See

fns.

23 and

28 above.

31 Sheldon S.
Wolin,
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exile to France when it looked as if he might
antagonize
some important civil authorities with his
publications. His
delightful autobiographical account of the
circumstances of
nis birth also shows this quite plainly:
h-i

m

.

^

'

'

^

I have no reason to be ashamed
of my birthplace, but of
the evils of the time I do complain, and of all
the
troubles that came to birth along with me. For the
rumour ran, spreading alarm through our town, that
the
Armada was bringing the day of doom to our race. Thus
my mother was big with such fear that she brought
twins
to birth, myself and fear at the same time.

Hobbes,

"Autobiography," trans.

B.

Farrington,

in the

.
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self-professed timidity of action,
however, contrasts
l
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33 0ne version
of the opposition to Hoboes'
s account

as related by his admirer Aubrey:

tSarfUl and

P^ncid

man,

His work was attended with Envy,
which threw several
aspersions and false reports on him.
For instance one
(common) was that he was afrayd to
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wh ^h rogues might think he
?
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had in lhis chamber;
and several other tales, as untrue

^

^

'

'

i

Aubrey's Brief Lives, ed. Oliver Lawson
Dick
University of Michigan Press, 1970),
p.

34Reik

'

35 Wolin,

36 Ibid.,

(Ann Arbor-

156.

The Golden Lands of Thomas Hobbes

Hobbes and the Epic Tradiition
p.

,

.

p.

p.

71.

4.

5.

37 CM. Bowra
argues for the individualism
and for the epic stress on his uniquely human of the hero
capacities.
See his Heroic Poetry
(New York:
St. Martin's Press,
1966), chs. 1 and 3; From Virgil to Mil ton
(LondonMacMillan and Co., 1945
ch. 1
)

,

38 Heroic Poetry,
See also Marina Warner, Joan
p. 4.
of Arc:
The Image of Female Heroism (New York:
Vintage
Books, 1981) for added confirmation of the masculine
dimensions of heroism. Her study of the history of Joan's
heroic image reveals that Joan's story was trapped within
a
masculine lexicon of meaning. Joan's image as we know it
today is the result of conventional classification systems
for female types in addition to the standard heroic fare.
Joan's insistence on wearing male clothing suggests that she
understood the masculine terms of heroism, while her
self-professed virginity gave her access to a specifically
female form of virtue.
Both images also signify a denial of
sexual difference. Male dress, argues Warner, usurps the
functions of men (Joan's captors understood this all too
well in forcing her to wear female attire) even as it
affirms the supremacy of the masculine heroic image. And
virginity signifies a denial of the specifically feminine.

s
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Ir ° niCally J ° an S Life
Probably one of
hha most
m nL heroic a woman
the
has ever led, is a tribute to the
male principle, a homage to the male
sphere of action."
(p.

T

'

'

•

39 "Autobiography"

,

p.

'

16.

40 Hobbes's

remarkable longevity is one highly notable
biographical feature distinguishing him from the
hero who
must usually die prematurely.
41 C.M.

Bowra argues that during times of social
stress and change what counts in cultural estimates
heroic men "is not so much their power to destroy as of
their
willingness to die." From Virgil to Milton p. 10.
,

42 Joan of Arc

,

p.

272.

43 See Peggy R.
Sanday, Female Power and Male
Dominance; On the Origins of Sexual Inequality
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981):
"If there
is a basic difference between the sexes, other than the
differences associated with human reproductivi
it is that
women as a group have not willingly faced deathty in violent
conflict."
(pp. 210-11)
,

One of the most notable exceptions to Sanday'
formulation concerning women and their willingness to risk
death would be the scores of women who took part in the
self-chosen martyrdom of the early Christians. While the
willingness, if not ecstasy, at the prospect of "dying for
Christ" cannot be denied these women, the fact that their
heroism was invariably cast in masculine molds by subsequent
interpretations is important to bear in mind. See Warner's
discussion in chs. 7 and 11 of Joan of Arc
See also my
review of Kristeva's analysis of Christianity in Appendix B.
.

44 This suggests that female heroes,

rather than being
simply and deliberately "hidden from history", are
automatically excluded because their activities cannot be
captured or framed within the existing lexicon of heroic
meaning, which is distinctly masculine.
See Warner's
Prologue to her Joan of Arc pp. 3-10. See also the
fictionalized account of Penelope's interpretation of her
husband Ulysses' heroic exploits, both in terms of what he
actually accomplished, and what he missed at home while he
was gone:
Sara Maitland, "Penelope," in Tales I Tell My
A Collection of Feminist Short Stories eds. Zoe
M) ther
Fairbairns, et al
(London and West Nyack:
The Journeyman
,

:

,

.

Press,

1978), pp.

146-158.
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CHAPTER
J.S. MILL:

IV

REASSESSING THE LIBERALISM-FEMINISM RELATION

What has been the opinion of mankind, has
been the
opinion of persons of all tempers and
dispositions,
ot all partialities and prepossessions,
of all
varieties in position, in education, in
opportunities of observation and inquiry. No
one
inquirer is all this:
every inquirer is either
young or old, rich or poor, sickly or healthy,
married or unmarried, meditative or active,
a poet
or a logician, an ancient or a modern,
a man or a
woman;
Every circumstance which gives a
character to the life of a human being carries
with
it its particular biases
its peculiar facilities
for perceiving some things, and for missing
or
forgetting others.
But, from points of view
different from his, different things are
perceptible
John Stuart Mill, "Bentham"

....

—

Were there no improvement to be hoped for, life
would not be the less an unceasing struggle against
causes of deterioration; as it even now is.
John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representat ive
Government

Introduct ion
In the company of political theorists,

John Stuart Mill

is emphatically not among those who make the blood boil;

in

contrast to Hobbes and Marx, he neither communicates nor
elicits passion.

self-styled hero.

Neither is he

a

systems-builder or

In reading Mill,

we can imagine sitting

down to afternoon tea with him in a Victorian parlor and

discussing, ever so calmly, politely and rationally, the
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topic at hand, most probably culled from
the recent store of
controversial events. No theatrics, no
yelling, minimal
body gestures:
in short, a "civilized" conversation.
As a rational and soft-spoken persuader,
Mill practices

style markedly and deliberately different
from that of his
direct predecessors Jeremy Bentham and
James Mill. 1
a

Urging the cultivation of "the power by which
one human
being enters into the mind and circumstances
of another," 2
he invokes a vision of truth made possible
only by
"combining the points of view of all the fractional
truths." 3

Although Mill effectively failed to live up to

this standard, we can still appreciate its humbling

influence on his style and approach.

Sometimes it is

tempting to condemn him for his wishy-washiness

,

to dismiss

his brand of tolerance as the intellectual stance of the

priviledged and comfortable bourgeoisie, masking significant
political and economic interests. 4

At other moments, one

is prompted to praise him for his humility in the face of

the multifarious complexity of social and political
life.

5

Under different circumstances yet, some of us

cannot help but be flabbergasted at his own arrogant

presumptions of privileged access to an unproblemat ic
truth.

6

We are less inclined to forgive this intellectual

child prodigy his logical and political lapses into

inconsistency and myopia.

Perhaps this is the price he must

pay for his intellectual style and standards,

for his

.

188

optimistic advocacy of the powers
of rational intellect, for
his own plodding and systematic
attempts to preserve logical
rigor
As a defender of tolerance
and champion of individual
liberty, Mill articulated

principles which comprise

a

significant portion of the political
ideological fabric in
the United States today. 7 As
such, he is a less exotic
thinker, more easily taken for
granted, and more often taken
to task for existing implementations
of his principles than
other political thinkers. On the
one hand,
we are the

privileged beneficiaries of his carefully
worked out
principles of tolerance, democracy and
individual rights,
most especially as these relate to
freedom of expression.
On the other, we are his troubled
heirs, especially insofar
as Mill represents "the heart of
liberalism." 8

of liberalism,

The crisis

stretching from the regressive turn to

fundamentalist Christianity among Americans who are

desperate for meaning and guidance in

a

secular age, to

tensions within the feminist movement 9

,

to the current

crisis of the welfare state 10

,

revolves around the

formulation of the relationship between the individual and
society.

And it is this troubled relationship which lies at

the heart of much of Mill's inconsistency.

One doesn't have to be antagonistic to Mill's work to

note his often troubling inconsistency.

Even his admirer

Hobhouse described him as "the easiest person in the world
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to convict of inconsistency,

rounded system." 11
of "no system",

incompleteness, and lack of

since Mill portrays himself as a man

as a practitioner of "practical

eclecticism", we are neither obliged nor entitled
to fault
him for lack of explicit systemic amplification
and
coherence.

We are, however, entitled to query his various

works and positions in reference to each other.

It is in

this sense only that the issue of inconsistency in
Mill's

work can and ought to be addressed. 12
The contradictory strands of elite rule and fully

representative democracy in Considerations on Representative
Government are especially perplexing, although not

necessarily irresolvable. 13
liberty,

Mill's abstract defense of

tolerance and self-rule, which coexists with his

disdain for the "ignorance", "deficiency of mental
cultivations" and "degradation" of the masses has a
significant parallel in the inconsistency between Mill as an

epistemological pluralist and monist, with totalitarian
tendencies that accompany the latter.

By "totalitarian" is

meant that Mill envisions a singular world of shared

opinions and values which also happen to be his.

His

repeated invocations of a world inhabited by the necessary

multiplicity of partial truths, explored most eloquently in
his essay on "Bentham", constrasts sharply with his implied

vision of a future world of rational unanimity where
singular Truth will prevail.

14

If we stop to consider
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Mill's empiricism, however, this contradiction
fades to

certain extent.

a

For Mill, truths are partial with respect

to an as-yet undeciphered or only partially
deciphered

empirical totality, which is bound to be made eventually

transparent by means of intellectual conflict and
exploration.

Mill's truth is not a truth to be created

(like Marx's), but a truth that corresponds to a

pre-discovered reality.

Finally, some people (the educated)

are more likely than others (the uneducated) to have access
to truth.

Hence, Mill's fears of populist mediocrity and

his defense of tolerance are both predicated on the

optimistic assumption of an attainable and general izable
truth.

While an appreciation of Mill's empiricism helps to
resituate the apparent conflict between his democratic and
elitist, pluralistic and totalitarian tendencies,

it cannot

resolve the problems that such inconsistencies pose for the

practical implementation of Mill's principles.

Contemporary

disputes over the proper extensions and limitations of
tolerance, concerning how one can simultaneously uphold

tolerance and specific ethical values, are a prime case in
point.

Our perplexity in the face of the "right" of the Ku

Klux Klan to hold public parades and meetings and current

disputes over issues of free expression and consumer choice
in the debates around pornography attest to the unresolved

difficulties inherent in many of Mill's principles.

Mill's

8

vigorous stand against relativism and
unrestricted tolerance
notwithstanding, he failed to provide the
principled means
for the adjudication of competing
claims between
the

freedoms of individuals and between the
freedom of

individuals and the interests of society.

This failure,

however, ought to be understood as a larger
failure of the
liberal paradigm, rather than as the personal
failure of
Mill.

15

Turning our attention to Mill's individualism, we
observe its contrast to his ideal model of public
spiritedness, which is exemplified in his own political and

intellectual activities.

Mill himself embodies one among

several instances where his communitarian and individualist

tendencies collide.

We see in his retention of a modified

Utilitarianism the effort to simultaneously preserve the
integrity of the self-interested individual and to encourage
the development of a creature capable of understanding his

self-interest in social terms as well. 16

Mill's

prescriptions for civil society in On Liberty aim,
paradoxically, at securing the greatest freedom for the
individual as a self-interested and egoistic creature, so
that he (and

I

do mean "he") will eventually evolve into a

civic-minded subject. 1 ^

Depending on which of the various

interpreters of Mill we choose to rely, his individualism
may be veiwed as a logical precursor to socialism 1

,

a

sensible blend of diverse tendencies in a complicated human
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subject 19

,

or as the ultimate defense of atomi
st ically and

solipsistically conceived subjectivity. 20
These inconsistencies in Mill's thought
have led,
understandably, to a wide array of competing and
diverse
interpretations.

Our task here is not to investigate these

extant studies in depth, nor is it to attempt

resolution of Mill's variegated thought.

a

new

Having taken

notice of some of the critical interpretations of Mill's
work, we will let them serve as a contextual backdrop,

so

that we can go on to explore Mill in terms of the gendered

features of his work.

Within the frame of this inquiry, we

will return to several themes that have been touched on
here:

Mill's epistemology

,

his often confusing politics,

and his individualism.
The specific question that informs this investigation of

Mill is the following:

his work?

Can masculine ideology be found in

This question is especially provocative in the

case of Mill because of his avowed feminism.

Mill provides

an ideal testing ground for the proposition that masculine

ideology is not simply a function of or equivalent to overt

attitudes towards women. 21

I

will argue that Mill's

feminism, although radical for its time,

is essentially

flawed, and that this is a direct outcome of certain

masculine dimensions of his theory which, in turn, are
centrally related to some of the basic tenets of
liberalism.

In many ways,

then,

this analysis of Mill is

s

applicable to liberal theory in general, although
we should
be careful not to collapse the two. Mill's
thought

must be

understood on its own terms as well as being a major
piece
of the multifaceted liberal tradition. 22

Finally,

I

would like to acknowledge and also

distinguish this project from the important work of Bruce
Mazlish,

in which he develops a psychohistor ical analysis of

James and John Stuart Mill. 23

while some of Mazlish'

insights will be utilized, the analysis of this chapter is

emphatically not a psychohistory of John Stuart Mill.
Certainly, Mill's relationship with his father and his

ambivalent attitudes towards women are fascinating and
suggestive.

However,

for the purposes of this study,

it

would be a mistake to rely primarily or exclusively on

particular aspects of Mill's personality and life-history.
As

I

will argue, Mill's thought partakes of a much larger

configuration (we have already encountered

a

portion of it

in Hobbes) than the idiosyncratic compass of his particular

life-experience.

And that is precisely why his work merits

critical feminist scrutiny.

Mill's World-View

Buried among the pages of otherwise dry political
analysis in Considerations on Representative Government are
some of the most telling statements Mill has to offer
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concerning his felt experience as
social observer and
participant.
Here we are given a brief glimpse
at Mill's
sense of placement in the overall
scheme of nature, history
and society.
His Weltanschauung teems with
sluggish and
hostile decay threatening without letup
against a vulnerable
but vigorous counterforce in the form
of human (Western)
civilization.

Mill's language in these textual irruptions

is uncharacteristically raw and
vivid.

Some of the key

terms in these irruptions (which function
as a kind of
violent or forceful intrusion on the text,
given their

contrasting tone to Mill's usual prose style and
especially
insofar as they are not required by the manifest
structure
of his argument on representative government)
are
"decay",

"deterioration",

"indolence" and "anarchy"; counterposed to

these is a vocabulary of "activity",
and "initiative".

"energy",

"courage",

Mill effectively depicts a world order

that is horizontally divided between two radically distinct
and opposed dimensions.

When read in conjunction with his

essay on "Nature", this material provides crucial insight
into Mill's thought-world. 24

What we can glean from these

writings illuminates the contours of an emotional

substructure in which gender and cognitive experience are
intimately linked. 25
The key passages under consideration take place within
the frame of Mill's discussion of Order and Progress as two

popularly conceived opposed criteria of good government.
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Mill goes to inordinate lengths in
arguing that the two
criteria are not really distinct measures
of different kinds
of government, but that Order should
be a sub-category of

Progress, since "the agencies which tend
to preserve the
social good which already exists are the
very same which

promote the increase of it." 26

Order and Progress,

comprised of similar qualities— "industry"

,

"enterprise",

and "courage"— and differentiated only with
respect to their

preservation or advancement of the social good, are then
contrasted to the deadly specter of decay:
If there is anything certain in human affairs,
it is
that valuable acquisitions are only to be retained by
the continuation of the same energies which gained
them.
Things left to take care of themselves inevitably
decay.
Considerations on Repres entative Government
~
(CRG
p.^L9)
(

)

And,

,

"the same beliefs,

feelings,

institutions and practices

are so much required to prevent society from retrograding as
to produce a further advance."

(CRG, p.

22)

From this

point on, Mill has his excuse or "cue" for the remarkable

passage which follows and merits quotation in full:

... we ought not to forget that there is an incessant
and everflowing current of human affairs toward the
worse, consisting of all the follies, all the vices, all
the negligences, indolences, and supinenesses of
mankind; which is only controlled and kept from sweeping
all before it by the exertions which some persons
constantly, and others by fits, put forth in the
direction of good and worthy objects.
It gives a very
insufficient idea of the importance of the strivings
which take place to improve and elevate human nature and
life to suppose that their chief value consists in the
amount of actual improvement realized by their means,
and that the consequence of their cessations would
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merely be that we should remain as we
are.
diminution of those exertions would not only A very small
put a Stop
to improvement, but would turn the
general tendency of
things toward deterioration which, once
begun, would
proceed with increasing rapidity and hence
become more
and more difficult to check, until it
reached a state
often seen
history, and in which large portions of
mankind even now grovel— when hardly anything
superhuman power seems sufficient to turn the short of a
tide and
give fresh commencement to the upward movement.
(CRG,
—

m

pp

.

22

23

)

Here lies Mill's world-view.

Immorality is equated with

passivity, passivity with decay; evil can only be
controlled
by constant exertion.

All it takes is a diminution of such

exertions for things to fall apart, and quickly at that.
Once civilization begins to unravel, regression will
proceed

exponentially.

Reversing the tide takes a superhuman

effort; the previous level or intensity of exertion will not

Downward movement threatens incessantly; upward

do.

movements can only be maintained through vigilant and
vigorous efforts.

There is an unbearable sense of striving

and tension here in Mill's depiction of a dichotomous world

structured in terms of two radically opposed zones.

Life is

a constant struggle against the quicksand of regression as

the insistent but invisible forces of decay suck and tug

persistently at our civilized (in Mill's case, Victorian)
hems.

A primal, slimy specter of political chaos and social

debauchery seethes and leers from the outskirts of moral
civilized society.
Decay threatens not only from without, but also from

within civilized life, in the form of the passive
personality.
characters:

Mill divides human beings into two basic
"the active or the passive type:

that which

struggles against evils or that which endures them;

that

which bends to circumstances or that which endeavors to make
circumstances bend to itself." (CRG, p. 47)

Futher on,

intellect stands as the distinguishing mark between the

active and the passive character.

For obvious reasons, only

the active-educated should have access to democratic

political power.

In the meantime,

Mill advocates the

educat ion-act ivi sat ion of the uneducated so that they can

eventually take part in the civilized and rational work of
political decision-making.
Mill's description of "the character which improves

human life" as "that which struggles with natural powers and
tendencies, not that which gives way to them,"

(CRG,

p.

48)

leads us into a consideration of the essay on "Nature".
What,

specifically, is it that the improving character is

struggling against?
In the essay on "Nature" Mill establishes his firm stand

against the Romantic notion that human beings ought to
imitate Nature.
immoral;

For Mill,

such a doctrine is irrational and

it is also immoral precisely because it is

irrational.

To the extent that we are natural,

such a notion is tautological.

says Mill,

But to the extent that the

"natural" denotes an arena of pre- or non-human activity
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(i.e.,

an arena of non-intervention by
human agency),

it

avoids facing the fact that all worthy
human action involves
an altering of nature for the better.
"if the artificial is
not better than the natural, to what
ends are all the arts
of life?
To dig, to plough, to build, to wear
clothes, are
direct infringements of the injunction to
follow

nature." 2 7
ii

Our duty, says Mill:

is to cooperate with the beneficent
powers,

not by
imitating but by perpetually striving to amend
course of nature— and bringing that part of it the
over
which we can exercise control, more nearly into
conformity with a high standard of justice and
goodness.
("Nature", p. 488)
In this revealing and fascinating essay, one
of Mill's

last projects, he invokes an essentially Baconian view
of a

nature that must be instrumentally harnessed:

Though we cannot emancipate ourselves from the laws of
nature as a whole, we can escape from any particular law
of nature, if we are able to draw ourselves from the
circumstances in which it acts. Though we can do
nothing except through the laws of nature, we can use
one law to counteract another. According to Bacon's
maxim, we can obey nature in such a manner as to command
it.
("Nature", p. 455)
And it is abundantly clear,

from Mill's engrossing and

frightening description of nature, that it must be
commanded.

A more horrible account would be hard to come by:

Nature impales men, breaks them as if on the wheel,
casts them to be devoured by wild beasts, burns them to
death, crushes them with stones, like the first
Christian martyr, starves them with hunger, freezes them
with cold, poisons them by the quick or slow venom of
her [sic] exhalations, and has hundreds of other hideous
deaths in reserve.
(p. 463)
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This characterization is
extended to include animal life
and
the realm of human instincts
as well.
Mill refers to "the
odious scene of violence and
tyranny which is exhibited by
the rest of the animal
kingdom" (p. 482), and invokes
cleanliness as "a triumph over
instinct, one of the most
radical of the moral distinctions
between human beings and
most of the lower animals",
(p. 476)
"The truth is that
there is hardly a single
point of excellence belonging
to
human character, which is not
decidedly repugnant to the
untutored feelings of human nature."
(p. 475)
"Nearly every
respectable attribute of humanity
is the result not of
instinct, but of a victory over
instinct ..."
(

p

.

474)

.

Clearly, Mill intends to debunk
the pastoral romantic
view of a benign Nature.
In his zealous efforts, he
goes so
far as to portray Nature as the
worst kind of vindictive
criminal.
"In sober truth, nearly all the
things which men
are hanged or imprisoned for doing
to one another, are
nature's everyday performances." (p.
462)
But of course,
this is an absurd portrayal, since
Nature— as Mill could
well appreciate— has no motives. Mill's
explicit argument
that the category of the "natural" should
contain no

favorable presumptions is backed up, paradoxically,
by the
implicit claim that the "natural" contains a
good many

unfavorable presumptions.

Mill meant to argue that the

category has no presumptions.

But that is significantly not

the actual strategy of the essay on Nature.
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At a latent level, Mill's
prose communicates something

altogether different than what he may
have consciously
intended as part of his logical
argument.
"Nature" in
Mill's account is an evil, malevolent
and destructive force,
a far cry from a category having
no preemptive
value.

"She"

stands in sharp contrast to the morality
and rationality of
the civilized order.
And it is in large part because of
this dichotomous contrast that Nature
lurkes as such a

devastating threat.
Once we appreciate the full force of Mill's
bizarre

depiction of Nature, the portrayal of civilized life
in

Considerations on Representative Government as

a

perpetual

and tension-filled striving against the forces of
decay

becomes all the more intelligible.

These forces of decay

and destruction are the forces of nature.

The "negligence",

"indolence", and "supineness " of human beings is precisely

what we exhibit in the absence of "artificial" discipline.

These are the threatening features of an unfettered human
nature.

Discipline and self-control, which figure

prominently throughout Mill's work, represent the harnessing
of nature within the individual. 2 8

Civilization can only

proceed by means of constant self-control on the part of the

human species.
Given Mill's dichotomous rendering of a world radically
divided between the forces of Nature and Culture, an
essential and unavoidable association is preserved between
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them as well.

Hence,

the work of civilization
involves the

deliberate undermining or harnessing
of the powers of
nature.
Society is civilized precisely to
the extent that
nature is repressed. To the degree
that they may
be

counterposed to brute nature, activities
and societies are
deemed "rational".
In short, Mill's conception of
nature is
not incidental to his conception of
culture and, by
extension, to his conception of politics
as cultured

activity.
Finally, we should take brief note of Mill's

presumptions of

a

singular phenomenal world, one that in

principle would be eventually amenable to
of explanation.

a

single structure

For the time being, we need only note that

Mill's epistemology suggests that he viewed his
stance in

relation to the social world as essentially equivalent
to
the stance of the scientist-observer in relation to the

natural world.

This empiricist stance presumes a strict

differentiation between the subject and object of
knowledge.

For obvious reasons, and with further

implications which will be explored in the next section on

Mill's method, this differentiation is vitally enhanced by
Mill's portrayal of a gross and criminal nature which is
thereby all the more easily objectified.

Mill's rendition of nature, then, may be explored on
several levels:

1)

as a description which is significant

and fascinating in and of itself;

2)

as a key negative

.
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feature of his portrayal of social
and civic life;
cornerstone of his epistemology

3)

as a

Mill's relationship to nature is
characterized in the
terms of distance and horror.
Let us also take note of the
specification of nature as a female in Mill's
prose.
His

relationship to

a

feminized, vindictive and objectified

nature can be explored in

a

number of ways.

We could

speculate on the quality and conditions of his unusually

bookish and emotionally starved childhood; investigate
the
intellectual and personal legacy of his father— who
often
sounds like a nasty character straight out of a Dickens
novel

— along

with the inherited intellectual framework of

his empiricism, which can be clearly traced to Bacon.

A

closer examination of his empiricism, which will follow
shortly, goes a long way towards explicating Mill's distance
from nature and the dichotomous pattern of thinking which

accompanies this stance.

As for the horror and disgust,

some is clearly attributable to Victorian ideology, while we

can also approach it as a logical, cognitive, and emotional

accompaniment to his empirical standpoint.
Mill's relationship to nature

horror

— are

of gender.

— the

Both features of

distance and the

also susceptible to interpretation on the basis
They clearly embody a masculine version of

experience.

Why should nature be experienced in such threatening
ways?

And why should a political thinker's views on nature

be important to the understanding
of his political theory?
An adequate answer to these questions
must take account of
the complexities of human culture and
the creation of

meaning.

Anthropology suggests that "nature" occupies

place in the cosmologies of many human
societies.
extent,

key

To some

the characterization of "nature" has to
do with the

felt experience of the actual environment:

gentle?

a

is

it harsh,

abundant or miserly in its resources? 29

or

To

another extent, the depiction of "nature" helps
to produce

a

specific orientation to and perception of that
environment. 30

Finally, the category is often used as a

key symbolic principle of order and differentiation. 31
This is why we should be interested in the political

thinker's treatment and sense of nature. Mill's portrayal of

nature is a paradigmatic element of an overall world-view,

contributing to and constituting his understanding of

distinctively human activity, including categories for
judging the excellence or deficiencies of those activities

which significantly include political practices.

Psychoanalysis and cultural anthropology help us to
understand the psychological origins and social

ramifications of "nature" as

a

carries significant import.

A society's view of nature and

symbolic category which

the environment of infancy are likely to be closely

connected.

32

This covers a broad range of linked

phenomena, ranging from adult perceptions of infants as

a
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drain on precious few resources, with
obvious ramifications
on the feeding of infants and on those
infants' subsequent
feelings about "nature", to the discomfort
experienced by
adults of certain cultures in the face of
unsocialized
infants. 33

Whatever the specifics may

be— harsh

or

gentle,

flexible or exacting— the infant's experience
of his
or her first environment is likely to set the
stage for his
or her consequent perceptions of nature.
If the
first

environment is a female-dominated one, the nature-female

association is also likely to be strengthened. 34
Louis Breger has termed the modern world-view of the
West,

"which sees the human species as special, as set off

from the natural world, as constructing its own environment
as a protection against what is felt to be a hostile,

grudging Nature," the "man-against-nature" view. 35

He

contrasts it with the "human-within-nature" world view,
where impulses, emotions and fantasies "are felt as

potentially harmonious with social life." 36

To the extent

that women are linked up with nature and excluded from an

androcentric portrayal of "civilized" Western humanity,
Breger

'

s

gender-specific terminology is deliberate and

appropriate.

He describes the emotional components of this

world view in the following way:
Repeated experiences of frustration, insufficient
nourishment, disrupted attachment, constricted autonomy
and harsh discipline lead to the perception of the world
and of other persons and the environment more

—
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generally— as untrustworthy, dangerous, punitive,
ungiving;
in short,

as enemies with which one must
A similar orientation towards one's
own
S
U tS fr ° m thS ex P erienc e typical
of the modern
Cnr^
i
world.
That is, repeated frustrations, punishments
and
inconsistent gratification create feelings of
anxiety
and guilt about one's own hunger,
sensual-sexual
autonomous strivings and anger at the authority; urges
these
too come to be experienced as enemies that
one must
combat in order to survive. 37

struggle.

^

What we have here is a world-view that clearly
predates
Mill's lifespan even as it took on its most
virulent

formulation in the Victorian ideology of Mill's time.

We

can also appreciate the ways in which Mill's upbringing
at
the hands of his father must have further enhanced Mill's

sensitivity to the components of

a

world-view fearful of

nature and intent on dominating her.

By all accounts, James

Mill was a stern father who himself embodied and articulated
an ascetic,
flesh'

if hypocritical,

distaste for 'things of the

38
.

We have already discussed in Chapter II some of the

psychoanalytic formulations of gender acquisition which are
relevant to this discussion of the gendered features of
Mill's world view, particularly as they concern "nature".
To recapitulate briefly:

emphasis was placed on the

pre-Oedipal mother-child configuration and separationindi vidua tion dynamics.

Special attention was paid to the

ramifications of separation from a mother who is

anatomically and eventually genderedly "like" her female
offspring and "unlike" her male offspring.

The negative

.
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articulation of masculinity vis-a-vis the
pre-posited
maternal presence was also discussed.
saw,

This issues, as we

in a tendency for the masculine neonate
to objectify

the mother,

to imagine and to treat her as a (m)other.

Dinnerstein's discussion of the primitive identification
of
the primal maternal surround with nature will be
especially
germane here.

Finally, masculine tendencies towards

excessive and objectified, and feminine tendencies towards

underdeveloped delineation from the mother-world are also
significant in the context of this discussion.
The description of reality that Mill's portrayal of

nature offers echoes in many ways distinctive features of
the process of masculine identity formation enacted within
the context of female-dominated childrear ing

.

A dehumanized

nature becomes, like the dehumanized mother, the very

measure of a civilized "human" identity to which it is

negatively counterposed

.

What we have here, as the

psychoanalytic literature amply suggests, is not simply
series of parallel or analogic dynamics. 3 9

a

The

recognizable themes of feminized nature, naturalized mother
and masculinized objective cognitive stance all suggest

a

complex web of intricately related dynamics of separationindividuat ion
"Our over-personification of nature," writes

Dinnerstein,
of women.

40

"is inseparable from our underpersoni f icat ion

The quasi-human status of women stems in

large part from our infantile immersion
in a mother-world
where the mother is also the first
representative of

nature.

It is the combination of two

things— the various

traumas associated with that inevitably
disappointing and
increasingly threatening immersion, and our
attempts to
escape that immersion with the help of
the father— which
help to constitute women's curious status,
along with the

over-personification and ob ject i f ication of nature.

Because

the terms of immersion (ultimate bliss and
primodial threat
of death to a dependent and emerging
self) and escape are

gendered, because the father steps in as gallant
rescuer, we
are thereby enabled to maintain certain
primitive emotions
and gendered associations.

Given the gendered structure of

modern Western culture, we may permanently sidestep
an adult

confrontation or mediation with

a

primordial (m)other whose

human subjectivity is difficult to acknowledge.

To the

extent that the primordial (m)other is equated with nature,
feelings directed at each are likely to partake of the same

emotional imagery.

For those who are born into cultures

where such imagery is already extant in the social milieu,
such primordial associations are further strengthened and

legitimized.

Unconscious feelings about mother (and, by

extension, women) and nature are likely to center around the
dual strands of unresolved desire and horror.

nature, poses a terrifying threat to autonomy.
threat, experienced by children of both sexes,

Woman, like
And this
is

amplified

.
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for the boy child,

given the gendered specification of

masculinity as that which is "not-mother "
The (perhaps universal) human need
for a "quasi-human
source of richness and target of greedy
41
rage"
becomes

localized in

a

gendered-f emale embodiment.

To the extent

that this embodiment is enabled to maintain
an apparently

self-sufficient existence; that

becomes one of two terms in

a

is,

to the extent that it

dichotomous rendering of

Male/Female, Culture/Nature, Reason/Passion, it
becomes

simultaneously more threatening and less amenable to
dialectical query and mediation.

The sexual division of

labor in childrearing, along with the genderized
dichotomous

symbolic culture of the modern West, allows us to maintain
what Dinnerstein describes as "the murderous infantilism of
our relation to nature" and women. 42

Within this emotional and symbolic frame of meaning,
maternal and natural re-engulf ment become the constitutive
threats to masculinity and "civilization".

And the dangers

of re-engulf ment are compounded by the strict boundedness of

masculinity and civilization thus conceived.

Here we have

an early intimation of how Mill's individualism and

preoccupation with autonomy are simultaneously masculinist
and intimately related to his portrayal of nature:
The cultural definitions of masculine as what can never
appear feminine, and of autonomy as what can never be
relaxed, conspire to reinforce the child's earliest
associations of female with the pleasures and dangers of
merging, and male with both the comfort and the

cultural anxiety; together they
can lead to postures of
and the longing which generates
it. 4 3

y

The primal terror of maternal
re-engul f ment which signals
the "death" of the masculine
neonate is recapitulated in
Mill's association of nature with
death.
This association
is further strengthened in
the context of Mill's description
of sex as "that clumsy provision
which she [nature] has made
for that perpetual renewal of
animal life, rendered

necessary by the prompt termination she
puts to it in every
individual instance." ("Nature",
p. 463)

This is not simply

an instance of quaint Victorian language
designed to avoid
the explicit description of sex; it also
weds sex to death.
As for the wonders of reproduction:
"no human being ever
comes into the world but another is literally
stretched on
the rack for hours or days, not unfrequently
issuing in

death."

("Nature", p. 463)

So much for nature's claim to

the successive reproduction and replenishment
44
of life.
As we have seen,

the equation of nature with death is

fully evident in Mill's portrayal of nature's threatened

re-engulfment of civilized life.

Civilization, like the

masculine ego, must be constantly defended in the form of
vigorous efforts designed to widen the gap between Nature
and Culture.

Nature vindictively makes up the distance, and

the deadly race is on.

Similarly with masculinity, creeping
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intimations of feminine encroachment
will not be tolerated.
The trauma of dependence on the
mother
takes its

conscious and manifest form in the
adult's compulsion to
overcome dependence on nature.
"... infantile

rage in the

face of the independent will of
the mother culminates in the
'adult' drive to annul the
independence
of,

dominate,

nature." 45

i.e.,

to

The domination of nature is an

expression, then, of a denial of dependence
on the mother.
Hostility toward the mother is redirected
toward the natural
world.
As Isaac Balbus writes:
"The mother that does not
matter reappears in the form of a nature
that is reduced to
46
mere matter."

Within Mill's empiricist frame, to which we
shall
shortly turn, nature is reduced to mere matter:

it is the

objectified substance of the scientist's explorations.
However,

in the essay on "Nature",

subjective form.
singular coin:
standpoint.

it assumes a stupendously

Each version represents the flip side of a

nature objectified from a masculine

Mill's criminal, sadistic and vindictive nature

may be understood in part as a projection of his own

unresolved feelings toward the mother.
in turn,

These projections,

serve to justify the domination of external and

internal nature.

Mill's corporeal asceticism may be firmly

situated within this scheme (which, we must stress, he did
not invent on his own.)

His identification of sex and

sexuality with death underscores the civilized Western

denial of the body.

If,

as Isaac Balbus has put it in
his

re-phrasing of Norman 0. Brown's thesis in
Life Against
Death,

"To embrace one's own mortality is to
be able to
affirm one's own flesh," 47 Mill expresses the

simultaneous and related denial of sexuality and
death by
allying them with each other and relegating them
to the

foreign and distant reaches of Nature.
We might also pause to consider Mill's insistence
on the

malleability of human nature in this context. 48

Nature is

so awful that if human nature were not malleable, all would

be lost.

Our malleability is the only hope for a

progressive improvement in the lot of humankind.
our abilities to manipulate nature

own

— constitute

— including

the very mark of our humanity.

Secondly,

our
(We have

already commented on Mill's repeated insistence on

self-control and self-discipline.)

It

is

in this double

sense that the malleability of human nature, a central tenet
of James Mill's theory of associat ionism (an early version

of behaviorism) which his son retained,

prominently in Mill's social theory.

figures so

Dennis Wrong's

comments on the oversocialized conception of man in modern

sociological theory are applicable to Mill. 49

Mill's

stress on the malleability of human nature, coupled with his
fear of nature, promotes an image of the human subject who
is disembodied and conscience-driven,

Ironically,

it is this

and little more.

impoverished and disembodied subject

.
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who both motivates and handicaps
Mill's feminism, as we will
see
In this opening section on Mill's
world view,

special

attention has been paid to his vivid
description of a
malevolent and intrusive Nature as found in
selections from
Considerations on R epresentative Government and
"Nature".

Since Mill does not present a systematic
grand design for
his political writings, it makes sense to
explore his views
on nature as a way of getting at his view of
the larger

scheme of life.

Furthermore, given the remarkable paucity

of information concerning the emotional dimensions
of his

work,

these writings are all the more precious for what they

reveal about Mill's felt experience as an intellectual and

about his sense of place in the order of things.

Mill's depiction of nature and the human struggle
against that nature opens the way for a more selected focus
on the masculinist dimensions of his thought.

We have

already discovered several significant clues in his
world-view, the most notable being his dichotomous rendition
of a vile and imposing nature counterposed to rational,

civilized life.

As

I

have argued, this paradigm partakes of

cognitive and emotional imagery which has been identified as
part of the masculine identity securing process.

In

subsequent sections of the chapter, which will examine
Mill's intellectual style and epistemology

,

his psychology

and concept of the individual, his politis and his feminism,

.

we will find further evidence for the
masculinist dimensions
of his work, including the echoes of a
Welstanshauunq that
is

significantly organized in terms of an unstable and

antagonistic relation between Culture and Nature, Reason
and
Pass ion

Mill's Style and Method
One of the most outstanding features of Mill's

intellectual style is his rationalism.

His praise of

Coleridge notwithstanding, all of his work (including the
essay on Coleridge) is characterized by an abiding

commitment to and optimism concerning the powers of reason.
These powers are often counterposed by Mill to passion and
instinct.

Careful comparison between his essays on Bentham

and Coleridge suggests that Mill was capable of criticizing

rationalism in its most virulent and limited form in
Benthan, but unable to enact such criticism in his own
work.

50

Ironically, it is in his essay on Bentham rather

than the one on Coleridge that Mill comes closest to a

passionate refutation of the limits of utilitarian
rationalism:

Knowing so little of human feelings, he [Bentham] knew
still less of the influences by which those feelings are
formed:
all the more subtle workings both of the mind
upon itself, and of eternal things upon the mind,
escaped him; and no one, probably, who, in a highly
instructed age, ever attempted to give a rule to all
human conduct, set out with a more limited conception

.
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either of the agencies by which human
conduct is, or of
those by which it should be, influenced.
"BenTnam" p
(

,

The essay on Coleridge,
more,

is

to which we turn expecting even

the less revealing.

Mill gives a kind of

half-hearted lip service to Coleridge's revolt
against the
philosophy of the eighteenth century. His real
aim is to

subsume Coleridge's intuitive idealist insights
within the
frame of a sensationalist theory of knowledge.
The

redeeming intellectual value of Coleridge for Mill
turns out
to be his ability to improve and deepen the
empirical

resources for the investigation of human nature and
conduct.
Mill,

then, assumes a critical but reformist stance

towards rationalism only in relation to its most excessive

practitioners.

From an adversarial position, he is capable

of detecting the imperfections and limits of a method to

which he is inextricably bound.

As a practitioner of that

method, however, Mill fails to embody such a critique.

His

best effort is to soften the edges, to round out the

description of the narrowly self-interested individual who
is the calculator of a limited number of utilities.

Ironically,

it

is

in the essay on Bentham that Mill

comes closest to articulating the very sort of criticism
that could be levelled against his own work:
The field of man's nature and life cannot be too much
worked, or in too many directions; until every clod is
turned up, the work is imperfect: no whole truth is
possible but by combining the points of view of all the
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There are portions of the essay
where Mill's description of
the differing standpoints of different
observers (whose

differences consist of differences in life
circumstances)
comes perilously close to challenging
his presumption of a
singular truth.
It would be a mistake,
however, to rely

extensively on these and related passages for
an adequate
understanding of Mill's style and method. The
Mill of

"Bentham" is the nagging but undeveloped voice
of

a

thinker

who was drawn to romantic intuitionism while
effectively

managing his distance from it.

Coleridge's "oscillation"

was useful precisely to the extent that it could
enrich

Bentham'

nature.

s

"slender stock of premises" concerning human

What might have been a genuine dialogue between two

radically different thinkers is rendered into an

accomodation that imposes much more heavily on Coleridge
than on Bentham.
In spite of his avowed appreciation of Coleridge as an

antidote to Bentham'

s

single-minded pursuit of

"naif-truths", and even though he attributed his mental

breakdown to "the dissolving influence of analysis," 51
Mill never divested himself of a fundamental commitment to

reasoned empirical analysis, which was predicated on an

optimistic appraisal of reason.

Reason, not love, and

certainly not instinct or emotion, would conquer all.

-
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Michael Oakeshott's description
of the Rationalist comes
remarkably close to capturing the
essential flavor of Mill's
intellectual style:
1

U

t ° nCe ske ? tical *nd optimistic:
here 13 no opinion, no habit, no
h.V?ii
\£
°® 1 ? ef nothing
so xfirmly rooted or so widely held
that
S
S t0 q estion ifc an d to judge
it by what he
V
cans hif
calls
his reason'; optimistic, because the
Rationalist
never doubts the power of his 'reason'
(when properly
applied) to determine the worth of a thing,
the truth of
an opinion or the propriety of an action.
Moreover,
he
is fortified by a belief in a 'reason'
common to all
mankind, a common power of rational consideration,
which
is the ground and inspiration of
argument
But
besides this, which gives the Rationalist a
touch of
intellectual equal itarianism, he is something
also
individualist, finding it difficult to believe that of an
anyone who can think honestly and clearly will
think
differently from himself. 52

skepMcal

£5

ifc

4 .!!

'

....

Mill is indeed a sceptic, notoriously dismissive
of

popular opinion, intuitive knowledge and "irrational"
belief.

Like Oakeshott's Rationalist, Mill is both an

egalitarian and an elitist.

If reason confers similar

capacities on all human beings (and we need to acknowledge
Mill's inclusion of women here), binding them together into
the fellowship of humanity,

it also promotes a kind of

intellectual arrogance in Mill.

His world is significantly

divided between the intellectual have's and have-not's.

As

Oakeshott has put it, the Rationalist "finds it difficult to

believe that anyone who can think honestly and clearly will
think differently from himself."

Mill's description of his

young Benthamite period, where "What we principally thought

of,

was to alter people's opinions;
to make them believe
according to the evidence, and know
what was their real

interest," 53 remains applicable to
his later work as well,
despite his repudiation in the Autobiography
of the

arrogance of this youthful stance.

It

evident in On the Subjection of Women

particularly

.

Notably, Mill shares with Oakeshott

ominous interest in education."

is

'

s

Rationalist "an

As Considerations on

Representative Government makes abundantly clear,
this
emphasis on education is tied in with an
emphasis
on

competence and technique and is closely related to
the
Rationalist project of reconstructing society along
lines
that are deemed to be 'rational' to the extent
that they

provide technical solutions to perceived problems.
Technical, rather practical knowledge wins the day, setting
the stage for a politics of public administration.

advocates a group of bureaucratic implementors

,

Mill

separated

from (protected from) electoral politics and a democratic

assembly, whose job it is to carry out the preferences of
the voters as they see fit.

Considerations on

Representative Government anticipates the practical

separation of politics and technique which we witness in its
full

flowering today.

(A prime case in point is the extant

opinion, articulated by President Reagan, that the American

people should leave the complicated business of
international arms negotiations policy to the experts.)
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Mill wants the business of government
taken out of politics;
the popular assembly should be limited
in its functions to
ratifying the proposals of professionals
or sending them
back to the drawing board. Mill relies
heavily on the
criteria of efficiency and competence to
develop the case
against pure democracy. 54 The "instructed
minority",

having access to the knowledge of what counts
as "general"
(as opposed to particular and

"sinister") interests,

is that

group which is entitled to vote.

Mill's rationalism comes to bear most fully on his

politics via the criterion of competence which is an
essential prerequisite of the right to vote.

Competence is

achieved through education, which Mill would like to see
extended to as many persons as possible.

It is the faith

that all will eventually come to "see the light" already

apprehended by the few

— rather

than a vision of mutual

transformation among inter-subjectively, but also
differently, constituted human beings

— that

informs Mill's

education requirement, along with his defense of tolerance.
Democracy, like reason,

is

in opposition to and is therefore

vulnerable to, challenges from the irrational sphere,
embodied in the uneducated rabble.
To the extent that Bacon and Descartes provide the early

intimations of what, according to Oakeshott, would later
emerge as the distinct Rationalist character, Mill's

empiricist connection to Bacon

(a

connection that was both

direct and mediated through James
Mill and Jeremy Bentham)
is significant and helpful in
thinking through
the

connections between his attitudes towards
nature, his
rationalist style, his empiricist epi stemology
and his
politics.
For Mill, all scientific explanation
,

is

fundamentally of the same kind.

Explanation within the

physical sciences and the moral sciences (meaning
the study
of the laws of the mind as well as of matter,
and not what

we might take it to mean as normative theory)
takes on an

effectively similar causal pattern.

Explanation in terms of

motives and intentions is equivalent for Mill to the

scientific explanation of physical causation.
for Mill,

Free will,

is an antecedent or intervening cause.

human behavior is explicable and still "free".
means," writes Alan Ryan,

Hence,
"This

.

"that there is no ultimate

difference in the causal status of persons and rocks; in
both cases, things could and would have been different

if,

and only if, the antecedent causes had been different." 55

Mill's empiricism in the "moral sciences" took the
specific form of methodological individualism.

According to

Steven Lukes, the doctrine of methodological individualism
involves the notion that "facts about society and social

phenomena are to be explained solely in terms of facts about
individuals."

6

Mill exemplifies methodological

individualism in his repudiation of the law of the Chemical
Mixture of Effects (whereby chemical substances interact to

^
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produce qualitatively different substances),
embracing
instead the scientific model of the physics of
his time.
(Mill's use of natural science metaphors is a
telling

reminder that his view of the logic of explanation
in the
social sciences is that it is not essentially
different from
explanation in the natural sciences. While other social
theorists, notably Marx and Freud, share with Mill a belief
in a systematic scientific grand design,

their conceptions

of scientific knowledge take different forms.) 57

Mill,

For

laws governing society exemplify the principle of the

Composition of Forces.

The analogy in physics is that final

effects can be calculated by determining the individual
effect of each contributing force, which adds up to the
final product.

Alan Ryan describes Mill's view of social

life as exemplifying "the mechanical interaction of

individuals, not their blending into something new." 58
Mill himself makes his method abundantly clear in these

excerpts from his System of Logic

;

The laws of the phenomena of society are, and can be,
nothing but the laws of the actions and passions of men
united together in the social state. Men, however, in a
state of society, are still men; their actions and
passions are obedient to the laws of individual human
nature.
Men are not, when brought together, converted
into another kind of substance with different
proper t ies 9
.

".

.

.

human beings in society have no properties but those

which are derived from and may be resolved into the laws of
the individual man."

0
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As an epistemological doctrine,

this version of

methodological individualism is premissed
on a host of
specific assumptions concerning the
human being in a social
context.
It presumes the integrity of an
inviolable ego,
one that cannot be qualitatively
transformed through its
relations with others:
social dynamics are ultimately
reducible to the behaviors and intentions
of individuals.

Methodological individualism effectively denies
that
qualitative changes may be produced within an
intersubjective context which, while constituted by
discrete
flesh and blood creatures in relation to each
other,

is not

quantitatively reducible to its constituent and discrete
parts.

63

We recognize at once the masculine features of

this human subject at the heart of methodological

individualism, with his clearly demaracted ego boundaries
and transactional relations with other men.

The "laws of

the individual man" prevail in social interaction and are
the building blocks of social explanation.

No "field

dependent" creatures these, to muck up explanations with

questions about quantity-to-quality shifts, inter- and
intra-sub ject i ve nuances and meanings, or the dissolving

subject-object interface.

All activity and its meaning is

derived from "the individual", as

a

discrete subject of

behavior and object of scientific inquiry.
Methodological individualism presumes the cognitive
capacity for ob jecti vi ty as the central defining feature of
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its objects of inquiry (human beings)
and subjects of

inquiry (scientists and social observers).

The presumptive

ideal at work here is that of an objective
cognitive stance

situated in protected relation to an external
and

ob jectif iable reality.
Evelyn Keller's inquiry into "the processess by
which
the capacity for scientific thought develops,
and the ways
in which those processes are intertwined with
emotional and

sexual development/'

has set a helpful precedent for the

consideration of the gendered features of Mill's
methodological individualism.

Arguing that the cognitive

capacity for objectivity is acquired along with the process
of identity formation as a function of the child's capacity
for distinguishing self from not-self,

Keller explores the

gendered features of that version of empiricist science
modelled on the presumptive ideal of an objectivized

cognitive stance situated in relation to an alien
nature.

64

This version of science,

traceable to Bacon,

"bears the imprint of its gender izat ion not only in the ways
it

is used,

offers

but in the very description of reality it

— even

description."

in the relation of the scientist to that
65

The description of self and reality contained within

methodological individualism may be traced et iologically to
the earlier process of identity acquisition.

(Such an

etiology would presumably exist for any epi st emological
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scheme.)

This reconstruction is premissed on the
argument
that cognitive and emotional development
and processes are
not radically distinct, but vitally related
to each other in
66
mutually constitutive ways.
If we pause to consider the

dynamics of separat ion-individuat ion, we notice
the seeds of
potential cognitive orientations that exist in
that crucial
oppositional dynamic between mother and neonate:
In the extrication of self from mother,
the mother,
beginning as the first and most primitive subject,
emerges, by a process of effective negations, as
the
first object.
The very processes (both cognitive and
emotional) which remind us of that first bond become
colored by their association with the woman who is,
and
forever remains, the archetypal female. Correspondingly,
those of delineation and ob jectif icat ion are colored
by
their origins in the process of separation from mother:
they become marked, as it were, as "not-mother "
The
mother becomes an object, and the child a subject, by a
process which becomes itself an expression of opposition
to and negation of "mother". 57
.

Such a dynamic holds a variety of potential consequences,
ranging from various forms of reconciliation with the primal
(m)other,

to extreme alienation from her.

cognitive stance,

As a particular

methodological individualism bears the

tell-tale signs of an unmediated struggle with the mother.
The radical differentiation of subject and object, whose

constituent failure is a disallowance of "that vital element
of ambiguity at the interface between subject and

object,"

68

survives in methodological indi vidual i sm

'

strict differentiation between its objects of inquiry and

between those objects and the scientists who study them.
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What makes the ob jectivist-individualist
empiricist
stance distinctively masculine? Presumably,
children of

both sexes must engage in a self-other struggle
with the
maternal caretaker and have similar needs for
autonomy.

some extent,

To

autonomy becomes a gendered term for children

of both sexes who are reared primarily by a
female mother

because

it

signifies a positional stance that is

"not-mother s"
'

.

Autonomy and objectivity become effectively

masculinized for all children.

Even further, this

masculinization of autonomy and objectivity is strengthened
for boys "to the extent that boys rest their very sexual

identity on an opposition to what is both experienced and

defined as feminine." 69

Hence,

"the development of their

gender identity is likely to accentuate the process of
separation,"

70

as we saw in Chapter II.

Unlike girls, who

must re-negotiate their relationship to a mother who is both
"like" and "unlike" them, boys are not as prompted to do
this.

The structure of the situation (familial and social

in the broarder sense) effectively gives them the distance

and the incentive to avoid this challenge.

The notion of

objectivity which is "rooted in the premise that the object
can and should be totally removed from our description of
the object,"

71

recapitulates the primal subject-object

split and perpetuates latent gendered associations of

masculinized objectivity and feminized object.
Mill's empiricism and his methodological individualism
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partake, along with his fearful and
tension-filled account
of civilization's antagonistic
relationship to nature, of a
cognitive orientation and corresponding
emotional structure
which have been linked to masculinity. 72
That his

Weltanschauung and his method are thus intimately
linked
should come as no surprise, particularly insofar
as they
share a common version of the human subject.

The human

subject thus conceived sets the agenda for an
appropriate

methodology for analysis and observation, and vice versa.
That is, methodological individualism helps to constitute
its object of inquiry.

This object is undeniably masculine,

most notably in his strict ego boundary differentiation and
in his radical separation from a nature that must be

disciplined within the self and harnessed for the work of
civilization.

Mill's version of the human subject is also

masculine by virtue of his horrific vulnerability.

The

revolt of nature threatens without respite, reenforcing the

need for clear-cut differentiation, absolute autonomy, and

uncluttered identity.

Mill's political theory, to which we

now turn in greater detail, is concerned with precisely

these issues.

Mill's Individual and the Quest for Liberty
The kind of man that liberalism requires, wrote L.T.

Hobhouse,

is one who can "discipline himself," whose

226

capacities for "the development of will, of
personality, of
self-control, or whatever we please to call
that central

harmonizing power which makes us capable of
directing our
73
own lives,"
have been developed and secured.
That

Hobhouse, a socialist, and one of Mill's most
generous

interpreters, should reiterate the themes of
discipline and

self-control is indicative of the strength and
centrality of
these qualities to Mill's conception of the individual.
(These themes are also indicative of the influence
of

Victorian conceptions of morality on Mill and Hobhouse.)
is the capacity for discipline and self-control
which,

fact, makes us moral and individual.

It

in

Without such developed

capacities, nature would gobble us up into her chaotic and

amoral (or is it immoral?) vortex.

We are individuals

precisely to the extent that we stand over instinct, to the
degree that we set the pace and the course for the orderly

progression of our lives.

Individuality and morality are

thus inversely related to instinct. 74

This scheme is reiterated in Mill's idealist version of

history which is propelled by ideas.

"It is what men

think that determines how they act." 75

Those of us who

a

would respond to Mill by suggesting that it is how humans
live that shapes how and what they think, would be treated
to Mill's partial and qualified agreement with this

argument.

The "convictions of the average man are in much

greater degree determined by their personal position than by
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reason," but to this extent they are
both inferior and
vulnerable to the ideas of others, notably
those of "the
united authority of the instructed." 76
Mill wants thought
to be "freed" from its material bounds.
Materially situated
ideas are suspect because they invariably
express partial
interests.
The particular is bogus; general izable
truth is
what we must seek.
Hence, Mill's focus in On Liberty on freedom
of thought

and his correspondingly less developed focus
on economic and

other practical forms of freedom may be understood in

relation to

1)

his conception of the ascetic (disembodied)

individual and intellect, and

2)

his account of the

causative relationship between ideas and events of the real
world.

Insofar as his sociology of knowledge is concerned,

Mill is not a materialist.

This is amply confirmed by his

curious inability to appreciate the possibility that the
ideas of "the instructed minority" might simultaneously

reflect and perpetuate specific economic and political

interests.

It is the tyranny of the majority which,

according to Mill, ought to be feared, most notably because
it is an uneducated and uncultivated majority and,

by

extension, all too wedded to material and partial and

therefore "sinister" interests. 77
Hence, Mill's discussion of "liberty" ranges primarily

over the territory of inner (private) consciousness and its

expression.

This consciousness inhabits and defines a
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singular individual who must be "sovereign"
"over himself,
78
over his own body and mind."
The only warrant for

intervention in the liberty of this individual
is the
threatened liberty of another similarly
constituted
individual.

"The only freedom which deserves the name
is

that of pursuing our own good in our own way,
so long as we
do not attempt to deprive others of theirs
" 79
Such
.

.

.

conception of liberty presumes, as Mill acknowledges,
that
there is an arena of belief and action which is purely

a

"self-regarding".

"To individuality should belong the part

of life in which it is chiefly the individual that is

interested; to society, the part which clearly interests

society."

"Each will receive its proper share if each has

that which more particularly concerns it." 80

Through

a

process of circular reasoning which relies on deceptively

self-evident principles, this formulation effectively begs
the question of the public-private distinction upon which it

rests.

8

Furthermore,

"society" may stand for the

collective interests of the whole; but it is always specific
individuals and groups who decide what it is that "society"
should concern itself with.
Over and above issues concerning the specific content of
each delimited sphere, however,

is the nagging

question of

the division itself which, on closer examination, makes

remarkably little sense.
enough:

As Hobhouse understood clearly

"there are no actions which may not directly or

229

indirectly affect others

.

.

even if there were they would

.

not cease to be matters of concern
to others." 82

The

distinction between individual and society,
private and
public, also presumes a division within
the
individual

himself in terms of private and social life,
an equally
problematic, if pervasive and generally accepted,
demarcation.

While such

a

demarcation works with fairly

innocent activities (e.g., what varieties of
flowers to
plant in my garden), the boundary is easily
dissolved by the
issues that matter— sexuality consumer habits,
and
,

childrearing practices are only

a

few.

Ironically,

it is on

this essentially flawed framework that many feminists

continue to rely, particularly in the area of reproductive
rights.

83

At the conclusion of On Liberty

equally unhelpful principles:

1)

,

Mill leaves us with two

the individual is not

accountable to society for acts which concern himself only,
and 2) he is accountable for those acts affecting others.

Between the easy extremes on either side of this
formulation

— what

color shirt

particular day; murder

— lies

I

a

decide to wear on

a

massive area of grey.

Most

"private" decisions simply cannot be cast in terms that have

ramifications only for the individual concerned.

An

interesting example in this respect concerns the response of

Americans to recent news about birth-control policy in
China.

Our response to that enforced policy, often issuing
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in late-term abortions for
pregnant women and strong social

sanctions against couples who would
like to have more than
one child, is bracketed by the
ideological framework with
which we interpret the issue. On the
one hand, it is viewed
as a gross violation of "private
rights".
On the
other,

the

social consequences of an unenforced
population policy are
so gruesome (millions would literally
starve) that the

"private rights" of couples take on the
appearance of
extreme selfishness.
Is this a "private" issue
or a

"social" one?

Put in these terms,

there is just no way to

make sense out of and to formulate judgements about
the

Chinese experience.

To opt for one characterization or the

other would put us in a position that would all-too-quickly

become indefensible.
It

is all too easy to poke holes into Mill's formulation

and defense of tolerance predicated on a public-private

distinction.

(This is not to say that a refurbished theory

of tolerance is a clear-cut and easy task.)

be said for his model of the human subject

—a

The same could

strangely

disembodied, hyper-rationalistic, sober maximizer of
interests,

ideally a conscience-driven do-gooder.

We have

already commented on the contrast between the individualist
and collectivist tendencies in Mill.

He was obviously not a

gratification-pursuing utilitarian maximizer of selfish
interests.

In fact, he was deeply committed to furthering

the long-term interests of his society.

And he urged others
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to do the same.

At the same time, we need to keep in
mind

that he engaged in this social work as an
"independent
84
center of consciousness."
We need somehow to maneuver a
position in relation to Mill which is respectful
of his

commitments and labors and critically aware of the
necessary
structural components of his theory.
As opposed to the common portrayal of
Mill's liberalism
as a paradigm which celebrates the atomistic
individual and

judges him to be free to the extent that he is unencumbered
by social relations and uncontracted duties, Graeme
Duncan

emphasizes "his conception of man as an essentially social
animal, to whose natural and customary attachment to his

fellows is added, as civilization develops, rational

perceptions of his actual and necessary links with
them."

85

"Liberty," writes Duncan:

is interpreted by him as a
common enterprise. Mill's
at times, to be thin
individual striding alone,
obligation and concern. 6
.

.

.

source of social duty and
version of society may seem,
but he had no notion of the
without any sense of social

Duncan's sympathetic defense of Mill provides

a

refreshing

and thought-provoking antidote to simplistic portrayals of

Mill's individualism.

However,

there is a misleading

tendency on his part to collapse Mill's preferences into the
actual logic of his theory.

Mill certainly does interject a

social conception of man in various writings.

These

interjections, however, do not automatically resolve the

question of Mill's atomistic conception of the human
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subject.

It

is

difficult to imagine how his prescriptions

for liberty and tolerance in On
Liberty could actually work

without such a subject.

Mill's preferences could very well

be at odds with his theory.

In this case,

we would need to

understand him as a tragic intellectual figure.

Mill

certainly embodied and advocated social
obligation and
concern.
But he did this in a strikingly solitary
way.
Notably, he gives little evidence for his
own sense of deep
embeddedness within a social context.
"Social feeling" for
Mill partakes of an essentially prescriptive
rather than

descriptive orientation.
one of two ways:

1

)

As such,

it may be understood in

as an "artificial" component of

de-natured humanity which is added on to an originally
atomistic subject, or

2)

as a rational extension of our

original egoism, such that

I

am able to perceive "my"

interests in the interests of others. 87

In neither case

is Mill's methodologically individualist subject deeply

transformed.

His social relations and interests continue to

be predicated on a subject who is essentially atomistic.
In his concern with autonomy, which significantly

mirrored his own sense of autonomous intelligence, Mill

elaborated

a

series of defensive prescriptions and maneuvers

for the individual besieged by the mediocrity and censorship

of the majority.

While we can appreciate Mill's concern

with the integrity of the individual swimming against the

popular tide, we can also marvel at his disregard for the
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components of collective social well-being.

We can also

situate such apparent disregard within the frame
of the
model of the physical composition of forces.
As
a

methodological individualist, Mill could well assume that
the guaranteed protection and well-being of the
individual

would yield social well being as an automatic and axiomatic

consequence
Our task here is not to reformulate a viable theory of

tolerance and liberty for a differently constituted
individual.

(If it were,

we would have to proceed on the

basis of a much "thicker" and "deeper" understanding of the
individual as a socially constituted subject.)

Instead, we

have the more manageable quest for the masculine features of
Mill's individual.

There is no need to belabor what should,

by now, be an obvious point.

It is one that has received

ample confirmation in our prior exploration of Mill's

world-view and methodology:

Mill's defense of tolerance and

definition of liberty rely on
demarcated,

conception of a clearly

a

field-independent subject.

Such a subject is

effectively and affectively capable of maintaining
discrete sense of identity vis

a

a

vis fellow human beings and

his society, to whom and to which he is cautiously related.
Such an identity, as Mill understood clearly, stood to be

threatened in the absence of a self /not-self demarcation and
by means of incursion into its "space" by the

undifferentiated mob.

On Liberty may be understood to
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provide such a demarcation and consequent
protection.
In short,
a

On Liberty is preoccupied with the liberty
of

well-differentiated masculine subject who requires

a

protected zone of thought, expression and action for
his
survival and well-being as a masculine subject. Within
zone,

this

the liberal masculine subject is constituted as a

self-sufficient and sovereign entity.

It is from this zone

that he ventures into the social world.

In the absence of

specific exceptions, this individual must be protected.

The

burden of proof effectively falls on those who would curtail
this individual, as Mill's language makes clear:
end for which mankind are warranted,

collectively,

"the sole

individually or

in interfering with the liberty or action of

any of their number is self-protection."

The social

relations of Mill's subject are to be negotiated within the
frame of an abstract morality of rights

.

At the center of

this moral scheme is an individual who is not to be

encroached on unless he happens to be invading the space of
another individual.
Mill's political morality of rights may be usefully

counterposed to

a

different moral structure, one that has

been identified as a specifically feminine morality.

As the

research of Carol Gilligan suggests, women proceed with

a

morality of (sometimes competing) responsibilities to
others, wherein moral decisions are related to the specifics
of situations, and are motivated by the injunction to avoid
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or to minimize human hurt. 89

When we place Mill against

this context-dependent scheme, his
abstract morality of
rights, centering around an antagonistic
relationship

between the individual and society, assumes
a specif iably
masculine aura. One cannot help but be struck
by the vast
differences between a morality predicated on self-

preservation and one that proceeds by means on
complex
adjudication between competing relationships and
respons ibilities.
Finally, it is precisely such an abstract morality
of

rights which fuelled and limited Mill's feminist project.

Mill's feminism, to which we now turn, is inhabited by

a

masculine subject who cannot help but subvert the very

liberation of women which Mill so gallantly fought for.
Mill's paradoxical feminism recapitulates, in a new form,
the tragic features of On Liberty

,

whereby Mill's vision of

the just society was effectively bracketed by his deeply

embedded theoretical and methodological assumptions.

That

these assumptions partake of a distinctively masculinist

substance and orientation could not help but problematize
his feminism.

Mi 11

'

s

Femi nism

Mill's renascent claim to fame as the only liberal
thinker to have applied the tenets of individual rights to
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women is often invoked not only in terms
of praise for
Mill's singular achievement 90 but also
in terms
of

,

incredulity.

How,

we might well wonder, could a political

theory which effectively secularized the
ground of human
dignity, made individuals the masters and
architects of
their destinies, and developed abstract and
general

principles of individual rights have failed to
concern
itself with the sexual double standard?

Usually ignored,

women occasionally came into view in liberal theory
as

subordinate exceptions rather than as equal participants.
Various justifications for the differential treatment of men
and women invariably fell back on reproductive biology,
less

developed intellectual and moral capacities in women than in
men,

the sexual division of labor, and the marriage

relation. 91

To some extent, Mill also fell into aspects

of this pattern, even as he tried to apply the tenets of his

liberalism to women.

Mill

i_s

unique in his attempt to

situate women consistently within the frame of liberal
rights.

However, the pre-Mill failure of liberal political

theory to systematically incorporate women should not be all
that surprising to us.
ways,

This failure attests,

in significant

to the androcentric conception of the human subject at

the very heart of that theory, and not simply to men's need
to re-legitimize the social inferiority of women.

On the

basis of the analysis of Hobbes offered in the preceding
chapter, we are in a position to appreciate the inherited
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masculinist features of liberal discourse that
may well have
insinuated themselves into Mill's feminist
enterprise.
We have just explored several of the ways
in which

masculinism inhabits Mill's framework at various levels.
This suggests that Mill's feminist endeavor should

be doubly

acclaimed and doubly scrutinized, since it is neither the
simple logical fruition of previously undeveloped

possibilities in liberal theory, nor an unproblematic
reformist inclusion of women as a previously excluded
group.

We are already in a position to question the 'add

women and stir'

formulation, the assumption that women could

be included within the liberal framework without

significantly altering that framework.

At a latent level,

Mill's feminism is the tortured outcome of a system of ideas

which was constitutionally unable to accomodate women as
women

,

as sex-specific and gendered creatures.

Women are

dealt with in the terms of exceptional and masculine
individualism.

Once again, as we will see, Mill's

preferences turn out to be at odds with his theory.

His

feminism is a kind of distorted compromise-formation.

To

the extent that they are masculinizable, women are

accomodated within Mill's framework.

When they are

not —-notably in their embodied capacities as wives and

mothers

— Mill's

sense,

the price of liberal feminist liberation is

trans-sexual i sm.

liberal feminism utterly fails them.

92

In a

Women must be disembodied, de-sexed,
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de-gendered, and made over into the image
of middle- and
upper-class men if they are to benefit from the
promises of
liberalism as Mill envisions them. They are
"free" to the

extent that they are ennabled to emulate men.

feminism attempts precisely such an ennabling.

Mill's
As such,

it

fails women just at the point that female
specificity and

"difference" cannot be ignored.

Mill's feminism in On the Subjection of Women is
fuelled
by the attempt to resolve the contradiction posed by
the

observation that "the social subordination of women

.

.

.

stands out as an isolated fact in modern social

institutions." 93

Within the frame of market relations, as

Mill clearly understood:

human beings are no longer born to their place in life
and chained down by an inexorable bond to the place they
are born to, but are free to employ their faculties, and
such favorable chances as offer, to achieve the lot
which may appear to them most desireable. (p. 32)

Sexual inequality for Mill is an antique feudal relic in a

modern world where human beings act as the rational
calculators of chosen utilities.

Perceptions of women's

nature have legitimated their exclusion from this modern

conception of the subject.

Mill is perhaps at his best in

his discussion of women's nature, which, he argues "rests
with women themselves

— to

be decided by their own experience

and by the use of their own faculties."

(p.

43)

He

understands that prevalent conceptions of women's nature are
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the products of a male imagination,
and that discussion of
that nature in the hands of men can serve
no honest
purpose.
"What is now called the nature of
women is an

eminently artificial thing."

(p.

38)

Female "nature",

argues Mill, has been produced within a
kind of greenhouse
environment where women have been limited by
social

conventions and rules such that their consequent
behavior
has been used as "proof" of this nature.
If nature prevents
women from doing certain things, such limits will
emerge in

the course of time.

In the meantime,

there is no need to

prevent women from doing what they cannot do and no
justification for barring them from what they can:
the knowledge which men can acquire of women even
as they have been and are, without reference to what
they might be, is wretchedly imperfect and superficial,
.

.

.

and always will be so, until women themselves have told
all that they have to tell. (p. 42)

What Mill did not anticipate is that what women had to tell
might throw his entire philosophical and political framework

into question.
We can certainly appreciate Mill's politicization of the

marriage relation, which anticipated the later slogan of
Second Wave feminists,

'the personal

is political':

"no

slave is a slave to the same lengths, and in so full a sense
of the word,

as a wife is."

(p.

48)

94

Woman's legal

position within marriage, where her legal rights are
subsumed under those of her husband, paves the way for
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bondage as

possibility within every marriage, argued Mill,
although every husband will not necessarily
avail
a

himself of

such despotic opportunity.

Men's open entitlement to the

exercise of unlimited authority corrupted men as
it impinged
on women.
Mill argues for legal reforms so that married
persons

will be equal before the law.

He argues for the equal and

voluntary association of marriage partners as a substitute
for patriarchal authority and feminized submission to
that

authority.

However, his discussion of the politics of

decision-making within the marriage relation is seriously
marred by two flaws:

his failure to deal with the political

implications of a sexual division of labor and unpaid
housework, and his curious discussion of the frequent

age-differential between husband and wife as a legitimate
reason for the husband's prerogative in decision-making.
Mill's abstract principles dissolve in the face of the

specificities of household and family life.
Although he advocates "ceasing to make sex

disqualification for privileges,"

(p.

a

112) he seriously

impinges on the vocational and professional aspirations of

women by arguing that the woman who marries has effectively

chosen a 'profession' as mistress of her husband's

(1)

household
Like a man when he chooses a profession, so, when a
woman marries, it may in general be understood that she
makes choice of the management of a household, and the

bringing up of a family,
as the first
Upon her
exertions, during as many
years
lfe as raay be
reguired for the purpose- and
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all other objects^nf
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The analogy that Mill draws
between the housewife and
"a man
when he chooses a profession"
borders on the absurd, given
the limited singularity
of "choice" for the married
woman.
While Mill understands in one
sense that "the power of
earning is essential to the
dignity of a
woman,

not independent property,"

(p.

67)

if she has

this historically-specific

need for an independent source
of income suddenly disappears
for the woman who has committed
herself to an "equal"
contract of marriage. Mill is unable
or unwilling to
guestion the sexual division of labor
within the
95
household,
and uncritically assumes that
legal equality
is primary, while economic parity
is its derivative.
He
tried to preserve an arena of choice for
the married woman
when he wrote that "the utmost latitude
ought to exist for
the adaptation of general rules to individual
suitabilities,"
(p.

68)

but such latitude rests, significantly,
on "due

provision" being made for her functions as "mistress
of the
family".
(Such "due provision", of course, would
fall

primarily to working-class and single middle-class women

.

Since Mill couches this discussion in terms of the
exc eptionally talented woman, we are left with the distinct

impression that most women would opt for the duties of
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housemistress.
writes:

We must take Mill at his
word when he
"If th ere is anything vitally
i mpo rtant to the

happiness of human beings,

it is that they should
relish

their habitual pursuit." (p.
126)

women will "relish"
reiisn t-Via-i
their

r-

»

He assumes that most

chosen" profession as housewives.

Without such an assumption, Mill would
have had to radically
re-think the social relations of
family
life,

along with the

relationship between family structure
and socio-economic
organization.
In response to the popular argument
that the family,

like a society, requires a government
and some ultimate
ruler, Mill invokes instead the image
of a voluntary

association or business partnership.

On the basis of the

partnership model, he argues that final decisions
do not
automatically rest with the male. However:
The real practical decision of affairs, to
whichever may
be given the legal authority, will greatly depend,
as it
even now does, upon comparative qualification. The
mere
fact that he is usually the eldest, will in most cases
give the preponderance to the man; at least until they
both attain a time of life at which the difference in
their eyes is of no importance. There will naturally
also be a more potential voice on the side, whichever it
is, that brings the means of support, (pp. 58-59)

Mill's lip service here to the logical possibility that the

wife might be the familial means of support is belied by his

discussion of women's "choice" of housewifely duties.

And

his discussion of the wisdom of age totally sidesteps an
engagement with the question concerning why younger women

marry older men.

In spite of his sincere
attempts to

dislodge male authority, Mill's
discussion has actually
strengthened it in a newly legitimate
form.
Authority is
only apparently de-sexed. Age
and income, still clearly
tied to the husband, and unquestioned
as gender-specific
attributes, become the new justifications
for differential
power within the marriage relation.
The underlying logic of
this account is unmistakable:
the woman who wants to reap
liberalism's benefits had better not marry. 96
On this account,

liberal feminist theory as articulated

by Mill cannot accomodate the wife and
mother.

When you

apply a theory of individual rights to
women, what comes out
at the other end is the corporate feminist,
the career woman
who can compete effectively in the world of
aspiring middle
97
and upper-class men.
Contemporary efforts to salvage
the female in the terms of liberally construed
"freedom"

have produced the "Enjouli" superwoman, who can bring
home
the bacon,

fry it up, and still be sexy for her husband at

the end of a double-work day.

Not surprisingly,

such a

mindset has also created a "post-feminist" generation of

young women, who see themselves as benefitting from the
legal and economic battles of their older sisters, but no

longer required to act the "militant" part of their
forerunners, because the obstacles to their freedom, legally
and economistically conceived, have been removed. 98

These

developments bear witness to the profound failure of liberal

244

feminism.

The singular failure of
Mill's feminism consists,
Part, of the larger failure
of his political

in

theory, which

effectively ignored the political
dimensions of structural
economic inequality and assumed
that legal change would
spearhead social change. Such
an approach is consistent
with the notion that it is ideas
that make history.
Working
class women are not helped in
Mill's account of bourgeois
family life, although Mill does
take yet another opportunity
to disparage working class men,
this time in terms of their
treatment of women. Notably missing
here is a discussion of
bourgeois male exploitation of working
class women in the
rampant prostitution industry of the
times, a phenomenon
that Mill could not likely have been
unaware

of."

m

a

similar vein, he was unable to appreciate
the possibility
that a political history might have
preceded the very sexual
division of labor which he took for granted.
Finally, it

never occured to him, just as it seems to have
escaped the

attention of contemporary "post-feminists", that the
subjection of women might be more than an outdated
anachronism.
Mill's failure to think through these issues could well
be the result of the understandable limits of human

criticism.

And yet, he is relentless in his critical

excavation of the taken-f or-granted

.

Over and over, he

entreats his readers to rethink the unref lect i vely accepted

beliefs of their lives.

Mill carries an interesting
variety

of blind spots himself.

Why does his feminism falter
in its
specific fashion? Our answer must
look beyond an assessment
of the limits of liberalism
to a reconsideration of Mill's
thought as a masculine phenomenon.

Simply put, Mill's feminism collapses
on the terrain of
"difference".
It fails at precisely the
point where women's
activities are not directly mediated by
the abstract hand of
the market, where their activities
consist of an interchange
with the realm of nature. Mill's feminism
collapses on the
terrain of the household. Given his terror
of nature, he is

unwilling to acknowledge this feature of
women's work and
even more unwilling to make men bear any of
the messy

responsibilities associated with it.

This interpretation of

Mill's feminism is strengthened in the context of
his

curiously ambivalent attitudes towards the women in his
life.

On the one hand,

there is his mother, who is

systematically denied.

On the other, Harriet Taylor is

blown all out of proportion as the unheralded genius of the
age.

These attitudes,

inability as

a

I

would argue, underline Mill's

political theorist to understand the

situation of women.
In the absence of commonly held knowledge about human

biological reproduction, one could read Mill's Autobiography
and assume that his father bore him:

"I was

born in London,

on the 20th of May, 1806, and was the eldest son of James
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Mill,

the author of the History of
British India

,

(p.

2

)

Mill utterly fails to acknowledge
his mother's existence,
much less the difficult circumstances
of her life.
The
lingering question is whether Mill's
mother was denied

because she was a mother, or because she
wasn't seen as
being mentally brilliant.
It seems fair to suggest that
the
two perceptions are inextricably linked.
it is in
On the

Subjection of Women, rather than the Autobiography

,

that

Mill provides us with a brief glimpse into
his feelings

about his mother:
A man who is married to a woman his inferior
in
intelligence finds her a perpetual dead weight, or,
worse than a dead weight, a drag, upon every aspiration
of his to be better than public opinion requires
him to
be.
It is hardly possible for one who is in these
bonds, to attain exalted virtue.
If he differs in his
opinion from the mass— if he sees truths which have not
yet dawned on them, or if, feeling in his heart truths
which they nominally recognize, he would like to act up
to those truths more conscientiously than the generality
of mankind
to all such thoughts and desires, marriage
is the heaviest of drawbacks, unless he be so fortunate
as to have a wife as much above the common level as he
himself is. (p. 114)

—

Mill's abstract description here fits perfectly with

accounts of James Mill's feelings about his wife, which were
not kept discrete. 100

Furthermore, Harriet Mill was

a

living reminder of James Mill's failure to live up to his
own ideal of sexual asceticism.

The same man who viewed

"the physical relation and its adjuncts" as "a perversion of

the imagination and feelings

.

.

.

one of the deepest seated

and more pervading evils in the human mind,"

101

managed to
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father nine children.

Harriet Mil! must have
stQod as a
constant source of mortification
to her husband and
eldest
son, a pregnant reminder
of her husband's
human-all-toohuman desires which had little
legitimate space within the
frame of his rational
utilitarianism. Notice that J.s.
Mill's description leaves us
feeling terribly sorry for
the
lofty husband and rather
peeved with the dead-weight
wife.
Notice too the striking parallels
between his rendition of
Nature's drag effect on civilization
(explored in the first
section of this chapter) and the
wife's retardation of her
husband's noble aspirations:
"Worse than a dead weight, a
drag." Once again, we encounter
the detectable connections
between a feminized nature set in
opposition
to a

masculinized civilization.
And then there is Harriet Taylor who,
conveniently
enough, comes to represent for Mill
everything that his
mother was not. To make things even more
convenient, she is
married to another man. She and Mill pursued
an ascetic and

deep friendship for twenty years before they
finally married
after the death of her first husband. Their
marriage, from
Mill's point of view, was a marriage of minds, above
all
else.

They shared an interest in feminism which Taylor, to

her credit, developed more radically and systematically
than
he did.

Harriet Taylor's feminism and other intellec-

tual accomplishments notwithstanding,

it seems clear
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the Mill overrated her gifts. 103

it has also been

suggested that Mill found her easier
to worship from
104
afar.
Harriet Taylor's de-sexual ization
and

over-exaggerated intellectual acumen would
seem to be
related much in the same way as his
mother's unavoidable
sexuality is tied in with her reported
simple-mindedness.
To suggest this is by no means to
fail to understand or
appreciate the Victorian sensibility of the
105
times.

What is of concern here is that Mill seems
to have had
some personal difficulties in dealing with
women as
flesh

and blood and brain creatures combined.

Instead, he resorts

to split images, denying a mother that surely
existed and

eulogizing a brain that probably did not.
of course,

The issue here,

is not Mill's personal attitudes towards
women.

These observations are little more than icing on the cake.
But they do substantiate our sense of dis-ease with Mill's

feminism as a practical and desirable model of emancipation
for women.

women.

And that is because it avoids the lot of most

Mill's denial of his mother haunts On the Subjection

of Women while his exaggerated portrayal of Harriet Taylor

reminds us of our average unexceptionalness

Mill's feminism is a feminism for the exceptional woman,
as Zillah Eisenstein argues. 106
is exceptional

But

I

would add that she

in terms that go beyond those of class and

educational privilege.
terms set by Mill,

is

The exceptional woman, within the

effectively re-gendered.

For the

terms of her exceptional talent
and drive are masculine
terms.
To the extent that they imply
the conquest of inner
and outer nature, an individualized
and objective cognitive
stance, a clear demarcation between
self and not-self,

between autonomous individuality and
collective identity,
the terms of liberal individualism
are indelibly

masculine.

This is why Mill's feminism, along with
the larger body
of his liberal theory, so fails feminists,
including those
who would claim, among other things, a
maternal identity and

practice. 107

Such imagery cannot but be problematic for

those women who would prefer not to make the
transsexual
switch,

for those who understand that the realm of the

banal— of everyday life— is

at least as instructive and as

ennobling as that of extraordinary effort and achievement as
defined by masculine culture. 108

Within this frame

of

analysis, we might recall the reported statement of an

anti-E.R.A. woman who was quoted as saying, "I don't care to
be a person." 109 The liberal feminist response to such a

statement would, of course, be one of incredulity.
must be kidding.)

(She

This statement, however, may carry more

insight than first meets the eye.

For this woman's

anti-feminism might well be motivated by her sense of
violated dignity implied by

a

liberal feminism housing an

abstract Everyman as its subject. 110

Contemporary liberal

feminism is the progeny of Mill's feminisn, an assimilative
feminism which preempts the critical possibilities of

a

I

feminism that would have us re-think
the terms of human
excellence and achievement even as
we question the
gender-based allocation of differential
burdens and
benefits.
Small wonder that it has elicited
the hostility
of women as well as of men. 111

Conclusion
Mill's feminisn, not surprisingly, is
a paradoxical
feminism. While his theorization of a status
for women
based on the liberal conception of individual
rights

ennabled him to opposed the kind of thinking
which
legitimized female inferiority in the name of their
reduced

capacities for reason, his "feminism" effectively writes
women out as sexed and gendered creatures.

In extending his

claims for the protection of liberal man to liberal woman,
Mill unwittingly enacts the masculine prerogative of

privileged identity.

For the unitary disembodied subject

housed by liberal theory is no abstract subject, appearances
to the contrary.

His motivation to separate from nature; to

observe a "methodologically individualist" terrain; to

cultivate

a

disembodied reason; to protect himself and

similarly constituted others from incursion into private
"space"; to formulate abstract principles of rights which

can be applied, context-blind, to any scene of social

conflict

— all

of this may be traced to a substratum of

251

experiences,

fears and needs which are
masculine.
For all of his genuine
desires to enter into the
mind
and circumstances of others,
for all of his discomfort
with
utilitarian rationalism, Mill
could not get beyond the
gendered terrain of his philosophical
enterprise. What he
did achieve, however, is not
insignificant.
He pushed the
liberal enterprise as far as it
might go, and perhaps a
little farther.
The paradoxes generated by his
efforts,
captured most strikingly in the
disparity between his
ethical vision of socially concerned
individuals working for
the improvement in social conditions
of their "fellowcitizens and his conception of the
isolated liberal subject,
are our paradoxes still.
To the extent that they are

transcendable, the clues for such a project
lie in Mill.
Feminists should neither ignore him nor
uncritically adopt
his framework for women's emancipation. To
pursue the
former course would be to ignore our political
culture; to
adopt the latter would effectively preempt "womanly

thinking". 112
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1979), pp.
181-201; Sandel, Liberalism and the Limit s
of JusticeCharles Taylor, "Atomism,"
Power, Poss ess ion s~aHd~'
Freedom:
Essays in Honor of C.B. MacPherson ed A1Vi«
Kontos
(Toronto:
university of Toronto Press, 1979), pp.
39-61; and Wolff, The Poverty of Liberalism
None of them,
to my knowledge, has identified the liberal
subject as a
masculine subject. Furthermore, none have invoked
the
maternal experience as a critical counterexample to
atomism.
(Significantly, Jaggar does.)
To argue, as I attempt here, that Mill's liberalism
partakes of masculine ideology, is not to suggest that males
are incapable of feeling uncomfortable with and formulating
significant critiques of liberalism. They may well,
however, find it more difficult than female critics to
identify gender-specific components of the theory.

J

'

.

m

,

.

.

63 Keller,

"Gender and Science", p. 416.

64 This version of science has,
of course, been
disputed by several scientists and philosophers of science,
including Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions
(Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1970);
Paul Feyerabend, Against Method:
Outline of an Anarchistic
Theory of Knowledge (London: New Left Books, 1975); and
Michael Polanyi, Knowing and Being (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1969), esp. Part II, and Personal Knowledge:
Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1958). For a helpful review of the
literature and disputes in contemporary philosophy of
science, see Richard Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and
Relativism:
Science, Hermeneutics and Praxis
(Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983),
esp.
Part I.
For a feminist analysis of why the
objectivist version may be at odds with the actual practice
of science and of how the contemporary dissatisfaction with
the logics of justification in science may be a
dissatisfaction with modern ways of knowing which are also
masculine ways of knowing, see Sandra Harding, "Is Gender a
Variable in Conceptions of Rationality?" in Beyond
Domination:
New Perspectives on Women and Philosophy ed
Carol C. Gould
(Totawa, N. J.
Rowman and Allanheld, 1984),
43-63,
System Become Visible
"Why
Has
the
Sex/Gender
and
pp.
Feminist Perspectives on
Only Now?" in Discovering Reality:
,

,

:
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* d >Epistemology, Metaphys ics,
Methodology.
and, DPhilosophy ot science. eds s^Hr*
Hirdl^j -mi Merrill
Hintikka
(Dordrecht:
D. Reidel, 1983), pp. 311-324.
.

*

65 Keller,

"Gender and Science", p. 414.

66 In a var iety of
distinctive and also related ways,
thinkers as diverse as Sigmund Freud, Jean Piaget,
Lawrence
Kohlberg, Carol Gilligan, and William Perry have
argued
for
the internal and significant connections between
emotional
and cognitive development.
67 Keller,

"Gender and Science", pp. 422-23.

68 Ibid.,

p.

420.

69 Ibid.,

p.

425.

p.

421.

70 Ibid.

71 Ibid.,

72 See Harding,
of Rationality?"
73 Hobhouse,

"Is Gender a Variable in Conceptions

Liberalism

,

p.

66.

74 Cf. Midgely, Beast and Man for an
alternative
conception of moral agency that does not require the
denigration of instinct and nature.
75 Cons iderat ions on Representative Government

76 Ibid.,

p.

,

p.

14.

15.

77 See

Mill's discussion in Considerations on
Representative Government ch. 6.
,

78 0n Liberty

,

79 Ibid.,

16.

p.

p.

13.

80 Ibid., p. 91.

S^See Elshtain, Public Man, Private Woman

S^Hobhouse, Liberal ism

,

p.

,

pp.

132-46.

76.

83 a clear contemporary example of this is the
couching of reproductive freedom in the terms of private
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^

(cont 'd)decision-making
and individual ownershio

83

^son.

Defen^of
Abortion, ^tl'
Abortion
in Philosophy and Public Affair*
i (i), 1971
For a complex exploration ot the
issues, see Rosalind
Re P^ductive Freedom:
Beyond 'A Woman's Right
to Snn I' M ln Sl g ns;
Jour nal of Women in Culture a nd
t
?
t
5 ;l\
(4 !' S m er 1980
6fel - 6 85.
Fo r cogent analy ses
;
of the ways in which
women's experience ennables a critical
comprehension of the illusory nature of this divide
between
public and private, see Dorothy Smith, "A Sociology
for
Women,
The Prism o f Sex:
Essays in the Soci ology of
Kggwledge, eds Julia A. Sherman and Evelyn Torton
Beck
(Madison:
University of Wisconsin Press, 1979), pp.
135-188; and Elshtain, Public Man, Private Woman
esp. ch. 6
.

\

m

.

,

I

have adapted this phrase from Wolff, The Poverty
as quoted in Duncan, Marx and Mill
p. 273.

of Libe ralism

,

,

85 Duncan,

86 Ibid.,

Marx and Mill
p.

,

p.

273.

274.

87 In the essay on
"Nature", for example, Mill
describes our innate capacity for sympathy as an extension
of "sympathetic selfishness".

88 0n Liberty

,

p.

13.

89 Carol Gilligan,

In a Different Voice:
Psychological
Theory and Women's Development
(Cambridge:
Harvard
University Press, 1982). For some important critiques of
Gilligan' s work which have recently surfaced and require
careful responses, see the following articles in Social
Research 50 (3): Lorraine B. Code, "Responsibility and the
Epistemic Community: Woman's Place," pp. 537-555; Mary Ann
O'Loughlin, "Responsibility and Moral Maturity in the
Control of Fertility or, A Woman's Place Is in the Wrong,"
pp. 556-575; Owen J. Flanagan, Jr. and Jonathan E. Adler,
"Impartiality and Particularity," pp. 576-596; John M.
Broughton, "Women's Rationality and Men's Virtues: A
Critique of Gender Dualism in Gilligan's Theory of Moral
Development," pp. 597-642; Debra Nails, "Social-Scientific
Sexism:
Gilligan's Mismeasure of Man," pp. 643-664; James
C. Walker, "In A Diffident Voice:
Cryptoseparat ist Analysis
of Female Moral Development," pp. 665-695.

—

^^Mill's achievement is a singular one in relation to
the male liberal tradition. We should acknowledge, however,
the earlier efforts of Mary Wollestonecraf t
in her A
Vindication of the Rights of Women along with the
,

,

261

90

—

(cont'd) collaborative

nature
obviously influenced by Harriet
;;
r
n a
rec iation of this point, see Alice
Rossi
"tlrZi'
l° ; T PP
of John Stuart Sin
i
Harriet Taylor
?LlSr Mill, ln her edition of Essays on Sex
ffHalit^ /Ch«a90 and London: Universi ty or Chicago Press,

^ %
g

which

im"^

...

131;

!

1See Els ^tain, Public Man, Private Woman

100-

pp.
Eisenstem, The Radical Future of LibeTaT Feminism
,

pp.
SUSa " Moiler °*in, Wome n in Western
pjl Ttici l
2i
2! *?2 r
PrinCet ° n Universit Y ^ess 1979),
pp.
f§7=|}| for h^f°?
hel P ful ^
discussions
of the liberal tradition
k
*
M
?f
before
Mill.
See also Gordon Schochet, Patr iarchalism a nd
Political Thought
(New York:
Basic Books, 1975).
,

:

(

92 See Janice Raymond,
The Transsexual Empire
The
Making of the She-Male
(Boston:
Beacon Press, 1979)
:

93 0n the Subjection
of Women

,

p.

36.

94 We also need to acknowledge
the difficulties and
dangers that are posed by the overpol i ticizat ion and
rationalization of family life. See Elshtain, Public Man,
Private Woman esp. ch. 6.
,

95 Without sounding unduly
nasty or nit-picky,

I'd

like to point out that Mill himself admitted to being
totally incompetent when it came to practical 'everyday'
affairs. Whey wouldn't a man who always lived in a house
where women took care of daily life (first, his mother, then
Harriet Taylor, finally, his step-daughter, Helen) lack
perception on the sexual division of labor? Mill's life
made it all too easy for him to assume that women would
"choose" this type of work.
See Smith, "A Sociology for
Women", for a relevant discussion of women's skills in
making their labor "invisible". Such invisibility is one of
the criteria for doing household labor "well".
96 This should not be construed as a supportive
argument or plea for marriage. My point is only that Mill's

feminism imparts a very different message than he intended.
His failure to criticize the marriage relation sufficiently
backfires in the hidden but logical implication that the
emancipated woman of liberal feminism is not likely to be a
married one.
9 ^The

term "corporate feminist" is Suzanne Gordon's.
See her article, "The New Corporate Feminism," in The
Nation, 5 February 1983.
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At a recent Society for Women
in
oorif
conference, several participants in an Philosophy
informal discussion
on their female undergraduate
students related their
students' expectations for their future
as adults?
A very
r
9
f th6Se YOUng women full
expect
to
be in
Y
S
the $60,000 and above
income bracket, to be happily married
Y
and to have several children.

L

I ?

See Steven Marcus, The Other Victorians
A Study
of Sexuality and Por nography in
Mid-Nineteenth CnhnrJ^
EngLand
jNew York
Basic Books, 1974) and
abridged ed. (New York: Grove Press, 1966). My"sic7et Li f e
;

:

100 See Mazlish, James
and John Stuart Mill
1Q1 The Autobiography
of John Stuart Mill

,

.

75.

p.

102 See Harriet Taylor Mill,
"Enfranchisement of
Women," in Essays on Sex Equality ed. Alice S. Rossi
(Chicago and London:
University of Chicago Press, 1970),
pp. 89-122.
,

103 See the discussion of
Harriet Taylor in Jack
Stillinger's "Introduction" to his edition of The Ear ly
Draft of John Stuart Mill's Autobiography (Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 1961), pp. 22-28. Cf Alice
Rossi's more sympathetic account in "Sentiment and
Intellect".
I have no intention of disparaging Harriet
.

Taylor Mill's accomplishments here. What i_s interesting is
Mill's overblown description of her, which would be
overblown for any human being.
104 See Stillinger's discussion of their
frequent and
lengthy separations during married life. But cf. Alice
Rossi's explanation for their frequent travels without each
other, in her "Sentiment and Intellect."
105 See Rossi,

"Sentiment and Intellect" for
sensitive appreciation of this point.

a

106 Eisenstein, The Radical Future of Liberal Feminism

ch

.

,

6

107g e e Sara Ruddick, "Maternal Thinking," in Feminist
Studies 6 (2):
342-367.
For critical extensions and
applications of maternal identity to political issues, see
Jean B. Elshtain, "Antigone's Daughters," in Democracy 2
(2), pp. 46-59; and Sara Ruddick, "Pacifying the Forces:
Drafting Women in the Interests of Peace," in Signs
471-489.
Journal of Women in Culture and Society 8 (3):

'
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appreciation of this point, see Nancy
!° ..^
h
Hartsock,
The Feminist Standpoint:
Developing the Ground
for a Specifically Feminist Historical
Materialism?" in
Discovering Reality:
Femi nist Perspective on
te
temoloqv
a
QqY>
CS
Meth oloqv
Philosophy of
r

i.

T2
*T*
Sandra
Harding
'

^ Merrill
and

^

s^^
(Dordrecht,

>

^

Hintikka
Boston
and London:
D. Reidel, 1983), pp. 283-310;
and
Smith,
A
*
Sociology for Women".
B.

'

109 Cited in Carolyn
G. Heilbrun, Reinventi ng
Womanhood (New York: W.W. Norton, 1979),
p. 175.
110 See Elizabeth Wolgast,
Equality and the Rights of
Women
(Ithaca and London:
Cornell University Press, 1980)
for an especially compelling analysis of the
ways in which
liberal conceptions of equality force a masculine
standard
of humanity on women.
Wolgast, however, makes the error of
equating feminism with liberal feminism. Unfortunately,
this promotes an analysis that tends to slide into
anti-feminism.
For an appreciation of the issues involved
here, see Alison Jaggar, "Human Biology in Feminist Theory:
Sexual Equality Reconsidered," in Beyond Domination: New
Perspectives on Women and Philosophy ed. Carol c. Gould
(Totawa, N.J.:
Rowman and Allanheld, 1984), pp. 21-42.
,

11]-This

is by no means to deny other significant
sources of hostility to liberal feminisn, which are clearly
fuelled by misogynist attitudes and a political interest in
keeping women in their place. Among the vast array of
interpretations of the new conservatism in U.S. politics,
see the following:
Zillah Eisenstein, "Ant i feminism in the
Politics and Elections of 1980," in Feminist Studies 7 (2):
187-205; Susan Harding, "Family Reform Movements:
Recent
Feminism and Its Opposition," in Feminist Studies 7 (1):
57-75; Rosalind P. Petchesky, "Antiabort ion, Ant i feminism,
and the Rise of the New Right," in Feminist Studies 7 (2):
206-246; Christine R. Riddiough, "Women, Feminism, and the
1980 Elections," in Socialist Review 56 (March-April 1981),
pp. 37-54; and Linda Gordon and Allen Hunter, "Sex, Family
and the New Right:
Anti-Feminism as a Political Force," in
Radical America 11 (6):
9-25.

112 This term is Sara Ruddick's from "Maternal
Thinking".
It is meant to connote styles and types of
thinking which inhere in and are generated by women's
activities
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rea1
aCtiVS mSn and ° n the b ^is of
Process we demonstrate the development
r$ the
IZ
J
of
ideological
reflexes and echoes of this iAie
life
process.
Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The
German Ideology

thJfr^
fT
re 1_llfe

'

'

To regard society as one single subject
is
at it wrongly; speculatively.

...

to look

Karl Marx, Grundrisse

Introduct ion

There is a bittersweet irony located at the heart
of the

attempt to uncover masculine ideology in the theory
of Karl
Marx.

For the thesis of masculinity as ideology is a

testament to Marx's materialist method and certain of his
categories, even as it calls into critical question the

Marxian framework and world view.

Significantly, the thesis

of masculine ideology poses a fundamental challenge to a

theory that failed to take account of its own gendered
standpoint.

Proceeding from Marx's and Engels' maxim that

"consciousness [is determined] by life," 1 our critical

exploration of Marx will advance in two ways:

an 'external'

feminist standpoint will be brought to bear on a body of
work that will also be assessed within the frame of its own

outlook and terminology; that is to say,
Marx presented his theory,

immanently.

in contradistinction to the
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productions of the Hegelian idealists
and liberal political
economists, as a theory about "real
individuals, their

activity and their material conditions." 2

While his

individuals may well be "real", they
are not fully
representative of humanity (unless one
believes and is
prepared to argue that gender is not a
significant

constituent of life experience,

knowledge and practice.)
theory, of course,

identity, consciousness,

What is missing in Marx's social

is an explicit account of gender.

The

criticism levelled by Marx against theoreticians
of
"society" conceived in the abstract could similarly
be

applied to his theoretical and empirical accounts of

class-identified men.

Using Marxian terminology, we could

dub this a "speculative" error, one that ignores tangible
and significant sources of differences between human

beings.

If capitalist society is no "single subject",

neither is either of its two
classes.

3

.(or

more) constituent

Ironically, women suffer a similar treatment

and fate in the hands of Marx that the proletariat suffered

under the rubric of liberal political economy:

rendered falsely,

if at all,

they are

and are thereby kept invisible

and powerless.
But while it is all too easy, and a bit tiresome at this

point, to charge Marx with grand neglect on the issue of
gender,

4

.

it

is less easy to make the case for a masculine

ideological structure in his work.

This has to do with the
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following issues:

problems that accompany the attempt
to
deal with the full scon, of Marx's
work; 2) certain aspects
of Marx's method that have an
ambivalent cast, particularly
when considered in relation to feminist
critiques of other
epistemologies to which it is also opposed;
1)

3)

the

contemporary intersection of Marxism and feminism.

Each of

these problems will be examined briefly in
turn.
We are by now quite familiar with the complex
breadth of

Marx's work.

While attempts to cut certain portions of the

published work out of the "essential" Marx seem to do
violence to the relevant complexities and sustained vision
of the man's work

(Althusser comes to mind as the grand

culprit here), those who attempt to spell out the unified

structure of Marx's entire thought tidy things up too
much.

5

We should be as wary of the attempt to impose a

singular unifying structure on Marx's work as of efforts to
depict a schizophrenic Marx, one who totally repudiated his

youthful analyses of alienation and his debt to Hegel.

Jerrold Seigel's recent biography of Marx alerts us to the
first danger, while careful reading of the Grundr i sse helps
6
us to maneuver around the second.

Like the humanity that

he depicted so vividly, Marx was a creature immured in time
and place.

Measured against the often ridiculously inflated

standards of social theory (and we would do well to ponder
the possibility of a relationship between these standards

and the history of male hegemony in Western social
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theory)

7

he is either brought tumbling
down from his
throne on high for being less than
perfect, idolized and
parroted for a totalizing wisdom that
no single human could
possibly possess, or given satanic attributes
and responsibilities for revolutions gone sour. Each
of these treatment:
,

grants him both too much and too little. 8

Turning to the second set of problems, we are
brought
face to face with dialectics.

To the extent that dialectics

in the hands of Marx represents an attempt
to transcend the

dichotomies which methodological individualism, among
other
epistemologies, perpetuates, what does this mean for our

assessment of Marx's method?

Initially,

it would seem,

dialectics is more closely allied with a feminine

epistemological orientation, most especially in its
relational and dialogic orientation. 9
us directly to Hegel's doorstep.

These issues bring

Clearly, a feminist

assessment of Hegel is long due, although it exceeds the

bounds of this particular work. 10

Our focus here will be

on Marx's utilization of Hegel's method as he understood it

and chose to appropriate it.
will argue,

In the hands of Marx,

as

I

the dialectic assumes an ambivalent cast,

simultaneously questioning and reproducing masculinist
epistemological assumptions.

This will be especially

evident in the dialectical interplay between subject and
object which ultimately fails as genuine Aufhebung.
The materialist aspect of Marx's method is also situated

ambivalently in relation to feminist
critiques of idealist
or rationalist methodologies which
elevate the brain at the
expense of the body. 11 Once again, it
would seem, Marx's
method partakes of a revolt against
classically masculine
methodology. While this characterization
is
true to a

significant extent, we will also see that Marx's
materialist
account is seriously flawed through significant
errors of

omission, which tend to perpetuate masculinist
assumptions

about the "real" world and to exclude female
experiences.
Finally,

it

is plausible to suggest that it is not only

the activist orientation of Marxism, but also its

dialectical and materialist elements which account for the

widespread contemporary attraction of feminists to Marx.
The contemporary intersection of feminism and Marxism makes

difficult, but not impossible, the effort to develop a

critique of Marxism as a masculine theory.

Several

significant strands of feminist theory owe Marx quite a
large debt:

Socialist-Feminists and Freudo-Marxist

feminists have incorporated wholesale many of his

categories. 12

My own intellectual and political formation

within these efforts is inescapable.

Furthermore, many of

the female heroines revived during feminism's quest for

active role models came directly out of socialist and

Marxist movements.

These activist women furnished rousing

proof of our slumbering potential, even as gradually

emerging intimations of their maltreatment within the ranks
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of "comrades" and their own
antipathy to feminism as a

"bourgeois" movement began to initiate

a

round of

questioning about the relationship
between Marxism,
socialism, and feminism that is still
going strong. 13
For these, among other,

reasons Marx poses difficulties

and challenges not to be found in
either Hobbes or Mill.
Perhaps feminist scrutiny of his work
offers greater promise
of intellectual and political benefits.

identify as radicals in

a

Those of us who

world of enlarged possibilities

and dangerously amplified threats to
human happiness and
survival 14 must come to terms with Marx as a
thinker who

attempted to understand the inner workings of
capitalist
society and thereby reinvigorate humanity's
guidance of its
future.
In reassessing Marx's legacy to radical
social

theory we are also re-thinking our identity and practice
as

critical thinkers and radical activists in the present.

Marx's Style

[Communism] is the solution to the riddle of history,
and it knows itself to be this solution.
Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts

Students of Marx are well aware of the vital relationship

between the substance and style of his work.

Marx's style

could be variously characterized as arrogant, aggressive,
ruthless, combative,

sarcastic,

sneering, relentless, and
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brilliant.

While some find his style distasteful
and
oppressive, others view it as the
appropriate and

complementary voice for the radical critic
of
dehumanizing capitalism.

a

brutal and

Perhaps more than any other modern

social theorist, Marx is the inspiration for
critics of
"value free" social theory and social science,
in spite of
his own claims to empirical scientific veracity.
Marx's

achievement in Capital was to imaginatively adopt the
standpoint of the working class and to elaborate an
analysis
of capitalism from that standpoint. 15

What he managed to

produce in so doing was a theory that was simultaneously

analytic/descriptive and radically evaluative in an
"internal" sense.

"exploitation",

Classically Marxian terms such as

"surplus value",

"alienation",

"private

property", and even "labor" bear witness to this powerful
fusion of description and evaluation.

Marx's language opens

up new vistas of insight even as it commits its users to a

critical stance towards the reality revealed behind the
facade of bourgeois relations and appearances.

Critics and disciples of Marx would probably agree that

his characteristic style was an aggressive one.

His

typical, polemical mode involved "marking out his own

position by eliminating former or potential colleagues from
1
it." ^

Such was also his strategy during those intense

periods of private study, research, and note taking that

punctuated his chaotic and diffficult life.

Marx's approach

to an issue was invariably one
that proceeded over the

toppled carcasses of existing, would-be
and sometimes
fabricated opponents.
It seems that he needed
such
opponents to get himself going.
"From his student days to
the time of Capital ," writes Jerrold
Seigel, "Marx's
characteristic mode of defining himself was
by opposition,
excluding others from the personal space
he occupied." 17
We may understand this definitional mode,
which is not

simply

a

one hand,

polemical mode, in two non-exclusive ways.

On the

the method bears witness to his Hegelian
roots.

We could say that Marx's style takes to
heart Hegel's

distaste for atomistic intellectuals who denied
their
relational historical and social identities. 18
Additionally, this style employs a type of Hegelian

dialectical rationale, whereby Marx developed and finetuned
his concepts through confrontational exchanges with
other
thinkers.

On the other hand, there is something disturbing

in the style of a theorist who can only create a discursive

space for himself by "invading" and "reappropr iat ing " the

territory of displaced others.

Like Hobbes, Marx evinces a

combative, heroic, and hence, masculine style. 19
In speculating on the possible sources of Marx's

aggressive style, Jerrold Seigel has suggested that Marx's
mother may provide a clue.

Seigel argues that Marx's style

might have been a reaction against Henriette Marx's

intrusive and dominating nurture style.

This interpretation
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problematic on several counts, although it
contains an
important measure of insight.

is

First, Seigel never manages to convincingly
make the

case for a maternal style that is either intrusive
or

dominating.
letter)

20

The little evidence that we do have (one

shows a mother who was solicitous of her son's

health and well-being and eventually critical of his
inability to support himself and his family.

The record

also suggests that Marx showed little affection for her

during his adult years and visited her infrequently, and
then primarily to request money.

P

i

We simply do not know

enough about Henriette Marx or her relationship to Karl to

characterize her as an overbearing mother.
However, we might well ask, when is maternal nurturance

within the bourgeois, nuclear family not intrusive and

dominating?

Seigel slides into the dangerous and

contestable tendency of "blaming the mother", whereas the
real issue here is a more structural one.

That is,

the kind

of family in which Karl Marx was reared is precisely that

modern,

intensely affective, nuclear configuration where

mothers carry an inordinate amount of responsibility for and
power over the lives of young children.

Within such a

setting, children are likely to perceive their mothers as

intrusive and dominating creatures, regardless of the

individual capacities for non-intrusive nurturance that

specific mothers may or may not have.

Such perceptions are
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likely to be retained in adulthood, often in
unconscious
and/or disguised forms.

Marx's estranged adult relationship

with his mother, coupled with his inflated-romantic

courtship to Jenny von Westphalen, suggest that he
suffered,
like Mill,

from an unresolved ambivalence toward the primal,

pre-oedipal mother.

This ambivalence, as we will see,

carries over into his analysis of women's labor under
capitalism.

But it has precious little to do with the

actual woman who mothered him.
The second problem with Seigel's analysis of Marx's

aggressive style is that it proceeds as if this style
simply an individual phenomenon, a personality quirk.

is

In

other words, Seigel pays little attention to the

intellectual tradition within which Marx was embedded.

An

adversarial, aggressive style is a significant feature of
the Western philosophical tradition; furthermore,

it may

have found in dialectics a particularly hospitable
environment, since its conversational form has assumed
combative, as well as dialogic features. 22

To

characterize Marx's aggressive style simply as
his personality is mistaken.

a

feature of

This is not to say that Marx

had nothing to do with the matter.

But his intellectual

style could more usefully be recast in terms which

acknowledge

a

pre-existing intellectual stylistic legacy for

which he was temperamentally suited,

if not

gifted.

23

The aggressive, adversarial mode is also larger and more
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significant than an individual feature of
personality to the
extent that it partakes of a masculine
cognitive structure
and style. We have already commented
extensively
on this

issue in the previous discussion of Hobbes's
adversarial

style.

For Marx,

as well as for Hobbes,

style may be understood,

in part,

this adversarial

to recapitulate at the

level of adult intellectual practice and
identity the prior
process of struggle for a location and identity
vis

the pre-Odeipal mother.

vis

"a

This process, as we have already

noted in more extensive detail, is marked by a
greater sense
of opposition, danger and conflict for the
boy-child than
for the girl-child.

Within the experiential and symbolic

frame of modern western gendered culture,

it comes to be

more firmly identified with a masculine identity.
it

is

constitutive of such an identity.

In part,

The echoes of this

earlier struggle for identity ramify in distinctive ways on

Marx's intellectual and polemical style, which flourishes in

hostile territory and will brook no contenders.

Ironically,

the radical theorist of species-being and envisioner of

communist society embodied an intellectual stance and style

which contradicted his ontology. 24
This problematic, masculinist feature of Marx's style

has also had unfortunate consequences for the political

history of Marxist movements and may account, in part

,

for

the undeniable fact that "the texture of Marxist thinking

degenerates easily into dogma." 25

While we can also cite
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such factors as the subsequent
positivist appropriation of
Marx, the progressive teleological
historical thrust of the
theory, and the sense of privileged
standpoint to account
for the regressive dogmatism of the theory,

the fact that

Marx's style often tended to be aggressively
monovocal
rather than dialogic should not be dismissed.

But the

really important question here concerns the extent to
which
Marx's aggressive, masculinist style is bound up with
the

substance of his theory.
Seigel's analysis is vindicated, then, with the proviso
that we substitute the mother of Marx's primary process

memory, early experience and specific family structure for

his "real" mother, and that we go on to acknowledge that

mothers of the former sort lurk in the stylistic tradition
of adversarial intellectual discourse and have "helped"

(as

projections of the masculine imagination) to shape the
subtext of that discursive style.
On a final note, we might pause to consider one of

Marx's early characterizations of his enterprise in this
excerpt from "Towards a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of
Right

:

Introduction,":

As philosophy finds in the proletariat its material
weapons, so the proletariat finds in philosophy its
intellectual weapons, and as soon as the lightning bolt
of thought has struck deep into the virgin soil of the
people, the emancipation of the Germans into men will be
completed 26
.

What we find here is a language of intellectual weaponry and
warfare,

a

phallic and violent metaphorical rendition of
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thought as a lightning bolt that will
turn emasculated
Germans into men, and a latent homosexual
imagery which
confirms an androcentric conception of
political and

intellectual activities.

The fact that this essay is often

held up as the inspirational model for
critical social
theorists should give us additional pause
for thought.

Marx's Method
The two decisive features of Marx's method
are

dialectics and materialism, which issue in Marx's

characteristic and innovative treatment of history and
labor.

If labor

is the

its "superstructure".

"base" of Marx's theory, history is

Each is conceived on its own in

dialectical and materialist ways, even as they are similarly
related.

Marx's methodological debt to Hegel is as

difficult to ignore as are his differences from him:
the greatness of Hegel's Phenomenology and its
final product, the dialectic of negativity as the moving
and creating principle, is on the one hand that Hegel
conceives of the self-creation of man as a process,
ob jectif ication as loss of the object, as
external ization and the transcendence of this
externalization. This means, therefore, that he grasps
the nature of labor, and understands objective man,
true, because real, man as the result of his own
labor. 27
.

.

.

My dialectic method is not only different from the
Hegelian, but is its direct opposite.
To Hegel, the
life-process of the human brain, i.e., the process of
thinking ... is the demiurgos of the real world, and
the real world is only the external phenomenal form of
'the Idea'.
With me, on the contrary, the ideal is
nothing else than the material world reflected by the

human mind, and translated into
forms of thought. 28
The materialist aspect of Marx's
method

is the core of

his

"inversion' of Hegel.

Displacing Geist, Marx relocates

dialectics in the laboring activities
and relationships of
human beings and re-reads history as
a panoply of class
struggle. 29 What Marx retains after
discarding Hegel's
"mystical shell" is a belief that the
material social world
is essentially dialectical and
that a dialectical mode of
inquiry is best suited to understanding
such a world.

Dialectics is thus an ontology with
epistemology.

a

corresponding

Like any other ontology, dialectics
cannot be

definitively evaluated in scientific or empirical
terms.
either believe that reality is essentially
change,

We

flux,

contradiction; that apparently discrete and disparate
objects could be related; that the identities of
various
objects actually derive from and inhere in their

relationships with other objects; that there is a deeper,
dialectical level of reality beneath and within the static
level of appearances; or we don't.

In other words,

dialectics either confirms and enriches our experience,

provides us with what we feel is explanatory power, or we
search elsewhere.

Those of us who are persuaded that life

is dialectical can attempt to persuade others of the

truthfulness and intellectual power of a dialectical
methodology; but we will never able to "prove" it so.

On

this view, dialectics is no more and no less "metaphysical"
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than any other epi stemology

Marx's dialectical method would
seem to be most
vulnerable in its historical rendition
in his hands.
Significantly, he shares with Hegel an
optimistic view of a
progressive unfolding of history. While
this unfolding
proceeds dialect ically, through processes
of contradictions
and newly formed social entities,
it assumes along with
Hegel's view a teleological endpoint
which is also the basis
for judging how far history has
come.
For Marx
this

endpoint consists of the self-realization
of man, rather
than of Geist:

Communism is the positive abolition of
private property,
of human self-alienation, and thus
the
l^p ropgiat o n
of human nature through and for man.
It is, therefore,
the return of man himself as a social
i.e., really
human, being, a complete and conscious
return which
assimilates all the wealth of previous development.
Communism as a fully developed naturalism is
humanism
and as a fully developed humanisn is naturalism.
It is
the definitive resolution of the antagonism
between man
and nature, and between man and man.
It is the true
solution of the conflict between existence and
essence,
between ob jecti f icat ion and self-affirmation, between
freedom and necessity, between individual and species.
It is the solution to the riddle of history
and knows
itself to be this solution. 30

r^T

,

A measure of the centrality and importance of this
optimistic

reading of history as progress, culminating in the "end of

history" may be gained by reflecting on the devastating

consequences for Horkheimer and Adorno of German fascism.
Their ensuing intellectual crisis was provoked not simply by
the horror at hand, but also in their realization that Marx
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had left them totally unequipped to
deal with this kind of
massive 'regression'.
Significantly, the
turn that they

took

'

in Dialectic of Enlightenment.

,

would have to be

assessed in Marxian terms as "ideological". 31
If we approach dialectics as a theory
of process,

we see

that it confirms and describes certain types of
experience
in the world,

those that are often apprehended in intuitive

and preverbal terms.

Dialectics speaks to the experience of

intimate social relations, the life of the body, the

panorama of Nature, and pre- or unconscious modes of
thinking,

including those found in artistic and religious

modes of expression (what Freud called the "oceanic

feeling".)

It offers a model of development that operates

through the conflict of interdependent opposites and whose
earliest surviving description may be found in Heraclitus:

....
....

War is the father and king of all things
Opposition is good; the fairest harmony comes out of
differents; everything originates in strife
We
enter and do not enter the same river, we are and are
not
The way up and the way down are one and the
same 32

....

.

Robert Heilbroner describes dialectics as "at bottom an

effort to systematize, or to translate into the realm of

manageable communicable thought, certain unconscious or
pre-consc ious modes of apprehending reality, especially
social reality."

33

As such,

dialectics is often

maddeningly elusive in intellectual terms, as well as being
susceptible of intellectual abuse.

Heraclitus provides an

early clue in his invocation of "war" on the one hand, and
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"fairest harmony" on the other.
of ambiguity,

Thriving in an atmosphere

contradiction, and flux, dialectics defies

"the syntaxes of common sense and logic." 34

Hegel

understood this well:
There is absolutely nothing whatever in which
we cannot
and must not point to contradictions or
opposite
attributes; and the abstraction made by understanding
therefore means a forcible insistence on a single
aspect, and a real effort to obscure and remove
all
consciousness of the other attribute which is
involved 35

Whose experience is dialectics most likely to describe?
Putting the question a little differently, what kind of

experience is most likely to generate
things?

(These questions presume:

1)

a

dialectical view of
that all epistemo-

logies are founded on some version of ontology, and

2)

that

ontology recapitulates, in some fashion, particular versions
ot* experience.) 36
•

flux,
is,

s

An ontology of essential changef ulness

struggle, opposition, achieved-yet-vulnerable unities

more likely than not, going to express the experience of

those groups of people who are either alienated with a

socio-cultural order and are therefore less likely to buy
into that order's reified and totalizing image of itself,

and/or whose life activities involve qualities and processes
of a dialectically described world. 37

The affinity between a dialectical ontology and the life
of the working class under capitalism was not lost on Marx.

His description of labor is especially rich in dialectical
imagery, drawing on the process of creative interchange

\
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between laborers and Nature and on
the creative process of
labor itself, which is simultaneously
exploited and denied
under capitalism.
Throughout the Manuscripts
,

struggling to substitute

a

we see Marx

dialectical language of

things-as-relations for the predominant
language of
things-as-discrete-objects. This exercise
reaches its apex
in his liberatory vision of
unalienated labor:
Suppose that we had produced in a human
manner;
Mph
each of us would in his production
have doubly attlrmed
affirmed
himself and his fellow men.
I would have:
I)
objectified in my production my individuality
and its
peculiarity and thus both in my activity
enjoyed
an
individual expression of my life and also
in looking at
the object have had the individual
pleasure of realizing
that my personality was objective,
visible to the senses
and thus a power raised beyond all doubt.
2) In your
enjoyment or use of my product I would have
had the
direct enjoyment of realizing that I had
both satisfied
a human need by my work and also
objectified the human
essence and therefore fashioned for another
human being
the object that met his need.
3) I would have been for
you the mediator between you and the species
and thus
been acknowledged and felt by you as a completion
of
your own essence and a necessary part of yourself
and
have thus realized that I am confirmed both in your
thought and in your love.
4) In my expression of my
life I would have fashioned your expression of your
life, and thus in my own activity have realized my
own
essence, my human, my communal essence. 38
More recently,

feminists have begun to notice a new set

of parallels between women's experience and dialectics.

Such parallels reside in the biological and social experience
of reproduction;

the nurture of young children; 40

"women's work"; 41 and the experience of women as the

objectified "other" in male dominated society. 42

The
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affinities between this last experience
and Hegel's
rendition of developing self -consciousness
in the

Master-Slave relationship have been as
significant for
feminists as they have been for theoreticians
of

working-class consciousness and liberation.
women, then,

Workers and

for shared and different reasons, are
each

obvious constituencies for dialectics.

While Marx was able

to develop a dialectical theory of society
and social change

from the vantage point of the male worker, he
failed to do
so for women.

This failure is most evident in his virtual

non-treatment of women's sex- and gender-specific labor.
But before we turn to a more sustained examination of

Marx's analysis of labor, a final note on his method is in
order.

As an ontology and method, dialectics partakes of a

worldview which is simultaneously conflictual and wholistic.
That is,

its stress on internal relations can either yield

an "everything-is-connected" view or an "everything-is-

contradiction" view. 43

Marx tended, on the whole, to

promote the latter formulation, particularly in his
political writings.
of history,

This is especially evident in his view

including his theory of class struggle.

the frame of Marx's utilization of dialectics,

Within

the wholistic

view is effectively consigned to the arena of "after-the

revolution"

— communist

society.

The strength of conflict theory lies in its analytic

simplicity and in its ability to see through the "civilized"
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and "fair" appearance of liberal
bourgeois economic
relations.
Its weakness is manifested in
its diminished
ability to articulate the complex
nuances of social
44
identity.
As a revolutionary theory, Marxism
has been

notoriously deficient in coming to terms
with the
agonizingly complex features of social
45
change.

I

would

argue that this is at least partially the
result of a
conflict theory which promotes a dichotomous
and dualistic
view of social reality.
Theoretical oversimplification

along the lines of "us" and "them" has yielded
notorious
abuses.

Vast numbers of human beings have been
"eliminated"

in the interests of

"politically correct" policy.

Cataclysmic theories of change fail to appreciate the
embeddedness of beliefs and practices, along with the
human
need for stability,

familiarity, and continuity. 46

A good part of the problem here may reside with the

dialectical starting point.
purports to be ant i-dual ist ic

That is, while dialectics
,

it

is already,

significantly,

situated within a dualistic frame which is to be superceded
in terms of a warfare model.

loses.
(see,

Someone wins, and someone

While opposition need not operate along these lines
for example Mary O'Brien's discussion of the

opposition of externality and internal i ty 47 it certainly
takes on these contours within the framework of Marx's model
of class relations.

Significantly, we will also find

elaborated in his theory of labor as

a

it

dialectic between man
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and nature.

AO

We can detect in Marx's dichotomous,
two-class model of
dialectical conflict a masculine cognitive
stance, one which
parallels the self-other relational struggle
for recognition
and in some ways enacts the desired
omnipotence of a

fledgling masculine ego.

standpoint

49

The notion of privileged

degenerates into

a

vision of the omnipotence

of an eventually victorious working class
and the total

demise of the other.

Like Hegel's portrayal of a fight to

the death between two egos who cannot (yet) tolerate

reciprocal acknowledgement, Marx's view of class relations
may be viewed as a developmentally retarded account of
social relations.

That is,

it may well be part of a

developmental stage of personal identity and socio-political
relations, but it fails utterly as a final, comprehensive
and satisfactory account.

The terms of this failure are

both empirical and theoretical.

That is, history has not

vindicated Marx's expectations of increasingly dichotomized
class relations in capitalist societies; and theoretical

efforts to understand late capitalism seem to be hampered
rather than helped by the two-class model. 50

Finally,

there is something in this model that makes many of us

justly uneasy.

To the extent that it partakes of and

reproduces a gendered outlook on social relations, it cannot

accomodate alternative conceptions of social conflict and

harmony 51
.
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Marx's Theory of t.*>^
[T]he first premise of all human
existence and
1
rY
[i5] that mSS iust
be^n ll%ol
P^ition to live in order to be able to
make t
history".
But life involves
everything else eating, drinking, a before
clothing and many other things. The habitation,
first
the P roduct ^n of the means
to'sati^i
production of material
life itself
Marx and Engels, The German Ideology

l^

^n°

•W

^

'

*

'

^

Mothers are no more visible within Marx's
account of
fundamental human activity— labor— than they
are in Hobbes's
state of nature or Mill's version of liberal
civilization.

Given his stress on the laboring activities of
human beings
and the material preconditions for certain forms
of

distinctively "human" activity, this invisibility is all
the
more striking in Marx.

It contributes,

limited and distorted account of labor.
this account ramify,

"nature",

in turn,

as we will see,

to a

The distortions of

on Marx's conception of

"necessity", and "freedom".

"Marx's procedure was in fact to set out from men's

labor and to ignore the specificity of women's labor,"

writes Nancy Hartsock. 52

The invisibility of women's

labor ramifies in distinctive ways, as we will see, on

Marx's account of "human" labor, and helps to account for
the difficulties encountered by those who have attempted to
add women's work to Marx's frame.

In The German Ideology

Marx and Engels discuss the history of the division of labor
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and locate its first instance in
the sexual division of
53
labor in the family.
They go on to categorize familial
relations, including the sexual division
of labor,

"natural" relations.

as

Adding insult to injury, they dismiss

the social significance of the sexual
division of labor by

stating that a "real" division of labor only
emerges with
the division between manual and mental labor.

Given Marx's

insistence that social relations be de-ontologized and

understood in historically specific ways, this is

particularly problematic.

what Marx and Engels subsequently

miss in their focus on the division between "brain" and
"hand" is the "heart". 54

For:

Women's work is of a particular kind—whether menial or
requiring the sophisticated skills involved in child
care, it always involves personal service.
Perhaps to
make the nature of this caring, intimate, emotionally
demanding labor clear, we should use the ideologically
loaded term "love".
For without love, without close
interpersonal relationships, human beings, and it would
seem especially small human beings, cannot survive.
This emotionally demanding labor requires that women
give something of themselves to the child, to the man.
The production of people is thus qualitatively different
from the production of things.
It requires caring
labor the labor of love. 55

—

The real first premise of human existence is that we are

born; that some woman has "labored" to bring us into the

world.

The second premise is that we will be cared for

during our early years of biological and emotional
vulnerability.

And this second premise calls on, but is not

exhausted by, Marx's and Engels' first:

the production of
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the means to satisfy our needs for
nourishment, protection
and (equally important but unment
ioned
social intercourse.
)

,

Strangely enough, reproduction enters the
scene as the
third premise of history:
"men [sic], who daily remake
their own life, begin to make other men
[sic], to propagate
their kind:
the relationship between man and woman,
parents
and children, the family ." 56 Marx's and
Engels sense
of

'

historical sequence here is strangely, but familiarly,
skewed.

The starting point for their analysis of the

premises of history-making men is the already born and
nurtured human being.

Not only do mothers not make an

appearance until the third act, but they are smuggled in via
a partiarchal

family.

Mothers and fathers enter the Marxian

historical scene simultaneously.

History and common-sense

suggest, however, that "mothers" predated "fathers". 57

When we do encounter "reproduction" in Marx's economic
writings,

it is reduced to the quantifiable notion of the

value of commodities which we must consume in order to

survive from day to day:
The minimum limit of the value of labour-power is
determined by the value of the commodities, without the
daily supply of which the labourer cannot renew his
vital energy, consequently by the value of those means
of subsistence that are physically indispensable 58
.

This formulation, of course, writes out the "use-values"

produced by women's labor and is also incapable of
accounting for the domestic labor of women which

is devoted

to the conversion of commodity goods into consummable
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use-values.

(Food is the best example of this.)

Given the

intimate relationship between women's
labor in the
recognized labor force and the labor of
reproduction in the
home, this move is doubly problematic.
Marx not only fails
to recognize women's work within
the home, but he cannot
provide us with the tools for understanding
sexually

segregated labor markets. 59
Recent attempts to formulate a theory of
women's work

have shifted from prior efforts to accomodate
such a theory
within the conceptual framework of Marxian economics,

highlighting instead the activity of "caring" as

"a

labour

which ensures life, as much as an emotion which expresses
love."

60

Arguing that the separate analysis of labor and

love (through the disciplines of economics and psychology)
is problematic for a full understanding of women's

caregiving activities, this approach is both

phenomenological and structural.

That is,

it takes

seriously the lived experience of women's labor, even as

it

observes that caring "marks the point at which the relations
of capital and gender intersect." 61

The labor of caring

for elderly parents, helpless children, handicapped family

members, over-worked husbands, etc.,

is a vital part of

women's work life which also translates into the

notoriously underpaid arena of "pink collar" work.
or may not produce use-values, need not entail the

consumption of commodities.

But it is part of the

It may

life-blood of our production system. 62

And it has a

powerful effect on the work that women
do:
er part-time housewife,

to the secretary,

from the full-

social worker,

nurse, waitress, elementary school
teacher, welfare mother,
and prostitute.

Within Marx's economic framework, women's
labor vanishes
and we are left with "a gender-biased
account of social

production and an incomplete account of the
life-processes
of human beings."
This account cannot help affecting
Marx's vision of post-capitalist society, where

we fish in

the morning, hunt in the afternoon, and engage
in social

criticism after dinner. 64

Not only has Marx "made the

tacit assumption that the usually invisible laborer cooks
the meal," 65 but he has failed to remember the children,

relying instead on dependable, invisible female

responsibility for this work.
This issue here is not simply one of exclusion, which

could be rectified by including women in the theory.

Marx's

failure to understand and appreciate reproductive and caring
labor directly influences his understanding of "productive"
labor.

This understanding was perhaps most artfully

captured by Marx in his comparison of the architect and the
bee.

66

While this comparison rightfully emphasizes the

creative and self-conscious aspects of human labor, it errs
in postulating an idealized and over-voluntar ist image of

human labor.

This image issues in Marx's vision of an
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unalienated labor which can only be
so when it has been
emancipated from the realm of
necessity.
Hence:
° f freedom actually begins
only
determlne &t necessity and mundin^ where
g
3olsTdeTifTonT
considerations ceases; thus
in the very~n^tu7e~3f- t hina S
9
S bey ° nd thS SphSre
f actual material
°
oro^n^
St
S
SaVage mUSt Wrestle wit Nature
to satisfy
?o
sa?is?v'hif
?
his wants,
to maintain and reproduce ^
life
so
must civilized man, and he must
do so in all social
formations and under all possible
modes of production
hiS realm ° f I*yical necessity
expand^a^r^^f
expands
'/ his wants; but, at the
as a result of
same time
3
oduction which satisfy these wants llso
increasT ?Freedom
this field can only consist in
6
men the associated producers,
rationally
J?
regulating
their interchange with Nature, bringing
it
£25525 control, instead of bei ng rllel 57 it
IL
as
CeS ° f NatUre; and achieving this with
IL^t
°l
the leastI expenditure
of energy and under conditions
most favorable to, and worthy of,
their human nature.
But it nonetheless remains a realm
of necessity.
Beyond
it begins that development of human
energy which i s In
end in itself, the true realm of freedom
wh7ch~h3w"e v^r
can blossom forth only with this realm
of necessity as
its basis
.67 (italics mine.)

lah^t^*

^

-

^

m

f

,

.

Necessity

— that

.

ineradicable foe— must be diminished as much

as possible for a truly "human" history to
flourish.

and humanity are thus,

in some sense,

opposed.

68

Nature

On this

level, at least, Marx and Mill share a similar
orientation

with respect to nature.

This vision of freedom is, of

course, tied in with Marx's sense of history and with his

historical sense of progress as
over nature.

a

steadily expanding control

The conditions for freedom are the conditions

for such control, necessary but not sufficient guarantors of

human self-realization.

Marx's anticipated "reconciliation"

of humanity and nature thus takes place at the dialectical
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expense of nature controlled.
If Marx had stopped to
seriously consider the labor of

mothers, he would have been forced
in one of two
directions:
either to characterize such labor
as

less-than-human because it is bound to
nature (i.e., becau se
it is not subject to full
control and because as biological
reproductive labor it is animal-like); 69
or to re-think
his account of labor to accomodate
reproductive labor, which
is influenced by biology and
necessity, as well as by
culture.
Implicitly, I would argue,
the former

characterization prevails in his analysis of
labor.
Mary
O'Brien's comparison of the mother and the
architect
introduces some of the more stubborn and
interesting
features of maternal labor which Marx avoided.

They are

worth considering in some detail:
To comprehend a self and a world and a task to
be done,
to work out the way to do it, to act upon this
determination, to make something and know that one has
made it, to 'reproduce' oneself daily by means of the
labour process; all of this is the unity of thinking and
doing, the fundamental praxis of production which is
embedded in socio-histor ical modes of production.
Reproduction is quite different
biological
reproduction differs in that it is not an act of
rational will. No one denies a motherly imagination,
which foresees the child in a variety of ways
[F]emale reproductive consciousness knows that a child
will be born, knows what a child is, and speculates in
general terms about this child's potential. Yet mother
and architect are quite different.
The woman cannot
realize her visions, cannot make them come true, by
virtue of the reproductive labor in which she
involuntarily engages, if at all. Unlike the architect,
her will does not influence the shape of her product.
Unlike the bee, she knows that her product, like
herself, will have a history. Like the architect, she
.

.

.

....

knows what she is doinqwhat she is doing. 70

lilce
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At issue here are questions
of control,

She Cannot hel P

the human

relationship to Nature, and the
characterization of
identifiably human activities as
exclusively

rational and

self-generative.

Stressing the planned, conscious,
and
purposive dimensions of human labor,
Marx counterposes such
labor to the realm of Necessity
(Nature) and so is

constitutionally unable to see women's
reproductive labor
and its derivatives as human
labor.
The fact that

"productive" labor as such would be
impossible without
reproductive and caring labor makes this
blindspot all the
more problematic. Marx has failed to
fully specify the

preconditions for "human" labor as he sees it.

At this

point, we could well ask Marx a feminist-inspired
version of
the question that he put to psychological
theories that

ignored the history of industry and production:

"What

should one think of a science [Marxism] whose
preconceptions

disregarded this large field of man's [sic] labour [maternal
labor] and which is not conscious of its incompleteness
•

•

,,.71
*

The differences between productive labor and maternal-

caring labor (understood in historically specific terms)

also issue in different, gender-based historical

consciousnesses.

For Marx, congealed labor in the

instruments and objects of production provides the umbilical
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cord through time by which people
remember,

identify with,

and differentiate themselves from their
predecessors.

Productive labor is the living (but Marx
calls this "dead"
labor!) congealed link of species continuity.
O'Brien
argues that women may be privy to a different
sense of

historical identity:

"women do not apprehend the reality of

past ages in a mediation on the probable history of
a

hammer." 7 2

Instead, we see it in our children, who

embody, among other things, congealed reproductive labor
(not simply our own, but also that of our parents, their

parents, etc.).

"Marx conflated production and

reproduction, analyzes productive labor only, and thus
reduces the awareness of species continuity to an economist

construction

.
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Marx's formulation of historical continuity is also

essentially forward-looking and teleological

.

Hence his

rendering of the past as a "tradition of all the dead

generations" which "weighs like a nightmare on the brain of
the living."
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This sense of time, of the relation of the

present to the past, is more likly to emerge out of

a

standpoint that has been forced to construct an abstract
formulation of generational continuity.

Nature at least

provides an anchoring with the past through the genetic

continuity provided through reproduction.

Given the overall

status of Nature within Marx's theory, however, such

continuity must be passed over completely in favor of

a
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productive labor which anticipates its
eventual liberation
as a complete rupture with past
history. 75
We can also begin to see how and why
Marx's conception
of labor and time yields an account
of man as an essentially

self-creative being:

"[F]or socialist man what is called

world history is nothing but the creation of
man by human
labor and the development of nature for man
1,76
.

"

[Socialist man

.

.

.

.

.

has the observable and irrefutable

proof of his self-creation and the process of his
origin." 77

"A being only counts itself as independent

when it stands on its own two feet and it stands on its
own
two feet as long as its owes its existence to itself." 78

Marx has essentially denied and reappropr iated the labor of
the mother in his account of self-created man.

Graeme Duncan has been especially, although not
critically, sensitive to this voluntar i st-1 iberatory feature
of Marx's portrayal of humanity:

Marx's strong concern for human autonomy or freedom, and
for man's ultimate self-realization in co-operation with
others, underlay his mature as well as his early
writing. He envisaged, as the outcome of history, man
unconstrained by his social environment, active,
versatile, revealing a variety of creative powers,
enriched, a whole man. 7 9
What is wrong with this account?

Nothing,

so long as it is

not exaggerated and thereby dependent on a denial of women
and Necessity.

("Necessity",

it should be stressed,

socially- and historically-specific category.

is a

It does not

have an invariant or self-evident meaning, aside from some
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of the basic requirements of
biological life.)

hands of Marx,
problems.

it

First,

human nature.

But in the

tends to issue in three distinct
it relies on an

Secondly,

Enlightenment tradition.

overly plastic view of

it is arrogant

Finally,

it

in the post-

recapitulates the

denial of mothers which we encountered in
his theory of
labor

Marx's account of human nature involves

1)

the notion

that man "makes himself" and hence, should
"revolve around

himself as his own true sun", and

2)

the notion that the

human is, and must be, defined solely in relation to
his
social,

relational setting.

Marx provided a significant and

much-needed critique of the pre-social individual monad of
liberal theory who is constituted as a subject prior to the

society in which he lives. 80

However, his substitute

notion of the individual as "the ensemble of social

relations" creates a good many problems as well.
models,

In both

furthermore, the individual is "constituted

abstractly without every being born."

O

-I

Within Mill's

frame, he is constituted as a rational discrete being

entitled to rights and whose social relations are negotiated
in the "space" which is created and administered by such

rights.

Within Marx's very different account, the

individual is constituted socially, particularly within the
frame of his laboring activities, which produce him even as

he produces them.

But this social construction presupposes
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the unacknowledged prior relation
to an earlier laborer-the

mother
Robert Heilbroner has been especially
acute in
describing the hazards of a plastic conception

of human

nature
[T]here is a severe price to be paid for a
view of the
human being as without any definition other
than
created by its social setting. For the individualthat
thereupon becomes the expression of social
relations
binding him or her together with other individuals
who
are likewise nothing but the creatures of their
social
existences. We then have a web of social determinates
that has no points of anchorage other than in
our animal
bodies

And our animal bodies, within the frame of Marx's analysis,
can't tell us very much about ourselves.

Dennis Wrong's

critique of the oversocialized conception of man 83 also

anticipates Heilbroner

's

discomfort with Marx's failure to

deal with politics in post-revolutionary society.

identification of

a

Wrong's

theortical partnership between an

over-socialized view of man and an over-integrated view of
society is substantiated in the fact that politics has
become, to use Heilbroner'

socialism.

s

image,

the Achilles' heel of

Marx's collapsed vision of

a

complementary and

trouble-free relationship between the individual and
communist society is too seamless to admit political
struggle and dialogue over society's means, ends, limits,
and possiblities. 84
.

.

That the theorist par excellence of

struggle and contradiction should end up with this kind of
vision is rather incredible.

Or is it?

Perhaps Marx
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himself embodies the human limit for
living with perpetual
conflict
An exaggerated emphasis on man's
self-creative abilities
is also arrogant.
it denies our natural embeddedness
and

promotes resentment against
god-like.

Nature that has not made us

a

It pits the "human" essence against the
"natural"

backdrop of limiting existence.
a state of

post-embeddedness

And it actually anticipates

where "the individual has

,

ceased to become the object of uncontrolled forces
and is
instead entirely self-created

,

ceaselessly going beyond its

own limits by means of its creativity, and continuously

participating in the movement of its own becoming." 85
(Italics mine.)

In spite of Marx's youthful efforts to

synthesize and transcend the dichotomy between Nature and
Culture, Necessity and Freedom, these efforts are resolved

on behalf of a humanity that appropriates Nature exclusively
for its own self-defined interests.

Marx also follows in

the tradition of post-Enlightenment humanists by defining

humanity against animal life:
The animal is immediately one with its vital activity.
It is not distinct from it.
They are identical. Man
makes his vital activity into an object of his will and
consciousness. He has a conscious vital activity. He
is not immediately identical to any of his
characterizations. Conscious vital activity
differentiates man immediately from animal vital
activity.
It is this and this alone that makes man a
spec ies-being
Italics mine .")
(

This issues in an instrumental relationship to Nature:
The practical creation of an objective world, the
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Not incidentally, these themes are
also intimately
related to the denial of the mother.
An exaggerated

emphasis on self-creation denies that we
were born and
nurtured.
It denies the bio-social basis
for species
continuity and projects it exclusively onto
the arena of
labor.

It promotes a view of communism as
severing "the

umbilical cord of the individual's natural
connection with
the species." 88

These themes help us to ponder Mary

O'Brien's suggestion that "Underlying the doctrine that
man
makes history is the undiscussed reality of why he
must."

89

When we deny our first bio-social relationship

we deny our own natural embeddedness as physical,

vulnerable, animal creatures.

We also deny the origins and

ground of our sociability as a species.

Philosophers such

as Marx who wish to articulate and promote this important

aspect of distinctively human life are forced to ground

it

in activities which post-date our first experience of mutual
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sociability.

When we deny maternal labor and women's
labors

of caring love,

which tend to be more aware of

a

non-instrumental, cooperative and also difficult

relationship with Nature, 90 we construct

a

deficient view

of "specifically human labor" and of "species life".

Without a retrospective appreciation for our bio-social
origins, we are all the more likely to join Marx in viewing
the past as a pile of "muck".

This denial of the mother in Marx's theory

— which

is

also central to the social acquisition and definition of

gendered masculine identity

— helps

to maintain the

domination of women and the domination of nature.

Hence,

Marxist social theory may be perpetuating problems
some of which it would like to solve, others of which it is

unaware

— that

involve not only half of the human species,

but our literal survival as a species.
of nature,

For the domination

as Adorno and Horkheimer came to argue,

also

entails its revolt. 91

Production and the Domination of Nature
[A]ll objects become for him the object i fication of
himself
Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts

In spite of all that has been said thus far,

intimations in Marx of a yearning for

a

there are

genuine, mutually

reciprocal and transcendent relationship between humanity
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and nature.

Not surprisingly, this yearning is
rendered in
the language of male-female relations.
(Not surprising, in
that the female represents herself as
well as nature.)
if
we can suspend,

for a few moments,

some of the substantial

problems with this excerpt,* we may appreciate
it for its
insight into the complex, enriching and instructive

dimensions of the interface between nature and
culture which

post-Enlightenment thinking has steadily sought to
eliminate 92

:

The infinite degradation in which man exists for
himself is expressed in his relationship to woman as
prey and servant of communal lust; for the secret of
this relationship finds an unambiguous, decisive,
open,
and unveiled expression in the relationship of man to
woman and the conception of the immediate and natural
relationship of the sexes. The immediate, natural, and
necessary relationship of human being to human being is
the relationship of man to woman.
In this natural
relationship of the sexes man's relationship to nature
is immediately his relationship to man, and his
relationship to man is immediately his relationship to
nature, his own natural function.
Thus, in this
relationship is sensuously revealed and reduced to an
observable fact how far for man his essence has become
nature or nature his become man's human essence. Thus,
from this relationship the whole cultural level of man
can be judged ... we can conclude how far man has
become a species-being, a human being, and conceives of
himself as such; the relationship of man to woman is the
most natural relationship of human being to human
being.
Thus it shows how far the natural behavior

*They include: a prudish distaste for "lust"; a male
standpoint:
"he" is the referential subject, "she" is the
object; the assumption that male-female relations are
transparently natural (but we cannot really have expected
Marx to know better); and heterosexist assumptions about
sexuality (once again, this is not to castigate Marx for
what he could not have known, but to remind ourselves.)
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This is a remarkable piece of writing,
most especially
in its intimation of the relationship
between the status of

women and the status of nature in modern western
culture.
This relationship was subsequently explored by
Adorno and

Horkheimer in the following terms:

Women have no personal part in the efficiency on
which
this civilization is based.
It is man who has to go out
into an unfriendly world, who has to struggle and
produce .... The division of labor imposed upon her
by man brought her little that was worthwhile.
She
became the embodiment of the biological function, the
image of nature, the subjugation of which constituted
that civilization's title to fame.
For millenia men
dreamed of acquiring absolute mastery over nature, of
converting the cosmos into one immense hunting
ground. y4
Marx seems well aware that the socio-cultural fates of men
and women are intimately related; that the degradation of

women issues in and reflects the degradation of man.
Another way of saying this is that the 'Woman Question' is

also the 'Man Question'.

Marx also invokes a vocabulary of

nature and necessity in non-pejorative terms, depicting
social relations between human beings as natural relations
too.

(Midgely would approve.)

He tells us that the status

of women within a culture is an important indicator of that

culture's health.

And he suggests that cultures can be

evaluated in terms of their success or failure in
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integrating nature and culture, i.e.,
that human progress
requires a genuine accomodation with
nature.

Finally, he

envisions a harmonious co-existence of
individuality and
community which may be understood simultaneously
in human
social terms as well as in terms of the
humanity-nature
relation.
Nowhere in this account do we find nature
lurking
as a threat or limit.
Nowhere in western social theory do
we find as intense a yearning for reciprocal
accomodation

between humanity and nature, men and women.
Unfortunately, this visionary sense of mutual

accomodation slides into one of appropriation, as Marx
begins to equivocate on the meaning of "participation".

The

following quote provides a glimpse into the early stages of
such a slide:

Labour is ... a process in which both man and nature
participate and in which man of his own accord,
regulates, and controls the material reactions between
himself and nature. He opposes himself to nature as one
of her own forces, setting in motion arms and legs, head
and hands, the natural forces of the body, in order to
appropriate nature's productions in a form adapted to
his own wants. 95
Here we see Marx articulating an equivalence between "human
will over nature" and "human participation in nature":

Nature builds no machines, no locomotives, railways,
electric telegraphs, self-acting mules, etc. These are
products of human industry; natural material transformed
into organs of the human will over nature, or of human
participation in nature. 96
Finally, this human will attains pre-eminence over a brute

nature that has been muted:

"All production is
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appropriation of Nature on the part of
an individual within
and through a specific form of
society." 97

m

capital

,
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But is all of labor the appropriation
of nature?

O'Brien,

in her assessment of the labor of
biological

reproduction, has suggested otherwise.
Bookchin,

Mary

So too does Murray

in arguing that nature also "appropriates"
us.

He

articulates a view of nature as something other and
more
than the brute, passive object of man's labors:
Marx tried to root humanity's identity and
self-discovery in its productive interaction with
nature.
But I must add that not only does humanity
place its imprint on the natural world and transform it,
but also nature places its imprint on the human world
and transforms it ... it is not only we who "tame"
nature but also nature that "tames" us."
One way of understanding Marx,

I

would suggest, is to locate

him in the tension between the recognition of nature and its
domination.

This suggests that a full assessment of his

social theory must acknowledge the complex contrariness of

his th i nk i ng
Marx's social theory is located on what Nancy Hartsock

has called "the epistemological terrain of production."
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This commits him to a particular
set of concepts, including
those of "class", "labor", "value",
"distribution",

"exchange",

"profit", and "surplus-value", among
others.

Recently, the Marxian category of
"production"

(a

highly

privileged category) and many of its attendant
concepts have
come under serious, if not devastating,
scrutiny,
from the

charge that these concepts do not enable
an adequate

theorization of power and must be resituated within

a

broader mode of inquiry, 100 to the accusation that
Marx's
concept of production is the "ultimate possible
expression
of"

"the hubris of domination." 101

I

would like to

maneuver a way between these two assessments by suggesting
and attempting to demonstrate two things.

First,

that the

resituation of Marxism within a different and larger
epistemological terrain is quite problematic; second, that
while Marx's theory is indeed tied in with a dialectic of
domination,

expression".

it is by no means

"its ultimate possible

We begin by exploring some of the ways in

which Marx's category of production contributes to and
intensifies the domination of nature.
The problematic of the domination of nature is

simultaneously elusive and compelling.
problem,

It

is the kind of

like the problem of "alienation" generated by

Marx's youthful theory, which we either "see" because of a
set of values and interests that we have, or don't "see"

because it doesn't fit into our scheme of things, including
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our experience of comfort or
discomfort with modern
culture.
In a secular age such as this
(and I count myself
as a secular thinker; i.e., I
do not believe in or

acknowledge any kind of 'higher power'),
the domination of
nature enters the discourse of social
theory as a type of
theological problem.
"Nature" takes the place of "God"

as a

kind of independent entity or Subject with
which we are also
vitally related; we are part of nature. Marx's
critique and

demystification of religion as a falsely objectified

projection of human aspirations (actually, it was
Feuerbach
who did this, but it had an important early influence
on

Marx) sets the tone for hostile relations between those
who

view "man" alone as the originator of meaning and those who

would look elsewhere as well.

A typical Marxist response to

the 'domination of nature' problematic would be to ask

sarcastically if that means that one should stop weeding the
garden.
rational,

This version of the problem reduces it to one of

instrumental policy.

Presumably, we avoid

ecological disasters (the revolt of nature), which are

problematic only to the extent that they impinge on us, by

becoming more rational in our utilization of nature.

What

is feared is an abondonment to the forces of nature.

(Look

what happens when you don't weed.)

in my

opinion,

The mistake here,

is to equate all exchanges with Nature either as

instances of domination or as benign and inconsequential.
On this view, the issue is not simply one of whether to
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weed, but of how to weed.
to weeds.

This "how" includes our attitudes

(But this is going to sound crazy
to my Marxist

friend, who sees the problem in
terms of 'to weed or not to
weed'.)
Organic gardening, among other practices,
provides
a tangible example of an orientation
to nature which is

simultaneously respectful and practical.

The fact tht it is

appealing to growing numbers of ordinary
Americans suggests
that it meets a felt need for a different
relationship to
nature than is commonly afforded.
in a similar
vein,

the

recent upsurge of interest in and activism on
behalf of
"animal rights" also testifies to popular discomfort
with an

ethos that cannot accord nature respect and dignity.

Adorno

and Horkheimer were also on to this feature of the problem:
The idea of man in European history is expressed in the
way in which he is distinguished from the animal.
Animal irrationality is adduced as proof of human
dignity
The antithesis is still accepted
today.
The behaviorists only appear to have forgotten
it.
The fact that they apply to humans the same
formulas and findings that, without restraint, they
force from defenseless animals in their nauseating
physiological laboratories stresses the contrast quite
adroitly. The conclusion they draw from mutilated
bodies applies not to animals in the free state but to
man as he is today. 102

....

Nature thus impoverished issues in the self-brutal ization of
humani ty
Isaac Balbus argues that Marx's concept of production

necessarily entails the domination of nature because it
requires an "instrumental relationship between humans and
their surrounding world." 103

As the substance of
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necessity, nature is humanity's
adversary in its quest for
self-creative, self-sufficient freedom.
"To conceive nature
as that which must be bent or
transformed by human beings is
to conceptualize it as the raw
material or the instrument of
104
human labor."
When we approach nature on these terms
we must assume that it "has no intrinsic
worth, no dignity
of its own," and therefore that it
makes no normative claims
on humanity. 105

William Petty

approvingly by Marx in Capital
of the material world,

'

s

analogy— quoted

— that

"labour is the father

the earth is its mother," reinforces

the notion that nature provides the passive material

substratum for "productive" labor, even as it plays on the
sexist depiction of women as "passive",

"natural", and

therefore less-than-f ully "human" creatures. 106

Within

this mode of thinking small wonder that mothers and

caring-laboring females are rendered invisible in Marx's
theory of labor.

Like the members of non-objectifying

"primitive" cultures who are viewed as child-like and

less-than-fully rational by Marx, women are excluded from
Marx's account of "human" labor, unless they are working

alongside men in the fields or factories.

For these

reasons, the re-accomodat ion of women and nature within

Marxian theory has potentially devastating consequences.
The Manuscr ipts offer some initial hope that Marx's

portrayal of nature is not as instrumental and objectified
as Balbus argues it is.

There we find Marx waxing eloquent
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on the "humanization of nature"
and the "naturalization of
man", suggesting an eventual
reciprocity between two

improperly opposed arenas.

While the young Marx was

obviously groping, as we have seen, for some
means of
reconciliation, his subsequent vision of
communism
effectively renders the "humanization" of nature

as its

domination by human beings:
Communism differs from all previous movements in
that it
overturns the basis of all earlier relations of
production and intercourse, and for the first time
consciously treats all natural premises as the creatures
of hitherto existing men, strips them of their
natural
character and subjugates them to the power of the united
individuals
The reality, which communism is
creating, is precisely the true basis for rendering it
impossible that anything should exist independently of
individuals, insofar as reality is only a product of the
preceding intercourse of individuals themselves. 107
Ital ics mine

....

(

.

Jeremy Shapiro has described communism (approvingly) in this
fashion, which is quite similar to Marx's version.

It

recapitulates the themes of self-created humanity and the

domination of nature, while it introduces the notion of
"post-embeddedness "
In the state of post-embeddedness depicted by Marx, the
individual has ceased to become the object of uncontrolled forces and is instead entirely self-created
ceaselessly going beyond its own limits by means of its
creativity, and continuously participating in the
movement of its own becoming.
(Italics mine.)
,

The dialectic of history is resolved through completion
of the self -transcendence of nature that occurs when
embeddedness in nature is overcome and human beings
bring the historical process under control. 108
Italics mine.
(
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Post-embeddedness is a dangerous and
arrogant fiction.
it
is also misogynist and masculinist.
It is dangerous because
its blindness elicits the revolt
of nature.
It is
misogynist because it perpetuates a fear
of and consequent
need to dominate naturalized and hence,
"dangerous" women.
It is masculine because it issues
out of a set of percep-

tions and needs rooted in a gendered
identity negatively

fashioned out of opposition to the pre-Oedipal
(m)other.
The "revolt of nature" was initially
theorized by Adorno
and Horkheimer in their reassessment of the
Enlightenment.
It has been subsequently re-invoked and
extended by

feminists seeking to articulate a theory of feministecology. 109 What Adorno and Horkheimer saw in the
,

tragectory of Enlightenment thought and practice was a
steady "progress" in the domination of nature that was

necessarily accompanied by social and affective regression.
Paul Connerton provides an encapsulated view of their

argument
The exploitation of external nature for the purpose
of freeing men from subjection to it strikes back in the
repression of man's instinctual nature. Nature his own
as well as that of the external world
is 'given' to the
ego as something that has to be fought and conquered.
This means that, in the interest of self-preservation,
the self is engaged in constant inner struggle to
repress many of its own natural drives. The strain of
holding the ego together in this way adheres to it in
all stages; and the temptation to lose it has always
been present together with the determination to maintain
it.
This dread of losing the self, which in its extreme
form figures as the fear of death and destruction is,

—

—
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the domination of nature is
simultaneously true and

illusory.

it is also a dialectic that
has been undertaken

primarily on behalf of and by men.

Women, as Adorno argued,

were "not yet entirely in the
grasp of society." 111 They
were also implicated in this
dialectic in a complex way: as
human beings who were thought to be
more "natural" than men.
She became the embodiment of the
biological function,
f natUrS
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The domination of nature also issues in
a longing to return
to it.
This return, as Silvia Bovenschen argues,
is

negotiated through the female:

"The biological-natural

moments of human existence only appear to have
been fully

expunged from masculine everyday life:

that relationship to

inner nature which has not yet been mastered is
projected

onto women, so that women must pay for the dys f unct
ional i ty
of man's natural drives." 113
The radical pessimism of Adorno

'

s

and Horkheimer's

account involves their argument that this dialectic of

Enlightenment is inexorable.

That is,

they pose
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objectification as

given of human cognition and
practice
and they relentlessly ally it
with domination.
Most
a

attempts to rewrite this dialectic
in a less determined and
tragic fashion focus on the link
between ob ject i f ication and

domination and try to break it.

History and Marx are

invoked to suggestion alternative
conceptions. 114

We are

already in a position to understand
that Marx is not the
solution (just as Adorno and Horkheimer
did).
History,
however, still holds clues, particularly
if we recall that
the history of the European Enlightenment
is a

gender-specific history.

The argument that the fantasy of

post-embeddedness is masculine is related to

a

similar

characterization of the dialectic of Enlightenment.

As

Sandra Harding has argued:
Once we recognize that the history of Western thought
is
the history of thought by members of a group with
a
distinctive social experience namely, men we are then
led to a new set of questions about the social nature of
that thought and about the justifiability and
reliability of the interpretations of nature and social
life emerging from that thought. 115

—

—

This introduces the possibility that Marx's ontologizat ion
of ob jectif ication (along with that of Adorno and

Horkheimer) has a masculine component.
For children of both sexes, the "world" from which
they must differentiate themselves, and in interaction
with which they create their own autonomous identity, is
in one sense the same "world"
the mother-world.
But in
another sense it is a very different world for male and
female infants: gender-differentiated experiential
worlds begin at birth. The masculine "objectifying"
personality develops through separation and
individuation from a kind of person whom he cannot

—

become biologically and against
will and control not to become whom he must exercise
socially.
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Objectification in the hands of Marx is not only
de-problematized.

It

is

held up as the apex of human

achievement and liberation which, in the final
analysis, is
a radically impoverished, solipsistic
standard of human
possibility and achievement.
It is also masculine.
Marx's overall and systematic failure to
accomodate

nature may help to explain a central tension at the
heart of
his theory, that between humanistic voluntarism ("man
makes
himself") and social-structural determinism ("life is not

determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life").
While this tension may be artfully combined, as it has been
in Alfred Schmidt's rendition of Marx's capitalist society

as

"a self-made prison of uncomprehended economic

determination," 117 or as we find it in Marx's version of

history in the "Eighteenth Brumaire" 118
to erupt in one-sided formulations.

,

it also threatens

Witness the wildly

divergent interpretations of Marx, from Eric Fromm's

humanistic appropriation, to Althusser's structural
reading.

We can detect something in Marx's approach to

nature which is similar to Mill's fear of an unconstrained
and vindictive nature.

In Marx's case, however, he had

higher expectations for its taming.

Nevertheless, or

precisely because of this expectation,
nature's domination
within the arena of human labor promises
a human omnipotence
which is eternally threatened. These
threats,

for Marx,

take the form of humanly-undetermined,
but still-created,
social forms and relations.
Not surprisingly,
the

capitalist version of these forms takes on
vitalistic,
nature-like, and even female capacities,

dynamically regenerative ones.

including

The banished mother

reappears in Marx's portrayal of a capitalism that

reproduces and augments itself, while his own intellectual
efforts are cast as the contributions of a mid-wife helping
to shorten the "birth pangs" of an incipient revolution. 119
Is Marx's theory the

"ultimate" in post-Enlightenment

attempts to dominate nature?
one that

I

This is a difficult question,

am inclined to answer negatively because of

Marx's latent intimations of a different dialectical

interplay between humanity and nature.

If we take Marx's

failure to consist of "his inability to extend [and

maintain] his splendid insight into the epi stemological

validity of sensuous experience and the sensuousness of the
"I

'man/nature' relationship expressed in labor,"'

OA

then the

terms of his failure, at least, are preferable to those of

others.

And if we were to actually search for candidates

for the dubious distinction of "ultimate", we would have to

consider others:

Hobbes, J.S. Mill, Weber, Freud, Sartre

and Habermas are Dust
iu<5f a f~,,
few of the potential
notables.
How
do we assess who is more
"ultimate" than whom? And
how will
this help us?
.Ultimate" really counts down
on the g round
rather than on the terrain
of the text.
From here we can
see with some sad measure
of certainty, that
Western
=,

,

civilization embodies, perpetuates
and extends the
"ultimate" (so far at least)
expression of the domination of
nature:
we are truly unsurpassed.
On the other hand, we had
better think twice before we
attempt to transplant Marx to
new epistemological terrain,
as Nancy Hartsock suggests.

For Marx's epistemological

terrain is bound up with an
ontological habitat that is in
some ways a masculine one. And
the knowledge which issues
out of this framework is necessarily
limited and distoring,
not simply in its inability to
"see" aspects of genderdifferentiated experience and knowledge
which call it into
question, but also in the very substance
of its own
horizon. Marx's epistemological commitment

to the arena of

"production" commits him to an ontological
perception of
reality which is detectably masculine. As such,
it

lacks a

self-conscious appreciation of its own roots which,
within
the Marxian view,

is the

critical theory.

To a great extent,

prerequisite of a genuinely

grasped was gender-specific man.

connections" were attenuated ones.

the "root" that Marx

As such, his "real
So too must his

"intellectual wealth" be correspondingly diminished.
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Ultimately, however, his
greatest fai lure-as a
materialist, critical diagnostician
of his age, and

revolutionary-may well have been his
inability to
systematically acknowledge the
intuitions of his youth,
which concern "that deepest
substratum of man [sic]-the
organism's need to establish and
celebrate its spiritual
identity with the phenomenal world
and the cosmos." 121
Too many of our "sins" and "needs"
are still in mute

di sarray

Conclusion
To get its sins forgiven, humanity only
needs to
describe them as they are.
Marx, "A Correspondence of 1843"

A theory will only be realized in a people in
so
far as it is the realization of what it needs.
Marx,

Right

;

"Towards a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of
tL~A
Introduction"

An immanent critical assessment of Marx would bring us
to his sociology of knowledge, which stresses the rich

material and relational substratum of consciousness and
knowledge.

While Marx looked to that substratum as the

arena of labor, he failed to appreciate the implications of
the fact that labor is organized on the basis of sex and not

simply class.

Marx is not simply unaware of the possibility

that such a substratum might be gender-differentiated, his

own framework of "desirable
belief" 122

i

constituted in gender-specific terms.

Hence, he has

s

itself

committed a version of the very sins
with which his
intellectual and political opponents
were charged and found
guilty: he has generalized a
(gender-)specific form of

human cognition and elaborated it
into a social theory.
In
short, Marx views social reality in
specifically gendered
ways.

His critique of that reality is
correspondingly

gendered and gender-blind.
Marx's "real connections" to his social world
reflect,
in part,

subject.

the introjected connections of the masculine

We find masculine identity at work in his need to

'clear the ground' of intellectual and polemical
endeavor.

Marx needed "room to move"~a lot of it.

Like the subjects

of Carol Gilligan's research on gender-differentiated

psychological development, Marx joins the ranks with those
male respondents who react to pictures of physical proximity

between humans with fantasized scenarios of violence
designed to widen the space between them. 123

Masculine

subjects are threatened by intimacy and proximity, largely
in virtue of their strict ego boundary construction.

On

this view, ground clearing is a type of survival strategy.

We also find the memories of masculine identity

acquisition echoed in Marx's dichotomous model of
antagonistic class relations.

Bourgeoisie and proletariat,

like mother and son, are intimately, but antagonistically,
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related.

Each survives at the expense
of the other.
Ultimately, the health and
survival of the latter require
the elimination of the
former.

Like Hobbes and Mill, Marx
has had to banish the mother
from his account of social
reality. This enables a number
of crucial and distinctive
turns in his theory:
a view of
history as forward moving progress,
a cataclysmic theory of
change, and a view of human labor
that is ultravoluntarist. The first two features
of Marx's theory embody
what Mary O'Brien has analyzed as
the male attempt to

re-write history without the generational
continuity enacted
124
through mothers.
I would tie this in to a
more

psychoanalytic and culturally specific account,
by situating
these features as the outcome of the masculine
turn away

from the mother.

The voluntarist account of labor is

enabled and enhanced by the missing mother because
it does
not have to take account of her labor as activity
which is
not neatly voluntarist.

Marx's voluntarist account of labor

is not incidental to his ob jecti

f

icat ion of nature,

for it

promotes a view of nature as the passive substratum of

humanly active efforts.

And his objectif ication of nature

plays into the dialectic of enlightenment, which is also
implicated in the nature-female affiliation.

affiliation has already had

a prior

But this

confirmation in the very

securing of masculine identity against a female mother-world
that becomes the prototype for "nature".

Hence,

the
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objectifieation of women and nature
are implicated in a
complex spiral of self-referential
and -confirming beliefs
and feelings.

Masculine gender identity also
enables
and necessity as being inversely
related.

a

view of freedom

This issues out

of an over-voluntarist conception
of labor and parallels the

antagonistic relationship between
humanity and nature.
Post-embeddedness is the inevitably
"utopian" endpoint of
such a scheme. What it recapitulates
at the

level of social

theory is a yearning and fantasy
embedded in the deep
psychology of masculine identity: clean
and ultimate
release from the (m)other.
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his Appearance and Reality in Politics (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 151-172, 173-193,
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interpretation in Money, Sex
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49 I am not opposed to the
notion that some
standpoints are more privileged than others if "privileged"
is understood to mean being more critical and inclusive
than
other standpoints. This is not to say, however, that
standpoints convey or guarantee a singular "truth".
(I
believe that Nancy Hartsock would disagree with me, but this
is how I prefer to use the term.)
We must also be extremely
careful of the potential abuses of the notion of standpoint.
A privileged standpoint that fails to "listen" to others is
a candidate for totalitarianism.
On the other hand, part of
what makes it privileged is its ability to understand and to
accomodate more voices than less-privileged standpoints.
50 This

is by no means to deny the significance of
class struggle or the reality of antagonistic class
interests.
These, however, would be better situated within
a more comprehensive context.
Several features of social
reality point us in this direction. First, a two class
model cannot help us to understand the situation of women,
Afro-Americans, persecuted lesbians and homosexuals, and the
treatment of Native Americans and other minority groups.
The voices, interests, and oppressions of these groups
require much more than a two-tiered model to account for and
rectify their situations.
Secondly, class theory needs to
come to terms with the internalization by members of the

327

bourgeoia^ceivefSlitS'l^^*
t
1 9 nit
respect,

°f

Y'
and the
good life.
° .f
[See RieWrt
Jonathan
Cobb,
The
Hidden lni u r jes of Silt IT $
H ° USS
rhil Is not a question of
]
USneSS
rdly
many of the outstanding
problems
age including the
threat of nuclear holoLnf? ? v oTth.°
?
+

™^
'

—

,

Decline

(New York:

p

Oxford Univ ersity Pre**

8-28 J-

*

i

,

Q«n 1

We can expect the

?
further
;
proletarianization
of labor in the United States, an
intensification of global class-like
relations between
*

^

'

>

'

*

"

Pe ° PleS ° f the WOrld and struggles
economic ^forn, by and on behalf of
5?Ln?i
nd pr °? er less workers.
Those who fail to
arUcuIate the
articulate
Jhf ,?
class-specific interests at stake in these
e
ar
ri ^ htfull y accused of capitulating
to
?
capitalist class
interests and power.

ooH

^T}

iLT^
nd
2

'

^

\

of the alternatives, see Carol
_ 11 5lFor Ina asense
Gilligan,
Different Voice:
Psychological The ory and
S DeVe
(Cambridge:
Harv ard University Pres s,
1982).

^^

.

52 Money,

Sex and Power

53 The German Ideology

,

,

p.

146.

pp. 43-44,

52-53.

54 See Harry Braverman,

Labor and Monopoly Capital
Monthly Review Press, 1976) for an especially
good elaboration of the separation of mental and manual
work.
The heart imagery comes from Hilary Rose, "Hand,
Brain, and Heart: A Feminist Epistemology for the Natural
Sciences," in Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society
~
—
L
(New York:

9

(1):

73-90.

55 Rose,

"Hand,

Brain, and Heart", p.

56 The German Ideology

,

p.

57.

75.

Of course,

in the

orignial German rendition of this it would be "menschen",
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Hobbes, Mill and Marx Revisited
Our exploration of Hobbes, J.S. Mill
and Marx provides
strong support for the thesis that masculine
gender is a

detectably significant constituent of the discourse
of
modern political theory. Specifically masculine
presuppositions, perceptions, interests and values have
334
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escaped detection and remark not simply
because of the
entrenched pervasiveness of the masculine
outlook, but also
because the eyes that beheld it have
been unselfconsciously
confirmed by its unart iculated presence
and
logic.

ln

other words, male hegemony in modern
Western political
theory has simultaneously produced
masculine ideology in
that genre and rendered it unproblmatic
and invisible.
While political theory has undergone
significant

permutations through time, adding new and
often discordant
voices to its various 'conversations' in
the
face of its

revealed limited abilities to express
socio-political

experiences, disappointments, desires and
possibilities,
is still
is,

landscape in which women are strangers." 1

"a

in effect,

it

it

gendered landscape, whose contours are

a

beginning to come into view just as, and precisely
because,
women are beginning to "speak from the silence"
that

heretofore has been ours.

2

The most notable feature of this landscape (one that

I

did not initially go 'fishing for', but which presented

itself to me as
theory)

is

1

went through the literature of political

the grand and contrived absence of the mother.

Given her privileged position in the construction and

attainment of masculine gender identity, this should come
as no surprise.

For while she is the key figure in the

articulation of masculine identity, she is the negative and
repressed ground of that identity.

Hence,

the search for

masculine ideology in .odern
western political theory has
turned up a "maternal subtext" 3
inhabited by a mother
who is both real and
fantasized.
The real missing mother
is the mother who has
birthed us and most probably
,

cared

for us during our early.,

vulnerable and formative years.

She provided the original
ground of our difficult striving
for identity.
The fantasized mother is
the mother of huge

proportions-terrifying in her wrath and
vindicti veness
seductive in her promise of a
recaptured "oceanic feeling"
The absence of the mother is
richly orchestrated; it
can take, as we have seen, a
variety
of forms.

But

whatever the particular scenario,
it is always based on
forcible expulsion which is subsequently

a

denied— i.e.,

"forgotten".

Such forget fulness is maintained
in the

layers of discourse within which she
is wrapped and handed
from theorist to theorist.
The forget fulness is so

successful, that no surprise or recognition
is registered
when she reappears in a Hobbesian sovereign
who is

self-generating through time, or in

a

capitalism that

reproduces itself with inexorable del iberateness

.

The

explusion and denial of the mother are handily captured
in
Hobbes's suggestion that we imagine ourselves "like
mushrooms".

They are presupposed in Mill's conception of

discrete, abstract individual who is entitled to rights on
the basis of a public-private distinction.

They are

embodied in Marx's vision of human beings as essentially

a
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self-creating producers.

Each of these characterizations,

significantly different as they are,
shares in
denial of the mother.

a

profound

Each is also threatened, although
differentially so, by
her reappearance on the scene.
in the case of Hobbes, she
threatens to turn the mushroom metaphor into
an absurd and
even humorous construct. We hear her
laughing in the

shadows of the state of nature.

For Mill,

the return of

the mother threatens to clutter the liberal
individual's

carefully manicured identity and to impede his access to

privately-generated rights.

She poses a fundamental

challenge to the nature-culture distinction by straddling
it and she threatens to release the lid on the Pandora's

box of repressed nature.

In Marx's case,

she provokes a

re-thinking of the basic elements of labor, along with the
categories of "production" and "history".

She is unmoved

by the communist ideal because she cannot abide a neat and

inverted distinction between freedom and necessity.
The missing and repressed mother is especially

implicated in the portrayal of nature, as we have noted

specifically in the cases of Mill and Marx.

The mutually

implicated fates of mothers and nature in western political
theory are the result not so much of ontology but of

post-Enlightenment dichotomies and associations that link
women to nature through the maternal function and set
4
masculinized Reason in opposition to feminized Nature.
.

.

This association,

I

would argue, is not simply an
idealist

or ideological one, however.

Maternal labor is implicated

in a profound and irreducible
relation to nature.

5

But

this relationship has been "stretched"
to the point that,
until recently, we have been unable to
conceive of maternal

activity as cognitive, rational practice.

6

Mill provides

one of the most extreme and disturbing
versions of

a

mind

set that fails to appreciate the legitimate
cognitive

dimensions of materially embedded labor.

This is exhibited

in his distrust of "partial" interests, which he
counter-

poses to the apparently disembodied rationality of the
educated.

His paranoid account of a vile and vindictive

nature set in opposition to civilization ramifies on his

portrayal of the "individual" who is only apparently
genderless.

This individual is indelibly marked by

"abstract masculinity" 7

,

Mills's feminism notwithstanding.

Marx's portrayal of nature-necessity as the objectified

ground of man's creative impulses and labors also requires
the banishment of the mother.

This is most evident in his

portrayal of an architect-like labor which writes out

maternal labor and women's labors of caring.

Antipathy

towards nature, virulent in Mill, ambivalently cast by
Marx,

issues in effective antipathy to women.

This in

spite of the intentions of either theorist.
A masculine orientation and cognitive structure has

a

powerful effect on the political theorist's
portrayal of
human nature and the subject.
In the case of Hobbes and
Mill,

an atomistic conception of the
individual prevails.

This individual inhabits a terrain populated
by self-sprung
persons whose identities are self-generated and

self-contained.

Inviolable egos such as these embody the

masculine fantasy of omnipotence and self-sufficiency.
There is, however, a steep price to be paid for the

attempted enactment of this fantasy,

for the denial of the

mother "cuts man adrift in an endless search for the origin
that he has effaced in his desire to be self-generating." 8
In Marx,

this fantasy issues in a vision of what Charles

Taylor has called "situat ionless freedom".
requires a struggle against
(inner and outer).

order governed by

a

For Mill,

it

forever threatening nature

And in Hobbes,
a

9

it

produces a civil

self-generating, but arbitrary (because

ontologically ungrounded) authority.

(Here we have a

classic instance of 'having one's cake and eating it too':
even as he eliminates the mother, he wants to re-introduce

precisely her own ability to provide generational
continuity.)

Hobbes's and Mill's individuals are defined

essentially in terms of rights which are negotiated
contractually.
life.

Marx,

Such rights are the essence of political

on the other hand,

of the individual.

invokes a social conception

His individual is not pre-const ituted

rather, he is a complex ensemble of his social relations.
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Nonetheless, Marx's version of the
subject shares with
Hobbes's and Mill's the fantasy of
self-creation.
In

Marx's hands, the fantasy is more
complex and attractive;
nonetheless it is housed within a frame that
cannot abide
the complexities of social and carnal
vulnerability.

This

orientation is given full sway in his vision of
communism.
It is also at the heart of his voluntarist
conception of

labor
We are also in a position to appreciate the
ways in

which effaced maternal origins have something to do with

a

plastic conception of human nature which we find

significantly developed in Marx and Mill.

(Hobbes's

description of human nature, on the other hand, is simply
radically under-described.)

While Marx stressed the "man

makes himself" version of this conception, Mill's

behaviorism moved him to focus on social influences as the
significant determinants of human identity, motivation and
potential.

Each version promotes an ontological emptiness

that flies in the face of an original securing of the self
vis a vis our primordial caretaker.

Each version makes it

particularly difficult to address the question of human
needs

^
.

In this study,

we have also explored the relationship

between masculinity and intellectual style.

Hobbes is the

most virile of the three, having cast himself as an epic

hero fighting dangerous battles.

Marx's style is also
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notably combative and aggressive.

Mill's aggression is the

more sublimated, cloaked under the veneer
of Victorian

gentlemanly rationality.

It too,

however,

tends toward an

arrogant and pre-emptive posture and is employed
as
of weapon with which to rout out foes.

kind

a

Within Mill's

scheme, disagreements signal a breakdown in
rational

discourse,

since rational method presumably points to the

correct solution.

Those who disagree with Mill are cast

aside as "unenlightened" or as "irrational", which means

less-than-fully-civilized.

This style is perhaps the most

insidious of the three.

Epistemology and method have also been explored with

a

view to searching for gender-specific components of

political theory.

Mill's methodological individualism is

the clearest and most extreme expression of a masculine

epistemological orientation, since it recapitulates, in

nearly classic form, a stereotypical masculine subject, one
with clearly demarcated ego boundaries and tidy

transactional relations with other similarly constructed
subjects.

Within such

a world,

methodological

individualism makes perfect sense.

The reconstruction of

social phenomena as the products of the quantitatively

reduced and simplified processes of cause and effect

is

theoretically attainable within an environment populated by
"individual men".

Hobbes's geometry-inspired political

science was an earlier version of the same thing, enhanced

and simplified by his nominalism.

course,

is quite different.

it

Marx's method, of

is aimed at understanding
a

complex system of relations which
also constitute the
"objects" within it.
This is very different from a
"scientific" approach to pre-cons
tituted objects who
subsequently engage in social relations.
Like Hobbes, Marx
is a conflict theorist, although
the language he uses
to

describe and understand conflict is
radically different.
Within Hobbes 's scheme, conflict is a
necessary by-product
of social relations:

human beings bump up against each

other in competitive movement towards
necessarily scarce
objects of desire. For Marx, on the other
hand, conflict
inheres in social reality itself.

The very relational

constitution of human beings presupposes contradictions,
whether latent or manifest.

Masculinity is exhibited in

Marx's account via the dichotomous rendition of class
relations that he presents.

Hobbes

's

The self-other opposition of

state of nature, where every ego is the Self, and

all others are the Other,

is transposed in Marx's account

into one grand Self-Other conflict, proletariat on one
side, bourgeoisie on the other.

Marx suggested, of course,

that the bourgeois ideologues had it backwards.

That is,

that their privileged identity was historically illusory.

His alternative account, however, recapitulates the

dichotomous contrast and anticipates its eventual

resolution as

a

one-sided unconditional victory.

ironically, Marx's futuristic
visioning fails to accomodate
the very dialectical interplay
that is so compelling in his
account of capitalism.
Between the historical transcendence
of class, politics and necessity,
he has left exceedingly
little for the dialectic to get its
hands on.

Marx and Hobbes share

a

distinctive and important

impulse which is rooted in their ultra-conf
li ctual accounts
of society.
Each projects a future and desirable order
which is remarkably conflict-free. Citizens
of the

Leviathan hand over their capacities for conflict
to the
supreme civil authority in exchange for peace and
stability.

In Marx's vision,

future comrades labor

creatively and cooperatively with no State hovering above
them.

Their relationship to society is thoroughly

unproblematic.

And whatever problematic relationship to

nature still exists, because of "her" recalcitrance, has

been reduced to

a

minimum.

We can understand these

theoretical projections, in part, as a psychological
response to the anxiety produced by incessant conflict.

An

indefinite future of Civil Wars or class struggle would be

psychically unbearable for anybody.

While Marx and Hobbes

had the "guts" to face up to the conflict of their times,
they were human enough to need and to construct an exit.
But the unreal and impoverished cast of their alternative

solutions suggests that the original formulations of the

problem were skewed.

And we are in a position now to
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appreciate the possibility that such
distortions might be
based to some degree on gender-specific
perceptions.
As the epigrams and quotes which head
up chapters III,
IV and V were selected to suggest,

each theorist would

appear to be aiming for human comprehensiveness
in his
work.

Such comprehensiveness,

in fact,

is

invoked as a

criterion for the truth and adequacy of each theory.
Hobbes believes that his theory of human nature
can be

cross-checked and verified by any who take time to reflect

honestly on their motivations, desires, passions and
behaviors.

Mill criticizes his Utilitarian predecessors

for having an overly limited view of their human subjects

and he suggests that we must be open to the partial and

often hidden views of differently situated individuals.

He

invokes, among other things, wealth, age and sex in making

his argument.

Marx believes that he has finally founded

comprehensive social theory by treating class as

a

a

significant constituent of knowledge, interests and power.
His insight into the necessary connections between social

relations and intellectual "wealth" is both compelling and
ironic, given his failure to appreciate the ways in which

women of his time were differentially embedded in social
relations.

Yet,

none of these theorists seems to be aware

of his sex and his gender as possible constituents of his

thought.

They have all failed to fulfill one of their own

criteria for "good" social theory.

This is not simply

because women are effectively
written out of these
accounts.
At a more profound level, the
"forgotten self"
of political theory is the
masculine self.
Each theorist embodies Freud's
description of the boy
who finds it self-evident that "a
genital like his own is
to be attributed to everyone he
knows." This "phallic
prerogative" serves, in the case of Hobbes,
to write women
out of his account of the state of
nature and civil

society.

In the case of Mill,

assimilates women to

it

itself in the form of liberal feminism.
in a failure to understand labor

fully,

In Marx,

it

issues

along with a

replication of a sexual division of labor which will not
and cannot acknowledge "women's work" even as
it legislates
it.

To the extent that Marx's "materialist" theory fails

to engage with the complex substratum of necessity in
human

affairs and relations,

it

fails dismally both as an account

of extant social reality and as a proposal for revolution.

But the problem here is not simply women's absence as

gendered and sex-specific persons.

For this absence is

orchestrated by the silent presumption that masculinity
the norm.

is

To bring women back in to political theory

requires also that we "bring men back in."
as the sociologist David Morgan has written,

To do this is,
"to take

gender seriously." 11
Each of the theorists studied here exemplifies the

"problem of difference" explored in chapter

I.

On the one

hand,

each may be charged guilty for
having taken it for
granted.
That is, each theorist replicates,
unself-

consciously,

features of his social environment and

intellectual inheritance which are built on
presumptions of
sexual difference.
On the other hand, each fails to

appreciate the ways in which "difference" puts
pressure on
his assumptions and formulations concerning
"human"

requirements and possibilities.
I

As the argument in chapter

was designed to suggest, women's "otherness" is
not

sim P 1 Y the false positing of a women's nature which can
be

rectified by policy changes,
language.

"role" switches and non-sexist

It is also a "true" characterization of women's

experiences in male-dominated, gender-differentiated
society, secured by centuries of differential activities

and interests.

At this point in Western history,

"difference" is something other and more than an

inconvenient and unwanted skin which "liberated" men and

women can shed with some good old-fashioned will power a la
Mill.

It is part of the very fabric of culture,

structure, subjectivity and identity.

social

Identity itself is

constructed on the terrain and with the materials of gender
differences.

I

would like to suggest, along the lines of

some of the French feminists (see Appendix B), that

"difference" preserves some critical counter truths.
this is a difference that must reappropr iated with a
twist.

Shoshana Felman has put it this way:

But
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Defined by man, the conventional
polarity of masculine
*
and feminine names woman as a
metaphor
of man
The rhetorical hierarchizat
ion-oTt^vSFy-^s i t ion
between the sexes is then such
that woman'
nee
bSlng t0tallY subs ^ed by the referent
of the
?hf feminine to masculine identity. 12

affi

On this view, attempts to write
difference out of political
theory should be as suspect as efforts
to reinvigorate it
as a reflecting metaphor for
masculinity.

Hence, Mill's

feminism is disturbing not simply because
it is

feminism (i.e.,

it

a

limited

fails to engage with the evident needs

of working class women), but because it
offers emancipation
in exchange for female-feminine specificity.

Such an

exchange is wildly premature and full of problems.

At this

historical point, what it offers is nothing other than the
legitimated imposition of the phallic prerogative.

Masculinity as Ideology
Graeme Duncan's reflections on social theory provide an

especially helpful way of initially situating this

discussion of masculinity as ideology:
My own belief ... is that it is impossible to
produce a substantial social theory which is free of
prejudice, and which does not rest upon a mass of
anticipatory and excluding decisions at different
stages along the way, including the beginning ....
Doubting that men are, or can be, sufficiently
disinterested or omniscient to see the world steadily
and see it whole, I must admit nonetheless that it is
conceivable that things will be different one day. But
hitherto the world has looked strikingly different from
the different places that men [sic] occupy in it.
It
looks different from a peasant's hut, a labourer's
tenement, an executive's split-level house, a
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president s palace, a monk's cell, or from
the various
prisons which woman has occupied historically.
These
differences of vision, which are not related
solely
to
wealth or social positions, should be at
least
n9 t0 bullies and dogmatists and bureaucrats.
S i"i*?i
And
hitherto efforts to establish one true view
of the
world have not resulted from argument,
persuation and
imaginative endeavor, but from the readiness of
men--perhaps under the guidance of the gods, or certain
of some
political fantasy— to impose their will on the
remainder 1
Duncan's comments are intended to remind us of two
important things about social theory:

its inevitable

partiality and its embeddedness within particular locations
which yield particular outlooks.

If the world looks

"strikingly different from the different places that men

occupy in it," it must also look strikingly different from
the different places that men and women occupy in it.

And

the "places" that we inhabit are not just (1) the places of
labor,

leisure,

family life and social relations; we must

also consider the terrain of gender identity itself as

differentiated territory.

The very ways in which that

"space" and its inhabitants are constructed and perceived
is different.

Masculine space is open and uncluttered;

more often than not,

it

hierarchical terms.

Feminine space is web-like,

is structured in linear

by diverse cross-currents of affiliation. 14

inhabited

The

masculine ego is well-defined and has an interest in

protecting his boundaries from violations.

The feminine

ego is more amorphous, complexly embedded in relationships
that tend to obscure a singular sense of self.

A final

comment on Duncan's assessment
of social theory:
thus far,
efforts to establish "one true
view" have been the efforts'
of men.
This phenomenon may be
understood as something
more than a reflection of the
fact that up until now, at
least, privileged men have been
the only persons in a
position to attempt such an imposition
of the will.

That

is,

masculine gender identity already
contains a predisposition to behave in this way. Acton's
characterization
of power
"absolute power corrupts absolutely "
—might

—

require some gender-specific modification. 15
In Chapter II

made a promissory claim concerning
the

I

notion of 'masculinity as world view' which
should by now
have been made good, or nearly so.
I have chosen to
utilize and defend this notion for several
reasons.
I

First,

want to argue that masculinity, understood in
ideal-type

terms, has a characteristic structure,

that it is something

more than a vaguely defined sense of identity with some
kind of unspecified relationship to or effect on political
theory.

Secondly,

I

want to underscore the (potential)

ubiquity of masculinity in modern western political
thought.

While that is

a

claim that extends beyond the

limited scope of this analysis, it is

seriously for future study.

a

claim worth taking

The notion of masculinity as

world view may be of analytic help to those who decide to

explore the question of this ubiquity in greater detail.

The notion of masculinity as
world view also raises
some important (although tentative)
critical questions
about the historical and thematic per
iodizat ion of

political theory.

if a masculine world view is found
in

the works of political theorists other
than those examined
here, what will or should the criteria
be for

distinguishing them from each other?

If those feminists

working in history have begun to notice that each
newly
"progressive" era in West has found more potent means for

dominating women, what does this suggest for our
understanding of the history of political and social
theory? 16

Such questions might also have a significant

bearing on our framing of the "problem of modernity".

To

the extent that modernity is tied up with the ethos of

"self-assertion", with the problems of the "self-made man",
is it a problem for women?

in this form?

Might it be

Do women experience modernity
a

masculine problematic?

Would

thinking along these lines enable us to understand it any
better?

17

Returning now to the issue of masculinity as world
view,

we must be able to identity, however crudely, a

subset of beliefs, attitudes and goals which characterize

masculinity as

a world view.

I

offer the following

schemat i zation, with a caveat that must be taken
seriously.

It is this:

I

have argued against the

reduct ioni st ic tendency to presume that gender translates
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automatically into the substance and style
of thinking in
political theory.
Instead, I have invoked gender as an
irreducible ground of thinking and cognition,
but as a

ground which may and has been mediated in
a variety of
ways.

The prescriptions of gender are also,

in many ways,

impossible and internally inconsistent prescriptions. 18
This approach mitigates against any kind of
extensive and

neat list-making.

When we "look" for masculinity in

political theory, we must proceed with a "feeling for"
"the

idiosyncratic vocabulary of the inner man" which has been

translated into public language. 19

This is very

different from proceeding with a checklist of masculine
attributes to match up against the texts with which we are
working.

With this cautionary note in mind,

I

would offer

the following as general attributes of masculine ideology

on the basis of my work with Hobbes, J.S. Mill and Marx:
1)

Mothers do not, as a rule, exist for the purposes

of political theory; neither do the activities

associated with biological reproduction.
2)

The human subject is a male-masculine (just like

me)

subject.

3)

Life is a struggle between usually conflicting

persons and goals and in relation to a recalcitrant and
often hostile nature.
4)

Thinking is adversarial and takes place in relation

to a resistant reality and fellow adversarial

thinkers.

There are many ways of breaking down
this

resistance:

we can rearrange the parts of reality
to

reconstruct cause-effect relations; we can
peel away
the levels of appearances to find reality
underneath.

Those who fail to see reality as
or corrupt.

In either case,

I

do are either stupid

they are dangerous and

must be opposed.
The point of life is to minimize human dependence

5)

on nature and fellow human beings.

To the extent that

we can achieve this, we are actualizing our humanity.
I

have sought to show that these elements are widely shared

between Hobbes, Mill and Marx, although diversely and
specifically articulated by each theorist, and that they
are systematically interconnected.

Their common point of

origin is located in the acquisition of a masculine
identity vis a vis the (m)other.

I

have also argued,

in

each chapter and in the opening pages of this concluding
chapter, that these elements of masculine ideology are

central to the conceptual schemes of each theorist, and
that they have a wide and deep influence on their

theories.

Finally,

there is no need to belabor the obvious

centrality of these elements to important issues of human
life and to metaphysical issues.

Hobbes'

s

They are at the core of

conception of civil society, Marx's view of labor,

and Mill's view of liberal democracy.
In this work,

I

have tried to demonstrate that the

construction of socio-political
problems and their
solutions by Hobbes, Marx and Mill
rests on an

anthropological foundation that is
identifiable masculine.
Each theorist works with a "cherished
conception of the
self

which imbibes aspects of masculine
identity.

While these aspects are elaborated in
significantly

different ways, we can also understand them
as elements of
the same multifaceted frame.

The point of such an analysis

is not to lump each theorist together
into an

undifferentiated collection of "masculine thinkers".
a

move erases more than it reveals.

Such

On the other hand,

it

is plausible to suggest that the concept of
"masculine

ideology" enables us to understand them simultaneously as

distinct thinkers partaking in a discursive substratum
i.e.,

a

,

kind of pre-consc ious conversation with its own

necessary and limiting horizon.

I

have attempted to bring

this discourse to the surface of consciousness.

In effect,

we can appreciate the uniqueness of each theorist in the

new light that is cast by the suggestion that they also

share a set of similar concerns which evolve out of

preoccupation with the health and well-being of

a

a

masculine

subject who, as such, is located in the world in specific
ways.

We can also begin to chart the deficiencies of each

theorist's work with respect to these shared, if

differently elaborated, concerns.

Such a critique proceeds

out of a different ontological experience or standpoint,
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that of women.

A.

Different Reality 21

The self-other opposition is, as
we have seen, central
to the construction of masculine
identity and deeply
implicated in the dichotomies of
post-Enlightenment Western
22
philosophical thought.
"The construction
of the self

in opposition to another who threatens
one's very

being" 23 cannot help but be felt in an
intellectual

tradition inhabited predominantly be men.

How might

feminine "difference" be invoked in critical contrast
to
the intellectual constructs of masculinity?

An obvious

starting point is in the process of feminine identity

acquisition where "girls form their self-concepts in large
part through identification with their first significant
other (s) who share the same socially defined possibilities
of a female body." 24

A likely result of this experience

is that "the self-other distinction is neither symbolized

by a distinction between the sexes, nor does it involve the

assumption that the self and the other possess opposing
characteristics." 25

Instead, argues Carolyn Whitbeck,

the daughter-mother relationship unfolds between beings who

are in some important sense analogous.

This provides

a

very different starting point for cognitive development,
one that is relations-based and which must subsequently be
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concerned with the scope and limits
of the analogy

between

the self and the other rather than
with questions of
identity and difference, strictly
conceived.
An

understanding of differentiation that does
not require
strict opposition could be characterized
as "a

multifactorial interactive model." 26
Some would argue that this early
psychological

experience provides a different ontological ground,
one
that enables a seeing of the Other as "distinct
and

different in some respects" without being an opposite. 27

Working such an ontological proposal out is quite
difficult, however:
The difficulty is that the terminology in which the new
ontology is to be articulated is automatically
interpreted in terms of the accepted ontology, so that
one is always at the risk of having one's statements
construed either as nonsense, or as a quaint phrasing
of what are familiar truths according to the old
ontology. 28
If this alternative feminist ontology is taken as a

mirror- image of the masculine one, nothing will have been
gained.

A mirror image conception would maintain the

originally problematic masculine cognitive structure;
furthermore,

its "alternative"

form of cognition and

rationality would be unable to provide limiting or

distinguishing criteria.

That is, all differentiation

would become "mushed out" into one giant undifferentiated

agglomeration.

A preserving of the notion of

differentiation, along with the introduction of the notion

of analogous thinking processes,
provides instead a

dl££erent Process of differentiation,
rather than the
"alternative" of no differentiation at all.
To argue for and attempt to delineate
an alternative

ontological ground along these lines is by no means
to
confine such an experience to women (or to assume

that all

women experience it and know it):

Although a certain history of relationships may incline
a person to seek out other relationships
and practices
that embody a similar ontological outlook, people may
become convinced of the superiority of a particular
ontology and seek the relationships and practices
consistent with that view. 29
Sara Ruddick has made a similar point in her discussion of

maternal thinking. 30

Whitbeck's initial effort to explore
ontology" is echoed in Isaac Balbus

'

s

a

"different

notion of

a

"post-instrumental" mode of symbolization, where our
relations to others and to nature are no longer
objectified, but partake of a mutual recognition of shared
and differentiated subjectivities.

Significantly, each

attempt is rooted in an analysis of the unfolding

self-other relation in infancy and early childhood.
"Thinking," writes Jane Flax,

"is a form of activity which

cannot be treated in isolation from other forms of human
activity,

including the forms of human activity which in

,31
turn shape the humans who think."

When we consider

such "shaping activities", parenting and early

socialization come immediately to mind.
"Difference" may also be explored on
the adult terrain
of reproduction and labor.
Mary O'Brien has made a cogent
argument for gender-differentiated
reproductive experience
and consciousness, which is implicated
in our sense of
time, history and bodily consciousness. 32

Significantly,

the sex- and gender-differentiated
aspects of this

experience seem to recapitulate and reinforce
the earlier
"lessons" of gender identity acquisition.
Hence,
male

reproductive consciousness, according to O'Brien, is
more
likely to center around feelings of di s-connect ion
and
alienation; subsequent efforts to "mediate" this
experience

have taken the historical form of compensatory efforts to
insure paternity.

Patriarchal versions of paternity, like

masculine gender identity, are bound up with efforts to
deny the original power of women.

Female reproductive

experience, on the other hand, partakes of biological

continuity and bodily experiences that mitigate against
dualistic classification scheme.

a

Sara Ruddick's work on

maternal thinking focuses directly on the activities of

mothering and suggests that this experience generates

particular "interests" and forms of knowledge appropriate
to those interests.

33

Interests in the preservation,

growth and acceptablity of the child generate

a

cognitive

orientation that must be flexible, humble, cheerful, and

complexly caring.

Maternal thinking is embedded in an
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environment of constant change,
generated by the inevitable
growth and maturity of children.
This reality is rarely
static or predictable.
Control is simultaneously necessary
and impossible.
It is exercized within a constantly
shifting environment, made unpredictable
by a larger social
order over which mothers have little
control, as well as by
the inevitable development of children.

Moving on to the sexual division of labor more
broadly
conceived, Dorothy Smith and Nancy Hartsock, among
others,

have argued that women's work provides a mediation
with
nature, particularity and contingency that is all too
often

hidden and presupposed within the frame of men's work:
the unity of mental and manual labor and the
directly sensuous nature of much of women's work leads
to a more profound unity of mental and manual labor,
social and natural worlds, than is experienced by the
male worker in capitalism. 34
.

.

.

Women keep house, bear, and care for children, look
after him when he is sick, and in general provide for
the logistics of his bodily existence.
But this
marriage aspect of women's work is only one side of a
more general relation. Women work in and around the
professional and managerial scene in analogous ways.
They do those things which give concrete form to the
conceptual activities. ... At almost every point,
women mediate for men the relation between the
conceptual mode of action and the actual concrete forms
on which it depends.
Women's work is interposed
between the abstracted modes and the local and
particular actualities in which they are necessarily
anchored.
Also, women's work conceals from men acting
in the abstract mode just this anchorage. 3 ^
These and many other efforts provide an elaboration of
"difference" with the intent not simply of documenting

women's heretofore hidden activities and interests, but of

bringing these to bear on dominant
and often malemonopolized practices and interests.
Muriel Rukeyser
provided a poetic intuition of the likely
results

of such

an interchange.

"The world would split open" because,
as

currently constituted, masculine paradigms

it is

prevail. 36
.

,

These paradigms are called into critical

question by the varieties of expression of
the "human
condition" elicited by female experience. But
Rukeyser

's

poem also imagines that a woman is able to "tell
the truth
about her life". As such, she must have access
to
and be

able to use the tools of truth-telling:

language, of

course, but more specifically, concepts which are capable
of conveying the rich and "messy" complexity of her

experience.

concepts." 37

"Womanly thinking" requires "womanly
Such concepts, of course, have not been

readily at hand for women entering previously male-defined
and inhabited disciplines.

Those of us working in

political and social theory are in the midst of the
difficult and exciting work of re-thinking the conceptual

apparatus we have inherited.

An understanding of the

connections between gender and modern political thought
suggests that such
immense.

a

task is simultaneously necessary and
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Politic al Theory and the Feminist
Critic;
What Should Po litical Theory
Really Be Now?
If masculine gender is in
fact a significant,

but

hidden, constituent feature of
the discourse of modern
western political theory, this suggests
that efforts to
re-right the sexual imbalance in political
theory cannot
and should not be elaborated by simply
adding women to that

discourse.

For a discourse,

in the Foucauldian sense,

is

"like a conversation in which utterances
are abstracted
from particular participants located in
particular

spatio-temporal settings." 38

And men and women,

as

gendered subjects, are located in different settings
even
as they are differentially located within similar

settings.

This is true not simply of the places they

inhabit, but also of the introjected object-settings that

constitute gendered identity itself.

Much more than

a

simple acknowledgement of women's existence and presence is
called for.
women,

For our existence,

identity and outlook as

as gender-specific subjects,

is simultaneously

denied by and threatening to academic discourse.

Women who have or who are attempting to settle on the
academic terrain have tended to do so in one of two ways:
They have repudiated their identities as women, as sex- and

gender-specific subjects, to become 'one of the boys*.
they have settled on the fringes of the territory, as

Or,
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rabble-rousers, weirdos, harpies.

Such women are often

seen as lacking in "professional"
discipline, commitments,
capacities, and "colleagiali ty"
Those who attempt to
avoid either location often settle
on a "line of fault",
.

marked by "a disjuncture between
experience and the forms
in which experience is socially
expressed." 39
The

dilemma is this:

in adopting the discourse of the academic

disciplines, we are often forced to give up our
identities
as women;

in failing to adopt the "talk"

(along with the

"walk") our identity as intellectuals is threatened.

There was, we discovered, a circle effect --men attend
to and treat as significant what men say and have
said.
The circle extends back in time and as far as
our records reach. What men were doing has been
relevant to men, was written by men about men for men.
Men listened and men listen to what one another say. A
tradition is formed, traditions form, in a discourse
with the past within the present. The themes,
problematics, assumptions, metaphors, and images form
as the circle of those present draws upon the work of
those speaking from the past and builds it up to
project it into the future. From this circle women
have been almost entirely excluded. When admitted, it
has been only by special license, and as individuals,
never as representatives of their sex. They could
share in this circle only by receiving its terms and
relevances. These have been and still are to a large
extent the terms and relevances of a discourse among
men 40
.

The impersonal mode of academia simultaneously masks
the gendered voices of its male practitioners as it confers

"abstract" and "impersonal" legitimacy of them. 41

As a

result, women in academia often find themselves on unsteady

ground,

threatened on one side by their delegit imizat ion as

intellectuals and on the other by their
attempts to work
with a "forced set of categories
into which we must stuff
the awkward and resistant actualities
of our world." 42
Attempts to articulate female experience
take place on this
fault line.
It is a mode of inquiry which
is

simultaneously hazardous, necessary and promising.

The

hazards consist not simply in the threat of
intellectual
de-legitimization, but also in the unwary adoption
of

disciplinary agendas which already constitute their
universes of observation. 43
_

The promises of such inquiry

exist not only for women but also for the critical

self-reflection of men and the disciplines themselves.

In

"disrupting the transparency and misleadingly self-evident

universality of its male enunciation,

1,44

attempts to

articulate female experiences are highlighting the
taken-f or-granted location of academic disciplines and

discourses in

a space of male

experience.

Hence:

The critic who intrudes into the father-son dialogue as
a female, that unholy ghost who would display the
strategies of the patristic heritage and dispel the
magic of men's naming, necessarily speaks as a
di ss ident 45
.

The necessity for such an inquiry, considered in terms
of the dissident female academic in political theory, may

be adduced by reflecting on Norman Jacobson's

characterization of "great" political theory:
the genuis of all great political thinkers is to
make public that which is of private concern, to
translate into public language the more special,
.

.

.

™
arrTvTn^^
arriving at public
10

Cabul * r y of the inner man in hopes
of
solutions which might
then
cnen be
De
y
internalized by each of us. 46

To deal with matters of private concern
and experience

which might illuminate political problems
and dilemmas,
within the context of a discourse that can not

admit to its

own gender-specific texture,

endeavor

is a nearly impossible

47

One of the foremost obstacles confronting the
feminist

dissident in political theory is the likely perception
that
her work is illegitimate because it raises concerns and
issues that could not possibly have been available to the

theorists she is reassessing.

historical embeddedness is

a

The methodological appeal to

powerful one, for it cautions

against the violation of the integrity of the political
theorist as a historically and culturally embedded
subject.

As feminists, we are (or should be) sensitive to

issues such as these,

for they call on the capacities for

empathy, respect and imaginative projection that women are
all too well versed in.

On the other hand, to imagine that

we can ever fully enter a strange and different time or

place contains a touch of abstract, disembodied arrogance.
"For we bring ourselves with us wherever we go; we cannot

ever deliberately forget the voices that have become

internally persuasive'."
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We cannot, in other words,

deny or dodge the life that we have with various works.
For it is this, along with our preoccupation with

3
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contemporary political and social issues,
that marks the
temper of political theory in the
present.
In reading the
classics of political theory as women
and

as feminists, we

need to embrace "the work as a whole—
the complete

imaginative offering, the experience the work
makes

possible for us." 49

This is a move beyond the earlier

one of documenting "instances" of sexism.

It gets us into

the heart of the political imagination in the
West.

And we

are entitled to search for and to identify "failures
of the

imagination", particularly when such failures continue to

constitute timely ideological differences that carry
significant import for the political fates of human
beings.

Certainly, we are entitled to read these works as

women rather than as abstract intellects.

The difference

between this activity and what men in the tradition have
been doing all along is simply that, until recently, we
have been eavesdroppers on a conversation that was not
meant for us, even as it affected us.

Freedom from male hegemony,

I

believe, cannot proceed

without reference to the languages and discourses we have
inherited.

Our freedom from the interpretations of the

past depends on our freedom to reinterpret the past."^
The rei nterpretat ion of the Western political imagination
is a vast project.

Such a re-thinking will come,

in part,

through re-interpretive efforts, along with attention to

human practices, desires, needs and possibilities that have
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been unjustly ignored:

.little can be contributed by disassociating
ourselves from what have been women's
practices, and
the women engaged in them, since we
will then either
ignore those practices or inadvertently
false account that masculinist culture perpetuate the
gives of
D1
.

.

them.

A simultaneous focus on women's practices and
the inherited
discourse of political theory may help us to
resist the

prevailing tendency "to deny the existence of the
other to
a greater or lesser degree or to make
any existing
other

into the self."
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This tendency, of course,

ramifies not

simply on women in the West, but on a host of other
peoples
and cultures besides our own, as well as on variously

oppressed males in our culture.

It is also a tendency that

must be resisted by white middle- and upper-class women who
are less prepared than they should be to listen seriously
to what women of other classes,

backgrounds have to say. 53

races, and cultural

Finally, the denial and

appropriation of the other would also seem to constitute
the destructive and suicidal tragectory of western

modernity itself.

To the extent that a vigorous feminist

re-invocation of "difference" in the name of the "other" is
promoted,

feminism promises a critical re-thinking of the

post-Enlightenment legacy to which political theory is heir.
If,

as Charles Taylor has said,

political theory boils

down to efforts to answer the (deceptively simple)
question,

"What is really happening in society?"
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then

the absence of and failure to
acknowledge female voices in
modern western political theory
is an issue of fundamental
importance.
And the question of whether
political theory
can account for existing practices
must open even further
to the question of the repertoire
of practices that fall
within our field of vision as political
theorists. A
recent collection of timely new writings
in political
theory, entitled What Should Political
Theory Be Now?

contains nothing which is by or substantially
about
55
women.
"Political theory", it would seem, is not
overly preoccupied with women. Feminists,
however, must be
more generous; we cannot afford a reciprocal
attitude.
In the immediate short run,

the aim of this work has

been to substantiate in greater depth and with more detail
feminist intimations that Western political theory is
masculinist.

The longer range aim of this work, one that

requires a fairly thorough interpretive "airing out" before
it can be enacted,

is to contribute to efforts to provide a

conceptual home for women
stressed

— within

— all

women,

it must be

the enterprise of political theory.

an effort will be a long time in the making.

Such

In the

meantime, we must insist on the vital significance of

"difference".

Otherwise we capitulate to a politics of

sameness, which is a capitulation to the politics of

masculini ty
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APPENDIX

A

GENDER AND PSYCHO-HISTORY

In the absence of vigilant
care and critical

discrimination in its application, the
interpretive approach
developed here is susceptible to a
number of dangerous
abuses and significant criticisms
related to such abuses.
The dangers derive primarily from

1)

problems attending the

cross-disciplinary application of psychoanalytic
theory,
and

methodological issues within history and
anthropology
concerning trans-historical and cross-cultural
applications
of contemporary notions of gender.
These problems
2)

will be

explored below in the effort to anticipate potential
cogent
criticisms of this work and to provide as rigorous a
model
of interpretation as possible.

Psychoanalysis has frequently been called to task for
its reductionistic and over-determined view of childhood

experiences, especially those relating to sexuality.

One

of the greatest abuses of which the psychoanalytic method
is

susceptible is the production of "seamless web" types of

explanation, which purport to account for nearly every
aspect of culture and social life (individual and

collective) in early psycho-dynamic terms.

Hence,

revolutions can be characterized as revolts against the

Oedipal father by jealous sons and works of art are
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susceptible to interpretation strictly
in terms of their
unconscious or sublimated contents.
Because its subject
matter— a psyche that is neither wholly
conscious

to itself

nor subject to prevailing standards of
rationality— is

simultaneously elusive and widely applicable
to a vast
array of human activities and concerns,
psychoanalysis
could conceivably be used to account for everything,
from
the arena of the bedroom,

economic marketplace.

to those of the battlefield and

Furthermore, objections to

psychoanalytic interpretations of social phenomena can be
written off in therapeutic terms as instances of "denial".
This, of course,

leaves the critic thoroughly boxed in.

Such reductionism is made possible within a frame of

explanation which accords, rightfully

I

believe, special

importance to early patterns of experience and their

rendering into meaningful but unconscious memories which we
may unwittingly repeat and re-experience.

It is

unfortunate that the dangers of reductionism accompany
those features of psychoanalytic theory which also make it
an exciting, expansive, and insight-producing approach.
in the case of Marx,

As

Freud's theory has simultaneously

provided the tools for expanded critical analysis and
fetishized social theory.

Critical social theorists must

learn to appreciate and insist on the difference.
The difference,

I

would suggest, consists in the claims

made within various explanations regarding the range and

focus of their explanatory
power.

it is one thing,

for

example,

to argue that the
international nuclear arms
buildup can be thoroughly
captured within a frame of

explanation that focuses on little
boys' needs to
demonstrate their phallic powers.
it is quite another
thing, however, to point out
that the arms race may contain
traces of this phenomenon, or
that it is partially
constituted in these terms. 1
Recent and important critiques
have surfaced with
regard to the current emphasis of
object-relations theory
on pre-Oedipal experiences, which
are even more elusive,
more likely to be deeply situated
in the remoter regions of
the unconscious, than the Oedipal
dynamics of orthodox
Freudian theory. Dinnerstein s analysis
is especially
1

susceptible to charges of reductionism and
over-determinism
because it moves rather fluidly between
different levels
and arenas of social life.
Her vivid rendition
of the

Kleinian version of the neonate's early relationship
to the
mother and of the dramatic breakup of symbiotic
unity
is

often rapidly transposed into the dynamics of adult

heterosexual relationships, and the anti-ecological and

pro-militaristic posturings of male political leadership.
Critics are correct to be wary of an overly neat
transposition, such that adult life and culture are nothing
but re-enactments of pre-Oedipal dramas. 2

Such an

account is unnecessarily static and pessimistic:

it grants

little in the way of active
mediation on the part of adults
and children who are clearly
more than overgrown infants,
it detracts attention from
soc io-structural phenomena, and
it fails to provide a plausible
analysis of change. 3
The simiplified excesses of
psychoanalyt ically-based
explanations warrant the critical scrutiny
and skepticism
they have received.
Such criticism, however, should not
detract attention from the important place
that

psychoanalysis occupies in social theory.

In providing an

entree to questions of latent meaning and
complex

psychological processes, psychoanalysis has a unique and
important role in contemporary efforts to understand
human

activities as fully as possible.

While we cannot abide

psychological reduct ionism, we cannot do without

psychoanalysis as a rich, if partial, source of speculative
and reconstructive efforts to interpret the human drama in
all of its complexity.
For the purposes of this study, which include the

effort to understand

a

portion of what might be termed "the

unconscious" of political theory, 4 psychoanalysis is an

indispensable tool of analysis.

This interpretive effort

is by no means intended to be exhaustive or inclusive.

do not claim to be offering a preemptive analysis which

supercedes all others.

I

do, however,

argue that gender

can be appropriately invoked as an interest-base and

ideological foundation in the historical elaboration of

I
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political theory; that it is not
incidental to the style
and content of discourses which
are materially produced and
situated in genderically
differentiated societies.
In
short, I argue that the study
of political theory can be
usefully enriched through an
interpretive effort which is
focused on gender and, as such,
requires the conceptual
tools provided by psychoanalysis.
Aside from the critique of psychological
reduct ionism,
which I will make every effort to avoid,
the analysis of

masculinity as ideology is subject to another
major
critical onslought, one that has also been
levelled against
psycho-history. Because my analysis includes
recourse

to a

thinker historically situated in pre-contemporary
times,

while it relies on a fairly contemporary version
and

understanding of gender identity,

I

am obliged to assume

the burden of defense against existing criticisms of

psychohi story

.

However, because my study begins with

Hobbes and is therefore situated entirely within the frame
of the modern political theory tradition in the West, the

burden of proof here is not enormous.

Nonetheless, many of

the issues at stake in the disputes surrounding psycho-

history bear in significant ways on the methodological
tenets of this study.
The historical troublespots associated with the study
of gender and psychoanalytic conceptions of psychodynamic

processes derive from

1)

the fragmentary and incomplete
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nature of historical accounts of
pre-industr ial social life
in the West, and 2) epistemological
disputes within the
disciplines of history and anthropology
having to do with
the study of the "di f f erentness - of
distant persons and
cultures.
Each of these problems will be treated
in turn.

While Freudian and post-Freudian analyses of
modern
versions of gender identity root their material
in the

dynamics of contemporary nuclear family life, to
which
social analysts have ample research access, many
features
of pre-industrial Western life have been lost to
historical

scrutiny.

5

The paucity of information regarding the

everyday life of the non-elite and illiterate masses of the
West is astounding.

Notably missing are rich and reliable

accounts of the lives of women and children, as well as
illiterate men who, until recently, were in no position to

contribute to the official historical record.

That a

historian with the credentials and resources of Peter
Laslett cannot definitively answer the question as to
whether starvation was a significant factor in the lives of

England's pre-industrial masses is illustrative of how much
we do not know about the basic existence of our ancestors

only a few centuries back.

The same observation holds for

questions concerning the emotional everyday lives of the

pre-industrial masses.

Commenting on the strange

disjuncture between the evidence in paintings of masses of
children and their virtual absence in written accounts of
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pre-industrial life, Laslett writes:
These crowds and crowds of little
children are
strangely absent from the written
record
There
is something mysterious about
the silence of all these
f b
63 in armS
toddlers »nd adolescents
in
**** at that time about their °wn
experience ... we know very little indeed
about child
nurture
pre-mdustrialtimes, and no confident
promise can be made of knowledge yet to
come.

....

th^V f

'

m

One thing we can surmise from Laslett

's

awe in the face

of this mysterious absence of children
is that literate

males of the elite had little to do with them.

This

deduction, however, tells us little about qualitative

features of parent-child interaction within the
fabric of

everyday life.
however,

One small bit of relevant information,

is that women appear to have been the primary

caretakers during the early years of children's lives.
The few explicit accounts that we do have of

pre-industrial child-rearing chronicle the experiences of
the elite.

For example,

David Hunt's study of the

psychology of family life in early modern France relies
extensively on records kept of the rearing and education of
Louis XIII.

In his extensive study of The Family,

Marriage in England 1500-1800

,

Sex and

Lawrence Stone apologizes

for the weak and circumstantial evidence concerning the

lower classes, most of which he chose to eliminate from the

abridged version of his work.

What has been gleaned by

noteworthy historians of the family such as Laslett, Stone,
Shorter, Aries, and Hunt is the result of painstaking
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research, much of it in the
form of demographic data culled
from parish registers, and
careful, hesitant conjecture.
Indeed, most of what can be
confidently attributed to
pre-industrial family life in the West
applies to a
miniscule proportion of pre-industrial
populations:
the
wealthy and literate males of the
elite who had the means
and leisure to document life as they
saw it.
We have
inherited a history of self-constituting
verbal activity
which has privileged certain subjects at
the expense of

others

7

In spite of the obstacles,

research on the

pre-industrial Western family has proceeded with some
measure of success due to refined procedures of data
collection, attempts to establish an empathic connection
with the experience of illiterate peoples, 8 and the fact
that many elite practices eventually trickled down to

affect the behavior and aspirations of the emerging middle
classes.

Thanks to the pioneering work of Aries, we are

more critically cognizant of the historical specificity of

concepts of childhood and intimate family relations, which
did not even begin to emerge until the seventeenth

century.

Stone's efforts have been directed towards

establishing the historical rise of affective
individualism, and Laslett's emphasis is on the contrast

between contemporary life in mass society and the
village-bounded existence of our pre-industrial ancestors.
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Together,

these works force a critical
appraisal of the
taken-for-granted and cherished concepts
of contemporary
everyday life and discriminating care
in their

retrospective historical application.

Differences between

the medieval household, pre- and
early-industrial, and

modern families are now acknowledged as
crucial points of
contrast
The evidence for the sixteenth and
seventeenth

centuries in western Europe seems to indicate the
women
were the nurturers and rearers of children, at
least during
the early years (up to the age of 7), although
the quality
of this care was markedly different from
contemporary

versions of maternal nurturance.

As we know,

infant

mortality rates were high and children were not even
regarded as human individuals until they had survived
weaning.

9

Childhood,

if

it existed at all

in the

pre-industrial world, was an exceedingly attenuated period,
in contrast to our own version.

By the age of seven, most

children were let out as servants and apprentices to new
households.

So much for the idyllic misconception of

pre-industrual tightly knit families bound for life to
cottage, land and family.

The elite practice of sending

infants out into the countryside under the care of peasant
wet nurses and (if they were fortunate enough to survive)

putting them under the care of female nurses and male
tutors (for sons) on their return home suggests that
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parents and children of the
aristocratic classes, as well
as those of the hard-laboring
masses, had brief, sporadic
relations in comparison with our
own.

Finally,

the image
of the extended family household
has been effectively

debunked as

a

myth.

High mortality rates, the fact
that

patriarchal heads of households didn't
retire until death
claimed them, and the clear association
between getting
married and setting up an independent
household conspired
to reduce,

rather than to enhance, cross-generational

familial ties.

Life expectancy in that time also mitigaged

against the likelihood of adults ever living
long enough to
become grandparents.
In sum, the intense, affective, and

protracted relations between parents and children, which
are the hallmark of contemporary family life, comprise
a

relatively recent phenomenon in the West. 10
The same may be said about affective relations between

spouses.

Husband-wife relations within the pre-industr ial

and early modern marriage appear cold and antagonistic in

relation to our own. 11

Among the elite and emerging

middle classes, marriages were arranged on economic, social
and political grounds.

The relationship between spouses

was often reducible to the terms of a functional contract

designed to strengthen family lines, holdings, and power.
Expectations for happiness in marriage ran low and divorce
was correspondingly rare, although re-marriage rates were

high among widowers who were first-born sons and widows
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with substantial dowries.

Married men and women of the

elite spent little time together.

Once the nuptials had

been effected, thereby cementing the
economic and political
ties of the families involved, procreation
was the only

remaining function meriting serious attention.
main purpose was to provide a male heir.

Here,

the

Given the high

mortality rates of infants, exacerbated by the
practice of
sending them out to wet nurses, elite families
produced
many children in the hopes that at least one male
heir
would survive.

Since female children were an economic

liability, reproductive strategy must have been frought

with anxiety, frustration, and resentment on the part of
marriage partners.
In non-elite households that were invariably the sites

of productive activity,

spouses probably had more contact

with each other as partners in work.

Laslett describes a

typical household of 1619 in England which operated a

bakery business and was comprised of the baker, his wife,
four journeymen,

two apprentices,

two maidservants, and

three or four offspring:
The only word used at that time to describe such a
group of people was 'family'. The man at the head of
the group, the entrepreneur, the employer, or the
manager, was then known as the master or head of the
family.
He was father to some of its members and in
place of father to the rest. There was no sharp
distinction between his domestic and his economic
functions.
His wife was both his partner and his
subordinate, a partner because she ran the family, took
charge of the food, and managed the women-servants, a

According to Laslett, these patriarchal
familial relations
are "as old as the Greeks, as old
as European

history, and

not confined to Europe." 13

"subordination",

They involved the

"exploitation", and "obliteration of those

who were young, or feminine, or in
service". 14

Within
this historical setting, nearly everyone
lived his or her
life within a family— although not
necessarily in the
family of origin— that was ruled by a
patriarchal

figure.

15

Characterizing the England of 1640 as an

"association between the heads of such families,
but an

association largely confined to those who were literate,
who had wealth and status," 16 Laslett also points
out
that the "head of the poorest family was at least the
head
of something." 1
If life was largely lived within the bounds of family

and village, we must also bear in mind that "the family"
was not the privatized and emotionally resonant site that
it

is today.

Situated in and comprising a cultural milieux

radically different from that of our own mass society which
relies on a public-private distinction, household members
lived in a social world commingling labor, recreation,

biological functions, emotional and instinctual yearnings
and religious activities and sentiments in a rich tapestry
of interchange which,

to our eyes, appears as confusing,

chaotic and crowded as the roomless
dwellings they
inhabited, in and around which they worked,
slept,

fornicated, defecated, played and died.

While there is much that is strange and
different to
contemporary eyes in this account of pre-industr

ial family

life,

several features continue to strike an emotional

resonance in our own age.

The antipathy to women and

marriage on the part of men, documented most convincingly
by Hunt, persists, along with clear cut distinctions

between male and female arenas of work and social life.
And the social subordination of women to men, while less
strict and ideologically overt today, continues to

structure social organization, family life and ideology in

identifiable ways.

While some feminists have been justly

criticized for misusing the term "patriarchy" to describe
political arrangements between the sexes in modern society,
one cannot fail but be struck by what evidently seem to be
some shared parallels between the pre-industr ial and

industrial worlds or, as orthodox Marxists would have

it,

the sticky and stubborn residue of now "antiquated" social

and familial relationships.

Similarities in male dominance and the sexual division
of labor notwithstanding,

they do not translate clearly

into a historical analysis of gender.

Contemporary

theories of masculinity and femininity provide an account
of gender identity acquisition which is secured within the
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complex inter- and intra-psychic
relations of an intensely
affective white middle-class modern
family life.
As the

historical literature previously reviewed
indicates, the
private affective family binding spouse
to spouse and
parents to children, providing the environment
for

projective and introjective psychic dynamics
which

constitute the fabric of contemporary identity,
did not
emerge in significant numbers among European
populations
until the eighteenth century. Also, contemporary

psychoanalytic models of gender acquisition are embedded
within a conceptual framework that presumes a host of
related concepts which are historically suspect, even as
they are precious and central to our way of life.

include notions of ego,

These

individual identity and

personality, childhood, parenthood, and sexual needs, some
or all of which may not be trans-histor ically applicable.
It is here that the charges levelled against psychohistory

as a method that fails to deal with the unique
"di

f f erentness"

of distant peoples and cultures,

as it

uncritically projects the historically relative features of
modern life onto our images of the past, should be noted
and dealt with.

Psychohistor ians have been criticized for presuming an
immutability of human nature and social forms, a charge
that is similar and related to criticisms of the Freudian

notion of pre-social drives.

The extreme version of the
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critique of the immutability assumption
leads to a position
which argues the impossibility of
historical discovery and
interpretation.

A human nature that is presumed to
be

thoroughly mutable and totally constitued
within culture
has no cross-cultural anchor points by
which to usefully
compare, contrast and highlight different
verions of this
nature.
In its most extreme form, the mutability
thesis

yields a starkly solipsistic account that denies
the

possiblity of knowing any others aside from the self.
critics of psychohistory

,

Many

while holding firm to the version

of cultural mutability, are not willing to go
the
solipsistic route. 18 Within this frame of analysis,

solipsism is avoided by means of identifying intra-cultural
regularities which constitute and characterize particular
ways of life. 19

Leaving solipsism out of the account, the issue may be

simplified and broken down in the following way:

either

cultural differences are significant enough to influence

perceptual tendencies and thereby create human beings in
different cultures and historical periods with notably
different perceptions of themselves and the worlds they
inhabit, mitigating against the assumption of some singular

human nature; or the biological and psychological

homogeneity of culture-learning humans precludes such
differences in the monumental sense.

David Stannard

pursues the implications of the former possibility thusly:
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.if

an individual in the past did not
even
events, or other seemingly
!
objective phenomenon in the same way
as does the
modern historian, it would clearly
be a mistake to
.

.

Cei e a Person,
ff^
(1

The question of the cultural variability
of perception,
where perception is understood to be a
type of dynamic

screening process which both selects and helps
to

constitute objects of perception, including the
perceiver
as an object in relation to others,

and complex.

is

extremely important

Human beings are born into culture and are

cognitively formed by rule-governed general belief systems
that could be characterized as paradigm-like, much as
they

are formed by those language systems which significantly

constitute and express their beliefs and desires.

characterization need not entail

This

a tabula rasa model of

development, unless one begins with the presumption of a
strict nature-culture division.

In this case,

culture can

be granted its formative role only in the absence of

natural

'constraints'.

If,

however,

the development of the

human species and of individuals within that species is
understood as the product of a complex and mutural
interaction between natural and cultural factors, which are

vitally interrelated, then the search for pre-cultural
humanity, based on the notion that the rules governing

particular cultures are purely arbitrary artifacts,
impositions and distortions of an underlying human nature,
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is as misplaced as the denial
of any substratum of human

nature and its cultural articulation
and elaboration. 21
As Clifford Geertz has argued,

"what man [sic] is may

be so entagled with where he [sic]
is, and what he [sic]
believes, that it is inseparable from them." 22
The

rejection of what he has termed the "uniformi
tarian view of
man" has tended to result in extreme posturings
within
social science of cultural relativism.
It is possible,
however, to maneuver a more sophisticated and
appropriate

path through this material which avoids the joint
mistakes
and implications of relativism and an overly socialized
account of the human subject. 23

On Geertz'

s

view,

such a

method proceeds "by seeking in culture patterns themselves
the defining elements of a human existence which although

not constant in expression, are yet distinctive in

character."

As the link between innate capacities,

general predispositions, actual behaviors and elaborated
meanings, culture provides the means for the study of human

beings who necessarily complete themselves, in varied and

particular ways, through rule-governed interpretive
activity.

On this view, the search for "bloodless

universals" or the Everyman is as misplaced as the notion
that cultures stand on their own as discrete entities which

cannot be compared to each other because they have
'produced' human beings who are as different as night and

day
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An epistemological and ontological
stance such as
Geertz's provides the most helpful and
appropriate

orientation to the study of "di f f erentness
"

,

although it

does not provide a methodological blueprint
for the study
of diverse cultures.
Such a blueprint, in any case, is not
on Geertz's agenda. We can now return to family
history
for an exploratory look at what this suggests
for our

interpretation of that history and its implications for the
study of gender.
In reading the historical studies provided by Stone,

Laslett, Aries and others, we are immediately drawn to

their insistent renditions of the essentially di

sorts of lives lived by humans in the past.
then venture to ask,

"how different?"

f f erent

But we must

The answer to this

question is not automatically provided in the description
of different cultures.

Nor is it simply resolvable in

empirical terms, since it involves recourse to complex

interpretation at two levels.

First,

the reconstruction of

beliefs from pre-industr ial ages, based on incomplete
records and involving a piecing together of a way of life

which we do not have before us for complete inspection,
could not possibly be engaged in strictly empirical terms.
Secondly,

"how different" involves recourse to our own

belief systems (public and private), which are not amenable
to understanding in strict empirical terms.

If,

in

attempting to answer the "how different" question, we must

be wary of extrapolating our own
experiences and

rule-governed cultural logics and applying
them to
different eras, we must also be willing

to look for similar

or related patterns of experience and
interpretation.

effect, we cannot help doing this.

in

It is one of the

characteristic ways in which we engage in the
ongoing
activity of interpretation which marks us as

a species.

Having no methodological guarantees or recipes,
we must

proceed as rigorously, carefully and empathically as
poss ible
If family history has taught us anything,

it

is that

the family is not simply a passive product of social

structure and that changes in family life do not proceed

neatly and in tandem with other socio-cultural changes.
Indeed,

static difference turns out to be relatively easier

to document than dynamic change is to explain.

Intimations

of new social relations and attitudes towards family life

often precede their full-scale implementation by one or two
centuries, suggesting that some individuals are prompted to

mediate the disappointments, frustrations or contradictions
of their times "ahead of schedule". 25

But how is it that

such nonconforming desires are felt at all?

Undue stress

on the fundamental difference of earlier periods and

cultures, along with an over-socialized view of the

inhabitants of those cultures, cannot help us to get at
this sort of question.

For example,

the rapidity with

which maternal breastfeeding took hold among
the elite of
England during the latter half of the eighteenth
century
suggests that under the surface of cultural
mores and

behaviors that excluded this practice, mothers were

powerfully desirous of feeding and nurturing their
children
and that this may have been artificially thwarted
by
men.

26

m
The

work of Shorter and Stone, among others,

clearly suggests that family life evolved in part out
of
the desire for more privacy and intimacy between spouses

and that this trend was initiated by the professional

classes and the gentry. 27

Furthermore, the Marxist link

between industrial capitalism and the nuclear family has
been rendered increasingly problematic by the

demonstrations of family historians that the ideology and

practice of nuclear family life, including concepts of
individualism, clearly pre-date the establishment of
capital ism.

Psychoanalytic theory provides

a means of

understanding

complex processes of social change through its theory of
instincts which are both pre-social and necessarily shaped

according to cultural norms.

The Freudian argument for

basic instinctual drives, somatically organized in terms of
the stages of physical maturation in infants and children,

suggests that humans are not simply plastic creatures who
are completely constituted in terms of the indelible

imprint of their cultures.

Culture must also be understood

in terms of its various accomodations—
be they repressive,

sublimating or fairly accepting-to
drives.

Examples of

the appropriate uses to which
psychoanalytic theory may be

put by historians are provided by the work
of Hunt and
Stone.
Hunt makes a convincing argument for the
primacy of
the oral stage in the life of the seventeenth
century

French child and Stone uses parent-child
interaction as a
means of explaining the particular brand of affect

characterizing seventeenth century England.

His

speculations on the relationship between extended sexual
latency for young men and England's formidable military

prowess are also compelling.
These historians have demonstrated some of the ways in

which psychoanalysis provides an open-ended model for the

exploration of diverse cultures, one that is simultaneously
attuned to the substratum of human needs and to various
cultural productions of needs and their satisfaction.

The

psychoanalytic notion of drives provides substructural
links between various historical periods and cultures.

And

these drives must be taken into account when the question
of "di

f f erentness

"

is raised.

So too must those aspects of

species-life (not in Marx's specialized sense) which

characterize homo-sapiens as a biological collectivity. 28
Situated between the important particularities of

different cultures and those open and closed instincts
which characterize human species-life, is the arena of

Western culture, comprised of various
diverse ways of life,
but also unified in some sense as
an identifiable
entity. 29 Western culture is
comprised of unmistakably
gendered societies which are patterned
hierarchically
and

valuationally in favor of men.

30

It is al so

characterized by a man-agains t-Nature view
of humanity and
culture which utilizes a sexual imagery
linking up women
with Nature.

We know this much, even if we cannot

ultimately explain the origins of the domination
of women
and Nature in the West.
However, care must be taken to
avoid the uncritical and ahistorical linking up of
male

dominance in our Western ancestral cultures with

masculinity as we know it today.
For example, with the benefit of hindsight, we can

explore Plato's attitudes towards women and the body and

notice parallels between his imagery and arguments and more
recent versions which are readily identifiable aspects of

masculine gender identity. 3
lingers:

But a critical question

Is Plato's somatophobia the same phenomenon we

witness in our time?

Or are the links only apparent and

merely fortuitous ones?
singular phenomenona?

Is

masculine gender in the West a

Minimally, can we speak of a

masculine core which is then elaborated in diverse and
connected ways? 32

Can we even think in terms of gender

identity, a term that presupposes our own cherished

conception of individualized identity, during those epochs
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that preceded the rise of affective
individualism?

are difficult and important questions.

These

Thankfully, they

have a minimal impact on this study,
which begins with
seventeenth century political thought.
Nonetheless, I am
going to hazard a few selected remarks
on these issues.
In the absence of definitive answers,

we can proceed by

way of carefuly maneuvering between
some fairly solid

anchor points.

The first such point is a biological-

evolutionary phenomenon which merits serious attention.
Homo sapiens share with the higher primates and
apes highly
distinguishable and individualized facial features, the
result of those facial muscles which are employed for

expressive and communicative activities.

What we share

with the closest of our animal relatives and have

systematically developed in wide-ranging and culturallyspecific ways, is a physiological facial apparatus designed
to exhibit and express individuality.

This needs to be

taken into account in our consideration of historical and

anthropological studies of pre-industr ial cultures which
stress the absence of individualism as we know it, along

with highly developed notions of personal identity.

Granting the significance of cultural diversity, we must

nonetheless give our evolutionary heritage its due.

As a

species, we have been characterized for thousands of years

by a physiological apparatus designed to express

individuality.

Such an apparatus would only have evolved
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and persisted in response to
the utilization of such
proclivities.

Minimally, acknowledgement of our
evolutionary heritage
forces careful reconsideration of
what life in pre- or
non-individualistic cultures must have been
like.
The
tendency to imagine the human beings
of such cultures as
nothing but undifferentiated blobs would
clearly be

mistaken.

We need a vocabulary that can enable
us to talk

about identity in a variety of ways.

It may be secured in

the environment of a nuclear family,
polis, village,

orphanage, clan, or matrilocal kinship structure.

state

It may

take on features that range from the ultra-individualized
to the minimally-individualized; be secured in
relation to
a few persons or to many.

But identity

— broadly

conceived—would seem to be an indelible feature of human
life that is biologically based, evolut ionarily secured,

and culturally elaborated in diverse ways.

In short,

questions about individualized identities cannot be

resolved in strict either-or terms of presence and
absence.

That is, the absence of identity as we know it

and experience it does not automatically imply the absence
of identity per se

.

Using Geertz's formulation, we might

approach identity as a distinctive although not constant
element comprising the various patterns of human

culture
The second anchor point for this discussion is provided
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by "gender" as a distinctive but by
no means constant
element of nearly all known human societies.
As Salvatore
Cucchiari articulates the summation of
anthropological
findings on this issue:

woman— are universal,

"Although the categories— man and

the content of the categories varies

from culture to culture; and the variation is
truly

impressive." 35

Equally impressive is the near-

universality of cultural forms which use the genitals as
the primary criteria for the assignment of human beings

into one of two major gender categories.
then,

On the one hand,

the "activities, attitudes, values, objects, symbols,

and expectations" 3 6 associated with the categories "man"
and "woman" vary widely; on the other, nearly all versions
of culture are symbolically and socially organized in terms
of a presumed meaningful ontology of dichotomous sex

differences.

To say this is by no means to suggest that

gender functions as a kind of primordial or natural
category.

It is no more reflective of brute "natural"

experience than other cultural forms which structure our
experience of nature.

As the anthropologist Michelle

Zimbalist Rosaldo has pointed out, the ubiquity of gender
in all forms of collective social life

provides a tempting

backdrop to universalizing and biologistic explanations. 37
.

.

.

.

.

.

Such a temptation must be abjured in favor of a focus on
the political and social terrain of its articulation.

Two points which the preceeding
discussion has been
aiming at merit direct formulation.
I have sought to
establish some plausible grounds for
the legitimacy of
invoking gendered identity in transcul
tural terms without
violating due respect for those significant
differences
which distinguish historical periods,
cultures and peoples
from each other.
In response to the "how different"

question,

I

propose that we be willing and prepared to look

for a variety of ways in which identity
might be fashioned

and secured and that we take seriously the universal

phenomenon of the categorization of persons in terms of
gender.

These two observations also work hand in hand.

For if human beings are inclined and predisposed to
fashion

particular identities for themselves, such a process

presumably takes place within

a social and

framework that is gender ized.

symbolic

Such a process need not take

place in a familial or Oedipalized environment.

This,

however, does not necessarily minimize the explanatory

potential of gender identity as

a

constitutive feature of

persons in societies which may be radically different from
our own.

Gender, of course, may be more or less important

within an overall cultural configuration.

38

We cannot

assume that it will always have a privileged and central
location in the social and symbolic frameworks of various

cultures
Of the three political theorists studied here,

Hobbes
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(1588-1679) would seem to be the one
who is most

problematically situated.

Whereas Mill and Marx are

located within the modern frame of
bourgeois family

relations epitomized by Freud, Hobbes
rests in the midst of
a significant watershed in European
family history. On the

one hand, he was reared within

a

sixteenth century family

which has been described by Stone in terms
which are

simultaneously chilling and reminiscent of Hobbes's own
state of nature:
What is being postulated for the sixteenth and
early seventeenth centuries is a society in which a
majority of the individuals who composed it found it
very difficult to establish close emotional ties to any
person.
Children were often neglected, brutally
treated, and even killed; many adults treated each
other with suspiction and hostility; affect was low,
and hard to find
The lack of a unique mother
figure in the first two years of life, the constant
loss of close relatives, siblings, parents, nurses and
friends through premature death, the physical
imprisonment of the infant in tight swaddling-clothes
in early months, and the deliberate breaking of the
child's will contributed to a 'psychic numbing' which
created many adults whose primary responses to others
were at best a calculating indifference and at worst a
mixture of suspicion and hostility, tyranny and
submission, alienation and rage

....

....

So far as the surving evidence goes, England
between 1500 and 1660 was relatively cold, suspicious,
and violence-prone 39
.

On the other hand, Stone detects a sixteenth and

seventeenth century trend of significant changes in the
structure of English middle- and upper-class family life:
Under pressure from the state and from Protestant moral
theology, it shifted from a predominantly open
structure to a more restrictedly nuclear one. The
functions of this nuclear family were more and more
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™

confined to the nurture and socialization
of the infant
n
Chil
nd the
ic
emotional
and sexual
satis?a ?satisfaction
of the .
husband and wife. 40

^^
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According to Stone, the period 1660-1800
witnessed major
changes in child-rearing practices among the
squirarchy and
upper bourgeoisie.
It is during this time that
the

"mother" emerged to become the dominant figure
in

children's lives.
during Hobbes
hand,

'

s

Hence,

the confusing facts of childhood

time would seem to be these.

"up to the age of seven,

On the one

the children were mostly

left in the care of women, primarily their mother, nurse,

and governess." 41

On the other hand, a discernible

ideology of motherhood did not yet exist.

Although women

bore and raised children:

Mothering was not the prerogative of married women in a
society where high adult mortality and frequent
remarriage meant that many children were raised in
households of neighbors and kin: babies were cared for
by their grandmothers, father's new wife, her widowed
aunt, an older step-sister, a cousin or maid servant,
as often as by their natural mothers.
Seventeenthcentury women valued their reputation for chastity,
health and hard work, their integrity as housewives and
traders; the qualities today associated with
'mothering'
tenderness, self-sacrifice, caring seem
significantly absent as a source of honour and
shame .42

—

—

Above all, the social system of child exchange (between
families with too many mouths to feed and those that needed
more labor; between middle- and upper-class families and

child-tenders and schools) mitigated against the intimacy
and corresponding tensions of parent-child interaction that

would be more prevalent during the eighteenth and
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nineteenth centuries.
We have one of either two (or more)
possible

interpretations.

1)

The fact that children were reared
by

women within an admittedly less intense
psycho-sexual
family environment is sufficient to make

the case for a

masculine identity forged in opposition to the
43
female.
The "pre-Oedipal" environment is insufficiently
2)

affect-laden to justify the retrospective application
of
masculine gender identity in the psychoanalytic sense

with

which it is also applied to Mill and Marx.
To make matters even more complicated,

1500-1700 is the

period identified by intellectual historians and historians
of science as the era which witnessed the emergence of

scientific conceptions of nature, rationality, and
empirical science. 44

Recent retrospective studies of

modern scientific rationality have identified significant

metaphorical parallels between the categories of "women"
and "nature" which psychoanalytic theory roots in

childrearing practices.

In some ways,

it would seem that

modern conceptions of science, which are also gendered,

pre-date the emergence of the modern family.

At this

point, historical knowledge raises more questions than it

can answer.

Modern gender relations and conceptions would

seem to be linked in some way with modern science and
rationality, even though there seems to be no way of

getting a handle on the question of origins.

These
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outstanding issues must also remain as
outstanding issues
in this work, particularly in the
analysis of Hobbes that
is developed here.

Minimally, however, we can say this much
about Hobbes.
He was embedded within a culture in the
midst of changes

that yielded modern family life and whose
gendered imagery
is more like than unlike our own.

To this extent, we are

entitled to query his work as potentially masculinist.

On

the other hand, we are in no position to assess the
origins
of this gendered frame of thinking.

As

I

argue in the

chapter on Hobbes, we cannot be sure that the thesis of

masculine ideology adequately captures the actual ground of
his own frame of thinking.

But we are entitled to suggest

that his theory was open to such a reading and

interpretation in the minds of subsequent students and
readers
My general point is this:

Gender identity can be

appropriately invoked as a component or ground of
particular ways of being in and thinking about the world.
It is not an interpretive concept which ought to be

restricted to that period characterized by affective

individualism to which we are the tangible and troubled
heirs.

Wherever gender means something in the cosmology

and social organization of culture, we can expect that the

people of those cultures define themselves and their

practices with reference to that system of meaning.

While

we do not know nearly enough about the
practices of

pre-industrial child-rearing in the West to trace
out in
fine detail the various ways in which
gender identity

may

or may not have been secured in early
interpersonal

dynamics, we can nevertheless attempt to reconstruct
in an

interpretive fashion the ways in which the overt and

socially sanctioned perceptions of gender entered
into the

substance and style of thought in pre-modern times.
Many of the mutually related conceptions and

experiences of masculinity and femininity whose

contemporary origins have been traced to the dynamics of
nuclear family life (most especially its sexual division of
labor which ensures female-dominated child-rearing within a

sphere marked as private) clearly pre-date the historical
rise of the nuclear family.

These include:

split images

of women which bifurcate sexual and maternal aspects,

fear

of female sexual prowess, glorification of male sexual

prowess,

insistence on the need for and legitimacy of

subordinating women, the depiction of manhood as an
achieved status which requires independence from and
control over women, and the association of women with the
natural and men with the cultural spheres of human

existence.

45

These trans-histor ical parallels ramify on

the prevailing psychoanalytic accounts in one of two ways:

Either 1) the nuclear family has been overemphasized as the
site of a particular process of gender acquisition which
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produces masculine presumptions of
superiority over women,
or 2) female-dominated childrearing,
a practice which is
not restricted to the nuclear family
form, has had
far-ranging effects in and of itself and
in tandem with
sexually differentiated and hierarchical
social systems,
such that female authority is feared and
denigrated in a
variety of familial and social environments.
The first

option clearly undermines those psychoanalytic
accounts
which identify the nuclear family as the linchpin
of gender
hierarchy.

The second option, on the other hand,

reinforces those object-relations accounts which stress the

pre-Oedipal significance and wide-ranging ramifications of

female-dominated childcare.

It also prompts a

reconsideration of psychological dynamics in non-nuclear
family settings which may produce remarkably similar

outcomes to those of the nuclear family. 46

The fact that

females, although not necessarily biological mothers, were

predominantly responsible for the care of the young in the
pre-industr ial West could serve as

a

sufficiently tangible

link with the past to justify psychohistor ical efforts to

contribute to solving the riddle of male "superiority" in
the West.

47

In any case,

the burden of defense for the study of

masculinity as ideology in the Western political theory
tradition is not so large as some of the noted potential

objections to such a study suggest.

Such objections are

often rightfully levelled against
studies covering a wide
cultural and historical terrain and
making broad
universalistic generalizations about
human nature and
conduct.
this case, however, the parameters of
inquiry
are already located in a historical
period when

m

contemporary versions and experiences of
familial and
emotional life were beginning to emerge.
My general argument, that which forms the
backdrop to
the interpretation of gender and political
theory offered
in this work is this:

One way of critically assessing the

Western intellectual tradition is by means of the notion
of
gender-diff erentited patterns of experience and
consciousness.
is

Since the Western poltical theory tradition

overwhelmingly male dominated, we can reasonably expect

that masculine identity will figure as an important

ideological influence on that tradition.

Of course,

this

would only figure as a reasonable expectation if Western
cultures, cosmologies, and social organization forms were

constituted in terms of gendered imagery and prescribed and
enforced sexual differences.

Common knowledge tells us

that this is overwhelmingly true.
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APPENDIX
DIFFERENCE IN A NEW KEY:

B

FRENCH FEMINIST OFFERINGS

How can I say you, who are always
other?
Luce Ingaray, "When Our Lips Speak
Together"

A new genre within feminist
theory known as "French

feminisms" has much to offer the feminist
student of sexual
1
difference.
For all of their diversity and heated

arguments between each other,

"French feminisms" are

notable on two distinctive counts:

Against the political

backdrop of feminist activism in the "base" areas of
reproductive rights, labor reforms, and public policy

legislation as it affects women, many of the French
feminists have increasingly and relentlessly pursued the

"superstructural" aspects of women's social inferiority,

analyzing language, psychology, the arts (especially
literature) and intellectual traditions.

Secondly, they

have been willing, if not eager, to take on the theme of
"difference" and to confront the body explicitly.
The concern with language, the symbolic order, women,

and the body intersect most tangibly in the "ecriture

feminine" strain, whose proponents speak and write

specifically as women and communicate their desire to

articulate

a

female language, usually grounded in female
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sexuality or sensuality.

Helene Cixous is one of the best

known practitioners of this genre.
is also similar,

Monique Wittig's work

although she publically disassociates

herself from Cixous

's

"feminized" approach, which she finds

crudely naturalistic and essential! st

.

In spite of their

significant theoretical and artistic differences,
both have

produced works in attempts to "write the body" of
women.
The work of Luce Irigaray, which we will also
examine in

some detail, is fascinating for its seductive rendering
of
the possibility of an analogy between repressed female

sexuality and

a

heretofore unar ticulated women's language.

With Irigaray and Cixous, Julia Kristeva shares an interest
in and concern with "desire" and the search for/creation of
a language appropriate to its expression.

Through their

differences and similarities, which will be treated below,

these four writers bear on considerations raised in this
work in their consensus that "the woman question" cannot be

addressed within the prevailing linguistic, symbolic,

political and intellectual formulas; that "difference"
in fact,

is,

the lid fastened securely on a Pandora's box of

repressed material that threatens not simply the sexually

uneven social distribution of responsibilities, rights and
benefits, but the symbolic and psychological underpinnings
of culture,

broadly conceived.

Getting a firm handle on just what difference is, what
it consists of,

and how we ought to approach it and treat
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it

is a difficult,

perhaps impossible task, captured

strikingly by Jacques Derrida in his
observation that:
is no longer possible to go looking
for woman,

woman's femininity or for female sexuality.

"It

or for

At least,

they

cannot be found by means of any familiar
mode of thought or
knowledge— even if it is impossible to stop looking
for

her."

The difficulty hinges on the phenomenon
itself,

the uses to which it has historically been
put, and our own

logico-linguistic apparatus.

As a phenomenon,

is simultaneously elusive and tangible.

"difference"

Just when we think

we have laid hold of it we are in the gravest danger
of

having fetishized it.

Just when it has been buried or

banished, presumably forever,
Cat-like, to mock our naivete'.

it appears again,

Cheshire

Historically, we find

countless examples of the ways in which "difference" has

been used to legitimize oppressive practices against
women.

And in logico-linguistic terms, we are inclined to

think about difference in dualistic and hierarchical
terms.

Alice Jardine describes this particular facet of

the topic, noting in ways similar to observations posed by

Midgely and Wolgast, that "Western culture has proven to be
incapable of thinking not-the-same-as without assigning one
of the terms a positive value and the other,

a negative."

Simone de Beauvoir anticipated, and perhaps prompted,
recent feminist theoretical developments in her country

when she wrote enigmatically:

"She is the elemental

3
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silence of Truth." 4

We might read this to mean:

Woman

is the repressed underside of a
verbalized and visible

Truth, of that which counts as Truth,

even though it is

partial; and it is partial precisely because
of her
silence.

She constitutes Truth by and through her

silence.

She can never

actively.

— as

a

woman

— articulate

As symbol and living subject,

this Truth

she bears silent

witness to a hypocritical truth masking as Truth.
have the deep irony of "difference":

Here we

it entails a

disregard of the Other (who may not speak) even as it
invokes her.

In the words of Josette Fe'ral

in the West has always been the Woman:

:

"The Savage

simultaneously

present and absent, present when absent, and all the more
absent when she is there."
Like the state of nature constructs employed by Hobbes,

Locke and Rousseau, involving logical reconstruction along

with fanciful projection as a means of highlighting the

possibilities and requirements of civil society, female
difference has invariably been put to logical and political
uses whereby it functions as a simultaneous confirmation
of /counter fact ual to male identity.

If little has been

added to the store of knowledge concerning pre-civil or
"primitive" societies through such state of nature

constructs, they often contribute to the social theorist's

analysis of his society's identity and to retrospective
critical studies of social orders and their ideologies.
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Similarly with conceptions of sexual difference,
we might
say that such constructs, while they
reveal little about
women, can tell us quite a bit about the
function of the

idea of woman within particular social-symbolic
orders, and

more significantly, about how certain conceptions
of

difference and of the "feminine" help to constitute
particular versions of masculine identity.

"Enmeshed in

man's self-representation, woman exists only insofar as she

reflects back to him the image of his manly reality." 7
It is precisely this feature of difference,

as

masculine projection, along with the hierarchical ordering
to which it is subjected such that women invariably lose,

which accounts for the attempts of many feminists to
expunge the term altogether.

Undoubtedly, the positing of

female Otherness as consisting of the "denied, abused, and

hidden" other side of man makes the term justly suspect.

What possible use might difference, "as a signature of her
void and mark of his identity," have for feminists

interested in a critical social theory and practice that
seeks to liberate women without subjecting men to the

injuries that have been historically levelled against women?
Many of the French feminists argue one step beyond this

question and the preceding formulation of "difference" that
the problem of difference consists not simply in the false

positing of Otherness from a male perspective, but in the
denial of difference as well:
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1
by man the conventional polarity
of masculine
and feminine names woman as a
metaphor of man
The rhetorical hierarchizat
ion-oTthe-veTy-oipos it ion
between the sexes is then such that
woman's difference
is suppressed, being totally
subsumed
by the reference
of the feminine to masculine
identity. 8
'

,

.

.

.

.

To expunge the term from feminist
discourse would amount,
on this view, to a capitulation to
the dynamic and politics
of masculine sameness and hegemony.
These feminists view
the critical task to be one of re-appropriating
rather than
eliminating "difference" as a critical concept.
Society
and language, based on the negation of difference
and the

presumption of a singular (masculine) identity and logic,
must be criticized from the vantage point of the
Other.
Operating in the service of "heterogeneity, alterity,
multiplicity", this difference, theorized and articulated
by Helene Cixous, Luce Irigaray, Monique Wittig, and Julia

Kristeva, among others, has a vital and critical role to

play for women and society at large.
while rejecting the entrapment of

a

Upholding difference,
reverse mirror

conception, many of the French feminists insist on walking
the admittedly fine line between false or fetishized

difference and real, critical difference.

Josette Feral

summarizes this impulse in the following way:
Difference, in this context, is not simply defined by
reference to a norm the masculine norm whose negative
side it would be while remaining inscribed within the
realm of identity.
Rather, difference is to be thought
of as other, not bounded by any system or any
structure.
Difference becomes the negation of
phallologocentri sm, but in the name of its own inner
di vers i ty 9

—

—
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Within this view,

"

di
ff erenow" —in
n 4.1
uirrerence
the name of women and,
i

for some, of a more generealized
critical alterity embodied
by other individuals and groups
as well-is a crucial and

precious concept that must be preserved,
expanded, sought
out,

and refined,

sexist.

rather than thrown out as outmoded
or

In the words of Julia Kristeva:

"Woman is here to

shake up, to deflate masculine values,
and not to espouse
them.

Her role is to maintain differences by
pointing to

them, by giving them life, by putting
them into play

against one another." 10
This reappropriation of difference, invoking a
critical

questioning of conceptions of subjectivity and structures
of logic and discourse,

takes place within the framework of

a persistent and vexing question whose voicing
and

potential solution ramify beyond exclusively feminist

concerns to a broader epistemological terrain.
words of Alice Jardine,

In the

it goes something like this:

Is there a way to think outside the patr iarchally
determined Same/other, Subject /Object dichotomies
diagnosed as the fact of culture by Simone de Beauvoir
thirty years ago, and, in the process, still include
women as a presence? In other words, do we want to
continue reorganizing the relationship of difference to
sameness through a dialectics of valorization, or is
there a way to break down the over-determined metaphors
which continue to organize our perceptions of
reali ty? 11

Jardine's question provides an initial clue to
understanding why so many of the French feminists writing
in the name of difference invariably deal with the
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Subject/Object relationship and its
connection to
identity.
In many ways, they are picking up
where de
Beauvoir left off.
The reappropriation of difference
involves a voicing of
that difference which is negated and denied
within social

organization (e.g.,

the invisibility of women's labor) and

dominant forms of language and thought (including

prevailing forms of "difference".)

As the posited

naturalized embodiment of non-culture, women might embody

alternate cultures rather than no culture.

Rethinking that

"disloyalty to civilization" of which women have so often

been accused, rather than denying

it,

and going even

further to rethink "civilization" in this respect, women's

previously empty and masculine-derived negativity (as "that
which is not-male") might be rendered into substantive and
critical forms. 12

Such an approach is based on the

proposition that "What is at stake in the woman's struggle
is much more than simply finding a place within the

existing values or discourses.

It is the problem of a

whole society, questioning its very foundations and its
right to impose its truth as uniquely true." 13

This broadened and vitally critical task of feminism as

theory and practice, captured by Annie Leclerc in the

observation that 'if we invent our sexuality, they will

have to rethink their own,'

14

also ramifies on the

conception and study of oppression.

For critical feminist

analysis in the name of difference
proceeds in the name of
a difference that is hidden,
denied, elusive and distorted
because it is repressed. This is
precisely why the
unconscious, the body and desire occupy
a significant, if
not privileged, focus of inquiry
within French feminist
discourse which builds on a psychoanalytic,
linguistic and
philosophical foundation.
If the articulated woman of the
social order is a false and limited

projection—

description of man's repressed nature— then where
do we
locate her? How can we even begin to think about
her? The
answer of some is that we must immerse ourselves
within,

re-evoke, and fantasize about the shadowy, pre-rat
ional

pre-socialized, repressed terrain of the unconscious:
For the woman's unconscious is 'the noise' in the
system, the defect.
It is a surplus which patriarchal
society has always wanted to get rid of by denying it
any specificity, thus positing that same society's
right to talk about it in terms of identity with a
resemblance to the male model. 15

This simultaneous search for/creation of

a

female

discourse, to get at "another thinking as yet unthinkable"
has yielded a rich array of unconventional works

challenging the substance and structure of the

taken-for-granted

.

Within the realms of fiction and

literature, Cixous and Wittig strive to write the

pleasures, appetites, agonies and discourses of female
selves, bodies and desire.

Kristeva,

as a linguist and

literary critic, listens for "the call of the
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unnamable

.

.

issuing from those borders where

.

signification vanishes." 16

And Irigaray, deported

Lacanian analyst, employes a medley of
styles, ranging from
critique and deconstruct ion of the thought
of Plato,
Aristotle, Hegel and Freud, to creative
imaginary forays
into the languages and sexual it ies of
women.

Julia Kristeva's work in linguistics may
be roughly

characterized as the attempt to displace
as a closed, homogenized,

a view of

language

and self-evident meaning system

with its correspondingly intact and comfortable
subject,
with a more dynamic and tension-filled account.

Kristeva

is interested in whatever threatens to upset the
complacent

balance of linguistically structured and socially
sanctioned meaning and "truth".

Politically situating

herself in opposition to the flow of totalizing and
rationalizing culture, she sums up her political ethics

with the following question:

"If we are not on the side of

those whom society wastes in order to reproduce itself,

where are we?" 17

She looks to the "margins of recognized

culture" in search of desires and logics "exceeding that of

codified discourse." 1
of negativity,

Above all,

it

is "the free play

needs, desire, pleasure and jouissance"

in which Kristeva is interested,

for they are the raw stuff

which language attempts to appropriate, if never completely
successfully.

Desire,

for Kristeva,

is both the instigator

and victim of language, much as Mary Midgely reminds us of
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the instinctual components of language.

language as both

a

Kristeva views

prison house and a gateway, and she

weaves a careful pattern between these two
accounts.

would clearly be mistaken to caricature
Kristeva as
primitivist who prefers the natural honesty of

It
a

grunts,

moans and hysterical speech to the 'artificial'

fabrications and structure of language.

Her quarrel with

language is rather in its totalizing tendency:
to write out what it cannot yet (or ever),

the attempt

or refuses to,

enunciate; the persistent attempt to flatten out the

diversity of human experience within
meaning.

Hence,

a

singular economy of

she pushes for a careful searching out of

those counter-cultural locales and texts where:
in the face of a want of discourse, there is that
strength that remains wordless or lacks truth when
verbalized, a strength of formidable institutional
contestation, or a strength of voice, gesture, gaze,
sweeping over the psychological requests of speech, and
yet the eternal 'that's not it', 'that's not enouqn'
3
.

.

.

•

•

•

20

In her approach to the study of language and

literature, Kristeva identifies two major discourses at

work (and at play), the symbolic and the semiotic.

Semiotic discourse is the conceptual articulation of those

bodily drives that elude sublimation and repression,
surviving to surface occasionally in symbolic discourse,

which is enacted on the visible terrain of signification,
sign, and syntax.

As the means through which man orders

and objectifies the world, symbolic discourse aims for
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homogeneity, a singular economy
of meaning.
The
relationship between the semiotic
and the symbolic is
fuelled by, and feeds on, the energy
and impulses of
semiotic desire even as it must squelch
it, by ordering it
into predictable and safe meaning
arrangements.
Surplus
meaning, that which exceeds and
threatens the necessarily
limited logos of symbolic discourse, is
relegated to the
distant reaches of the crazy, perverse,
inaudible.
It may
be allowed expression in poetry.
As the repressed,
desiring, perhaps instinctual foundation of
symbolic
discourse, the semiotic precedes (temporally and
logically)
the institution of the symbolic as sanctioned
language.

In

the terms provided by the psychoanalytic account
of

individual development and socialization, we could imagine
the semiotic as originating in that pre-verbal, pre-ego

stage of identification with the mother's body, prior to
the successful differentiation and establishment of self

against that maternal body, prior to the full
implementation of sexual prohibitions, prior to the

ultimate repudiation of our claims on and identification

with the maternal body.
Kristeva uses a feminized vocabulary to describe the
semiotic, in order to rekindle the primal memory of

maternal presence.

The question of women's more direct

access to this discourse, as daughters, as mothers, as
special victims of Oedipal ization,

is a separate issue,

one
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that Kristeva, unlike Cixous
and Irigaray, seems less
willing to address, although her
own maternal experience is
sometimes expressed in her writing.

According to Kristeva, the existing
systems of
signification are constantly threatened
by a simmering
semiotic murmur which occasionally breaks
through

to the

surface of symbolic discourse.

Hence her approach to

language as a dynamic compendium and
articulation of
heterogeneous and unstable meaning. This

is not to deny

the power of the symbolic edifice,
It is,

for it is formidable.

however, an important recognition of the
possibility

of cultivating its cracks and fissures.

The semiotic

provides the ground (shifting and elusive, to be sure)
from
which to criticize language in the name of unacknowledged,
unsatisfied, and multiple desires.

Within this framework, the relationship of women to
culture and language becomes an interesting source of study
and speculation, both for what this relationship can reveal

about women, as well as for what it suggests about a

culture from which women are at least partially alienated
and

in which they are deeply implicated as the Other.

Invoking the unmistakable parallels between the semiotic
and the feminine, Kristeva writes:

"The role of women

strikes me as more interesting when it consists in stating
the right to the difference, the return of the negative,
the challenge to communities, divinities, authorities,
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including that crafty authority, the
ego.

.

.

"
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Interesting, and well worth noting
before we proceed
with a more sustained examination of
Kristeva's treatment
of sexual difference, is the fact
that her most fully
developed treatment of this issue takes
place between the
covers of a book ostensibly about Chinese
women.
Bearing
witness to her careful avoidance of the error
of mistaking
the Chinese experience itself for the
Chinese experience as
viewed through Western eyes, the book is also a
fitting

testament to the difficulty of taking a direct line
of

approach to the issue of sexual difference.

A large

portion of About Chinese Women is actually about the sorts
of questions about Western women brought to light through

engagement with Chinese women.

Kristeva's inquiry takes

the form, deliberately it would seem, of reflective

dialogue rather than linear inquiry.

Like the Chinese

Revolution in relation to the West, women in relation to

western male-dominated culture promote "the chance that the
discovery of 'the Other' may make us question ourselves
about what, here and now, is new, scarcely audible,

disturbing."
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Like the Chinese Revolution, "woman as

such does not exist."

"difference".

Neither, Kristeva might say, does

Each must be approached as complex

refractions, products of interchange, contrasts; as surplus

and repressed meanings leaving their traces in scattered
and often undecipherable patterns.

"Women.

We have the
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luck to be able to take
advantage of a biological

peculiarity to give

a name

to that which,

in monotheistic

capitalism, remains on this side
of the threshold of
repression, voice stilled, body mute,
always foreign to the
23
social order."
Warning against the theology of an
"inverted humanism", Kristeva would
have women search for
their voices and identities, but
not with an end point
(glorification of womanhood) in mind; the
denial of
difference, as well as its instituted
and totalizing

reification,

result in totalitarianism, defined as
the

inability/unwillingness to tolerate difference.
The historical and current burden carried
by women in a
society that simultaneously denies and inscribes
difference
is powerfully described by Kristeva in a
rich panoply of

prose that communicates a uniquely female/feminine
experience of the mind-body split within Western culture:
voice without body, body without voice, silent
anguish, choking on the rythms of words, the tones of
sounds, the colours of images, but without words,
without sounds, without images; outside time, outside
knowledge, cut off forever from the rythmic, colourful,
violent changes that streak sleep, skin, viscera:
socialized, even revolutionary, but at the cost of the
body; body crying, infatuating, but at the cost of
time; cut off, swallowed up; on the one hand, the
aphasic pleasure of childbirth that imagines itself a
participant in the cosmic cycles; on the other,
jouissance under the symbolic weight of a law
(paternal, familial, social, divine) of which she is
the sacrificial support, bursting with glory on the
condition that she submit to the denial, if not the
murder of the body ... 24
.

.

.

Woman's apparent choice is either to accede to

a

language
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and culture which deny her
embodied subjectivity, or
to
become the repressed specified
other o£ carnality. These
limited and mutually exclusive
choices are the products o£
a social and symbolic order
which Kristeva describes
variously as monotheistic, Christian,
paternal, and
capitalist.

Monotheism is the grand symbolic
organizing principle
of community which succeeded
historically by repressing
paganism (the worship of a variety of
gods) and
"the

greater half of agrarian civilization
and their
ideologies:

women and mothers." 25

No other civilization, therefore, seems
to have made
the principle of sexual difference
so crystal clear:
between the two sexes there is a cleavage,
an abyss,
which is marked by their different relationships
to the
Law (religious and political) and which
is the very
condition of their alliance. Monotheistic unity
is
sustained by a radical separation of the sexes:
indeed, this separation is its prerequisite.
For
without this gap between the sexes, without this
localization of the polymorphic, orgasmic body,
laughing and desiring, in the other sex, it would have
been impossible, in the symbolic sphere, to isolate
the
principle of One Law— One, Purifying, Transcendent,
Guarantory of the ideal interest of the community.

There is one unity: an increasingly purified
community discipline, isolated as a transcendent
principle and thus insuring the survival of the group.
This unity that the God of monotheism represents is
sustained by a desire that pervades the community,
making it run but also threatening it.
Remove this
threatening desire this perilous support of the
community from man; place it beside him: you have
woman, who is speechless, but who appears as the pure
desire of speech. 26

—

—

Kristeva identifies monotheism with "the function of human
symbolism:

to provide an instance of communication and
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cohesion despite the fact that

it

operates by dividing

thing/word, body/speech, pleasure/law,
tion."
ii

27

incest/procrea-

The patrilinear function is also
firmly

implicated in the monotheistic impulse:
P atrilinear descent with transmission of the
Zv/
father
s name centralizes eroticism
in the single goal
of procreation, in the grip of an
abstract symbolic
authority which refuses to acknowledge the
fact that
the child grows and is carried in the
mother's body,
which a matrilinear system of descent kept
alive in the
mind by leaving certain possibilities of
polymorphism— if not incest still available. 28
1

—

Invoking a Freudian mode of analysis, Kristeva argues
that the development of productive forces

consolidation of economic and political

— the
power — is,

in

effect, premissed on the centralized, repressed, and

sublimated eroticism that women experience and symbolize

through the maternal body.

"Jouissance" is the term that

she uses to get at this repressed feminine eroticism (not

exclusively experienced by women).

Difficult to pin down

concretely, the term connotes sensuous pleasure and the

orgasmic experiences associated with sex and maternity.

According to Kristeva, our entire logic of production and
reproduction (what Freud referred to as "civilization") is
based on the radical codification of sexual difference, the
denial of jouissance, and the exclusion of women as women
from knowledge and power.

This point is also pursued by

Irigaray and Cixous.
As the particular version of monotheism which
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constitutes the symbolic and
social order of the West,
Christianity is for Kristeva,
the fantasy of a male
homosexual economy, premissed
on a denial of sexual
difference in its denial of maternal
,

jouissance.

She

describes The Word as a sublimated
version of the fart,
evidence of a deeper lying fantasy
of anal penetration and
resulting pregnancy. Only in assuming
the role of a male
homosexual, as a virgin anally impregnated

by The Word, can

Woman (i.e., Mary) be placed within the
symbolic order of
Christianity.
(v/hile Kristeva does not mention
it, we
might also consider the Church-inspired
persecution of
witches in the context of this interpretation.
The

sexualized tenor of this brutal assault on women
is
unmistakable.) 29

Women's legitimate forms of

participation within the Christian symbolic order are
reduced to two:

the ecstatic and the melancholic,

represented by Theresa d'Avila and Catherine of Sienna,
respectively.

The price of specifically female sexuality

is masochism or social persecution.

These two limited choices
feminine masochism

— de-feminized

— characterize

of a female's access to power,

ecstasy or

the only possible avenues

knowledge, and symbolism

within a monotheistic symbolic order organized around the
unitary rule of the Father.

It is the mother,

figure of an

earlier and repressed symbolism, who loses out. 30

Specifically feminine sexuality, described by Kristeva
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as maternal jouissance,

is based on the daughter's

relationship to the maternal body.

Like other feminist

theorists, Kristeva stresses the
significance of the
pre-Oedipal period of psycho-sexual
development for

understanding female sexuality and
psychology in
contradistinction to that of males. 31 Freud's
Oedipal
castration trauma is transposed by Kristeva
into the

Lacanian mode of viewing
symbolic function:

it

as a process of learning the

"with the Oedipal phase come language,

the symbolic instance,

the ban on auto-eroticism, and the

reorganization of the law of the father." 32

she defines

the symbolic function as "a system of signs
(first, rythmic

and intonation differences, then signif
ier/signif ied)

organized into logico-lingui stic structures whose goal is
to accredit social communication as exchange purified
of

pleasure." 33

Superego and symbolic order (the order of

verbal communication) are built on the foundation of

prohibitions rendered unconscious:
The symbolic function in our monotheistic West
functions by means of a system of kinship dependent on
transmission of the father's name and a rigorous
prohibition of incest, and a system of verbal
communication that is increasingly logical, simple,
positive, stripped of stylistic, rythmic, 'poetic*
ambiguities.
Such an order brings this constitutional
inhibition of the speaking subject to a zenith never

before attained
In contrast,

process,

34

•

.

.

.

the "truth" of the pre-Oedipal, primary

mother-dominated realm is "a curious truth:

outside time with neither past nor future, neither true nor
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false; buried underground,

judges.

It refuses,

it

neither postulates nor

displaces, breaks the symbolic
order

before it can re-establish itself.- 35

Lurking beneath

the surface, all that is repressed
"by sign, by sense, by
communication, by symbolic order, in
whatever is

legislating, restrictive, paternal

36

-that which

is

allied with the pre-Oedipal phase-is
capable of "blowing
the whole thing apart." 37 Jouissance,
pregnancy ("escape
from the bonds of daily social temporality"),
and a

''marginal speech,

with regard to the science, religion,
and

philosophy of the polis," 38 are identified by
Kristeva as
"the means by which this 'truth', cloaked
and hidden by

the

symbolic order and its companion, time, functions
through
women.

39

If a woman cannot be part of the temporal symbolic
order except by identifying with the father, it is
clear that as soon as she shows any evidence of that
which, in herself, escapes such identification

and acts differently, resembling the dream of the
maternal body, she evolves into this 'truth' in
question.
It is thus that feminine specificity defines
itself in patrilineal society; woman is a specialist in
the unconscious, a witch, a bacchanalian, taking her
jouissance in an anti-Appo Ionian, Dionysian orgy. 40

Women represent the elusive and unconscious truth of
the symbolic order only so long as this 'truth'

given tangible form.

is not

For once the unconscious passes into

the symbolic order as 'truth',

it

becomes fetishized.

And

here lies the dilemma for feminists, as Kristeva sees it:
assuming an activist, militant, virile, and hence
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masculinized stance as we demand
entry into the Symbolic
order, "or else we remain in
an eternal sulk before
history," 41 This problem, which
might be termed
the

"problem of perpetual negativity",

is one to which we will

return.
To sum up Kristeva's position with
respect to

"difference"

would argue that her overweening interest
is
in a counter-theory of the subject/
theory of the
I

counter-subject, rather than in a theory of
woman per se as
counter-subject.
"Woman" would seem to represent
an

attitude, a position within the symbolic order,
a sex.

As idea, attitude, position and sex,

rather than

"woman" aids

in the displacement of the modern Western
notion of the

Subject as an organic and consistent entity.

While this

subject may indeed have been conceived in phallic terms,

women do not embody the full range of repressed
alternatives, of those polymorphous manifestations of

negativity, dissidence, and difference.

Indeed, biological

sex must not be confused with sexuality if Kristeva is to
be interpreted correctly.

Jean Genet, for example,

within Kristeva's framework as a good example of

stands

a writer

whose texts are suffused with "feminite", along with

Mallarme and Artaud who, she argues, have achieved literary
versions of semiotic discourse.

(In fact,

analyzes the literature of female writers.)

Kristeva rarely
The writer who

can set "jouissance" into play, opposing the rules of

conventional language, enacts
that pre-verbal
identification with the .other
which necessarily underlines
the logic of "paternal
discourse" phallologocentrism)
if
Genet, Mallarme', and Artaud
did not have "the luck to be
able to take advantage of a
biological peculiarity to give
a name to that which
rema ins
fore
(

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

ign to the

social order," they were nonetheless
able to invoke the
"feminine discourse" of the semiotic.

Kristeva's version of "difference",
then, is not a
strictly sexual one.
"Woman" raises the question of
difference because "she" has some foothold
within the
symbolic order which enables her and those
sympathetic to
her situation (male homosexuals are such
a potential group)
to criticize language from within (the
symbolic) and

without (the semiotic).

The "problem of Woman" is the

problem of all those "who swim against the tide."
Ultimately,

it is the

problem of the rigidly conceived

subject, who must deny the semiotic/ femi nine, twist
it,

simplify

it,

and dominate it,

in order to maintain his

peculiar sense of self and mastery of reality in "this
untenable place where our speaking species resides,

threatened by madness beneath the emptiness of
heaven."

42

If the long term goal of feminism is "another

economy of the sexes," along with

a

radically refashioned

cultural order, the more immediate strategy must be to "go

on waging the war of the sexes, without a perverse denial
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of the abyss that marks the
sexual difference or a

dissillusioned mortification at its
depth." 43
battle can best be waged, according

Such a

to Kristeva,

if we

assume the critical stance of
listening for the barely
perceptible murmurings of the semiotic.
In contrast to Kristeva' s concern
with the mute body,

silenced desire, with "the inexhaustible,
non-symbolized
impulse," Luce Irigaray focuses more
directly on "that

repressed which is the feminine imagery."

Irigaray employs

an inventive, complex, and extended
rendering of the

related critiques of the symbolic-social order,
of

conceptions of a unified and unproblematic (male)
subject
and discourse, and of the problem of the domination
of

women and Woman to the stylistic outer reaches.

If

Kristeva makes for difficult reading, Irigaray leaves

American readers simultaneously dumbfounded and acutely
uncomfortable with her detailed and evocative bodily
imagery.

That she has been denounced as a crude biological

reductionist and ontologizer of difference says more about
the limits of the language that she is trying to
di

splace/deconstruct than about her position proper. 44
As with the attempt to convey and summarize the work of

Kristeva,
Irigaray'

it is difficult,
s

if not

impossible,

to do so in

case without fairly extensive quoting and

paraphrasing.

This is so because the aphoristic and

stylistic use of language in her work is integral to its
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waning.

Because she is doing what she
advocates through
her mode of writing, her
procedure (firmly rooted in the
French intellectual tradition
and language) is her
45
content.
a regrettable, but
unrecuperable loss also
attends the translation of her
works into English, where
puns, double, ambiguous,
multiple and contradictory

—

meanings are often lost.

The extensive footnotes provided

by her translators can only
partially make up for the lost
meaning, since the real power of
Irigaray's work seems to

depend on the active and immediate
engagement of her
readers within the frame of her prose.
According to
Carolyn Burke, one of her foremost American
translators,
"reading Irigaray is like taking part in a
process in which
neither participant is certain of the outcome." 46
in

other words,

Irigaray's texts do not aim for singular,

whole, or pre-f ash ioned and detachable meanings:

don't understand a thing?
you.

„47

"You

No more than they understand

in spite of these noted impediments to a full

experience, understanding and appeciation of her work,

Irigaray provides sufficient grist for the mill to justify
a tentative,

if necessarily diluted,

accounting of her work.

According to Irigaray, women are caught in a world

structured by male-centered concepts.

Within this system

of signification, women have no way of representing, much
less knowing themselves in any but a masculine fashion.

her imaginary dialogue for two female lovers (or an

In
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auto-erotic self),

»„ hen 0 ur Lips
Speak Together.

••

Ir i garay

writes:
If we continue to speak
the same language to each
other, we will reproduce the
same story?
lf we
continue to speak this sameness,
if we speak to Lot
°h
other as men have spoken for centnrJ!
.^
3
us to speak, we wilf f ail
^crSther?
Words will pass through our bodies,
above or heads"
disappear, make us disappear.
How can I touch'you
if you're not there?
Your blood is translated into
eir S n S
ak t0 each othe" and about
us
us.
Bu t ^s
But
us " ??
Get out of their language.
Go back
9
through all the names they gave
you.
I'm waiting
wai?inq tor
for
you, I'm waiting for myself. 4 8
'

.

.

^

T

Her sarcastic and reportedly witty
(as yet untranslated)
expose' of Plato and Freud's portrayal
of women as

irrational and imperfect (because castrated)
men Speculum
De L Autre Femme
is one feature of her more basic
argument
(

'

)

that Western thought is based on a systematic
repression of
women's experience/sexuality. Going a step
beyond

Kristeva's version of resistance as the listening
for,

experience and articulation of

"

joui ssance" or semiotic

discourse (both necessarily negative with respect to the
symbolic order), Irigaray (and Cixous as well) hones in

directly on the evocative and explicit expression of female
sexuality and the creation of

a

expressing that sexuality, with

language capable of
a view to

establishing some

tangible ground from which to critically analyse, demystify
and deconstruct "phallologocentr i sm"

projects are vitally connected.

.

Indeed,

these two

"In the face of language,

constructed and maintained by men only,

I

raise the
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question of the specificity of
a feminine language:
language which could be adequate
for the body,

of a

sex and the

imagination (imaginary) of the woman." 49

Phallologocentrism is responsible for

conception of
the unitary masculine subject
who stands at the center of
a
symbolic and linguistic universe that
orders reality in
a

accordance with the conjoined rule of
the Father and the
Phallus.
Extending Derrida's definition and
critique of
logocentrism as a 'metaphysics of presence'
which obscures
the very differences on which
meaning-as-presence
depends,

'phallologocentrism'

(a

term which is also used by Derrida

in Writing and Difference) specifies that
this singular

system and the hierarchies which it has
established are
rooted in a specifically masculine construction
of presence
and identity.
In the words of Helene Cixous:
This opposition to woman cuts endlessly across all
the
oppositions that order culture. It's the classic
opposition, dualist and hierarchical. Man/Woman
automatically means great/small, superior/inferior
means high or low, means Nature/History, means
transformation/inertia.
In fact, every theory of
culture, every theory of society, the whole
conglomeration of symbolic systems— everything, that
is, that's spoken, everything that's organized as
discourse, art, religion, the family, language,
everything that seizes us, everything that acts on
us
it is all ordered around hierarchical oppositions
that come back to the man/ woman opposition.
50
.

.

.

—

.

.

That this opposition has been set up from the vantage point
of the masculine subject makes for phallo centrism.

Women

have a specificity, constructed within but also lurking

outside of phallologocentric discourse, that distinguishes
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7

them from men.

Distinguished in this double sense,
within
a discourse that sets
woman up as counter-identity,
and

outside of a discourse that cannot
capture real difference
because it threatens the logic of
that discourse, female
specificity is inf ur iatingly difficult
to specify.
Irigaray does not shrink from the
task at
hand.

Employing a method of deconstruct ion
and creative
writing which evokes erotic and
pre-Oedipal imagery, she

attempts to reveal that the presumed
neutrality of language
accomodates a masculine subject and sets
up the feminine
subject as exception, without giving her
voice,

thus

denying her specificity:

They neither taught us nor allowed us to say
our
multiplicity.
That would have been improper speech.
Of course, we were allowed— we had to?
display one
truth even as we sensed but muffled, stifled
another.
Truth s other side— its complement? its
remainder?
stayed hidden. 5 l

—

—

Phallologocentrism reduces everything to its own system of
signification.

Women are subjected to the principle of

Identity conceived as masculine sameness and (not
surprisingly) found lacking.

Turning the tables on

phallologocentric discourse, female difference become the
lack or question within the discourse.

Cixous describes

this method as elaborated in her own work:
If woman has always functioned "within" the discourse
of man, a signifier that has always referred back to
the opposite signifier which annihilates its specific
energy and diminishes or stifles its very different
sounds, it is time for her to dislocate this "within",
to explode it, turn it around, and seize it; to make it
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C °" tainin

taking it into her own mouth
Very °™ teeth to inv4nt
for herself a language to
get inside of. 52

wf?'

9

Freud's genius was to shake up the
notion of a unified
consciousness and subjectivity with his
discovery of the
unconscious. Yet he mistakenly persisted
in defining
sexual difference in terms of an a
priori sameness (in
terms of the penis/phallus) such that
female sexuality is
relegated to the status of absence, lack,
deficiency. This
type of signification, according to Irigaray,
denies female
subjectivity in its own right. Cixous describes
it as "the

reductive stinginess of the masculine-conjugal
economy." 53
In the face of this limited economy of meaning,
women

"can touch each other only when naked." 54

... to find ourselves and each other, we have a great
deal to take off.
So many images and appearances
separate us, one from another. They decked us out
according to their desires for so long, and we adorned
ourselves so often to please them, that we forgot the
feel of our skin.
Removed from our own skin, we remain
distant.

^

Women must become the speaking subjects of their
difference, which requires that they break through this

system of thought and signification, critically confronting
a phallic

conception of the subject with their embodied and

expressive alternatives:
If we don't invent a language; i f we don't find our
body's language, its gestures will be too few to
accompany our story. When we become tired of the same
old ones, we'll keep our desires secret, unrealized.
Asleep again, dissatisfied, we will be turned over to
the words of men who have claimed to "know" for a long
time.
But not our body
Thus seduced, allured,

—

.
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ecstatlG ov er our becoming, we
will
eprived of 2!i£ movements : Frozen, be
°
a^ho^f we are made for endless change. 56
although

f'
*

Kristeva's attempt to shake up the
notion of the
Subject as a singular and consistent
entity may be viewed
as a project to which Irigaray's
more focused and detailed
evocation of female imagery is parallel.
Both would have
us interrogate the rules of
discourse in the attempt to
understand the simultaneous production and
denial of
meanings which help to constitute the
"feminine":
To put discourse into question is to
reject the
existing order.
It is to renounce, in effect, the
identity principle, the principles of unity
and
resemblance which allow for the constitution
of
phallocentric society.
It means choosing marginality
an emphasis on margins
I with
in order to designate
one s difference, a difference no longer
conceived of
as an inverted image or as a double, but
as alterity,
multiplicity, heterogeneity.
It means laying claim to
an absolute difference, posited not within the norms
but against and outside the norms. 57
)

Easier said than done, we might reply.

For there is a

tightly tangled and unavoidable knot at the heart of any

attempt to articulate difference outside the norms.

problem is this:

The

Does language translate/describe reality,

or does it create/constitute it?

The first option has been

effectively ousted from Irigaray's approach.
effect, a non-option.

It is,

in

She is simply not situated within a

conception of language as mirror of reality.

Indeed,

the

view that language merely describes the phenomenal world

would not generate the sorts of analyses that we find in
the likes of Kristeva, Irigaray and Cixous.

Language

itself would not be the focus
of such lively, passionate
interest and concern.
The emphasis, instead, would
be on
"practice", crudely conceived; for
language would be
expected to follow suit once appropriate
changes in the
base structure (society) had been
made.
Irigaray's work is
clearly located within the position
that language

constitutes social reality, including
subjectivity.
But in
this case, how, if ever, can we assume
a critical position
towards language and our constitution
within it? Irigaray
is obviously sensitive to this problem:
How can we speak to escape their enclosures,
patterns,
distinctions, and oppositions:
virginal/deflowered,
pure/impure, i nnocent/ knowing ... How can we shake
off the chains of these terms, free ourselves
from
their categories, divest ourselves of their
names?
Disengage ourselves, alive from their concepts? 58
,

That Irigaray proceeds as if such a critical position
is possible is related to the work of Jacques
Lacan and

Jacques Derrida, to which we briefly turn, for

consideration of Derrida'
Lacan'

s

s

a

deconst ructi ve method and

notion of an asymmetrical sexual entry inuo the

Symbolic order.

For while Irigaray's work is uniquely

distinctive and even engages in

a

forthright challenge to

and critique of the work of Lacan, these two thinkers have
had an unmistakable influence on her work.
Lacan is by now famous for his attempts to document the

simultaneous acquistion of language and subjectivity.^ 9

Within this framework, identity is that position which we
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(are forced to) assume within
the Symbolic order.

Lacan'

work goes so far as to identify
the processes by which we
are subjected to the structure
of the Symbolic order and
also come to think of ourselves as
the point of origin of
our ideas and beliefs.
This false sense of subjectivity,

developmental^ following the first period
of infantile
omnipotence, is acquired during the Mirror
Phase, when the
pre-oedipal child glimpses him/herself in the
mirror and
perceives itself simultaneously as subject and
object.
The
illusion of totality or unity, fostered by the
mirror
image,

goes underground after the establishment of
symbolic

relations, persisting in unconscious formations.

Lacan and Derrida, building on the work of Ferdinand
de
Saussure, argue that we are situated within and produced
by

language through a set of relationally generated meanings
fixed by our relation to/positions within the Symbolic

order with respect to various signifiers.

According to

Lacan, the phallus functions as the privileged signifier in

the child's entry into the Symbolic order, which is also
its passage through the Oedipus Complex.

The early dual

imaginary identifications of the ego with itself and the

mother are broken by the introduction of a third term, the
father,

in relation to whom the child is forced to assume a

position.

Such positioning is initially achieved through

the designation of having/not-having a phallus.

Like a

signifier, the phallus fixes difference according to having
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or not having it.

It is in this sense that
Lacan argues

that women lack access to the
Symbolic order, or, as
re-fashioned by several Lacanian feminists,
that women's
entry into the Symbolic order is
negative 60 Here we can
identify an important starting point
for a conception of
sexual difference rooted within language
and the symbolic
order, which promises the avoidance
of the problem of
.

formulating difference in extra-linguistic
or -symbolic
terms
Irigaray proceeds out of this framework by
employing

Derrida's tactic of unseating the privileged
61
c
signifier.
•

.

She does this initially by attempting to

deconstruct the ascription of 'no sex'

changing

it

to 'many sexes',

(no penis/phallus),

and also by attempting to

write female sexuality without reference to the
phallus.

62

In effect,

she reverses the phallus/

non-phallus hierarchy, although this is never intended as

permenent switch.

a

Her creative evocation of a feminine

dialogue would seem to operate simultaneously as a

refutation/critique of the subject/object relationship and
of any attempt to re-insert a hierarchical and dichotomous

ordering of signifiers, be they masculine or feminine:
Open your lips, but do not open them simply.
I do not
open them simply. We you/l are never open nor
closed.
Because we never separate simply, a single
word can't be pronounced, produced by, emitted from our
mouths.
From your/my lips, several songs, several ways
of saying echo each other.
For one is never separable
from the other.
You/l are always several at the same

—

—
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voiS;

d

d0minate the other?

her
e
t°anl

w*ichVoe s

ST^tK-JS

impose her

JSlS^* ^'
1

(Notice too that Irigaray
refashions a meaning from "no
word" to "no single word",
playing with the notion that
women lack access to language and
the symbolic arena.)
Derrida's deconstructi ve method
opens the way for an
immanent critique of language.
If we can only exist in
relation to language and never outside
it, we can
nevertheless engage in a critical process
precisely because
language itself is not as closed and
fixed as it appears.
Infinitely complex, meaning— ostens ibly
fixed by the
relationship between signifier and signified
is almost

—

free-floating, due to its constitution within
a series of

differences and the inevitable slippage between
the
signifier and signified:
The play of differences involves syntheses and
referrals (renvois) which prevent there from being
at any moment or in any way a simple element which
is
present in and of itself and refers only to itself.
Whether in written or spoken discourse, no element'can
function as a sign without relating to another element
which itself is not simply present. This linkage means
that each 'element'
phoneme or grapheme is
constituted with reference to the trace in it of the
other elements of the sequence or system. Nothing, in
either the elements or the system, is anywhere ever
simply present or absent. 64

—

—

Irigaray invokes this play of difference in two ways.
First, by invoking a feminine imaginary in contrast to a

phallic one; second, by setting the play of difference into
operation within her rendition of female discourse.

"Speak
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just the same.

Because your language doesn't follow
just

one thread, one course, or one
pattern, we are in luck.
You speak from everywhere at the
65

m

same time."

ways,

then,

these

Irigaray's approach aids in the identification

of the conditions of thought
imposed by phallologocentrism.

This practice is critique, since these
conditions, presuming
a universality and self-evident
logic, are necessarily

deligitimized when subjected to such scrutiny and
confronted
with alternate discourses.
"Speak, nevertheless.
Between
us

'hardness'

is not the rule.

We know the contours of our

bodies well enough to appreciate fluidity.
do without the sharp edges of rigidity.

attracted to dead bodies." 66

Our density can

We are not

Cixous poses the longer

range ramifications of the method in this way:
What would become of logocentri sm, of the great
philosophical systems, of world order, if the rock upon
which they founded their church were to crumble? If it
were to come out.
that the logocentric project had
always undeniably existed to found (fund)
phallocentrism, to insure for masculine order a
rationale equal to history itself? Then all the
stories would have to be told differently, the future
would be incalculable, the historical forces would,
will, change hands, bodies, another thinking as yet
unthinkable will transform the functioning of all
.

.

soc iety ^
.

In the transcribed interview entitled "Women's Exile,"

Irigaray introduces us to her critical questioning of
theoretical discourse,

including that of psychoanalysis,

which portrays the female sex as

a

lack,

hole, other,

in
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relation to the male.

This status of female sexuality
in

psychoanalysis is the symptom of a
more general discursive
function.
"Freud's discourse represents the
symptom of a
particular social and cultural economy,
which has been
maintained in the West at least since
68
the Greeks."

The

usefulness (and limit) of Freud and
Lacan is that they
describe the consequences of a soc
io-cultural system which

they then fail to criticize sufficiently.

Lacan'

portrayal of woman as a lack in the discourse
organized
around the phallus as privileged signifier
is,

in an

important sense (and here is where American
feminists have
been too quick to dismiss Freud), not false
at all.

"Can

female sexuality articulate itself, even minimally,
within
an Aristotelian type of logic?

the female,

says Irigaray,

No."

59

The language of

"has nothing to do with the

syntax which we have used for centuries, namely that

constructed according to the following organization:
subject, predicate,

or;

subject,

verb, object.

For female

sexuality is not unifiable, it cannot be subsumed under the

concept of the subject." 70
This female sexuality is precisely what Irigaray seeks
to explore in her creative prose pieces,

"When Our Lips

Speak Together" and "And One Doesn't Stir Without the
Other."

71

"I have tried to find out what the specific

modes of functioning of the female sex and the 'imaginary'

could be."

72

(Italics mine.)

This is where Irigaray is
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most difficult to understand
and most susceptible to
misinterpretation.
It is important to bear in
mind that
she characterizes her project
as one of inventing/exploring
new possible languages rather
than of documenting

pre-f ashioned ones:
C
it?
That We are women from the start.
!2 don't
I
That we
need, to be produced by them, named
by
S C
r profane bv them.
That
°
this
has
al«;«^?; ^dY ha ened without their
labors.
And
t^T/L
t
constitutes the locus of our exile.
It ? s nnVly^l^l
we have our own territory but that
their
~rf
n
nation,
family, home, and discourse imprison
us in
enclosures where we can no longer move—
or live as
pro P ertv is our e ^ile. Their enclosures,
JZ1
the \death of our love.
Their words, the gag upon our
lips. /J
(Italics mine.)

?W

^^

<

~^!^

,

It must be stressed that her mode is one
of deconstruct ion,

rather than naive reconstruction.

For example,

on the prevailing notion that woman has 'no sex'

she plays
(no

phallus), and takes the implication in a new direction,

suggesting that "she does not have

'a

sex'

[rather than

'any sex'], and that her sex is not visible, or

identifiable, or representable in a definite form." 74
(Italics mine.)
lack,

This sexual multiplicity, as opposed to

in turn threatens the genital organization of

heterosexual ity

,

along with a phallic conception of the

subject and of identity:
You are moving. You never stay still.
You never
stay.
You never "are". How can I say you, who are
always other? How can I speak you, who remain in a
flux that never congeals or solidifies? How can this
current pass into words? It is multiple, devoid, of
"causes" and "meanings", simple qualities; yet it is
not decomposable.
These movements can't be described
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as the passage from a beginning
to an end.
These
° n t flow into one, definitive sea; thele

5"r

rivers h
have no permanent banks; this body,
no fixed
e
T 1 " Un easin ^ility, this life.
9
Which
tSv
S
they i?Avn.
might 5
describe
as our restlesness, whims,
nS
r
S
For aJL1 this seeras so strange to
u
r' claim
?
those who
"solidity" as their f oundat ion.

U

?^!

-

.

^

What is understandably confusing for
some is Irigaray'
often direct appropriation of an anatomical
vocabulary to
convey and explore women's language(s).
For example, her
image of two lips to simultaneously describe
women's

discourse and sexuality:
the woman's auto-eroticism is very different
from
that of the man.
The latter needs an instrument to
touch himself:
his hand, the woman's sex, language
Woman, however, is in touch with herself, and in
herself without the necessity of a mediation and prior
to any possible distinction between activity and
passivity. Woman 'touches herself all the time,
moreover without anyone being able to forbid her to do
so, for her sex is made up of two lips which embrace
each other continuously.
Thus, in herself, she is
already two but indivisible into ones which affect,
are affected by, are attached to each other. 76
.

.

.

.

.

.

—

.

—

And yet, she clearly attempts to disengage from an
anatomical interpretation of her method.

"We must go back

to the question not of the anatomy but of the morphology of
the female sex." 77

Her choice of words here is

intriguing, since "morphology" has both a biological and

linguistic definition:

"1:

a branch of biology dealing

with the form and structure of organisms

description of word formation in
Webster)

2:

a language".

a study and

(Merriam-

Invoking an association between language (word)

and structure (organism),

"morphology" also lends itself
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to the image of language
as a living and dynamic
structure;
we also hear the unmistakable
linking up of bodies (biology)

with the symbolic order (words)
in this term.
Pointing out
what others (especially Nietzsche)
have noted, Irigaray
argues that "all Western discourse
presents a certain

isomorphism with the masculine sex:

the privilege of

unity,

form of the self, of the visible,
of the specularizable; of the erection (which is
the becoming in a

form)." 78
If Irigaray is saying that the
structure of language

and thought recapitulates the symbolic
structuring of the

masculine body ("the body" as we think we know it)
and vice
versa,

this is very different from an 'anatomy is
destiny'

formulation of language expressing anatomical 'truth'.

In

other words, Irigaray is far from asserting that raw
or

pre-social sexuality dictates our forms of representation.
(The question of influence, however, seems to remain

open.)

Pre-social, non-structured, non-symbolized

sexuality is better defined as "drive", "desire", or
"instinct".

This is the raw stuff which is channelled,

molded, cut out in definite forms,

repressed and sublimated

as it gains representation (a place)

order.

within the Symbolic

If our knowledge and language of sexuality and

identity invoke anatomical imagery, this imagery itself
(breasts, penis, buttocks,

lips),

our sense of the

anatomical, has already been organized linguistically and
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symbolically.

This,

I

would argue,

is the framework within

which Irigaray ought to be read;
otherwise, she will be
grossly misinterpreted.
On this view, Irigaray'

s

provocative observation that

"the criteria for a valid sexuality
should be the same as
those of a valid discourse, and that
the criteria should be

acceptable for a masculine sexuality," 79
should be viewed
as rooted in the Lacanian notion of
linguistically
structured sexuality and subjectivity.

To say that

Irigaray is addressing the intersection of sexuality
and

representation means that she chooses to focus on
linguistically and socially structured sexual meanings

which are themselves embedded in an imagery of 'the
natural'.

That these meanings are generated primarily in

reference to an Oedipal phallic signifier in relation to

which men and women are situated and hence, defined

differently and that this difference is constituted

hierarchically in relation to the "rule of the father" and
"presence" of the phallus, is the ground which Irigaray

attempts to dislodge.

She does so by introducing the

forbidden and repressed, yet logically implicit notion of
mu ltiple sexualities,

re-evoking the pre-Oedipal

mo ther-daughter relationship,

and using an explicit and

often shocking language of female sexuality and anatomy.
Since conceptions of sexuality and sub jecti vi ty/ identi ty

are integrally bound up within her psychoanalytic
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framework,

it is no accident that the
subject-object

relationship repeatedly crops up in her work.

Contrasting

the phallic conception of this relationship
with its

repressed feminine counter-par t

(

s

)

,

she writes:

We live as two beyond images, mirages,
and mirrors.
Between us, one is not the "real" and the other,
her
lmitaton; one is not the original and the other,
her
copy.
Although we can be perfect dissemblers within
their system, we relate to each other without
simulation.
Our resemblance does without semblances:
in our bodies, already the same.
Touch yourself, touch
me, you'll "see". 80

When she argues that the morphologic of Western discourse
"does not correspond to the female sex," she is situating
herself, appearances to the contrary, within a discourse

that denies women-as-the-f emale-sex access to that singular

and contained sense of identity enjoyed by men, rather than

within "nature" itself.

She then attempts to describe-

always metaphorically and tentatively

— what

such a

morphology of the female sex might be, what sort of

discourse it might entail:
These two lips of the female sex make it once and for
all a return to unity, because they are always at least
two and that one can never determine of these two,
which is one, which is the other: they are continually
interchanging. They are neither identifiable nor
separable one from the other. Besides, instead of that
being the visible or the form which constitutes the
dominant criteria, it is the touch which for the female
sex seems to me primordial:
these two lips are
^~~
always joined in an embrace 8
,

'

'

.

That Irigary uses an anatomical language to express
these thoughts simultaneously throws the phallus-as-

signifier into critical relief as it seeks to defuse the
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classical anatomical and biological
explanations for
women's passivity and inferiority,
by giving this discourse
a

'taste of its own medicine'.

Furthermore,

the explicit

invocation of female sexual imagery
breaks the linguistic
and social taboo against an overly
explicit rendering of
female sexuality, satisfied vicariously
in this culture
through the pornographic industry.
What is also striking
about Irigaray's imagery is that it
seems largely devoid of
the fecundity which is often associated
with
the

feminine.

83

This may be a deliberate attempt on her part

to develop those voices besides the
maternal which is,

after all, the main version of female sexuality
allowed

within the prevailing sexual economy of meaning that
must
insure reproduction (biological and social).
Difference, then,

for Irigaray,

is sexually specific

because language and the symbolic order organize it along
these lines.

Woman is the counter subject; counter-

subjectivity and counter truths are apprehended through

a

relentless searching out of the denied feminines lurking

within and threatening the singular phallic-inspired
logic and identity.

This assault on the unified and

masculine subject is evident in the works of all four
writers under consideration here.

From Kristeva's critical

perusal of "that crafty authority, the ego", to Irigaray's
"How can

I

say you who are always other?", to Cixous's

"contestation of this solidarity of logocentrism and
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Phallocentrism", to Wittig's
explanation of her use of the
split "I" (j/e) in The Lesbian
Body_, this theme is
striking
in its consistent evocation
among writers who disagree
about so many other things. Wittig's
self-conscious
rendition of her own experience as a
writer towards a
language that has written her out and
will only accomodate
her on its masculine terms is instructive:
'I' (Je) as a generic feminine
subject can only enter
by force into a language which is foreign
tolt, the
human not being feminine grammatically
speaking but he
(il) or they (ils).
'I'
Je conceals the sexual
difference of the verbal persons while specifying
them
in verbal interchange.
'I' (j e
obliterates the fact
that elle or elles are submerged in il or ils,
i.e.,
that all the feminine persons are complementary
to the
masculine persons. The feminine 'I' (Je) who is
speaking can fortunately forget this difference and
assume indifferently the masculine language.
But the
'I' (Je) who writes is driven back to her
specific
experience as subject. The 'I' (Je) who writes is
alien to her own writing at every word because this 'I'
(Je) uses a language alien to her.
This 'I' (Je)
experiences what is alien to her. This 'I' (Je) cannot
be 'un ecrivain'.
If, in writing je, I adopt this
language, this je cannot do so.
J/e is the symbol of
the lived, rending experience which is m/y writing, of
this cutting in two which throughout literature is the
exercise of a language which does not constitute m/e as
a subject.
J/e poses the ideological and historical
83
question of feminine subjects
(

)

)

.

.

.

But for all of their similarities on the turf of

criticizing masculine subjectivity and identity, these
writers, once past the critique of singular masculine-

inspired identity, differ enormously on the question of

women and subjectivity.

Wittig has publicly situated

herself in critical opposition to the ecr iture feminine
strain, criticizing it for what she perceives to be an
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uncritical and unmediated appropriation
of a language of
difference and femininity that is
culturally contrived and
useful only for keeping women in
their appointed places
relative to men.
"The women say that they perceive
their
bodies in their entirety. They say
that they do not favor
any of its parts on the grounds that
it was formerly a
forbidden subject. They do not want to
become prisoners of
84
their own ideology."
of the four writers under

consideration here, Wittig is the least inclined
to include
"Woman" in her vocabulary.

in Les Guerilleres and The

Lesbian Body we find references to "women" and
"the women"
only.

And in her dictionary for Lesbian Peoples

,

"woman",

like "wife" is defined as a term that has been:

Obsolete since the beginning of the Glorious Age.
Considered by many companion lovers as the most
infamous designation. This word once applied to beings
fallen in an absolute state of servitude.
Its meaning
was, "one who belongs to another." 85
The abbreviated dictionary version of Wittig'

s

position is

developed more fully in her essay "One is Not Born

a

Woman," where she argues that "woman" and "man" are

political and economic categories, mutually implicated in
each other, and requiring a radical questioning.

"...

women will have to abstract themselves from the definition
'woman'

which is imposed on them."

"'Woman'

confuse us, to hide the reality 'women'."
the categories of sex must be destroyed,

is there to

Of.

Arguing that
she identifies

lesbianism as a concept which transcends these categories,

for "what makes a woman is
a specific social relation
to
man ... a relation which
lesbians escape by refusing to

become or stay heterosexual." 87
Hence, Wittig writes a lesbian-inspired
literature,

whose thematic and scenic trajectory
has increasingly
excluded the presence of men, from L'Opoponax
set within
girls' school and which chronicles the
resistance
,

a

to

feminine socialization, to Les Guerilleres

.

an epic myth of

Amazon-like revolution against the patriarchy,
to Les Corps
Lesbien, a lesbian re-writing of the Song of Songs,
and

Lesbian Peoples;

Materials for a Dictionary

,

in which

there is no entry for "men" and where we find a
playful

recuperation of body, self,

language and history for women

only
The women say, I refuse henceforward to speak this
language, 1 refuse to mumble after them the words lack
of penis lack of money lack of insignia lack of name.
I refuse to pronounce the names of possession
and
non-possesion. They say, If I take over the world, let
it be to dispossess myself of it immediately, let it be
to forge new links between myself and the world. 88

Wittig'

s

literary rendition of her political call for

demystif icat ion of the category "woman" is to produce

a

literary form that is maximally non-susceptible to a
reading in terms of current definitions of womanhood and

gender identity.

Her critique of l'ecriture feminine is

that it falls prey to, and helps reproduce,
it

would seek to destroy.

those meanings

Metaphorically characterizing

her method in Les Guerilleres

,

she writes:

a
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ma eS no raist ^e,
^

turns to the left at

not fall into the snakepit.
Cal

At

this
^ lations

if one

stage of the march

"eg?n agai^f
zero.
If one makes no mistake in
the calculations
if
one bends down at just the right
moment, one win not
be caught
the jaws of the trap.
At this stage of
St interru Pt
calculations
and begin
89
laliTlt
again
at zero. y9
(Italics mine.)

zero^l/onf'T

m

,

In spite of her opposition to
l'ecriture feminine,

Wittig does not stray from the task of
writing the body.
The Lesbian Body is a remarkable, beautiful,
terrifying and
disturbing work.
In it, Wittig seeks to write the whole
body, and a specified lesbian body at that.

The eroticism

of the text is produced by a sensuous descriptive
language

that partakes,

in brief sketches,

of emotional rantings,

strong feelings of attraction and revulsion, violence and
sensuousness, confusingly allied.

feature of the text is Wittig'

s

The most remarkable

journey into the depths,

the interior, of the body:

THE LESBIAN BODY THE JUICE THE
SPITTLE THE SALIVA THE SNOT
THE SWEAT THE TEARS THE WAX
THE URINE THE PEACES THE
EXCREMENTS THE BLOOD THE
LYMPH THE JELLY THE WATER
THE CHYLE THE CHYME THE
HUMOURS THE SECRETIONS THE
PUS THE DISCHARGES THE SUPPURATIONS THE BILE THE JUICES
THE ACIDS THE FLUIDS THE
FLUXES THE FOAM THE SULPHUR
THE UREA THE MILK THE
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ALBUMEN THE OXYGEN THE
FLATULENCE THE POUCHES THE
PARI ETIES THE MEMBRANES THE
PERITONEUM, THE OMENTUM
THE PLAURA THE VAGINA THE
VEINS THE ARTERIES THE VESSELS
THE NERVES 90

Wittig attempts to write
meaning.

a

body unmarked by any economy of

Intestines, eyes, blood vessels,

even those parts

of the body which are not
typical components of erotic or

common discourse (who stops to think
about the ociput?)
become objects of desire. Bodies flow,
intermingle,

penetrate and sometimes violate one another
in nearly
unimaginable and often disturbing ways:
M/y most delectable one I set about eating
you, m/y
tongue moistens the helix of your ear delicately
gliding around, m/y tongue inserts itself
in the
auricle, it touches the antihelix, m/y teeth
seek the
lobe, they begin to gnaw at it, m/y tongue
gets into
your ear canal.
I spit you, I fill you with
saliva.
Having absorbed the external part of your ear I
burst
the tympanum, I feel the rounded hammerbone rolling
between m/y lips, m/y teeth crush it, I find the anvil
and the stirrup-bone, I crunch on them, I forage with
my fingers, I wrench away a bone, I fall on the suberb
cochlea bone and membrane all wrapped round together

...

This prose is unabashedly disturbing, most especially in
its violation of bodily integrity,

even as it partakes of a

powerful erotic dimension.
In contrast to other attempts to write the body,

Wittig

's

approach steers clear of a sentimentalizat ion of

the female body.

This lesbian passion is not the stuff of

an idealized or typical femininity.

hint of a

f eti

It also avoids any

shi zation of body parts,

except in the
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particular moments of particular
passions.

By the end of
the text, no body part is
more privileged than any other,
in clear contrast to Irigaray's
celebration of two lips.
Note too that there are no
mothers in this discourse. But
like Kristeva, Cixous and Irigaray,
Wittig's exploration of
the body provides a marked
contrast to the erotic language
associated with the speculari zable
penis.

What is notably at stake in French
feminisms is the
problem of the subject who is linguistically
structured
within social relations. Each of the French
feminists

presented here partake, in measurable and
significant ways,
of a view of language as a significant
constructor
of

social relations and identity.

Their shared focus on

language bears witness to their common interest
in

criticizing and modifying language as a central feature
of
feminist theorizing and practice.

That all of these

writers turn to a language of the body speaks to their

desperate search for something/anything that might

partially elude existing linguistic structuring.
The question of the extent to which human beings are

constituted by the symbolic orders under, through, and
within which they live is an exceedingly difficult and
important one.
a preeminent and

For those who would tend to grant language

highly constitutive role in social

organization, human relations, and subjective identity,
"difference" can be posed in two slightly different ways.
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The first is what

would call the escape or
marginality

I

thesis, which argues that
women tend to avoid a complete

structuration within the social
order because they are
absent from language and denied
public accessibility and

representation as speaking subjects.

As Cixous has put it,
"There's no room for her if she's
not a he." 92 This

would seem to be Kristeva's position.

The other approach

looks to women's constitution as
the Other within the
symbolic order and then seeks to
deconstruct it. This is
the method which Irigaray develops.
Cixous seems to be

playfully situated between these two, at
times invoking
"the mother

...

who stands up against separation; a force

that will not be cut out but will knock the
wind out of the
codes," at others asserting that "there are
no grounds for

establishing a discourse, but rather an arid millenial
ground to break.

.

.

"

93

with Irigaray and Kristeva,

Cixous celebrates the multiplicity of difference.

The

final option is rendered by Wittig, who would expunge

"difference" altogether as an overloaded term.
For those who would prefer to retain a version of

subjectivity that is not totally constructed by language,

Kristeva seems to provide
establishing
is,

a kind of

a

tangible critical stance by

unpredictable holding pattern.

That

her subject is not entirely constructed within symbolic

discourse.

Her evocation of a semiotic realm establishes

some tangible ground for criticism.

Unfortunately, an
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inescapable side effect of her method
is to cast criticism
in a perpetual stance of
negativity.
"Woman" is
interesting for Kristeva precisely
because of her critical
negative impact on a symbolic order
that must deny her.
Within this formulation "Woman as such"
is a means for
cultural criticism rather than an end in
herself. A clear
implication of Kristeva'

s

work is that feminism will only

remain critical so long as it remains on the
margins.
This, of course,

raises serious problems for those

feminists who envision concrete changes and
improvements
for women as being of urgent importance.

negativity, some might argue,

Perpetual

is an unaffordable luxury for

those who have been on the margins long enough,

for those

women who are poor, sexually and physically and mentally
abused,

for those who are politically disenfranchised.

If Kristeva wants to invoke a language of masculine/

feminine difference to promote critique, but nonetheless

avoids their reification within an instituted discourse,

Irigaray and Cixous,

focussing more directly and

unabashedly on female experience and imagery, seem less
fearful of positively invoking those categories which have

been used against women.

They are willing to play

difference out for all that it is worth.

While their

deconstruct ive method has yielded rich insights,

it could

be criticized for taking too much from the symbolic order.
A more important critique of their ultrasexual i zed language
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is that it reproduces
the tendency within modern
culture,

brought^to critical light by
Foucault, of equating sex with
truth.
on this view, those who
think they have found
something fundamental when they
dig it out of repressed or
forbidden terrain are actually
playing right
in to the

prevailing construction of truth.

In defense of Irigaray

and Cixous, we should note that
they deliberately situate
themselves against any singular
definition of sex, that
they stress the multiplicity of
sexualities and
'truths-

suggested by women's repressed erotic.
In a different key, Wittig,

echoing Marx's youthful

call for a "relentless criticism of
everything", would have
us dispense with difference altogether.
Her argument that
we must repudiate the category "woman"
overemphasizes the

closed hegemony of language, while the presumption
that we
can do so ignores this power. Less ambitious
than Wittig
in this sense,

the deconstruct ive methods of Irigaray and

Cixous grant language a significant power, but do not
view
it as a thoroughly closed system of meaning.

is where we are situated,

If language

they might say, this is where we

must struggle to articulate counter-truths and alternate

meanings
"Difference" has been stretched to the limits of its

critical applications and implications by these French
feminists, who provide a wealth of indications concerning

the rich suggesti veness of the theme, along with a host of
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problems engendered by its
explicit use.
promise in raising the question

For all of its

of "who is speaking" in

terms that move beyond content
to the very organization and
form of language, the problems
associated with "difference"

cannot be denied.

They include:

the problem of accounting

for the critical consciousness
of women;

the question of

whether "difference" may in fact
recapitulate too much of
the old thinking to get beyond it;
and the question of
whether "woman" is useful or adequate for
getting at the
diverse experiences of women divided in
cultural, economic,
racial and economic terms.
it

is clear that "woman"

In the United States,

at least,

functions all too often as a

premature and even racist term, one that has substituted

a

white female for a masculine stance. 95
Time, practice, and further dialogue will help to

clarify the issues at stake.

With careful handling,

"difference" offers the possibility of as yet unarticulated, but potential alternatives to predominant conceptions

of politics.

It suggests that these alternatives might be

rendered visible through a sustained focus on female
experiences.

And it provides intimations of a critical

method for those of us engaged with male- identi f ied and

-dominated discourses.
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